Talk:Consciousness/Archive 2

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"Now mankind can receive the reasonable partner capable to help with satisfaction of any imaginable desires."

Michael Zeldich

Introduction

In our opinion in order to fulfill the requirements to the system capable of understanding what it is doing the new class of devices should be developed.

That class of devices will differ from all the currently known devices in the computer field, because they will be subjective.  Subjective nature could bring to that class of devices the ability to learn instead of to be programmed. That, in turn, raises the question of how to motivate them to perform the tasks which are necessary for the owner. It is known that at MIT, for example, researchers are developing the basic principles of building the robotic society where members of it could be motivated by programmed analog for human moral rules.    

We could propose the different way of motivation. Projected systems could be motivated according to desire of the motivator.

The Basic concepts

In our opinion, there is no reason to attempt to develop the “Consciousness” system. The theories of "Consciousness" have described its properties by explaining the behavior of the system. Every known explanation of its properties actually is a description of some act of the behavior 1 of the "conscious" system. We believe that it is possible to develop the subjective systems which will behave in reasonable way. However, the problem is not only in the designated terms. Our opinion is that the concept of "Consciousness", in a technical sense, isn’t a valid one. It is a thought up, nonexistent phenomenon. The theories are attributing the various properties to "Consciousness", but it is not proven that it is possible to define it in a scientifically consistent way. Assumption that “Consciousness” is really existing phenomenon, inevitably leads to necessity, to place the central managing body inside of the brain, but that is in contradiction with the known facts. Nevertheless, attempts to create and study “Consciousness” systems still continue. The last, known to me attempt to design the elements of a “Consciousness” systems was based on micro-tubular structure theory proposed by professors Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff. As a result of that study, according to the authors of the theory, connections between a micro-tubular structure and “Consciousness” has not been established. We have opinion, that the term “Reason” instead of the controversial terms “Cognitive”, “Consciousness” or "Artificial Intelligence" makes more sense for a description of the subject.

We can judge about the abilities of the system to be reasonable only by the phenomenon of its observable behavior. The hierarchy of subjective models which reflect its past experience determines the behavior of the system. The control system aspires to receive the greatest positive reaction on the part of itself, and other reasonable systems, if it is a member of the society, by establishing the models of behavior (1).

The summary of the above is:

"The system is reasonable, if it is capable to determine its own behavior, be guided by its own, subjective representation about the World known to it."

There is no rationality without subjectivity!

The World is given to us by subjective representation!

We believe that creation of the reasonable systems could be directed by these ideas. The reasonable system can’t be guided directly by any finite set of programs. Almost all that is necessary for the development of the discussed system could be derived from these statements.

(1. the term “behavior” is describes all that is happening with the system under influence of it’s own internal causes. For example, speech, mind, perceiving, feeling at al. are kinds of behavior.)

Here is an analogy: Consciousness:Cells as Culture:Population So consciousness is a culture formed by the interaction of all the cells in a human. 72.209.71.249 03:12, 10 December 2006 (UTC)ME:)

And I say, Consciousness is our true identity, it is who and what we truly are. You are Consciousness. You are the eternal witness, the only aspect of Creation that never change. The mind is only a tool for us (Consciousness). With it (mind) we can imagine, with it we may experience anything, whatever we choose. We have six senses, smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing and the sixth with which we may perceive higher dimensions, energies and beings. With the sixth sense we can perceive beyond the limits of our flesh and behold the True Nature of Reality. /Minoya 18:07, 14 December 2006 (UTC)

This section is about the description and location of phenomenal consciousness, not the "nature" of consciousness. Another section is needed for the latter.

The assertion about Descartes' description of conscious experience in this article has been challenged, references for this assertion are given below and an extended discussion can be found in the archive.

References for Descartes' description of phenomenal consciousness as things laid out in space and time and viewed from a point:

• 1. The soul/mind is unextended (a point): "... And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, [that is, my mind, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it." (Meditations VI, 9)

Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/Meditation6.html

• 2. He considers that the soul/mind is looking at the pineal gland: "By this means the two images which are in the brain form but one upon the gland, which, acting immediately upon the soul, causes it to see the form of the animal."(passions of the soul 356).

• 3. Descartes defines ideas as extended things (this is not the common usage of the term and causes confusion for students): "Now among these figures, it is not those imprinted on the external sense organs, or on the internal surface of the brain, which should be taken to be ideas - but only those which are traced in the spirits on the surface of gland H (where the seat of the imagination and the 'common sense' is located). That is to say, it is only the latter figures which should be taken to be the forms or images which the rational soul united to this machine will consider directly when it imagines some object or perceives it by the senses. And note that I say 'imagines or perceives by the senses'. For I wish to apply the term 'idea' generally to all impressions which the spirits can receive as they leave gland H. These are to be attributed to the 'common' sense when they depend on the presence of objects; but they may also proceed from many other causes (as I shall explain later), and they should then be attributed to the imagination. (Treatise of Man)"

• 4. Cartesian Ideas are clearly described as phenomenally extended: "2. But before considering whether such objects as I conceive exist without me, I must examine their ideas in so far as these are to be found in my consciousness, and discover which of them are distinct and which confused. (3) In the first place, I distinctly imagine that quantity which the philosophers commonly call continuous, or the extension in length, breadth, and depth that is in this quantity, or rather in the object to which it is attributed. Further, I can enumerate in it many diverse parts, and attribute to each of these all sorts of sizes, figures, situations, and local motions; and, in fine, I can assign to each of these motions all degrees of duration."(Meditation V). Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/Meditation5.html

• 5. This description of Descartes' concept of conscious experience is found in other encyclopedias: "Descartes is offering a broadly representational picture of how ideas might relate to reality. Ideas of particular objects 'represent' the world. This in turn has several consequences. (a) Ideas are different from things in the world. (This already moves Descartes towards a broadly realist epistemology, and thus can be interestingly contrasted with the idealism of Berkeley.) (b) Ideas (at least of secondary qualities) do not resemble the world: my idea or feeling of hunger (to take one of Descartes' favorite examples) has no resemblance to whatever may be happening in my stomach, if I have a stomach." [http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/descarte.htm#SH7d Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Reid has a similar concept of a point, unextended soul/mind looking at things:

".. I take it for granted, upon the testimony of common sense, that my mind is a substance-that is, a permanent subject of thought; and my reason convinces me that it is an unextended and invisible substance; and hence I infer that there cannot be in it anything that resembles extension" Reid, T. (1764). An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Edited by Brookes, Derek. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997.

"It is therefore acknowledged by this philosopher to be a natural instinct or prepossession, a universal and primary opinion of all men, a primary instinct of nature, that the objects which we immediately perceive by our senses are not images in our minds, but external objects, and that their existence is independent of us and our perception." (Thomas Reid Essays, 14)"

Plato has a similar concept:

"And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on -- the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?"(The Republic)

As have many other philosophers... loxley 09:27, 21 October 2005 (UTC)

I don't like this part: "Evidence from parapsychology of psychokinesis or telepathy, if substantiatied, might support the theory that the location of consciousness is not confined to the brain." Why would telepathy, if substantiated, support this? Also, it seems that telepathy is given too much credit here. Any Ideas on how to reword this?

