Operation FB
Operation FB | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of The Second World War | |||||||
Iceland, western start and terminus of reciprocal sailings to and from Murmansk | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Allies | Axis powers (Nazi Germany) | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Arseniy Golovko | Erich Raeder | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Royal Navy Soviet Navy RAF Coastal Command Soviet Air Defence Forces Merchant Navy United States Merchant Marine merchant ships from Allied and neutral nations |
Luftwaffe Kriegsmarine | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Eastbound: 13 merchant ships escorts (west): 4 anti-submarine trawlers escorts (east): 3 trawlers | |||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Sunk: 5 Wrecked: 1 Recalled: 3 | |||||||
23 Soviet independent sailings 29 October 1942 – 24 January 1943, 1 sunk |
Operation FB (29 October – 9 November 1942) took place as part of the
Discussions between the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt led to ships being dispatched independently to Russia from Iceland as a substitute for PQ 19, using the polar night of the Arctic winter for concealment. The ships sailed at approximately twelve-hour intervals, with seven trawlers strung out along the routes as rescue ships. Of thirteen sailings to Russia, three were ordered to turn back and five arrived; of 23 independent departures from the USSR, 22 ships reached their destination. The outbound convoy series JW, began with Convoy JW 51A (15–25 December 1942), returns being called RW.
Background
Arctic convoys
In October 1941, after
By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaised with the escort commander.[3]
Due to the losses of Convoy PQ 18 (2–21 September) in the Arctic and Operation Torch (8–16 November) in the Mediterranean, for which more than 500 ships had to be escorted, much of the British Home Fleet was sent south. The United States and Britain suspended Arctic Convoys to the Soviet Union for the autumn. The US president Franklin D. Roosevelt had favoured sending PQ 19 but the British had replied that it would delay Torch for three weeks. Roosevelt suggested sending three smaller convoys with fewer escorts but Winston Churchill called this unrealistic.[4] Soviet forces were fighting the Battle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942 – 2 February 1943) on the Eastern Front and the hiatus was much resented by the Soviet leadership, which judged British reasons for the cessation of Arctic convoys to be specious. the British claimed that the ceaseless Home Fleet operations amounted to a ratio of warships to convoyed merchant ships of nearly 1:1 on the Arctic run and that the British contribution to the Red Army in tanks and aircraft far exceeded that of the US.[5]
Signals intelligence
Bletchley Park
The British
In 1941, naval Headache personnel with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Y computor parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpret Luftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.[6][7]
B-Dienst
The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.[8] B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.[9] In early September, Finnish Radio Intelligence deciphered a Soviet Air Force transmission which divulged the convoy itinerary and forwarded it to the Germans.[10]
Prelude
Convoy hiatus
In the Arctic autumn, the hours of daylight diminished until by midwinter there was only twilight at noon, conditions in which convoys had the best chance of evading German aircraft, ships and U-boats. The surviving ships of PQ 18 (2–21 September 1942) were still in Soviet ports, unloaded and waiting to return. Forty ships were ready to sail to the USSR in convoy PQ 19 but this convoy operation had suspended by the British, to the dismay of the US and the anger of the USSR. The suggestion that some ships should sail independently in the meantime, gained favour and a British ship owner, J. A. Bilmeir, offered cash bonuses in advance of £100 each for officers and £50 per rating to volunteers. The Russians had also asked that two Soviet ships at anchor in Iceland be sent back independently to Archangel.[11]
Frederich Engels sailed on 11 August and Belomorkanal followed next day, both reaching Archangel, which increased optimism at the
Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine
From 24 to 28 September, the
Operation FB
29 October – 2 November
USSR | To | From |
---|---|---|
Sailed | 13 | 23 |
Turned back |
3 | nil |
Sunk | 4 | 1 |
Wrecks | 1 | nil |
Arrived | 5 | 22 |
2 November 1942 – 24 January 1943
On 2 November,
Convoy QP 15
Convoy QP 15 (convoy commodore, Captain W. C. Meek) was a return convoy of thirty empty
On 20 November, a gale blew up and scattered the convoy in the seasonal perpetual darkness. Baku was badly damaged in the storm but managed to limp back to port; a large wave hit Sokrushitelny and ripped off the stern. Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft were grounded and Kriegsmarine ships stayed in port, as the British had hoped when planning the convoy. Three Soviet destroyers were sent to assist Baku and managed to rescue 187 crew from the Sokrushitelny but were not able to save the ship, which sank on 22 November. Neither of the two British groups of reinforcing destroyers found the convoy, which, west of Bear Island, had fragmented. On 23 November, the U-625 torpedoed and sank the British freighter Goolistan and later in the day, U-601 sank the Soviet freighter Kuznets Lesov; both ships were lost with all hands. The rest of the merchant ships were reassembled in two groups and arrived in Loch Ewe in the north of Scotland on 30 November and 3 December.[23]
