Battle of Lesnaya
Battle of Lesnaya | |||||||
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Part of the Swedish invasion of Russia | |||||||
Battle of Lesnaya by Nicolas IV Larmessin | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Swedish Empire | Tsardom of Russia | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt Berndt Otto Stackelberg | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
12,500 men:[1] 8,000 infantry 2,500 dragoons 2,000 cavalry 16 cannons Lesnaya (9,700):[2] 6,850 initially 2,806 men later arrived as reinforcements Propoisk (2,800):[3] 800 men in the vanguard 2,000 men or more protecting the supplies |
26,500–29,000 men:[a] 11,340 infantry 12,768 dragoons 2,500–5,000 irregulars 30 cannons, 60 mortars Lesnaya (19,000–21,000):[2] 15,000–17,000 initially 4,076 dragoons later arrived as reinforcements Propoisk (1,400–1,900):[2] 900 dragoons 500–1,000 irregulars On the march (6,191):[4] Werden's infantry arrived late or just after the battle | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
3,000[5]–3,873:[6] 1,000–2,000 killed 1,000–2,000 wounded In total (October 9–11):[7] About 4,000 killed, captured and dispersed ...other estimates |
Around 7,000:[8] 3,000 killed 4,000 wounded ...other estimates | ||||||
The Battle of Lesnaya (
Peter I intercepted Lewenhaupt's column before it reached the safety of
Background
In 1700
Denmark–Norway was quickly knocked out of the war by a bold Swedish
In 1705 the two sides prepared for a final confrontation in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russians intervened with full force in order to put Augustus back on the throne. After the battles of Gemauerthof, Warsaw, Grodno and Fraustadt the campaign was decided in favor of the Swedes who chased their enemies out of Poland in 1706 and subsequently invaded Saxony, where Augustus saw himself defeated and forced to make peace.[9]: 16–19 Seeing how only one major threat remained, the Swedes decided to invade Russia in 1707.[9]: 19–22 After some time of fighting against the Russians under Peter I, the Swedish king soon called upon reinforcements from Livonia where Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt was acting Commander-in-chief.[9]: 102
Prelude
In early April 1708, the governor of
In May same year, Lewenhaupt returned to Riga in order to complete the task, which proved far from easy. The near lands had suffered many campaigns in the years of the Great Northern War and so much was drained of needed resources. In early June, the column—of which Lewenhaupt was gathering—was ordered to start campaigning to reach Charles XII in Mogilev, according to schedule. However, the convoy was nowhere ready to leave because of the difficulties assembling it. Only in the beginning of July it was ready, having then suffered three to four weeks behind the schedule[9]: 102–105 and a significant shortage of men as 20,000 men were expected, but only 13,000 soldiers proved able to march.[10]: 22
Lewenhaupt's convoy
The march turned out slower than expected, torrential rain turned the roads into mud, streams became over flooded which turned out to be a major task to cross and so, unfortunately for Lewenhaupt and Charles, the expected time of arrival kept moving back. However, after several weeks of waiting and no words heard from Lewenhaupt, there was a twist to the plans as Charles found his position in Mogilev unsustainable and instead on September 26, decided to abandon his camps and march
Peter I, who overestimated the Swedish force being 16,000 men strong, had gathered numbers far superior to those of Lewenhaupt and was eager to catch his convoy while it was still out of reach of Charles' main army and safety.
