Operation Ha-Har
This article may be unbalanced towards certain viewpoints. (August 2018) |
Operation Ha-Har | |||||||||
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Part of 1948 Arab–Israeli War | |||||||||
Bayt Nattif after capture, 1948 | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Israel (IDF) |
Egyptian paramilitary forces and local militias; Transjordan (Arab Legion) | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
General Zvi Ayalon Joseph Tebenkin |
Glubb Pasha | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
1,400 | 1,300 | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
1[clarification needed] | unknown |
Operation Ha-Har' (
Background
In mid-October 1948, the Har’el Brigade published a combat ordinance, which read: "The enemy is planning to cut-off the well-springs of immigration and [Jewish] settlement, to build a nest of war conspiracies against us and against all those who love peace in the world, to cut-off from Israel the Negev; to inflict harm to the capital, the center of yearnings of the generations of Israel; to subjugate the Hebrew element of Jerusalem; to dismantle Jewish industry; to block-off the sea; to deny the independence of Haifa and its port. These schemes will be eradicated on the battlefield."[3] Up until that time, the Brigade had been active in capturing infiltrators who sought to carry out attacks against Jews and their property, as also in securing the public transportation to Jerusalem.[3]
The Regimental Operations Department initiated patrols south of the
In a written dispatch, "Raanana" had informed Palmach-Harel headquarters responsible for the central front: "In all these last few days, the enemy has not ceased from his own operations in this sector [of the country]. There has been an exchange of unrelenting gun-fire. The strategic location itself is not easy to hold-on to, since it is much lower than the other positions. Our suggestion would be, 1) consolidating and expanding the position by occupying other positions, with additional operations conducted by small raiding parties; the addition of 120 mm. mortar for this area; 2) In the event that operations should be halted, a call to the United-Nations for a cease-fire."[3] "Raanana" waited impatiently for a prompt answer, but his request to "occupy other positions" was denied him. Nevertheless, in spite of being denied, these positions were still taken by force when operations began, the Har’el Brigade continuously moving and extending the border of Jewish hegemony as far as Wādi Surar (Nahal Sorek), where it was also deemed necessary to establish a military outpost beyond its south bank.[3]
Preparations for war
In the meantime, Palmach-Harel headquarters continued to make suggestions to the higher military echelon on ways in which the Jerusalem Corridor could be better secured by extending its control over other vital areas.
Renewed fighting
Hostilities began on 15 October 1948, when Israeli troops assigned to Operation Yoav took the offensive to the south, opposite Egyptian army positions in the northern Negev. The Har’el Brigade, stationed further north, remained inactive for four days, a decision taken by the IDF's General Staff and which, for political reasons, wanted to see first whether or not the Jordanian Arab Legion would react. On 19 October, when the "junction" in the south was captured and there was once again an unobstructed land-link with settlements in the Negev, the Brigade was given leave to commence military operations in its sector of the country.[5] Among the considerations for permitting the Brigade to start its offensive was the fact that the Arab Legion had not intervened in Israeli military operations in the northern Negev, while there was also some concern that the United Nations Security Council might call for a cease-fire on 19 October. If that were to happen, the Brigade would have lost its opportunity to expand the Jerusalem Corridor by ridding it of hostile elements.[5]
Fall of Dayr Aban
The Jordanian
Fall of Dayr al-Hawa