After mulling this over for a while, I've made a few changes to correct for POV. The most obvious change is that I removed an entire section entitled "Consciousness - My Guessplanation", because it contained nothing relevant to the article. A personal view of consciousness is POV by definition, and a "guessplanation" clearly constitutes research by the auhtor. Frankly, I'm surprised that this section wasn't cut out earlier.

The other changes, aside from some grammar and such, were focused on removing \very clear bias towards the Chalmers school. I toned down apparent endorsements and made reference to views that differ from his. The issue is genuinely controversial, so we must remain NPOV.

As always, I'm wide open to suggestions for corrections, further research and so on. Alienus 07:25, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Ah, so you are here now Alienus. Correcting POV to Dennett. Anyhow, you asked for suggestions: this article needs a section on access consciousness - a new heading below "The description and location of consciousness" (which is largely about phenomenal consciousness). loxley 09:25, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Your changes were blatantly POV and amounted to nothing short of vandalism. I am disgusted. Alienus 09:31, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

No, they were not vandalism. Dennett 1988 clearly redefines qualia as 'judgements'. Is your disgust a state or a process? loxley 12:10, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

With all due respect, your grasp of Dennett's work is underwhelming. Dennett doesn't redefine qualia, he simply denies that they exist. In fact, a chapter of that book (which I hope you actually read all the way through) is entitled "Qualia Disqualified". Can't get any clearer than that. Dennett's stance is that cooked feels exist, but raw ones do not. As is often the case, you use "redefined" as a not-so-subtle insult, which it typical of a POVandal. Alienus 12:17, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

When I wrote 1996, I meant 1996. Check the reference list instead of damaging text through your ignorance. Alienus 12:22, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Come on alienus, you can't go round saying your correcting POV when what you are doing is inserting Dennett's philosophy! Look at the 1988 paper, Dennett defines qualia as judgements. My report is impartial and allows the reader to assess the position. Why do you keep removing it? We both agree that Dennett has changed the meaning of the term "qualia" - why are you being so coy? loxley 12:28, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

As I've pointed out already, Dennett defines qualia the same way everyone else does. Where he differs from people like Chalmers is that he argues against their existence. Now, if you want to support your claim that Dennett has some alternate definition, then I'll be glad to listen. In the absence of support from verifiable sources, I cannot distinguish your changes from simple POV.

Speaking of POV, it's terribly dishonest to accuse me of what you are guilty of. Wherever you touch down, you erase or slander Dennett's ideas. Sometimes the damage is from ignorance, as you really do not have a solid understanding of his stance, but often the changes seem to serve no purpose but to make him look bad. This is embarassing for you, and I'm at the point where I'm going to have to give up repeating myself and instead take this to a higher authority. Alienus 12:35, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Dennett defines qualia as the behavioural results of judgements. In consciousness explained Dennett defines qualia as "mechanically accomplished dispositions to react". Look it up, you've got the book. So according to Dennett something is 'blue' provided it gives rise to the verbal output "blue" (heterophenomenology) or the reaction to the physical wavelength 'blue'.

In "Qining Qualia" http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm (esp. Section 4) Dennett says:

"The infallibilist line on qualia treats them as properties of one's experience one cannot in principle misdiscover, and this is a mysterious doctrine (at least as mysterious as papal infallibility) unless we shift the emphasis a little and treat qualia as logical constructs out of subjects' qualia-judgments: a subject's experience has the quale F if and only if the subject judges his experience to have quale F."

Yes, Dennett defines qualia as the behavioural results of judgements. I am not anti-Dennett, I just think we should not suppress his true ideas. Please take this to a higher authority. loxley 12:50, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

<Commenting on the phrase in Turing Test--Alan Turing proposed what is now known as the Turing test to determine if a computer could simulate human conversation undetectably. This test is commonly cited in discussion of artificial intelligence. See Chinese room.>

From Joseph E. LeDoux The Emotional Brain: the Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life; 1996; ISBN: 0684836599; p.281.

However, it is not clear that consciousness is computable. Philip Johnson-Laird reminds us that a computer simulation of the weather is not the same thing as rain or sunshine. Working memory theories, in dealing with consciousness in terms of processes rather than as content, try to explain what kinds of computational functions might be responsible for and underlie conscious experiences but they do not explain what it is like to have those experiences? These theories provide an account of the way human minds work, in a general sense, rather than an account of what a particular experience is like in a particular mind. They can suggest how a representation might be created in working memory but not what it is like to be aware of that representation. They suggest how decision processes in working memory might lead to movement but not what it is like to actually decide to move. In other words, working memory is likely to be an important, and possibly an essential, aspect of consciousness. It is in fact likely to be the platform on which a conscious experience stands. But consciousness, especially its phenomenal or subjective nature, is not completely explained by the computational processes that underlie working memory, at least not in a way that anyone presently comprehends.

Yesselman 22:31, 30 December 2005 (UTC)

Is a fly conscious of the presence of your hand as you try to swat it? This level of consciousness is already attainable by computers. If you describe conciousness as the kind of infinately extended cognition that we see in humans, then this will become available to computers once we have developed sufficiently capable neural net machines, since the physical mechanisms of the human brain are actually not very hard to simulate. In terms of the article in general, someone should point out that some level of consciousness is clearly exhibited by most higher mammals, but it seems only humans have infinately extended cognition. By this I mean that a dog may anticipate a beating from a bad owner, but it cannot anticipate that beating may come in 2 months time. Only humans posess the kind of cognition that allows them to take decisions now, based on rational extrapolation of distant consequences. I think while the article is an accurate compilation of philosophical aspects of conciousness, it doesn't really touch upon recent (last few decades) discoveries about the mechanisms of the brain leading to conciousness, or recent developments in AI.

--Furrypig 01:07, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

Yesselman confuses complexity of cognition with the actuality of consciousness. The more complex computers become only increases the sophistication (speed and algorithims) of physical processes. However, it is clear that qualia are purely "out of the dark" and personally observable, unlike a bunch of electrons bouncing around on silicon.

I noticed some debate over Dennett's position on qualia. I'm not very sure about it myself, and the fact that I disagree with Dennett doesn't make it easy for me to understand his view fairly. But I've always understood that he basically believed qualia didn't exist. According to this website [1]: "But, Dennett says, let's be clear: there are no such things as qualia". That seems to coincide with how I've come to understand Dennett, i.e. he's a physicalist.

Loxley, do you have a reference to show "Dennett maintains that qualia exist in terms of judgements or beliefs"?