The next morning, Lewenhaupt, who during this time stayed with his
Battle
On October 9, the Russians gathered all their available forces to attack the Swedes in the rear as they were crossing the stream of Lesnjanka at the village of
Opposing forces
The Swedish army was commanded by
The Russian army was commanded by
Russian attack at the Middlefield
Peter I initially split his 13,000 men into two
Around 11:00, the battle began. Peter I's column under Menshikov had reached the Middlefield from the north-west, finding the 900 Swedes deployed there. Unfortunately for Menshikov, the commander of the heavily outnumbered Swedish outpost,
Meanwhile, Tsar Peter's right column had reached the Crossroads and traversed the marshes of Krivl, just south of the Middlefield, close to where Menshikov's column had been in action. Having Peter to their left flank and Menshikov to the front, Stackelberg's five Swedish battalions were now fighting two Russian columns numbering 13,000 in all. Six other Swedish battalions were on their way to the battle zone. The Russians at the Crossroads under Peter were almost routed by the Swedes and could have faced a crushing defeat, had not the Russian Guards halted their advance. The fighting at the Crossroads surged back and forth. The Russian line was strengthened by six artillery pieces. However, the Swedes who themselves had no artillery in this particular fight, were able to capture four of them and block Peter's progress at the Krivl bridge.[10]: 147–155
Facing the Swedish right flank at the Middlefield, Menshikov's guardsmen then executed a successful flanking maneuver, forcing the five Swedish battalions to retreat into the southern fringe of the forest and prepare to receive the expected Russian onslaught. Their departure left unguarded a bridge near the Crossroads, leaving it clear for Russian troops to march out and form up en masse. Thus trapped in a "pincer movement", hemmed in and outnumbered, Stackelberg—against the wishes of Lewenhaupt—ordered an orderly withdrawal. The six Swedish battalions which were yet to arrive on their march through the forest, were also ordered to retreat, an action which isolated and exposed Hälsinge's second battalion which had previously routed the Russians and now came close to being annihilated by them.[10]: 147–155
Lewenhaupt (who sought to gather his
Tsar Peter with his Russian infantry and dragoons had now pushed away the last retreating Swedes and had full control over the southern forest edge. The Russians now strove to reach the Lesnaya field between the forest and the village of Lesnaya, to block the bridge over which the Swedes might obtain further reinforcements. (A company of 1,000 cavalry had already managed to get back to assist in the fight at Lesnaya.) A Swedish counter-offensive to push the Russians out of the forest was now ordered by Lewenhaupt, who had been very disappointed by Stackelberg's decision to retreat. The Swedes counterattacked with the support of 16 artillery pieces from Lesnaya. However the Russian troops, backed by their own 30 cannons, were too strong and the Swedes had to fall back.[10]: 156–166
Fighting at Lesnaya
The Swedes retreated almost to the village of Lesnaya and the Russians followed them to the adjacent open terrain, intending to launch a decisive attack from there. However, both sides being exhausted by the day's intense combat, hostilities were ceased at about 15:00 when, separated by only 150–200 meters, the two sides sank down on the field, facing each other, and rested. During this extraordinary interlude, in which only three Russian cannons sounded off, the two armies distributed food, water and ammunition to their ranks, issued orders and deployed reinforcements in preparation for the final conflict. Somehow during this remarkable phase, the Russian General Friedrich von Hessen-Darmstadt was shot and mortally wounded as he rode back and forth in a provocative manner between the two armies. He died of his wounds four days later. The hour-long pause concluded at about 16:00, with the arrival, after a long march, of Bauer's company of 4,000 Russian dragoons.[10]: 167–170
At a little past 16:00, the Swedes opened fire, with cannons positioned 600 meters from the southern forest edge, on the newly arrived dragoons, who were then attaching themselves to the Russians' left flank. The Russian dragoons under Bauer then—without awaiting orders from Peter I—charged against the Swedes, supported by most of the other Russian troops. The open terrain gave the Swedish army opportunity to closely coordinate its infantry and cavalry, an advantage which they gratefully seized. Repeatedly, Russian front line troops retreated from infantry Gå–På shock attacks only to find themselves under immediate attack from the rear by Swedish cavalry.[10]: 170–180 However, this could only be a temporary advantage in view of the Russian reserve strength, reportedly three battalions deep by this time, enabling an irresistible grinding advance.[10]: 167–170
The Russian right flank under
Aftermath
For a few hours the Swedes remained in their positions in case of a renewed attack and to convince the Russians that they intended to stay. Subsequently, Lewenhaupt decided to withdraw his army under the cover of the darkness[15]: 50 and continue on his march against Propoisk. One major reason for this decision is said to have been a report coming from a captured Russian officer speaking about recent Russian reinforcements consisting of up to 10,000 men[10]: 183 referring to the more than 6,000 strong infantry division under Nikolai Grigorovitj von Werden.[4]: 193 Each unit slowly made its way across the stream as they were covered by the remaining units. During this progress, a number of wagons broke and partially blocked the road where the Swedish artillery was moving down, so it was decided a number of these would be sunk in the mud (to prevent them falling in Russian hands) as they were hard bringing in the rapid march. Having successfully crossed the stream with all his troops, Lewenhaupt continued towards Propoisk. However, this withdrawal was the beginning of the end for a large part of his army.[9]: 116
Swedish disaster