From there, the Brigade proceeded to climb higher ground until it reached the crest of the mountain range where it received orders to arrange for the military occupation and capture of Dayr al-Hawa (site of the present-day Nes Harim), a village perched at an elevation of some 637 meters above sea-level.[8] This was done with the intent of making it a springboard for further military operations while advancing toward the mountains overlooking al-Khader, Bethlehem and Hebron.[8] The Brigade began sending out armed patrol-parties of two to three men in order to acquaint themselves with the terrain, and to learn about the feasibility of sending out greater forces to infiltrate enemy lines. The plan was to cross-over the railroad line that connected Jerusalem with Hartuv. Scouts succeeded in crossing over the railway without being detected, and reached a position southwest of Dayr al-Hawa.[8] When a second detail was sent out to ascertain whether or not the route could be traversed, they were ambushed by gunfire, which caused the party to retreat. A third detail sent out was also fired upon, which actions taken together gave the Brigade a correct assessment of the enemy's preparedness for battle. Given these circumstances, plans were drawn-up for the attack on Dayr al-Hawa.[8]
Two companies attacked Dayr al-Hawa. In addition to the massive firepower from their personal weapons, they were also aided by a 120 mm. mortar battery. When they had come within 200 meters of the village, the firing of auxiliary weapons used to assist them in the initial onslaught was brought to a halt. Another force assaulted the village from a different side. The villagers, being attacked from in front and from behind, soon capitulated.[8] By midnight, units of the Fourth Battalion had taken full command of the village Dayr al-Hawa where they found the villagers had fled with their animals.[8] At this success, they began making preparations for further action. In the process of taking the village, three companies with support weapons, accompanied by armored vehicles, had ascended the mountain.[8] In the coordinated attacks, the Har’el Brigade had captured three military outposts: the 'House' outpost, the 'Cannon' outpost and the 'Joint' military outpost.[11] In each of them, the Brigade initially met-up with some resistance.[11] Tabenkin recalls: "When the 'Joint' outpost and Dayr al-Hawa had been captured, there was created for us the preeminence of decisive force, and we then decided to move also by day... When dawn broke [the following morning], it was decided that the soldiers of the Fifth Battalion would proceed unto Bayt Nattif with the intent, that after the capture of the village, it would be possible to proceed onward [unhindered] over the Bayt Ha-Elah road northward (sic)."[11]
Fall of Allar
The people of the neighboring Arab village,
Fall of Beit Jimal
Afterwards, on 20 October, a much smaller force from the Fifth Battalion broke-away and travelled with a battle corps of the 10th Armored Brigade on the Bayt Jibrin highway and captured
Fall of Bayt Nattif and Zakariyya
The following day (21 October), Moshe ("Morris") Ben-Dror, the commander of the Fifth Battalion, put together a battle corps consisting of two companies of riflemen, a support company and saboteurs, who were instructed to take
Fall of Jarash and Bayt 'Itab
With war approaching, by the 21st of October, the residents of
On 22 October, at 15:30 hours, at the request of the
The result of the campaign to expand the Jerusalem Corridor as far as the western foothills of the
References
- ISBN 0-88728-224-5. p.266.
- ISBN 0-521-33028-9. p.220.
- ^ a b c d e f g Har’el: Palmach brigade in Jerusalem, Zvi Dror (ed. Nathan Shoḥam), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers: Benei Barak 2005, p. 267 (Hebrew)
- ^ a b Har’el: Palmach brigade in Jerusalem, Zvi Dror (ed. Nathan Shoḥam), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers: Benei Barak 2005, pp. 267 - 268 (Hebrew)
- ^ a b c d e Har’el: Palmach brigade in Jerusalem, Zvi Dror (ed. Nathan Shoḥam), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers: Benei Barak 2005, p. 268 (Hebrew)
- ^ Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, London 1957, p. 200
- ISBN 965-7121-03-5
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Har’el: Palmach brigade in Jerusalem, Zvi Dror (ed. Nathan Shoḥam), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers: Benei Barak 2005, p. 269 (Hebrew)
- HaKibbutz HaMeuhad: Tel Aviv 1958, p. 200 [Hebrew title: חברים מספרים על ג'ימי] (Yad Tabenkin Archives, Testimony of Danny Agmon, 16-12/52/194)
- HaKibbutz HaMeuhad: Tel Aviv 1958, p. 206 (Hebrew title: חברים מספרים על ג'ימי)
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Har’el: Palmach brigade in Jerusalem, Zvi Dror (ed. Nathan Shoḥam), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers: Benei Barak 2005, p. 270 (Hebrew)
- ^ Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, London 1957, p. 200 (although, in his account, the cease fire was to take effect from three o'clock in the afternoon).
- ^ a b Har’el: Palmach brigade in Jerusalem, Zvi Dror (ed. Nathan Shoḥam), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers: Benei Barak 2005, p. 273 (Hebrew)