My guess (and I've never read much directly written by him) is that he believes that qualia do not exist, but that we've somehow fooled ourselves by confusing judgements and beliefs with qualia. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 13:10, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

Yes, you are right. Dennett does not believe that qualia, in the sense of "ineffable qualia" exist:

"The infallibilist line on qualia treats them as properties of one's experience one cannot in principle misdiscover, and this is a mysterious doctrine (at least as mysterious as papal infallibility) unless we shift the emphasis a little and treat qualia as logical constructs out of subjects' qualia-judgments: a subject's experience has the quale F if and only if the subject judges his experience to have quale F. We can then treat such judgings as constitutive acts, in effect, bringing the quale into existence by the same sort of license as novelists have to determine the hair color of their characters by fiat. We do not ask how Dostoevski knows that Raskolnikov's hair is light brown" Daniel C Dennett. (1988). Quining Qualia. in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds, Consciousness in Modern Science, Oxford University Press 1988. Reprinted in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader, MIT Press, 1990, A. Goldman, ed. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, 1993. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

The important point here is: "a subject's experience has the quale F if and only if the subject judges his experience to have quale F". So Dennett defines qualia as judgements or beliefs (processes). What is interesting however is that Dennett does not deny that we have conscious experience. He agrees that conscious experience contains coloured things arranged in space but the colours belong to the things in space, not the mind. This is why I was so keen to keep the reference to Dennett's ideas on the plenum.

The section is on phenomenal consciousness and it appears as if Dennett is one of those who believe that the content of conscious experience is external to "mind". This gives us a real problem if we want to provide a compact description of Dennett's ideas: colour is a property of the world outside the body, colour is part of "conscious experience", the word "qualia" is redefined as a judgement and ineffable qualia do not exist. If you can put this information into an acceptable form I would be grateful.

I just added "Dennett believes that "ineffable, intrinsic, private" qualia do not exist (Dennett 1988)." as a first shot. loxley 16:00, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

continuation of Loxley's comment...

Our really big problem here is the way that eliminativists can change the meaning of words as part of their program of replacing "folk psychology". I would have reserved the term "qualia" for the "conscious experience" containing a sensation such as the colour blue. According to Dennett and others this "blue" might be a property of a surface in the world but notice that they still use the term "conscious experience" to describe it. To me this blue is the quale. But Dennett shifts the term "qualia" from the "blue" in "conscious experience" in the world to a judgement about this experience and confuses the discussion. Notice that Dennett has not actually denied that qualia exist, in the sense of the term that everyone else understands, he has simply redefined the term to mean a process in the brain rather than what he believes is a "conscious experience" in the world. So here we have a classic "Dennettism", Dennett can say he believes that the qualia that he has defined are nothing special, being no more than processes and leaves the qualia that everyone else understands largely unexplained.

So how can we cover the two uses of the term "qualia" in a general text without explaining the background in 4 or 5 paragraphs and giving eliminativists far more attention than other "isms"? loxley 15:14, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

It's not that Dennett has some misleading, private definition of qualia. In fact, his definition matches that of, say, Chalmers. Dennett's four-part definition of the essential qualities of qualia is widely accepted, and even featured in our qualia article (demonstrating that opposing something does not mean your view is ignorant or contrary). So please never say again that Dennett redefines qualia. He might be happy if the word had a different meaning, but he's not about to change it himself.

Ultimately, the place where Dennett differs from Chalmers is not the definition, but the denial that anything matching the definition exists. In specific, he freely admits that we see red, but denies that this phenomenal perception can really be separated from our behavior and behavorial dispositions; our judgements about the data.

In other words, nobody is denying that we have cooked feels; the issue is whether there can be raw feels. In denying the existence of raw feels, Dennett is saying that what we're pointing at when we say qualia is actually a cooked feel. In this way, Dennett is more behaviorist than eliminativist. Alienus 17:06, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

Talking of cooking, it looks like you have cooked the qualia article! Dennett is not the world's leading authority on qualia. The article needs attention. loxley 18:21, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

Don't worry, I'll be quick to revert any damage you cause. Alienus 19:11, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

I'm starting to think that there are numerous, somewhat incompatible, definitions of qualia. There's a long article here about it [2]. I haven't read much of it yet. But basically I think I might decide that the word is useless and that there's no point deciding who has the right definition.

Also, there's something weird about arguing about the definition of a word (or even about the existence of a argument!) - consider the No true Scotsman fallacy. Somebody should coin a number of new words, and stop the alleged problem of people redefining words as a lazy way to make their statements true. This definitely happens in some parts of consciousness/brain research - some AI researchers will claim to have replicated a child's intelligence based on the fact that his robot could navigate as effectively as a toddler, totally ignoring the fact that toddlers do more than crawl towards food. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 01:15, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Well, if there are multiple definitions in use, we need to mention all of them, though not equally. Alienus 01:35, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Has Dennett explicitly stated that the 4 'properties' listed at qualia are his definition of qualia? As opposed to merely (true) statements about qualia? Obviously a 'true statement' isn't necessarily a 'definition'. Indeed, where a 'true statement' and the 'definition' coincide, we have a useless truism. So I think it's important to find out whether he considers his 4 'properties' to be the definition or instead to be statements about qualia. The page I linked to above [3] seems to put Dennett's theories down to a confusion over definition. e.g. (this quote needs to be read in the context of the whole article):

Philosophers who deny that there are qualia often have in mind qualia as the term is used in the senses specified in this section. [But] sometimes their target is qualia conceived of as in the opening paragraph of the entry, but with the additional assumption (often not explicitly stated) that qualia are ineffable or nonphysical or ‘given’ to their subjects incorrigibly (without the possibility of error). Thus, announcements by philosophers who declare themselves opposed to qualia (e.g., Dennett 1987, 1991) need to be treated with some caution.

I guess the people who most strongly believe in qualia would also strongly believe that a definition cannot be written down easily. I'd be in that camp. But anyway, the funny thing about documenting multiple definitions of a word is that you have to also flag up which definition is in use every time 'qualia' appears in Wikipedia. Ideally, I'd like to coin new words qualia-1, qualia-2, qualia-3 et cetera and assign them to each of the conflicting definitions and then use these in Wikipedia - but of course that's impractical. Then philosophers might better realise why it is they so often misunderstand each other and then they might come up with a clearer set of definitions. It's like arguing over a definitions of 'good-looking', we all know what people mean when they say it, but it doesn't mean we agree on the details of height, hair colour et cetera of what would be a 'good-looking' person. Consider also the multiple, totally unrelated, meanings of 'right' - I think 'qualia' is in danger of becoming almost as multi-purpose as 'right'. I'm not blaming Dennett or anything, because to me it's the sort of thing that will always have multiple definitions. Even though I'm certain I know exactly why the hard problem is so damn hard, I can't think of how to write it down. The best I could do is a list of what qualia are not. What's the definition of a definition anyway?

