Cosmological argument

In the

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna (the Proof of the Truthful) and Maimonides to formulate one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument.^[16][17] His conception of the first cause was the idea that the universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is 'that which we call God':^[16]

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Importantly, Aquinas's Five Ways, given the second question of his Summa Theologica, are not the entirety of Aquinas's demonstration that the Christian God exists. The Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas's Treatise on the Divine Nature.

A regress is a series of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference. Depending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of

• Impossibility:
  actual infinities existing in reality. Accordingly, it may be argued that an infinite causal or temporal regress cannot occur in the real world.^[20]
• Implausibility: The regress contradicts empirical evidence (e.g. for the finitude of the past) or basic principles such as Occam's razor.^[23]
• Explanatory failure: A failure of explanatory goals resulting in an infinite regress of explanations. This may arise in the case of logical fallacies such as begging the question or from an attempt to investigate causes concerning origins or fundamental principles.^[24]

Aquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle's Physics (8.5) that a series of causes may either be accidental or essential,^[25][26] though the designation of this terminology would follow later under John Duns Scotus at the turn of the 14th century.^[27]

In an accidentally ordered series of causes, earlier members need not continue exerting causal activity (having done so to propagate the chain) for the series to continue. For example, in a generational line, ancestors need no longer exist for their offspring to continue the sequence of descent. In an essential series, prior members must maintain causal interrelationship for the series to continue: If a hand grips a stick that moves a rock along the ground, the rock would stop motion once the hand or stick ceases to exist.^[28]

Based upon this distinction Frederick Copleston (1907–1994) characterises two types of causation: Causes in fieri, which cause an effect's becoming, or coming into existence, and causes in esse, which causally sustain an effect, in being, once it exists.^[29]

Two specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument:^[28]

• A first cause is essential: Later members exercise no independent causal power in continuing the series. In the example illustrated above, the rock derives its causal power essentially from the stick, which derives its causal power essentially from the hand.
• All members in the causal series must exist simultaneously in time, or timelessly.

Thomistic philosopher, R. P. Phillips comments on the characteristics of essential ordering:^[30]

"Each member of the series of causes possesses being solely by virtue of the actual present operation of a superior cause ... Life is dependent inter alia on a certain atmospheric pressure, this again on the continual operation of physical forces, whose being and operation depends on the position of the earth in the solar system, which itself must endure relatively unchanged, a state of being which can only be continuously produced by a definite—if unknown—constitution of the material universe. This constitution, however, cannot be its own cause ... We are thus irresistibly led to posit a first efficient cause which, while itself uncaused, shall impart causality to a whole series."

In the

Aquinas's argument from contingency is formulated as the Third Way (Q2, A3) in the Summa Theologica. It may be expressed as follows:^[16]

1. There exist contingent things, for which non-existence is possible.
2. It is impossible for contingent things to always exist, so at some time they did not exist.
3. Therefore, if all things are contingent, then nothing would exist now.
4. There exists something rather than nothing.

He concludes thereupon that contingent beings are an insufficient explanation for the existence of other contingent beings. Furthermore, that there must exist a

5. Therefore, there exists a necessary being.
6. It is possible that a necessary being has a cause of its necessity in another necessary being.
7. The derivation of necessity between beings cannot regress to infinity (being an essentially ordered causal series).
8. Therefore, there exists a being that is necessary of itself, from which all necessity derives.
9. That being is whom everyone calls God.

In 1714, German philosopher

Alexander Pruss formulates the argument as follows:^[33]

1. Every contingent fact has an explanation.
2. There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
3. Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
4. This explanation must involve a necessary being.
5. This necessary being is God.

Premise 1 expresses the principle of sufficient reason. In premise 2, Leibniz proposes the existence of a logical conjunction of all contingent facts, referred to in later literature as the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF), representing the sum total of contingent reality.^[34] Premise 3 applies the principle of sufficient reason to the BCCF, given that it too, as a contingency, has a sufficient explanation. It follows, in statement 4, that the explanation of the BCCF must be necessary, not contingent, given that the BCCF incorporates all contingent facts. Statement 5 proposes that the necessary being explaining the totality of contingent facts is God.

Philosophers Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly have argued in defence of the inference from statement 4 to statement 5.^[35][36]

At the turn of the 14th century, medieval Christian theologian

1. Each member in an accidentally ordered series (except a possible first) exists via causal activity of a prior member.
2. That causal activity is exercised by virtue of a certain form.
3. Therefore, that form is required by each member to effect causation.
4. The form itself is not a member of the series.
5. Therefore [c,d], accidentally ordered causes cannot exist without higher-order (essentially ordered) causes.

