London Conference of 1939

In 1936, following the Great Arab Revolt, Palestinians went on a general strike. Additionally, Palestinian leaders formed the Higher National Committee (HNC).

After the strike, the British government established the Peel Commission, chaired by Lord Peel, to investigate its causes and to make recommendations to the British government in the light of commitments made in the Balfour Declaration for the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. The commission concluded that the only solution was to partition the country into a Jewish state and a Palestinian state. The two main Zionist leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, had convinced the World Zionist Congress to approve equivocally the Peel recommendations as a basis for more negotiation.^[1][2][3]

The partition idea was rejected by the Palestinians as it went against the promise made by the British for the Palestinians to have their own state and become independent. On 1 October 1937, with a resurgence of violence after the publication of the Peel Commission proposals, the HNC and all nationalist committees were outlawed. Five prominent Palestinians, including Yacoub Al Ghussein and three members of the HNC were deported to the

In 1938, the Woodhead Commission was sent to Palestine to report on how to implement the partition proposals. The commission, chaired by Sir John Woodhead, was boycotted by the Palestinians, whose leaders had been deported or were in exile and who had no wish to discuss partition.^[7] The commission considered three different plans, one of which was based on the Peel plan. Reporting in 1938, the Commission rejected the Peel plan, primarily on the grounds that it could not be implemented without a massive forced transfer of Palestinians, an option that the British government had already ruled out.^[8] With dissent from some of its members, it instead recommended a plan that would leave the Galilee under British mandate but emphasised serious problems with it that included a lack of financial self-sufficiency for the proposed Palestinian state.^[8] The British government accompanied the publication of the Woodhead Report by a statement of policy rejecting partition as impracticable for "political, administrative and financial difficulties".^[9]

Coinciding with the publication of the Woodhead Commission's report on 9 November 1938, the government issued a statement that it wished to end the Mandate and that Britain would continue to govern Palestine until a new regime was established. To that end the Colonial Secretary,

Some Palestinian leaders welcomed the proposed conference but it soon became clear that there was not going to be any alternative to dealing with the disbanded

The five Arab regimes invited were the Kingdoms of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and the Emirate of Transjordan - all within the British sphere of influence. Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had been instrumental in ending the 1936 strike.^[14]

The Zionists had reacted negatively to the proposed conference and debated whether they should attend.

The conference was opened by the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain on 7 February 1939 at St James's Palace, London. The Palestinian delegation refused to attend any joint sessions with the Zionist Jewish Agency delegation so there were two ceremonies. This was at the insistence of the Palestinian delegates. The first ceremony, for the Palestinian delegation, was at 10.30 a.m., the second for the Zionist Jewish Agency delegation was at 11.45.^[17][18]

Meetings with Palestinian Delegation

The Palestinian delegation was led by

The Palestinian delegates had meetings with the representatives from the Arab states in Cairo from 17 January. Despite pressure from the other delegates, the Palestinian group refused to include any representatives from the moderate National Defence Party (NDP) of Raghib al-Nashashibi. A campaign of violence between the rebels and the NDP's supporters led to 136 deaths in 1939. The NDP claimed to represent most of the upper classes and demanded representation at the London conference. The British let it be known that if agreement could not be reached, they would talk to two Palestinian Arab delegations. Nashashibi and his deputy Ya'aqoub Farraj joined the Arab delegation two days after the opening ceremony.^[22]

Although the Palestinian delegates refused to have any contact with the Zionists, some meetings took place with other Arab delegates.

On 9 February, Jamal Husseini put forward the Arab position:

• Independence
• No Jewish national home in Palestine
• Replacement of the Mandate by a treaty
• End of Jewish immigration^[23]

The first task the conference set itself was to establish the meaning of a series of letters, written in

On 6 March, a member of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry flew from Cairo to Beirut to try to get Amin Husseini to approve concessions that were considered by the delegation. Husseini insisted to continue to reject the British proposals.[28]

On 17 March, after he had warned the delegation a day earlier, MacDonald read a statement outlining the British proposals and closed the conference. There had been 14 British-Arab sessions. The British proposals were published two months later in what became known as the 1939 White Paper.^[29]

