Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission
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Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of Operation Pointblank | |||||||
1st Bomb Wing B-17s over Schweinfurt, Germany | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
United States United Kingdom | Nazi Germany | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Curtis LeMay Robert B. Williams | Adolf Galland | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Luftwaffe | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
376 B-17 heavy bombers 268 P-47 fighter sorties 191 Spitfire fighter sorties | Approx. 400 Bf 109, Bf 110, Fw 190 and other fighters | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
60 bombers, 3 P-47s, and 2 Spitfires lost 58-95 bombers heavily damaged[note 1][1][2][3][4] 7 aircrew KIA and 21 WIA aboard returning aircraft 557 aircrew MIA or POW |
25–27 fighters[1][2][3] 203 civilians killed |
The Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission was a
After being postponed several times by unfavorable weather, the operation, known within the Eighth Air Force as "Mission No. 84", was flown on the anniversary of the first daylight raid by the Eighth Air Force.[5]
Mission No. 84 was a strike by 376 bombers of 16 bomb groups against German
As soon as the reconnaissance photographs were received on the evening of the 17th, Generals Eaker and Anderson knew that the Schweinfurt raid had been a failure. The excellent results at Regensburg were small consolation for the loss of 60 B-17s. The results of the bombing were exaggerated, and the high losses were well disguised in after-mission reports. Everyone who flew the mission stressed the importance of the escorts in reducing losses; the planners grasped only that Schweinfurt would have to be bombed again, soon, in another deep-penetration, unescorted mission.[6]
— Donald Caldwell
Background
Because of diversions of groups to the
Pointblank operations in April and July 1943 had concentrated solely on the production of the Fw 190 at factories in Bremen, Kassel, and Oschersleben, and although serious losses to the bomber forces had occurred, the attacks had been successful enough to warrant attacking those manufacturing Messerschmitt Bf 109s.
The production of
The mission plan
To successfully complete its portion of the attack, the Eighth Air Force decided to attack a target in central Germany as well as Regensburg to divide and confuse German air defenses.
The 1st Bombardment Wing, following it, would turn northeast and bomb the ball-bearing factories of Schweinfurt, where almost the entire production of bearings was centralized, and by doing so catch German fighter aircraft on the ground re-arming and refueling. Because of limited range thanks to inexplicably not employing
Two supporting attacks were also made a part of the overall mission plan. The first, a
The second was a series of attacks on Luftwaffe fighter fields at
Donald Miller states: "LeMay's force was expected to take the brunt of the German counteroffensive, allowing the Schweinfurt armada to proceed to the target with only light resistance. With LeMay escaping over the Alps, the Schweinfurt force would be left to face the full fury of the Luftwaffe on its return to England. The plan was brutally simple: LeMay would fight his way in and Williams would fight his way out."[9]
Weather delays
Eighth Air Force bomber operations were calculated with one to two hours of climb and assembly into formations factored into mission lengths. In addition, the mission length for the Regensburg force was anticipated to be of eleven hours' duration, so that commanders had only a 90-minute "window" in which to launch the mission and still allow the 3rd Bombardment Wing B-17s to reach North Africa in daylight. Mission 84 planning indicated a takeoff window from dawn, approximately 06:30
At dawn of August 17, after airmen had gone to their airplanes, England was covered in fog. The mission takeoff was delayed until 08:00, when the fog had cleared sufficiently over East Anglia to allow the 4th Bombardment Wing to take off using instruments, a technique they had practiced. Although attacking both targets simultaneously was deemed critical to success of the mission without prohibitive loss, the Regensburg force was ordered to take off, even though the 1st Bombardment Wing remained grounded at its bases by the adverse weather.
By the time the fog had sufficiently cleared over the Midlands, the Regensburg force had already reached the coast of the Netherlands, which indicated that reacting German fighters would have sufficient time to land, replenish, and attack the second task force. Consequently, the launch of the Schweinfurt force was further delayed to allow US escort fighters sufficient time to return to base to rearm for a second escort mission. In all the 1st Wing was delayed more than three hours behind the 3rd Wing.
Raids
Regensburg strike force
The Regensburg task force was led by the 3rd Bombardment Wing commander,
Prov. Wing | Group | UK airfield | Sent | Losses |
---|---|---|---|---|
403d PCBW | 96th Bomb Group | Snetterton Heath | 21 | 0 |
388th Bomb Group | Knettishall | 21 | 1 | |
390th Bomb Group | Framlingham | 20 | 6 | |
401st PCBW | 94th Bomb Group | Bury St. Edmunds |
21 | 1 |
385th Bomb Group | Great Ashfield | 21 | 3 | |
402nd PCBW | 95th Bomb Group | Horham |
21 | 4 |
100th Bomb Group | Thorpe Abbotts | 21 | 9 |
Times | Group | Leg | Sent | Claims |
---|---|---|---|---|
1005—1020 | 353rd Fighter Group | Haamstede to Diest | 37 P-47 | 1 |
1030—1045 | 56th Fighter Group | Herentals to Eupen | 50 P-47 | 0 |
Approximately fifteen minutes after it crossed the coast at 10:00, the Regensburg force encountered the first German fighter interception, which continued with growing intensity nearly all the way to the target area. Several factors weighed against the Regensburg force in this air battle. The arrangement of two groups instead of three in the two following provisional wings meant a third fewer guns available to each for their mutual defense and made them more likely targets. The overall length of the task force was too great for effective fighter support.