To return to a definition of qualia, I don't think Dennett's is useful. For example, consider ineffable. While I do believe qualia are ineffable, I don't think this should be in the definition. In general, a true statement of X is not necessarily a definition of X. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 02:29, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

P.S. I don't know if I can take seriously a philosopher who writes something as arrogant as this!: [4] Just read the first paragraph. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 02:36, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Alienus has a standard technique of reverting any changes in an article to his own version then writing on the comment "(Opponent) stop edit warring now" or similar. This is done so that arbitrators/mediators will accuse the other party of edit warring!

Notice that Alienus has simply reverted my last edit entirely. I am not going to change the text now but would be very grateful if another editor of this article could examine the issue.

The last edit by Alienus was 19:09 1/2/06. loxley 09:05, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

I've just done this [5] to restore loxley's earlier quote. I really can't see how it could be described as controversial. Unless there's something obviously controversial that I've missed, I don't see the harm in leaving it in. Alienus, is it:

1. An inaccurate quotation? i.e. Dennett did not say those words?
2. Is it the text after the quote (about direct realism et cetera) that's at fault?
3. Is it perhaps out of context?
4. Is it pretty much true and fair, but simply long-winded and we can't go into too much detail about everything?

Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 12:35, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

1. The quote is accurate.
2. The text after the quote, categorizing Dennett as a direct realist is inaccurate. On a few occasions, I've tried removing the misleading commentary while leaving the quote, but this runs into other problems (see below).
3. It's out of context. The context of the quote is an attack on what he sees as Cartesian materialism, particularly the notion of phenomena "entering into" consciousness as if there were a little theater where it gets played for the homunculus. It is not a quote about direct realism.
4. I replaced it with a short, accurate sentence that explains exactly how Dennett sees the relationship between phenomenal and access consciousness. The quote, because it is irrelevant, adds nothing.

None of this is news to Loxley, though you might not have been familiar with my reasoning. Now that you are, I'm going to revert the change.

It would have been better if these issues had been resolved here before the article got changed, to avoid having it flip-flop. Please keep in mind that I know that, unlike Loxley, you're not interested in an edit war, and I don't take your change personally. I just think we can find a more effective procedure for resolving these issues. Alienus 14:23, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for the answers. I know you two have had disagreements before but I'm not going to get involved. I still have too much to learn about the subject anyway.

I'll get back to this talk page if/when I have any suggestions. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 15:06, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

I've been checking

direct realism

and I am thinking that Dennett is not a direct realist. But leaving that aside, I don't think it's fair to call Dennett a direct realist unless he is quoted saying that. Failing that, do we have a quote from another philosopher so we could say that "X says that Dennett's views are like direct realism"?

Apparently, direct realism is a theory that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the world, with no 'representations' getting in the way. Dennett says that judgements or qualia or something get in the way (or something like that). Whatever exactly Dennett believes, he believes there is something in the way. So he's not a direct realist. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 22:19, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Alienus has diverted this discussion. The text that was cut made no claim that Dennett is a direct realist. The text was:

However, Dennett does not believe that we have no conscious, phenomenal experience he proposes that: "When we marvel, in those moments of heightened self-consciousness, at the glorious richness of our conscious experience, the richness we marvel at is actually the richness of the world outside, in all its ravishing detail. It does not "enter" our conscious minds, but is simply available" (Dennett 1991). This relationship between "conscious experience" and "mind" is similar to that proposed in direct realism but Dennett does not use this term to describe it. Dennett also believes that phenomenal experience cannot be divorced from their associated behavior and behavioral dispositions, from the judgements we implicitly make about them.

There is no claim that Dennett is a direct realist. The quotation describes Dennett's approach to phenomenal consciousness in a section on phenomenal consciousness. The reason that this entry must be a quotation is that Dennett is very coy about labels or drawing labels about his realism onto himself. Alienus cut the text because he assumed it was calling Dennett a direct realist, I can assure him that this is not the case. Given that the text was cut in error I am restoring it. loxley 09:22, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

What puzzles me is why Alienus wants to censor any mention of Dennett's idea of phenomenal consciousness. Surely it is essential in a section on phenomenal consciousness? loxley 09:30, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Dennett and his ideas are already mentioned a few sentences earlier. I don't know of any controversy over the description there, so why fight over this quote and the associated analysis? I'm not happy with attempting to analyse his ideas too directly in Wikipedia, especially as Dennett avoid the labels as you say. If you can find a quote from another philsopher that compares/contrasts Dennett's ideas with direct realism, then we could discuss it. My guess is that the comparison is wrong, but my opinion doesn't matter, I think we should leave it out, at least until we can quote another philosopher as saying it. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 16:53, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Don't be puzzled; allow me to explain. Briefly, the quote doesn't make any sense out of context, and his OR summary is simply wrong. I've replaced it with another philosopher's summary of Dennett's response to the issue, using a direct quote. BTW, I do want to point out that endorsing a distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness is itself POV, as it sides with Block against Dennett. Typical bias from Loxley. Alienus 17:00, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Alienus has just reverted again without any discussion. Just the comment that the quote about phenomenal consciousness by Dennett was "worthless". This quote is from a philosopher who is difficult to label and explains his idea of phenomenal consciousness in his own words. It is essential for clarifying the debate. loxley 12:36, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

So long as you keep vandalizing, I will revert. Alienus 17:06, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Identical subjects. Lapaz 04:57, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

That is a highly debatable assertion. The Wikipedia way of connecting concepts that appear to be connected is to describe the arguable connection in the "conscience" article and then have a link to consciousness. loxley 09:13, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. Conscience is not the same thing as consciousness, although they share etymological roots. Unless someone suppports your suggestion, I think we need to remove the tag that mentions the proposed merger. Alienus 15:39, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Oppose merge. Seperate subjects. — goethean ॐ 16:33, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Oppose merge. It wouldn't do any harm to mention Locke's quote and have links between the articles. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 16:40, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

I move that we consider this settled. If ANYONE AT ALL supports this merge, we can always reopen the issue. Alienus 17:08, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

I certainly do not consider it as easily settled. Merge template is here to initiate discussions, don't bypass it by a simple removal of it. If there is a true justification for two separate articles on very similar article, it should at least be debated here & explained in each pages. Which is not, for the time being, the case (as in: "consciousness" differs from "conscience" because...), which should be done at the very beginning of the article. Otherwise, it is just confusing, as the difference between themselves is far away from being as obvious as some of you would have it, both from a layman perspective and from a philosophical perspective. So, please excuse my ignorance, but could you please explain both here and make the distinction in the beginning of the article which, according to you, really justifies making forks on similar subjects? Lapaz 16:56, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

Another little comment: of course i understand that

Essay Concerning Human Understanding

, where the two are closely intertwined. Beside, Locke has been said to be the inventor of the modern sense of the word "consciousness", so it is interesting to see how, according to him, conscience & consciousness are one & the same thing. How would you feel guilt for something you are not conscious of? "And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God; who, as far as the happines or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it." (§15 "Whether in Change of thinking Substances there can be one Person", in Chapter 27 "Of Identity & Diversity").