6. An essentially ordered causal series cannot regress to infinity.
7. Therefore [4,5,6], there exists a first agent.

Scotus affirms, in premise 5, that an accidentally ordered series of causes is impossible without higher-order laws and processes that govern the basic principles of accidental causation, which he characterises as essentially ordered causes.^[38]

Premise 6 continues, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the Second Way and Third Way, that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot be an infinite regress.^[39] On this, Scotus posits that, if it is merely possible that a first agent exists, then it is necessarily true that a first agent exists, given that the non-existence of a first agent entails the impossibility of its own existence (by virtue of being a first cause in the chain).^[27] He argues further that it is not impossible for a being to exist that is causeless by virtue of ontological perfection.^[40]

With the formulation of this argument, Scotus establishes the first component of his 'triple primacy': The characterisation of a being that is first in

The Kalam cosmological argument's central thesis is the impossibility of an infinite

4. If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans (without) the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.
5. Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.

For scientific evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig refers to the

Craig remarks upon the theological implications that follow from the conclusion of the argument:^[47]

"... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

Objections to the cosmological argument may question why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Critics contend that the concept of a first cause qualifies as special pleading, or that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why there should be a first cause at all.^[48] Defenders maintain that this question is addressed by various formulations of the cosmological argument, emphasizing that none of its major iterations rests on the premise that everything requires a cause.^[49]

Andrew Loke refers to the Kalam cosmological argument, in which the causal premise ("whatever begins to exist has a cause") stipulates that only things which begin to exist require a cause.^[50] William Lane Craig asserts that—even if one posits a plurality of causes for the existence of the universe—a first uncaused cause is necessary, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which he argues is impossible.^[4][1] Similarly, Edward Feser proposes, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the Second Way, that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be theoretically possible for accidentally ordered causes to do so.^[51]

Various arguments have been presented to demonstrate the metaphysical impossibility of an actually infinite regress occurring in the

Whereas J. L. Mackie argues that cause and effect cannot be extrapolated to the origins of the universe based upon our inductive experiences and intellectual preferences,^[55] Craig proposes that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist".^[56]

Secular philosophers such as Michael Martin argue that a cosmological argument may establish the existence of a first cause, but falls short of identifying that cause as personal, or as God as defined within classical or other specific conceptions of theism.^[57][1]

Defenders of the argument note that most formulations, such as by Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Craig, employ conceptual analysis to establish the identity of the cause. In Aquinas's Summa Theologica, the Prima Pars (First Part) is devoted predominantly to establishing the attributes of the cause, such as uniqueness, perfection and intelligence.^[58] In Scotus's Ordinatio, his metaphysical argument is the first component of the 'triple primacy' through which he characterises the first cause as a being with the attributes of maximal excellence.^[27]

In the topic of cosmic origins and the standard model of cosmology, the initial singularity of the Big Bang is postulated to be the point at which space and time, as well as all matter and energy, came into existence.^[59] J. Richard Gott and James E. Gunn assert that the question of "What was there before the Universe?" makes no sense and that the concept of before becomes meaningless when considering a timeless state. They add that questioning what occurred before the Big Bang is akin to questioning what is north of the North Pole.^[59]

Craig refers to

William L. Rowe characterises the Hume-Edwards principle, referring to arguments presented by David Hume, and later Paul Edwards, in their criticisms of the cosmological argument:^[63]

"If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained."

The principle stipulates that a causal series—even one that regresses to infinity—requires no explanatory causes beyond those that are members within that series. If every member of a series has a causal explanation within the sequence, the series in itself is explanatorily complete.^[63] Thus, it rejects arguments, such as by Duns Scotus, for the existence of higher-order, efficient causes that govern the basic principles of material causation.^[27] Notably, it contradicts Hume's own Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in which the character Demea reflects that, even if a succession of causes is infinite, the very existence of the chain still requires a cause.^[64][65]

Some objections to the cosmological argument refer to the possibility of loops in the structure of cause and effect that would avoid the need for a first cause. Gott and Li refer to the curvature of spacetime and closed timelike curves as possible mechanisms by which the universe may bring about its own existence.^[66] Richard Hanley contends that causal loops are neither logically nor physically impossible, remarking: "[In timed systems] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them."^[67]

Andrew Loke argues that there is insufficient evidence to postulate a causal loop of the type that would avoid a first cause. He proposes that such a mechanism would suffer from the problem of vicious circularity, rendering it metaphysically impossible.^[68]