Einsatzgruppe Serbia

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Einsatzgruppe Serbia was a grouping of the German Schutzstaffel

Einsatzgruppe Serbia (EG Serbia), initially named Einsatzgruppe Yugoslavia (EG Yugoslavia), was a German Schutzstaffel (SS) grouping in the German-occupied territory of Serbia during World War II. Directly responsible to the Reich Security Main Office (German: Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) in Berlin, EG Serbia consisted of representatives of the various offices (German: Ämter) of the RSHA, particularly Amt IV – the Gestapo (Secret State Police), Amt V – the Kriminalpolizei (Criminal Police, or Kripo), and Amt VI – the Ausland-Sicherheitsdienst (Foreign Intelligence Service, or Ausland-SD). It also controlled the 64th Reserve Police Battalion of the Ordnungspolizei (Order Police, Orpo).[1] While formally responsible to the Military Commander in Serbia via the head of the administrative branch of the military headquarters of the occupied territory, the chief of EG Serbia reported directly to his superiors in Berlin.[2]

Background

Pre-war activities in Yugoslavia

In 1936, the chief of the Belgrade General Police,

Communist Party of Yugoslavia since it was banned in 1920.[4] At the conference, Jovanović supported the motion of the Polish delegates to extend the activities of the International Criminal Police Commission to cooperation against international communism. He also supported the candidature of the director of the German Gestapo, Reinhard Heydrich, to be president of the commission, and had discussions with Gestapo officials about the fight against international communism. In January 1937, Jovanović again travelled to Berlin, this time with Milan Aćimović, the Belgrade City Administrator, who was also a confidant of the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Milan Stojadinović. The two Yugoslavs met with Reichsführer-SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Heinrich Himmler, and Heydrich, and agreed on cooperation and the exchange of police liaison officers between Yugoslavia and Germany.[3]

In early January 1938, SS-Sturmbannführer (SS-Major) Hans Helm was appointed as a police attaché to the German diplomatic mission in Belgrade. Helm was a protege of the senior Gestapo official, Heinrich Müller, and his appointment to the position was encouraged by Jovanović and Aćimović, whom he had met when they visited Berlin. The German ambassador, Viktor von Heeren, was a former member of the diplomatic corps of the pre-Nazi Weimar Republic, and was wary of Helm and his role, and concerned about what impact the Gestapo official would have on Germany's relationship with the Stojadinović government. In December 1938, Aćimović was appointed as Minister of the Interior in the Stojadinović cabinet, but in early February of the following year, Stojadinović fell from power, and Aćimović also lost his portfolio. At the same time, Jovanović was transferred to an advisory role in the Ministry of the Interior. However, both men maintained their contact with Helm, with Jovanović allegedly permitting a secret German Abwehr (military intelligence) radio to be installed in his home. Helm maintained contact with several Germanophile officials within the Belgrade City Administration, including a White émigré Russian, Nikolaj Gubarev, an agent with the anti-communist Section IV of the Belgrade General Police. Helm cultivated Gubarev as an informant, part of an intelligence network he established throughout the country to collect political and military information, including information about British and French intelligence services operating in Yugoslavia. Helm's connection to Gubarev was known by the intelligence staff of the Supreme Command of the Royal Yugoslav Army, and as a result, in late 1939, Gubarev was transferred away from Belgrade. In addition to his intelligence work, Helm also collected commercial information, helping a German company obtain a concession to explore for oil in Yugoslavia ahead of British interests.[5] On 27 September 1939, the Gestapo and its parent organisation, the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police, or SiPo), was placed under the umbrella of the new Reich Security Main Office (German: Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA), now commanded by Heydrich, and the Gestapo became Amt (Office) IV of the RSHA, with Müller as its chief.[6][7]

Helm was under strict instructions not to deal with any people or organisations that were in opposition to the Yugoslav government. This responsibility fell to SS-

Serbo-Croatian: Združena borbena organizacija rada, Zbor) of Dimitrije Ljotić, the Russian White émigré community, and ethnic Germans.[10] One of Kraus' most significant informants was Tanasije Dinić.[11] In the spring of 1940, Nassenstein was transferred to Zagreb to consolidate contacts among Croatian separatists and counter the work of the British and French intelligence services there.[12]

The Tripartite Pact and the coup d'état

Following the 1938

Royal Yugoslav Army Air Force officers deposed the country's regent, Prince Paul, in a bloodless coup d'état, placed his teenaged nephew Peter on the throne, and brought to power a "government of national unity" led by General Dušan Simović.[16] The coup enraged Hitler, who immediately ordered the country's invasion.[17] When the coup occurred, Helm was visiting Berlin, and Kraus was in Belgrade.[8]

Establishment

a black and white photograph of two men in uniform
Wilhelm Fuchs (right) with the head of the Ordnungspolizei, SS-Obergruppenführer Kurt Daluege. Fuchs was appointed as chief of EG Yugoslavia.