Unfortunately, it is not simply a matter of sticking a tag on a page to incite debate: you also need to present a decent reason for doing so. Clearly, it is the opinion of none of the editors who responded here nor of the one editor who responded on the Conscience page that this is not an appropriate suggestion. Moreover, a cursory glance over the two pages in question shows no discernable overlap.

That said, you pose, as near as I can tell, two arguments for why they should be identified: 1) that they are closely linked by Locke and 2) the rhetorical "How would you feel guilt for something you are not conscious of?". In reply to #2, then, it is psychologically tenable to feel guilt for something one isn't conscious of (which is to say I can be conscious of feeling guilty, but unaware of what, exactly I feel myself to be guilty for).

Now you're point about 1) could be interesting, however, you seem to be confusing the psychological feeling of a job well-done or of guilt with the "reward or punishment for it". Contextually, this "reward or punishment" seems to refer not to some psychological state, but to a juridical sense, that is a sense whereby it is possible to be judged guilty or innocent. Furthermore, this identification of consciousness and conscience is not, I think, terribly rigorous. Consciousness, in Locke's sense, is that which identifies a person as a person; therefore, wherever there is a person, there is a conscious entity. Conscience, however, is not innate, and thus, Locke provides the dramatic example: "View but an army at the sacking of a town, and see what observation or sense of moral principles, or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure." (§9 in Chapter 2 "No Innate Practical Principles" of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding). Thus, consciousness (which surely even these marauders have) is not the same as or necessarily linked with conscience (which they obviously don't have).

Clearly, of course, this leaves the possiblity that conscience implies consciousness, in the sense that I feel guilty for my own actions, but many other things (e.g. pain, emotion, the ability to use language, and "lived experience") have been taken as indicators of consciousness, yet they are all understandable (as is conscience) outside of a discussion to consciousness, and similarly a discussion of consciousness could be understood without them.

Finally, and etymologically, a differentiation between conscius and conscientia is apparent in some Latin authors (e.g. Cicero), though it isn't quite the differentiation we have today it does point to it: conscius is knowledge of oneself, whereas conscientia is the knowledge of right and wrong.

All that said, I would like to second Alienus' motion and move that we eliminate the tag. — Ig0774 00:21, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

Oppose magna cum lauda Somebody needs to break out their wiktionary. Conscience is the

Jimminy Cricket in you that tells you something is morally wrong. Consciousness is awareness that you exist. These are totally different. I will boldly remove merge flag. MPS

04:34, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

Thank you. — Ig0774 05:10, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

In my opinion, in an article, there should be a balance between the complexity of an article and the simplicity of an article. Please admit with me that in order to comprehend this article, one would have to be a material expert of the philosophy of the mind and it's consciousness, or at least possess a great ammount of intelligence, in addition to knowledge. This article is not balanced in this virtual scale. It is deeply tipped toward complexity, and while it might offer more information than if it were simpler, it is very hard to comprehend. I believe this is a problem, and while I cannot quote any wikipedia policy, I believe something should be changed, or perhaps a summary be given. Granted it would be very hard to summarize the article into something that would be easier to understand...

Opinions?

silvarbullet1 _|^|_| Contribs 10:50pm, 14 May 2006 GMT

I recently reverted some text by 209.135.109.15, which came uncited and looked like it was a rehash of popularizations of QM consciousness. Unfortunately, 209.135.109.15 seems to be new to Wikipedia and doesn't know how to deal with disagreement, so they've edit-warred to get their text kept. I am instead asking that they come here and discuss what I object to about it so that we can come to some consensus. Alienus 07:09, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

Yet another artical on an infinitely vast and endlessly controversial topic which I will have to rescue from edit wars and other nonsense (if I ever have the time and health/energy)? Ok...I can't look it over just now. First criticism: there are a lot of refernces but the article is badly referenced. For some clue on the meaning of this enigmatic assertion, please see my FA

"According to some recent theories like infomysticism, technognosticism, involving also quantum physics, regarding quants as 'messenger particles' (carriers of information, so quantum non-locality/teleportation is simply a matter of 'resetting a value'), and all the physical universe is based on underlying information (bits of some 'nature's binary code', more basic than even vibration) - consciousness is understood as a symbiosis (interaction) of Mind and Information. Mind (or soul) is, as manifestation of the essence, non-physical, and Mind (on any level in pantheistic aspect) emanates from The Spirit (the totality of manifestable essence). Mind is a 'driver', and the associated organic form (material body) is its 'vehicle' (for this physical world). And the morphic field of the mind's past (a complex abstract/energetic form) is the 'baggage' of an individual. Morphic fields (term introduced by Rupert Sheldrake) are the universal database of experience.

Consciousness, as the interaction of mind/soul (essence) and information (quantum energy and information from morphic fields/hyperplanes) is what a complete living self is (driver + vehicle + baggage). The 'modern gnostic prophet' Philip K. Dick defined a person in Gnosis, as a symbiosis of Mind and Information, considering heightened consciousness as achieved Gnosis/insight, necessary for the self-realization and salvation from Demiurge's Hysterema (world of imperfection and suffering). Self-realization through Gnosis would mean that (high) consciousness gets preserved after physical death somehow (and 'vehicle' successfully transformed from matter into 'pure energy')."

Ndru01

Ok, first of all there is certainly no justification for adding it to the lead section (which is already extremely overdone). The lead of ANY article is supposed to 4 paragraphs Maximum. Secondly, the grammar is bad and the style of expression make the paragaphs almost unintelligible to me (what would the lay reader think??). But these problems could be dealt with. The main problem is that there seem to be no references. For example, it starts out thus: "Accordinf to some recent theorists...." Who? and where were these theories published? There are many other such factual assertions throughout which nedd to be verifiable (see

WP:NOR (no Original Research). --Lacatosias

09:44, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

I did notice some minor mistakes in expression and made changes. Also, through google easily references can be found to Erik Davis or Steve Mizrach. Also I mentioned Rupert Sheldrake (leading scientist in the field of telepathy and extended mind today with revolutionary theory of morphic fields (Formative Causation)), and additional reference (some might find it very useful) to Philip K Dick. So nothing is 'hidden'... Maybe I should have mentioned David Bohm as well, but he is referenced in this article anyways: http://www.fiu.edu/~mizrachs/techgnosis.html (comes through google with search 'infomysticism' among the first ones, and the one that is the most complete of the links that return with a search). And I mentioned Bohm under my addition to 'Demon' entry, that is also for some reason for someone problematic to be presented...

greetings Ndru01

Ok, then, the problem now,as I see it, is to fidn a way of including this information which does NOT misrepresent it as being scientifically verified or in any way part of the mainstream of view of the vast majority of scientists and of the fiedl of consciousness studies in general. Parapsyhcology is, of course, interesting and might deserve a mention, but only as a rather marginal view. I will see if I can deal with the matter in one of the sub-sections or create a separate section to deal with the majoroity view (againts parapsi) and the minority view, so that they are balanced.--Lacatosias 10:24, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

__________

Ok, some different organizing of text might be indeed a better solution... Just, speaking of using words, I have to say that Rupert Sheldrake is pure strict science. For a rational objective mind, even Darwin is more 'parapsychology' than Sheldrake (since Sheldrake's explanation of evolution is more complete than Darwin's, coming 'on top of it'), or some Dawkins with his unbelievable 'selfish genes' certainly more 'parapsychology' than Sheldrake... Term '(today's) alternative science' although also unfortunate is however much better than 'parapsi'...

greetings, Ndru01

ps. Ok, I agree my text to be where you put it now... Thx.