Despite the difficult condition, having men lost in the woods during the march, the Swedes reached Propoisk, only to find that the town and bridge had been burned down. This was most likely done by Bauer's detachment as they were still blocking the crossing. By now the Swedish army was disintegrating into a mob as fear grew,[15]: 50 possibly of being trapped between Peter's army behind them and Bauer's detachment. There were also no suited material for building a bridge. The Swedes saw the risk in having the Russian army pursue them from behind and so Lewenhaupt decided that everything that could be carried be taken from the wagons, subsequently all wagons but a few, were burned and the bulk of the essential supplies within.[10]: 202 This resulted in that a large part of the army took the opportunity to get drunk[15]: 50 and so was left for the enemy to catch, others decided that they were better off surrendering or try to reach home by themselves.[9]: 117 The Swedes mustered about 3,451 infantry and 3,052 cavalry at Propoisk who were in good condition to fight.[10]: 202 Lewenhaupt decided that all the combatants would be mounted on the remaining horses to increase the speed of the march. Between 1,000 and 1,500 wounded and sick soldiers were left at Propoisk as these seemed unable to follow the pace Lewenhaupt now made in order to reach the main army.[10]: 198 The rest were missing, perhaps as many as 4,000 men.[12]: 290 The next morning the Russians caught up with the soldiers at Propoisk which had now increased to 3,000 men as more stragglers had joined its defenses. The Russians demanded their surrender, however as the Swedes refused and instead answered with musket fire, they soon assaulted the town. After an hour or so long defense, the Russians gained the upper hand and pushed the Swedes out of the town, further to the river of Soz, where they could escape the onslaught.[10]: 201–202 The Russians were content with this and proceeded to round up any deserters they could find, however, they did not attempt to confront the main body of Lewenhaupt's army as they were allowed to withdraw unmolested.[9]: 117
The following day Lewenhaupt found a crossing over the river
Modern look
Lesnaya is often seen as the first great Russian victory of the war and the first indication of the final result of the
The two sides were in fact not equal in numbers, they only appear so in many accounts because the numbers given usually only count the initial Russian forces under the Tsar without taking in account the irregulars that accompanied the force or the later arrival of Bauer's command. Sometimes the Swedish units are also assumed to have been at full strength at the battle. Also while the initial Russian forces were about the same strength as the whole Swedish army, they did not all participate in the fighting. The Russians, in fact enjoyed a considerable numerical advantage in all stages of the battle, yet they had not been able to defeat their enemy. Similarly the Swedes were greatly constrained during the battle by the need to protect the vital wagons and their supplies.[9]: 119–120
Casualties
The estimated number of casualties sustained by both sides during the battle varies widely, depending on the source.
Swedish casualties, according to General Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt, numbered not much more than 1,000 men during the battle itself, with a total of 1,674 dead and captured in the battle and on the road towards Propoisk. Overall, he claims, the casualties could not exceed 3,000 men in the battle and the following days (with the events at Propoisk), however, these figures are regarded as questionable and too low, according to the Swedish and Russian writers Einar Lyth and Pavel Konovalchuk. According to Lewenhaupt's Lieutenant, Friedrich Christoph von Weihe, the Swedish losses in killed amounted to 2,000 men in the battle along with a number of captured. In total, Weihe estimates that there were 3,800 Swedish casualties in the battle and in the following days. Robert Petre, a second-lieutenant in the Swedish army and veteran soldier in the Hälsinge Regiment, however, puts the total Swedish casualties at 4,549 men. According to the Russian official description regarding the Swedish casualties, 8,000 were killed on the battlefield and a total of 3,500 captured soon thereafter,[10]: 231–233 other sources claim 6,700 Swedes killed and wounded in the battle and another 5,000 in the pursuit,[8]: 277–278 numbers which are proven unrealistic and impossible in regards to the initial strength of the army.[10]: 231–233
Later attempts have been made by authors trying to calculate the Swedish casualties using the initial strength of the force as basis. Lewenhaupt said there were less than 10,914 men present under his command, Weihe and Petre in turn claimed there were 11,450 and 12,950 men, respectively, at the beginning of the march from
Einar Lyth and Pavel Konovalchuk make an estimation calculated out of these numbers in their book "Vägen till Poltava. Slaget vid Lesnaja 1708 (The road to Poltava. The battle of Lesnaya 1708)" using the initial strength presented by Petre of 13,000 men, which concludes up to 4,000 Swedes killed, captured or dispersed in total, during the battle and the days after and no more than 2,500 men killed or captured in the battle itself. Using the same calculation on the number of 12,500 Swedes presented by Dorrell, the total losses would amount to 3,500 men and 2,000 in the battle and on the road towards Propoisk (similar estimation to that of Weihe), applying a rough estimation of 1,000–1,500 wounded to this number, representing the large numbers of wounded left at Propoisk and the ones being wounded while marching back towards Sweden, there's a possibility that the Swedes suffered 3,000–3,500 men dead, wounded and captured in the battle alone.[10]: 231–233 Another estimation is made by the Russian historian Vladimir A. Artamonov in his book "The Dawn of the Poltava Victory: The Battle of Lesnaya", where the author estimates the Swedish casualties at 3,873 dead and wounded in the battle and another 877 captured afterwards, totaling losses of 4,750 Swedish soldiers, also here, using Petre's number of 12,950 Swedish soldiers as the basis for the calculation.[14]
Russian casualties, according to Russian official claims, amounted to about 1,111 dead and another 2,856 wounded in the battle, figures which are disputed as "incomplete and contradictory", according to the Russian and Swedish writers Pavel Konovalchuk and Einar Lyth.[10]: 231–233 Alexander Gordon, an officer of Scottish descent who served with the Russian army during the war, wrote a book on the history of Peter the Great, in which he puts the Russian casualties at about 3,000 killed and 4,000 wounded.[8]: 277–278
Swedish official reports declared that more than 20,000 Russians died in the battle, which is considered to be a highly unlikely number by most authors. Lewenhaupt initially estimated more than 6,000 dead and wounded Russians during the battle, but later increased that number to 9,000 dead and wounded, claiming that this estimate was reported to him by Russian officers, while he was in captivity in Moscow.[10]: 229–235 Artamonov questions the reliability of this claim.[14] Another Swedish source, Gustaf Adlerfelt, a court historian of Charles XII, declared that the Russians lost 6,000 men killed and many more wounded, referring to the "confession" of a captured Russian Adjutant-General named Schultz.[18]
Notes
- ^ Estimation using Dorrell's numbers of Peter's 15,000–17,000 men, Bauer's 5,500–6,000 men (20,500–23,000), with Artamonov's estimation of 6,200 infantry (26,700–29,200) under Werden.