The last wing formation of bombers was fifteen miles behind the first and nearly out of visual range. Of the two groups of P-47s (87 aircraft) tasked to escort the force to the German border, only one arrived at the rendezvous point on time, covering only the lead wing, and the second arrived fifteen minutes late. Both P-47 groups were forced to turn back to base after only fifteen minutes of escort duty, without engaging any German interceptors. The last provisional wing in the task force was left without any fighter protection at all.
After ninety minutes of combat the German fighter force broke off the engagement, low on fuel and ammunition. By then at least 15 bombers had been shot down or fatally damaged, 13 from the trailing formation.
The Regensburg force then turned south to cross the
Schweinfurt strike force
The 1st Bombardment Wing, commanded by
The Schweinfurt force had 230 bombers, comprising 12 groups, divided into two task forces, each with two wings. Each wing was composed of a three group formation, and was more than twenty miles in length. Williams personally led the mission, flying as co-pilot in an aircraft of the lead formation, as wingman to the commander of the
Prov. Wing | Group | UK base | Sent | Losses |
---|---|---|---|---|
(first task force) | ||||
201st PCBW | 91st Bomb Group |
Bassingbourn | 18 | 7 |
"101st Composite Group"[note 2] | 19 | 6 | ||
381st Bomb Group |
Ridgewell | 20 | 9 | |
202d PCBW | 351st Bomb Group |
Polebrook | 21 | 1 |
306th Composite Group | 20 | 0 | ||
384th Bomb Group | Grafton Underwood | 18 | 5 | |
(second task force) | ||||
203d PCBW | 306th Bomb Group | Thurleigh | 21 | 0 |
305th Bomb Group | Chelveston | 20 | 2 | |
92nd Bomb Group |
Alconbury | 20 | 2 | |
204th PCBW | 379th Bomb Group | Kimbolton | 18 | 0 |
103rd Composite Group | 17 | 4 | ||
303rd Bomb Group |
Molesworth | 18 | 0 |
The Schweinfurt task forces followed the same route as the Regensburg force. Because of the delayed start of the mission, eight squadrons of
The first German attacks began almost immediately and employed different tactics from the morning mission. The lead wing was attacked continuously in head-on attacks by both Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighters, and although the RAF escorts claimed eight victories they were forced to return to base early in the engagement. The two groups of P-47s (88 aircraft) arrived five and eight minutes late, and despite some individual combats, they too were forced to break off virtually as soon as they arrived.[citation needed]
Inside German airspace, the
Losses among the 57 B-17s of the lead wing were so severe that many among its airmen considered the possibility that the wing might be annihilated before reaching the target. However, 15 miles from Schweinfurt, the opposing fighters, after shooting down 22 bombers, disengaged and landed to refuel and re-arm in order to attack the force on its way out. Five miles from Schweinfurt, German anti-aircraft guns began firing an effective flak barrage into the path of the bomber force.[18]
At 14:57 approximately 40 B-17s remained of the lead wing, when it dropped its bombs on the target area containing five factories and 30,000 workers, followed over a 24-minute span by the remainder of the force. Each wing found increasingly heavy smoke from preceding bomb explosions a hindrance to accuracy. 183 bombers dropped 424.3 tons of bombs, including 125 tons of
Three B-17s were shot down by flak over Schweinfurt. Fifteen minutes after leaving the target, each task force circled over the town of Meiningen to reassemble its formations, then continued west toward Brussels. At approximately 15:30, German fighters renewed their attacks, concentrating now on damaged bombers. Between 16:20 and 17:00 a covering force of 93 P-47s and 95 Spitfires[note 3] arrived to provide withdrawal support, claiming 21 fighters shot down. Eight more bombers were lost before the force reached the North Sea, where three more crash-landed. The Schweinfurt force lost a total of 36 bombers.[20][21]
Times | Group | Leg | Sent | Claims | Losses |
Penetration support | |||||
1336–1355 | 11 Group RAF | Walcheren to Antwerp | 72 Spitfire | 8 | 0 |
1336–1355 | 83 Group RAF |
Walcheren to Antwerp | 24 Spitfire | 0 | 0 |
1353–1410 | 78th Fighter Group | Antwerp to Eupen | 40 P-47 | 2 | 0 |
1355–1409 | 4th Fighter Group | Diest to Eupen | 48 P-47 | 0 | 0 |
Withdrawal support | |||||
1621–1651 | 56th Fighter Group | Nideggen to Sint-Niklaas | 51 P-47 | 16 | 3 |
1641–1700 | 353rd Fighter Group | Mechelen to Sint-Niklaas | 42 P-47 | 0 | 0 |
1647–1715 | 11 Group RAF | Sint-Niklaas to England | 72 Spitfire | 3 | 0 |
1720–1740 | 83 Group RAF | Sint-Niklaas to England | 23 Spitfire | 2 | 2 |
Aftermath
The Americans listed 55 of their bombers with 552 crewmen as missing after the August 17 double-target mission. About half of those became
The 60 aircraft lost on a single mission more than doubled the highest previous loss at that time. There were also 55 to 95 additional aircraft badly damaged. Of those damaged, many were stranded in North Africa and never repaired.