No. It's not that Sheldrake has ONLY done parapsyhcology but that he has been involved in work (telepathy and such matters are CERTAINLY categorized as paraphyschology even by their proponents) in parapsyhcology. Life-after death is, strictly speaking, part of [[thanatology], I suppose. The whole thing might be summarized perhaps as "alternative science", for lack of something better. Anybody else have some suggestions.--Lacatosias 11:28, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

_________________________

It was recently suggested (by Dawkins, the somewhat opponent of Sheldrake, but obviously interested in subject of telepathy himself) to, regarding telepathy, change its categorization from paranormal to perinormal, and this, as I understood, is now under consideration by the scientific community. This would mean the soon telepathy won't be anymore under 'parapsychology' as well, but under 'peri-psychology', or 'peri-science' or whatever...

greetings, Ndru01

Whoever put the cleanup tag on this article has a good point. I think a lot of the article should be shifted to Awareness. Especially the bits about:

• Philosophical criticisms
• Class consciousness
• Access consciousness

The way the article is going it will end up with "Political consciousness" and "fashion consciousness" as subheadings! All these things are Awareness, not the phenomenon of consciousness. Even Dennett's ideas are really about awareness and spoil the article as a feature about the phenomenon of consciousness itself ie: I am conscious and I am also conscious OF x - being conscious OF x is awareness. Machines can be aware.

See http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/consciou.htm#SSH4b.i

Some of the confusion may be due to linguistic problems, for instance in Russian the word "consciousness" has overtones of social knowledge. See http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000239/

Robinhw 00:13, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps a disambiguation page would be in order? Since the word here gets overloaded with so many different meanings. DanielDemaret 09:45, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

As the entry explain, there is kind of a problem with the English word "consciousness", since it comes from the French "conscience". Shifting parts such as the philosophical criticisms (or concepts such as class consciousness) to awareness would be, IMO, wrong, as it would miss the important issue about this difficult translation. I don't know if I'm clear, but we are not talking here only about linguistic concerns, but also about the philosophical difficulties of translation. You may think that it would be far more relevant to having parts on "political consciousness" in the "awareness" title, and think it is in no way related to ordinary "consciousness". But this is discutable, if you understand the different senses at stake in this problematic translation. Lapaz 01:41, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

...needs some cleanup. Techgnosticism gets 33 googlehits — non-notable. Infomysticism, 74 googlehits. Original research. — goethean ॐ 19:13, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

That's why it has been removed. But we have an edit warrior on our hands who inists on having it in on pain of spamming my email adress to death.--Lacatosias 07:55, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm sorry if some emails are being automatically sent, but that is simply not my fault... I would very much like to turn off that automatic thing if it is possible, so please advice how to turn it off... Alternative science maybe needs some minor 'cleanup', but please let it stay as a section. And I don't see the relevance of how many google hits something gets to the subject itself, the hits are just a measure of popularity and not of the real value of something.

Ndru01 11:55, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Spamming is absolutely unacceptable. I think that's a bannable offense. — goethean ॐ 15:38, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Why was alternative science again deleted? I agree that 'spamming' is something wrong, but editing something many times with very minor edits in order to perfect the text cannot be anything wrong, but the opposite Ndru01 11:57, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Spam is unsolicited email. It has nothing to do with editing Wikipedia articles. — goethean ॐ 17:52, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

_______________

Yes, I know that, and I never sent any unsolicited emails to anyone. So I really don't know what did Lacatosias mean when he said "spamming my email adress to death", I was equally surprised as you.

Ndru01

Now, don't lie. You know perfectly well that you sent two or unsolicited emails. I'm glad that you have stopped, of course. But, anyway, this has nothing to do with your edit warring on this page. Stop doing that as well, please!!--Lacatosias 10:24, 1 April 2006 (UTC)

____________________________________

If word 'science' is so disputable, then my text certainly should be allowed to go under 'Modern Mysticism', whatever logic and intepratation of words you may try to impose.

Sincere bestwishes, Ndru01 14:46, 1 April 2006 (UTC)

ps. I still don't know what you mean by unsolicited email. If you mean my editing the article shortly before I officially registered, I apologize for that, but I didn't understand that is such a big crime, otherwise it shouldn't be allowed in the first place (anonimous editing). So I am not a liar, I didn't lie about anything.

Editing wikipedia articles, whether anonymously or with an account, will not result in email being sent to anyone. User:Lacatosias, I suggest that you either forward the offending emails to an administrator or drop the subject. — goethean ॐ 20:38, 1 April 2006 (UTC)

__________________________________

Either Alienus or Latacosias deleted my text again. It wasn't under Alternative Science anymore, but under Modern Mysticism. Can they please explain why can't it remain as Modern Mysticism, since it is certainly relevant to the subject and is undoubtedly Modern Mysticism (if it is not Alternative Science):

According to some recent theories like Infomysticism and TechGnosticism that base themselves on

Interesting to note is that the famous science-fiction writer Philip K. Dick (the 'modern gnostic prophet') defined a homoplasmate, a person 'in Gnosis', as a symbiosis of mind and information (similarly to the mentioned theories), considering heightened consciousness as achieved Gnosis (or insight), necessary for the self-realization and salvation from the Demiurge's hysterema (world of imperfection and suffering). Self-realization through Gnosis, if true, would mean that higher consciousness gets preserved after physical death somehow (and the 'vehicle' would be successfully transformed from matter into 'pure energy').

Ndru01 02:25, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

1) The way you sign your name is with ~~~~. Learn this or you'll look like a hopeless newb forever.

2) The quality of the text is unacceptably low. It's not cited and it's full of OR. It has no place here and I will revert it again if you try to edit war. Alienus 02:30, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

I though it said to use Ndru01 07:20, 2 April 2006 (UTC) or only Ndru01 . But ok, I'll put this time that hyperlinked as you said.