Immediately following the coup, Heydrich summoned SS-Sturmbannführer Walter Schellenberg, the acting head of the Ausland-SD, and ordered him to compile a list of all Yugoslavs who were opposed to Nazi Germany, so they could be arrested during and after the pending invasion. This list was assembled hastily and contained a number of errors, but quickly came to comprise over 4,000 names. Heydrich then appointed SS-Standartenführer (SS-Colonel) Wilhelm Fuchs to lead Einsatzgruppe Yugoslavia (EG Yugoslavia), consisting of police and security detachments, which would be responsible for arresting those on the list. Fuchs had been the head of a SD detachment in occupied Poland. On 1 April, Fuchs went to Vienna, where he gathered about 60 SD and Gestapo officials, including experts in Yugoslavian affairs such as Helm and SS-Sturmbannführer Wilhelm Beissner, who was head of the Yugoslav section of the Ausland-SD office in Berlin. When the German-led Axis invasion of Yugoslavia commenced on 6 April, Fuchs and the main body of EG Yugoslavia were in Graz with the German 2nd Army, and a smaller Einsatzkommando (EK) led by SS-Sturmbannführer Jonak was with German troops preparing to invade Yugoslavia from Romania. On 8 April, Fuchs and his men were in Maribor, and commenced arresting people on the list. However, the rapid success of the invasion meant that by 13 April, he was in Zagreb, so he quickly formed a second EK under Beissner to operate in the newly created Axis puppet state, the Independent State of Croatia (Croatian: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH).[18]

Map showing the partition of Yugoslavia after the Axis invasion

German forces entered Belgrade on 12 April, two days later, Jonak and his EK had arrived, where they were met by Kraus, who had weathered the

Banovina Croatia, along with rest of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina and some adjacent territory. The Italians, Hungarians and Bulgarians occupied other parts of Yugoslavian territory.[20] Germany did not annex any Yugoslav territory, but occupied northern parts of present-day Slovenia and stationed occupation troops in the northern half of the NDH. The German-occupied part of Slovenia was divided into two administrative areas that were placed under the administration of the Gauleiters of the neighboring Reichsgau Kärnten and Reichsgau Steiermark.[21]

The remaining territory, which consisted of

Kosovska Mitrovica), and the Banat was occupied by the Germans and placed under the administration of a German military government.[22] This was due to the key rail and riverine transport routes that passed through it, and its valuable resources, particularly non-ferrous metals.[20] Heydrich appointed Helm as head of the Gestapo in the occupied Serbian territory, and Kraus as the chief of EK Belgrade, with Fuchs remaining as head of EG Yugoslavia, with primary responsibility for the German-occupied territory of Serbia. Fuchs was also temporarily responsible for the three EKs established within the NDH, headquartered at Zagreb, Sarajevo and Osijek. Jonak was given responsibility for exploiting the Yugoslav archives on behalf of the RSHA.[23]

Operations

Heydrich returned to Berlin on the same day, and EG Yugoslavia immediately got to work, establishing EK Belgrade in the district prison on King Alexander I Street, and sending SS-Sonderkommandos (ad hoc task forces, or SS-SKs) into the interior of the occupied territory on various tasks. One of these SS-SKs, commanded by SS-Sturmbannführer Karl Hintze, located the

concentration camps in the Third Reich.[26] The roundup included diplomatic staff in various posts, including Berlin, despite this being a breach of diplomatic immunity. Documents obtained from the Yugoslav embassy in Berlin by Schellenberg's men indicated that the Yugoslav military attaché, Pukovnik (Colonel) Vladimir Vauhnik, had been obtaining information from the top echelons of the Wehrmacht, as he had advised Belgrade of detailed information about the Axis invasion two days before it began.[27]

As soon as the invasion was over, Kraus became aware that former Yugoslav Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković was seeking to return to power under German authority. Based on his work in Yugoslavia before the invasion, Kraus wrote a report recommending against this course of action.[28]

Footnotes

  1. ^ Browning 2014, p. 334.
  2. ^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 78.
  3. ^ a b Odić & Komarica 1977, p. 25.
  4. ^ Begović 1989a, p. 46.
  5. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 24–29.
  6. ^ Broszat 1981, p. 270.
  7. ^ Höhne 2001, pp. 256–257.
  8. ^ a b Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 29–30.
  9. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 33–34.
  10. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 30–50.
  11. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 50–55.
  12. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 57–63.
  13. ^ a b Roberts 1973, pp. 6–7.
  14. ^ Pavlowitch 2007, p. 8.
  15. ^ Roberts 1973, p. 12.
  16. ^ Pavlowitch 2007, pp. 10–13.
  17. ^ Roberts 1973, p. 15.
  18. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 77–79.
  19. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 79–80.
  20. ^ a b Tomasevich 2001, pp. 63–64.
  21. ^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 83.
  22. ^ Kroener, Müller & Umbreit 2000, p. 94.
  23. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 80–81.
  24. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 81–82.
  25. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, p. 84.
  26. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 82–85.
  27. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 85–87.
  28. ^ Odić & Komarica 1977, pp. 88–89.

References