China brain
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In the
Early versions of this scenario were put forward in 1961 by Anatoly Dneprov,[1][2][3] in 1974 by Lawrence Davis,[4] and again in 1978 by Ned Block.[5] Block argues that the China brain would not have a mind, whereas Daniel Dennett argues that it would.[6] The China brain problem is a special case of the more general problem whether minds could exist within other, larger minds.[7]
The
Background
Many theories of
The thought experiment
Suppose that the whole nation of China were reordered to simulate the workings of a single brain (that is, to act as a mind according to functionalism). Each Chinese person acts as (say) a neuron, and communicates by special two-way radio in corresponding way to the other people. The current mental state of the China brain is displayed on satellites that may be seen from anywhere in China. The China brain would then be connected via radio to a body, one that provides the sensory inputs and behavioral outputs of the China brain.
Thus, the China brain possesses all the elements of a functional description of mind: sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and internal mental states causally connected to other mental states. If the nation of China can be made to act in this way, then, according to functionalism, this system would have a
Consciousness
The China brain argues that consciousness is a problem for functionalism. Block's Chinese nation presents a version of what is known as the absent qualia objection to functionalism because it purports to show that it is possible for something to be functionally equivalent to a human being and yet have no conscious experience. A creature that functions like a human being but doesn't feel anything is known as a "philosophical zombie". So the absent qualia objection to functionalism could also be called the "zombie objection".
Criticisms
Some philosophers, like Daniel Dennett, have concluded that the China brain does create a mental state.[6] Functionalist philosophers of mind endorse the idea that something like the China brain can realise a mind, and that neurons are, in principle, not the only material that can create a mental state.[9]
See also
- Alan Turing
- Behaviorism
- Blockhead argument
- David Chalmers
- Dualism
- Eliminative materialism
- Emergent phenomena
- Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
- Hilary Putnam
- Neutral monism
- Property dualism
- Systems theory
References
- ^ a b Dneprov, Anatoly (1961). "The Game" (PDF). Knowledge—Power (in Russian). 1961 (5): 39–41.
- ^ a b Vadim Vasiliev, Dmitry Volkov, Robert Howell (15 June 2018). "A Russian Chinese Room story antedating Searle's 1980 discussion". hardproblem.ru. Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies. Retrieved 13 July 2021.
A. Dneprov: "The Game" (originally published in 1961)
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ a b Dneprov, Anatoly (1985). "The Game (1961)". The Clay God. Stories and Short Stories. Series "Galaxy" (in Bulgarian). Vol. 66. Varna: Georgi Bakalov.
- ^ David Cole (2009). "Section 2.3 The Chinese Nation". The Chinese Room Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Ned Block (1978). "Troubles with functionalism". Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 9: 261–325. Archived from the original on 2011-09-27. Retrieved 2011-06-23.
- ^ a b Daniel Dennett (1991). "Chapter 14. Consciousness Imagined". Consciousness Explained. Back Bay Books. pp. 431–455.
- Zbl 1390.81001.
- S2CID 55303721.
- ^ Edward Feser (2006). "The "Chinese nation" argument". Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide. Oxford: Oneworld. pp. 89–93.