The text quality maybe isn't perfect, but it is however not low at all, it is made very understandable as much as possible, since the content is extremely complex. And because it involves many different things, I don't know what exactly to cite, since I cannot have 10 or 15 cites in that text. And why is it so necessary that my text have any cites, when of some 15 sections only 3 have cites, and the rest none. Plus through google, search: infomysticism gives the text (Infomysticism, Technosis and War against entropy) that is itself as whole better than citing something from it. I can mention Steve Mizrach (the author of that text), or Erik Davis, the author of books on Techgnosis. Ok, I'll put these 2 names now in a bracket in the first sentence after words Infomysticism and Technosticim, I should have done that in the first place. By OR I suppose you probably meant the dual expressions, like mind/soul, field/hyperplane, hierarchy/holarhy, human/animal, form/object, abstract/energetic, complex/sophisticated and generated/used. Well, what's wrong with them? Some people do like them, incl myself, and hold that they have more explanatory potential and make the understanding easier, not more complicated. This text actually somehow requires these expressions, since it needs to combine and merge things, the whole aspect is on merging and presenting the merged result, which in fact happens to revolves around consciousness, our subject. Of these expressions, maybe only complex/sophisticated wasn't quite right, that one should have been AND, not OR (/), but ok, I'll correct that too. The rest was all there for a valid reason, since they appeared first as single in some context, but later, the new context needed them together.

greetings, <Ndru01>Ndru01 07:23, 2 April 2006 (UTC)</Ndru01>

ps, didn't work the signature, let's try again differently Ndru01Ndru01 07:25, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Something else to consider is that if can't be expressed in intelligible English it simply doesn't belong in a general, popular Encyclopedia such as Wikipedia. You may want to try adding your material to the specialist Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy!! Give it a try. Good luck!! (;--Lacatosias 07:33, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

but what exactly is unintelligible in the text? Ndru01

ps. Ok I reduced the text now significantly, 9-10 rows are deleted from the end of the 1st paragrapsh, since that text can be found following the link to morphic fields, and can be however omitted here. I do try to be cooperative, as much as possible...

greetins Ndru01 16:59, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Will you please stop deleting the text whoever is doing that. It is now reduced and improved, so it should stay as it is.

Ndru01 22:00, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Nrdu, someone (I'm sorry I've forgotten the username again) has just created a new artcile and put your material in that article insetad of this one. Is this a satisfactory solution. We have to resolve this thing in some way. The consenus seems to be leave the material out of this article though. Or am I wrong? What does everybody suggest on this matter? --Lacatosias 09:19, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

ok, if my text is still controversial, it can be put some remark or comment at the end, if you consider necessary. So many 'controversial', most of them more controversial than this one (and much less relevant to some subject than this mine) exist with remarks in this project, so this one shouldn't with remarks (if necessary) be a problem either... Ndru01 15:27, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Ndru01: your text is at

Modern Gnosticism and is linked to from the "see also" section of the consciousness article. Let's work on improving your text at that article. — goethean ॐ

15:46, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Does anyone have a reference for the definition "quality"? as referring to consciousness?DanielDemaret 21:00, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

I haven't worked on this article. As far as Iìm concerened though, I would like to see every single sentence that is not common knowledge referenced in every single article on Wikipedia ( see the FA philosophy of mind).--Lacatosias 07:58, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

That would be ideal, of course. Lets start with a reference for the definition as a minimum requirement. Can anyone at all substantiate the current definition with a good reference?DanielDemaret 09:41, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

The Encylopedia American has a an interesting lead paragraph:

The term consciousness has wide variety of meanings. The two more technical applications (comment: I don't know they these are techincal applications) are as follows: (1) A person is conscious as long as his mental processes are going on, and he is unconscious when these felling, ideas, thoughts, etc. , are suspended. (2) Concsiousness also denotes a personìs awareness of his mental processes. By introspection, he can have some knowledge of what he is thinking, feeling and sensing.

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy says:

Concousness exists, but it resists definition. There are some criteria....It involes experinece or awareness. Human mental life has a phenonenla side, etc..

In the Encicopedia Garzantine di Filosofia (Italian), we have:

Conscsiousness is a term which, in the hisroty of Western thought, has assumed various specific menaings, independently from that of simple awareness:

Of course, one must note that,just as in German there is no word for mind, in Italian there is realy NO WORD for conscsiouness. Coscienza is used to indicate both conscience and consciousness.--Lacatosias 10:26, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

"Coscienza" is used to indicate both, so there is a word for "consciousness"! It's just not specific. The English "consciousness" word comes from the French "conscience", which, as in Italian, is the only word for both "conscience" and "consciousness". "Consciousness" appeared, as a sense, in the use of the word "conscience" in the French translation of Locke. Lapaz

• As I recall it, the first use of the word consciousness meant conscience, and then the word has been hijacked by different people for different uses.DanielDemaret 10:56, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

I think we've already been through the fact that this is not true.

GofG _|^|_| Contribs

12:56, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

• Dennet, Nagel and other philosophers all seem to mean different things by the word, and psychologists also differ in what they mean, not to speak of various theologians.DanielDemaret 10:58, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

All the more reason to clarify the meaning.

GofG _|^|_| Contribs

12:56, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

• By starting out this article with a definition, we seem to be saying that we know that the word has only one meaning, and that this meaning has many "key features". I think that this is totally misleading. The word has different connotations, and each connotation must be defined separately.DanielDemaret 11:01, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree.

GofG _|^|_| Contribs

12:56, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

1. Self-awareness
2. Political awareness
3. Sentience
4. The stream of consciousness (James)
5. ...
6. ...

DanielDemaret 14:03, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Or possibly a disambiguation page? Or a nifty little coloured table in a box to the right?DanielDemaret 14:08, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Surely Block has already pinned it down. There is phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Access consciousness includes self awareness, political awareness, Dennett's eliminativism, functionalism, the stream of consciousness etc. Access consciousness is really awareness. Phenomenal consciousness is the state of being; it has been described by Descartes, Kant and many philosophers. It is Chalmers' "hard problem" of consciousness. It involves space, time and content. Eliminativists and functionalists often consider that phenomenal consciousness is the world beyond the body and deny that it is important. Robinhw 22:46, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

• Yes, but in the article the right now, the word consciousness is still defined as a single quality, which is misleading. I am merely trying to get consensus on which editorial form that is most easily readable. I am not trying to re-make the list itself. Your suggestion on the form? DanielDemaret 23:45, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, I was being obscure above. You are right about the need to disambiguate. It seems clear that fashion consciousness and political consciousness etc. are separate subjects. Unfortunately political consciousness, self consciousness and access consciousness lie on a spectrum so that Marxists might claim that class consciousness or social consciousness is consciousness itself and Dennett would claim that access consciousness is consciousness itself. Most philosophers before the twentieth century would claim that none of these are consciousness and, following Kant would say that only phenomenal consciousness is consciousness itself.