Meetings with Zionist Jewish Agency delegation

The

• Jews in Palestine must be the majority
• Continuation of the Mandate
• Continuation of illegal Jewish immigration
• Investment to speed up development in Palestine[34]

The delegation was willing to accept the partition of the country, as recommended by the Peel Commission, under protest. The two main Zionist leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, had convinced the World Zionist Congress to approve equivocally the Peel recommendations as a basis for negotiation.^{[1][2][3][35]}

Despite the Palestinian boycott of the Zionist Jewish Agency, some meetings took place with Palestinians. On the evening of 7 March, the British managed to hold an informal meeting between three Palestinian delegates and four of the Jewish delegates with MacDonald and three other British officials. The Egyptian delegate,

At the 24 February 1939 meeting, Ben Gurion laid out the Zionist Jewish Agency's minimum terms, the continuation of the Mandate and the rejection of anything that would imply Jewish minority status. The meeting also had MacDonald announce the outlines of the British policy: after a transition period, Palestine would become an independent state allied to Britain, and the Jewish minority would have protected status.[38] On 26 February, both delegations received a written summary of what was planned. That evening, the Zionist Jewish Agency refused to attend a government ceremonial dinner in its honor. On 27 February, the Mapai newspaper in Palestine, Davar, published a cable from Ben Gurion: "There is a scheme afoot to liquidate the National Home and turn us over to the rule of gang leaders". On the same day, Zionist attacks took place through a co-ordinated series of bombs across Palestine murdering 38 Palestinians, motivated by Ben-Gurion.^[39] The delegation refused to hold any further formal sessions and reduced its involvement to informal meetings in MacDonald's office.

St John Philby, an advisor to the Saudi delegates, held a lunch at his home on 28 February with Weizmann, Ben Gurion and Fuad Hamza, the Saudi foreign affairs official. Philby put forward his own proposals, but no further meetings took place though he had discussions with Weizmann and Shertok later that year.^[40]

On 3 March, Ben Gurion failed to get the delegation to disband, and it was agreed to remain in London.^[41] On 4 March, he became ill and had to withdraw for several days.^[42] By 16 March, many of the delegates had left London.^[43]

On 17 March, Weizmann sent a letter to MacDonald: "The Zionist delegation, having given profound consideration to the proposals placed before it by His Majesty's Government on 15 March 1939, regrets that it is unable to accept them as a basis for agreement, and has therefore decided to disband".^[44][45]

Aftermath

Two days before the end of the conference, the German Army occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia.

These were Colonial Secretary's final proposals, which were published on 17 May 1939:

• A limit to Jewish immigration for five years after which numbers would be set with agreement with the Palestinians
• Restrictions on Jews buying land.
• Gradual introduction of Palestinians, into senior administrative posts.
• Transfer after ten years of all powers to a representative government

The proposals were conditional on the end of violence in Palestine. If after ten years, no agreement had been reached about the form of government, the British would reconsider the situation.^[46]

After the delegations had left London, the British made a further attempt to get Arab approval by suggesting a faster transfer of power conditional on an end to violence and the involvement of the League of Nations if conditions were unsuitable for independence after ten years.^[47] In May, the HNC delegation announced its rejection of the White Paper, with Amin Husseini imposing the decision on the majority of delegates that was in favour of accepting. That tactical blunder did not help the Arab National Council in any way. It has been suggested that he had to refuse to deal with the British to maintain his leadership of the actual rebels in Palestine.^[48]

On 17 April, the Histadrut announced the launch of a campaign against the proposals. In the first month after the end of the conference, over 1,700 Jewish illegal immigrants entered Palestine. On 17 May, to mark the publishing of the White Paper, telephone wires were cut and government offices attacked. There were riots in Jerusalem, and Jewish attacks on Arabs and government property continued through the summer. The Jewish underground Etzel claimed to have killed More than 130 people during that period.^[49] There was also an increase in illegal immigration, with 6,323 arriving between April and October, leading to a peak in Jewish unemployment.^[50]

In Zionist circles,

Ben Gurion wrote in his diary: "This is not the last word." He later claimed that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had explicitly told him that the policy would not outlive the war.^[52]

References