- ^ 29th September in the Swedish calendar
- ^ Robert K. Massie. Peter the Great: His Life and World. Ballantine Books, 1981. p. 452
- ^ a b c The Dawn of the Tsarist Empire: Poltava & the Russian Campaigns of 1708–1709, Dorrell, Nicholas. Partizan Press (2009). pp. 105–108
- ^ Peter From, Katastrofen vid Poltava. Lund (2007). pp. 104–111
- ^ a b Artamonov V. The Mother of the Poltava Victory: the Battle of Lesnaya. Saint Petersburg. (2008). p. 193
- ^ Timothy C. Dowling, Russia at War: From the Mongol conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and beyond. California (2015). p. 481
- ^ В. А. Артамонов. Заря Полтавской победы – битва при Лесной.
- ^ Konovaltjuk & Lyth, Pavel & Einar (2009). Vägen till Poltava. Slaget vid Lesnaja 1708 (in Swedish). Svenskt Militärhistorisk Biblioteks Förlag. p. 233
- ^ a b c d Gordon A. The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia: To which is Prefixed a Short General History of the Country from the Rise of that Monarchy: and an Account of the Author's Life, Volume 1. Aberdeen. 1755. pp. 277–278
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac Nicholas Dorrell (2009)
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao Konovaltjuk & Lyth (2009)
- ^ Peter From, Katastrofen vid Poltava. Lund (2007)
- ^ a b Lars Ericson (2003)
- ^ a b Bespalov A. Battles of the Great Northern War. M.: Reiter. (2005)
- ^ a b c d Artamonov V. The Mother of the Poltava Victory: the Battle of Lesnaya. Saint Petersburg. 2008
- ^ ISBN 9781780764764
- ISBN 9781851096671
- ^ Frost, Robert I (2000), The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe 1558–1721. Longman.
- ^ Adlerfeld G. The Military History of Charles XII, King of Sweden, Volume 3. P. 58
Literature
- Konovaltjuk & Lyth, Pavel & Einar (2009). Vägen till Poltava. Slaget vid Lesnaja 1708 (in Swedish). Svenskt Militärhistorisk Biblioteks Förlag. ISBN 978-91-85789-14-6.
- Dorrell, Nicholas. The Dawn of the Tsarist Empire: Poltava & the Russian Campaigns of 1708–1709, Partizan Press (2009)
- History of the Art of War – История военного искусства / Под общ. ред П.Д. Ротмистрова. – М., 1963. – T.I. – С. 132–135.
- History of the Northern War – История Северной войны. 1700–1721. / Отв. ред. И.И. Ростунов. – М., 1987. С. 73–76.
- The Book of Mars or of Affairs of War – Книга Марсова или воинских дел. – Изд.2. – СПб., 1766.
- Kresnovsky's History of the Russian Army, from Narva to Paris: 1700–1814 – Кресновский А.А. История русской армии: В 4-х т. – М., 1992. – T.I. От Нарвы до Парижа 1700–1814. – С. 35–36.
- Letters and papers by Emperor Peter the Great – Письма и бумаги императора Петра Великого. – Т.5. – СПб., 1907.
- Soviet War Encyclopaedia – Советская военная энциклопедия: В 8-й т. / Гл. ред. комис. Н.В. Огарков (пред.) и др. – М., 1977. – Т.4. – С. 624.
- Strokov's History of the Art of War – Строков А.А. История военного искусства. – М., 1955. – T.I. – С. 496.