Spitfire pilots claimed 13 German fighters shot down and P-47 pilots claimed 19.[20][note 4][note 5] Gunners on the bombers claimed 288 fighters shot down,[24][note 6] but Luftwaffe records showed only 25 to 27 were lost.[1][2][3]
In Regensburg, all six main workshops of the Messerschmitt factory were destroyed or severely damaged, as were many supporting structures including the final assembly shop. In Schweinfurt, the destruction was less severe but still extensive. The two largest factories, Kugelfischer & Company and Vereinigte Kugellager Fabrik I, suffered 80 direct hits.[26] 35,000 m2 (380,000 square feet) of buildings in the five factories were destroyed, and more than 100,000 m2 (1,000,000 square feet) suffered fire damage.[27] All the factories except Kugelfischer had extensive fire damage to machinery when incendiaries ignited the machine oil used in the manufacturing process.[28]
Albert Speer reported an immediate 34 percent loss of production,[29][note 7] but both the production shortfall and the actual loss of bearings were made up for by extensive surpluses found throughout Germany in the aftermath of the raid. The industry's infrastructure, while vulnerable to a sustained campaign, was not vulnerable to destruction by a single raid. Speer indicated that the two major flaws made by the USAAF in the August strike were first in dividing their force instead of all striking the ball-bearing plants, and second, failing to follow up the first strike with repeated attacks.[31][4][32]
203 civilians were also killed in the strike.[note 8] While the battle resulted in a German victory, the scale and range of the American operation, along with the British-led Operation Hydra (1943) in the same day, shocked the German air command; the stress contributed to the suicide of Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Hans Jeschonnek the next day.
The Schweinfurt mission in particular foretold the failure of deep penetration raids of Germany without adequate long-range escort. The 1st Bomb Wing was over German-occupied territory for three hours and thirty minutes, of which two hours and ten minutes, including all of the time spent over Germany itself, saw no fighter support whatsoever. When the
Legacy
- The mission was enshrined in fiction as the "Hambrucken raid" in Beirne Lay and Sy Bartlett's novel, Twelve O'Clock High. It provides a reasonably accurate view of the thinking behind the planners' intention and the decisions that led to the abandonment of the goal of launching a double strike in such a way that the second strike would meet no aerial opposition; and of the action in the air itself.
- It is also cited as a failure of the Bomber Mafia's precision bombing doctrine, in the book by the same name by Malcolm Gladwell.
- The Schweinfurt portion of the mission also formed the framework for the novel The War Lover, by John Hersey.
- In the early 1990s, the raid was depicted for the first time in a video game, as a playable mission in Secret Weapons of the Luftwaffe.
- In February 2024, the raid was depicted in Episode 3 of Masters of the Air on Apple TV+.
Notes
Footnotes
- ^ Sources vary as the number lost. Most of the damaged aircraft were stranded in French Algeria and some never returned to service, due to the lack of repair facilities there.
- ^ The 101 CG was made up of B-17s from the 381st (7), 351st (6), and 91st (6) BG. The 306 CG had 9 each from the 306th and 305th BG, and 2 from the 92d. The 103 CG had 11 from the 303d and 6 from the 379 BG.
- No. 403 Squadron RCAF, and No. 421 Squadron RCAF.
- ^ All break down the claims as 16 for the 56th FG, 2 for the 78th FG, and one for the 353rd FG.[22]
- ^ Caldwell and Muller state 16 claims.[23]
- ^ Freeman states that the gunners' claims were later reduced to 148, and that actual German loss was "only 27 fighters".[25]
- ^ Miller puts the loss at 38%.[30]
- ^ According to Coffey: 70 men, 77 women, 48 children, and 8 foreign workers.[27] Miller rounded the figure at 200.[30]
Citations
- ^ a b c d Price 2005, p. 129.