Aftermath
Analysis
Three ships for north Russia were ordered to turn back after a U-boat sighting, four were sunk, one was wrecked and five arrived safely. On the return journey, 23 ships sailed for Iceland, one was sunk and 22 arrived.[11] In 1956, the British naval official historian, Stephen Roskill, wrote that,
These independent sailings were more successful than some people had expected.[18]
The tactic of independent voyages resembled the "patrol and independent sailings" of the
Ships
Eastbound
Name | Flag | GRT | Sailed | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|
Briarwood[26] | UK | 4,019 | 4 November[19] | To USSR |
Daldorch[26] | UK | 5,571 | 3 November[19] | |
SS John H. B. Latrobe[26] | US | 7,176[19] | 31 October[19] | |
Empire Gilbert | UK | 6,640 | 30 October[19] | Sunk by U-586 |
SS Dekabrist | USSR | 7,363 | 30 October[19] | Bombed and sunk by I/KG 30 |
SS William Clark | US | 7,167 | 2 November[19] | Bombed by II/KG 30, sunk by U-354 |
Empire Sky | UK | 7,445 | 1 November[19] | Sunk by U-625 |
Chulmleigh | UK | 5,445 | 31 October[19] | Grounded South Cape, Spitzbergen, abandoned, bombed by II/KG 30; torpedoed and bombarded by U-625 16 November
|
SS John Walker[26] | US | 7,176 | 30 October[19] | |
SS Richard H. Alvey[26] | US | 7,176 | 29 October[19] | |
SS Hugh Williamson[26] | US | 7,176 | 1 November[19] | |
Empire Scott[26] | UK | 6,150 | 2 November[19] | |
Empire Galliard[26] | UK | 7,170 | 29 October[19] |
Soviet FB sailings
Name | Sailed | Arrived | Notes |
---|---|---|---|
Mussoviet | 29 October | 7 November | Eastbound to USSR |
Azerbaijan | 31 October | 9 November | |
Chernyshevsky | 2 November | 11 November | |
Donbass | 4 November | 7 November | Sunk 7 November by German destroyer Z27[25] |
Komsomolets Arctiki | 14 November | 24 November | |
Dvina | 24 November | 5 December | |
Mironich | 25 November | 5 December | |
Yelina | 25 November | 5 December |
Other independent Soviet sailings
From 29 October 1942 – 24 January 1943, of the 23 ships sailing from the USSR, 22 arrived.[26] (Data for this section taken from Ruegg and Hague (1993) unless indicated.)[26]
- Aldan
- Elna II
- Kara
- Krasnoe Znamya
- Kuzbass
- Msta
- OB
- Okhta
- Osmussaar
- Sakko
- Sheksna
- Shilka
- Soroka
- Uritski
- Vanzetti
- Vetluga
Notes
Footnotes
- ^ Woodman 2004, p. 14.
- ^ Edgerton 2011, p. 75.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 22–23.
- ^ Woodman 2004, p. 296.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 296–297.
- ^ a b Macksey 2004, pp. 141–142.
- ^ a b Hinsley 1994, pp. 141, 145–146.
- ^ Kahn 1973, pp. 238–241.
- ^ Budiansky 2000, pp. 250, 289.
- ^ FIB 1996.
- ^ a b c Woodman 2004, pp. 296–298.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 305–306.
- ^ Rohwer & Hummelchen 1972, p. 245.
- ^ a b Rohwer & Hummelchen 1972, p. 272.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 299–300.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 307–308.
- ^ PRO 2001, p. 115.
- ^ a b c Roskill 1962, p. 289.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Hutson 2006, p. 23.
- ^ a b Woodman 2004, pp. 298–299.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 298–300; Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 207.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 306–307.
- ^ Woodman 2004, pp. 307–309.
- ^ Ruegg & Hague 1993, pp. 46–48.
- ^ a b c Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 207.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Ruegg & Hague 1993, p. 46.
- ^ a b Hutson 2006, p. 133.
References
- Budiansky, S. (2000). Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II. New York: The Free Press (Simon & Schuster). ISBN 0-684-85932-7– via Archive Foundation.
- ISBN 978-0-7139-9918-1.
- Hinsley, F. H. (1994) [1993]. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War (2nd rev. abr. ed.). London: ISBN 978-0-11-630961-7.
- Hutson, H. C. (2006). Arctic Interlude: Independent to North Russia. Bennington, VA: Merriam Press. ISBN 978-1-57638-118-2.
- Kahn, D. (1973) [1967]. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (10th abr. Signet, Chicago ed.). New York: Macmillan. OCLC 78083316.
- ISBN 978-0-304-36651-4.
- Rohwer, J.; Hummelchen, G. (1972). Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945 (1939–1942). Vol. I. London: Ian Allan. ISBN 0-7110-0277-0.
- Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 1-86176-257-7.
- Roskill, S. W. (1962) [1956]. The Period of Balance. OCLC 174453986.
- Ruegg, Bob; Hague, Arnold (1993) [1992]. Convoys to Russia (2nd rev. exp. pbk. ed.). Kendal: World Ship Society. ISBN 978-0-905617-66-4.
- The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (repr. Public Record Office War Histories ed.). Richmond, Surrey: Air Ministry. 2001 [1948]. ISBN 978-1-903365-30-4. Air 41/10.
- Woodman, Richard (2004) [1994]. Arctic Convoys 1941–1945. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-5752-1.
Websites
- "Birth of Radio Intelligence in Finland and its Developer Reino Hallamaa". Pohjois–Kymenlaakson Asehistoriallinen Yhdistys Ry (North-Karelia Historical Association Ry) (in Finnish). 1996. Retrieved 26 July 2018.
Further reading
- Davies, James (2004). "Feature Article: 'Liberty' Cargo Ship" (PDF). ww2ships.com. Retrieved 14 March 2023.
- Hutson, H. C. (2012). Arctic Interlude: Independent to North Russia (6th ed.). CreateSpace Independent Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4810-0668-2.
- Richards, Denis; St G. Saunders, H. (1975) [1954]. Royal Air Force 1939–1945: The Fight Avails. History of the Second World War, Military Series. Vol. II (pbk. ed.). London: ISBN 978-0-11-771593-6. Retrieved 14 April 2018.