- ^ a b c d Bowman & Boiten 2001, p. 64.
- ^ a b c Jablonski 1974, p. 186.
- ^ a b c Miller 2006, p. 201.
- ^ "VIII Bomber Command 1 | American Air Museum in Britain".
- ^ Caldwell & Muller 2007, p. 114.
- ^ Ramsey 1945, p. [page needed].
- ^ Freeman 1993, p. 67.
- ^ a b Miller 2006, p. 195.
- ^ Coffey 1977, p. 3.
- ^ De Cock & Kit 1980, p. [page needed].
- ^ Terdoslavich 2010, p. 147.
- ^ Coffey 1977, pp. 7, 19, 56, 59.
- ^ Woods, "Combat Claims and Casualties", 17 August 43, "Ramrod 206 Part III" and "Ramrod 206 Part IV", pp. 111–112.
- ^ a b c Coffey 1977, p. [page needed].
- ^ a b Freeman 1990, p. [page needed].
- ^ a b Coffey 1977, pp. 22, 40.
- ^ a b Coffey 1977, p. 49.
- ^ Freeman 1990, pp. 89–90.
- ^ a b Freeman 1990, p. 90.
- ^ Coffey 1977, p. 234.
- ^ Woods, VIII Fighter Command transcription of 17 August 43, pp.110 and 111; Air Force Historical Study 85, p.229, actual credits awarded.
- ^ Caldwell & Muller 2007, p. 113.
- ^ Miller 2006, pp. 200, 202.
- ^ Freeman 1993, p. 69.
- ^ Coffey 1977, p. 235.
- ^ a b Coffey 1977, p. 54.
- ^ Coffey 1977, p. 74 "as reported by Speer to Hitler".
- ^ Coffey 1977, p. 72.
- ^ a b Miller 2006, p. 200.
- ^ Coffey 1977, pp. 74–75.
- ^ Hansell, Haywood S. Jr. "Balaklava Redeemed". Air University Review. Archived from the original on 25 February 2013. Retrieved 21 August 2008.
Bibliography
- Bishop, Cliff T.(1986). Fortresses of the Big Triangle First, ISBN 1-869987-00-4
- Bowman, Martin W.; Boiten, Theo (2001). Battles With The Luftwaffe: The Bomber Campaign Against Germany 1942–45. Harper Collins. ISBN 0-00-711363-3.
- Caldwell, Donald L.; ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0.
- Coffey, Thomas M. (1977). Decision Over Schweinfurt. David McKay Company, Inc. ISBN 978-0-679-50763-5.
- De Cock, Jean-Pierre; Kit, Mister (1980). Bombardiers lourds de la dernière guerre : B-17, forteresse volante, Avro Lancaster, B-24 Liberator [Last World War Heavy Bombers: B-17, Flying Fortress, Avro Lancaster, B-24 Liberator] (in French). ISBN 978-2-7312-0031-7.
- Freeman, Roger A. (1990). The Mighty Eighth War Diary. Motorbooks International. ISBN 978-0-87938-495-1.
- Freeman, Roger A. (1993). The Mighty Eighth. Motorbooks International. ISBN 978-0-87938-638-2.
- Jablonski, Edward (1974). Double strike: the epic air raids on Regensburg-Schweinfurt, August 17. ISBN 0-385-07540-5.
- Miller, Donald L. (2006). Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-3544-4.
- Overy, Richard. (1995) Why the Allies won. W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0-393-31619-3
- "Combat Claims & Casualties", transcriptions of RAF and VIII Fighter Command summaries by Tony Woods
- ISBN 1-903223-47-4.
- Ramsey, John F (August 1945). The War Against the Luftwaffe: AAF Counter-Air Operations, April 1943 – June 1944 (PDF). USAF Historical Studies (Report). Air Force Historical Research Agency. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-09-02. Retrieved 2009-06-17.
- Terdoslavich, William (2010). "Raids on Ploesti and Schweinfurt: August 1943 and October 1943". In Fawcett, Bill (ed.). How to Lose WWII: Bad Mistakes of the Good War. New York: HarperPaperbacks. ISBN 978-0-06-180731-2.
External links
- Maj.Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., "Balaklava Redeemed", Air University Review, 1974 Archived 2013-02-25 at the Wayback Machine, a detailed analysis of the concept and leaders by a World War II strategic bombing planner
- "Bombing of Schweinfurt," from the Third Reich in Ruins webpage by Geoff Walden – then-and-now photos of the bombing of Schweinfurt.
- "Reality... Remembering Scheinfurt" by Wally Hoffman Archived 2010-01-27 at the Wayback Machine – a first hand account of the bombing raids over Schweinfurt by a member of the 8th Air Force.