Perhaps the introduction to the article could go back to its earlier version and include your list:

Consciousness is a quality of the

• Awareness
• Self-awareness
• Stream of consciousness
• Class consciousness
• Intentionality

This article is mainly about phenomenal consciousness.

Many cultures and religious traditions place the seat of consciousness in a soul separate from the body. In contrast, many scientists and philosophers consider consciousness to be intimately linked to the neural functioning of the brain, dictating the way by which the world is experienced.

Humans (and often other animals, as well) are variously said to possess consciousness,

An understanding of necessary preconditions for consciousness in the human brain may allow us to address important ethical questions. For instance, to what extent are non-human animals conscious? At what point in fetal development does consciousness begin? Can machines ever achieve conscious states? These issues are of great interest to those concerned with the ethical treatment of other beings, be they animals, fetuses, or in the future, machines.

In common parlance, consciousness denotes being

Robinhw 15:14, 1 April 2006 (UTC)

Neat. I have copied this to the intro. Geometer 10:39, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

The new intro is too long. It

Good points. Changed intro accordingly. Geometer 16:15, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Ok, it was indeed still long. Now it is finally reasonable length, since I didn't really need that part about quantum nonlocality, and the explanation that Gnosticism dates back to ancient times (instead just 'ancient Gnostics'):

Modern Gnosticism

According to some recent theories like TechGnosticism (

Interesting to note is that the famous science-fiction writer Philip K. Dick (the 'modern gnostic prophet') defined a homoplasmate, a person 'in Gnosis', as a symbiosis of mind and information (similarly to the mentioned theories), considering heightened consciousness as achieved Gnosis (or insight), necessary for the self-realization and salvation from the Demiurge's hysterema (world of imperfection and suffering). Self-realization through Gnosis, if true, would mean that higher consciousness gets preserved after physical death somehow (and the 'vehicle' would be successfully transformed from matter into 'pure energy').

So please, don't delete it now! Thanks, Ndru01 15:38, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

How many concepts of consciousness and cults are there out there? Having a section for each one in the consciousness article would be absurd. The section on Modern Gnosticism should be transferred out to

• I vote that it should be transferred out/removed. Robinhw 15:53, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
• I take issue with
  Modern Gnosticism article. Perhaps modern gnosticism is part of a larger group of notable views that can be referred to. — goethean ॐ
  16:11, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
• I vote to transfer. Most alteranative views MUST be exlcuded from the main body of the article or this thing will be eternally hopeless. Edmund Husserl is a major player and should not be counted as among most alterantive views (scientiology, tiny cults and groups invented on the Internet are better examples). --Lacatosias 16:18, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
• It's already transfered, and I'm Ok now with it. And the link under Misc is ok, although the link should maybe be under philosophy, since it is more relevant, but if you insist, Misc will be ok, as long as the link exists. Ndru01 17:04, 4 April 2006 (UTC)
• I vote for transfer. patrickw 13:24, 27 July 2006 (UTC)

---No---

Is the number of conscious beings that can exist at one point in time infinit? If so there must be an infinit number of potential identities. Common wisdom tells us that nothing is infinit. This problem can therefore be solved if only one identity exists. If so we are all the same person living different lives.

I'm not sure why "common wisdom" tells us that nothing is infinite — especially not when we are refering to potentialities and not realities (it may be hard to imagine that there are infinite conscious existences — though, in fact, Jainism asserts that there are — but there doesn't seem to be anything contradictory about asserting that there are infinitely possible ways to exist. But, in any case, there doesn't seem to be much of a way to figure out some sort of universal cap on the number of conscious beings.

Of course, the universe is held to be a finite size (but not a fixed size), so on the assumption that every conscious being takes up a fixed amount of space (Wb) and the universe is at any given moment a fixed size (Wu) the number of conscious beings that could exist at any given period of time is Wu / Wb. However, this formula is a little too simplistic, and a little bit silly. There is no reason to think that because there are potentially infinite conscious beings (if we are inclined to think that there are) that there are an infinite number of conscious beings. The latter simply does not follow from the former. Moreover, if we are "one person living different lives" we do not really do away with the problem you seem to raise. How is one identity in many "different" lives (each of which take up physical space) any different from multiple identities each living different lives? "Common wisdom" tells us that things cannot be infinite, including the number of lives of this putative "single identity".

The problem with assuming only "one identity" (by which I assume you mean one conscious entity) is that it blatantly falsifies conscious existence (specifically being conscious of things that I am not). Of course, one might claim (in line with certain theories of child development) that this sort of consciousness is not our initial experience as living beings. Nevertheless, these same theories of child development rely on the recognition of things that genuinely are not oneself as a stage of development.

Finally, one might point to a parallel problem: are there an infinite number of possible unconscious entities? Following the chain of reasoning above, this would seem to imply that all unconscious entities are one and the same thing or, in other words, that the universe was one whole thing. Then the problem to be raised is how do we account for the multiplicity of things? Do we refer to a concept such as maya (delusion), and thus imply that the universe as we experience it is nothing but a lack of understanding of our own true nature?

In short, on what grounds could we possibly assert that "only one identity exists"? Ig0774 19:06, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

This forumala although disturbing, solves many problems. (My english is not very good) Firstly, the number of possible beings that can exist at a point in time is only limited by the amount of space and matter available. If there is infinit space and matter available than an infinit number of beings can exist. If every being has a different identity then there must be something infinit that distinguishes all of them. Not only is infinity unattractive, there is no known physical mechanism to distinguish beings. For instance lets look at a classic problem involving quantum mechanics. We now know that in the future we will be able to make exact replications of objects through teleportation. Inorder to teleport an object it first has to be destroyed. Suppose we destroy a human then recreate him/her elsewhere. This is not a difficult concept to grasp. The problem arises when we destroy a human being and then recreate him/her in two or more locations. There will be no physical difference between the two humans yet you are saying they have different identities. Furthermore, which human is original identity? Even more troubling is that we are constantly being teleportated by natural means since motion is quantized. Why are we the same identity if we are teleported as one being, but different identities when we are teleported as two or more beings.

Secondly, there have been new breakthroughs in physics over the past decades. Entanglement is the instant communication between objects no matter the distance. Physics can only conclude that physical distance is not required for information to travel from one point to another. Furthermore, the study of black holes has led us to believe that we might be living in a two-dimensional universe. This has been named "Holographic Principle." Photons simply give the impression of higher dimensional space (recent issue Scientific American). If that is the case, this would solve your multiplicity issue. In addition the "Many Worlds Theory" could use simplifying. The theory attempts to explain quantum theory but requires dopplegangers. (google Many Worlds Theory)

Thirdly, how would you distinguish yourself from someone else. You can't! All you can do is say you have a different perspective, personality, etc. The problem is all these things rely on the brain which is physical. You cannot distinguish consciousness. You could be anyone and anyone could be you.

Fourthly, think about the following. What is the difference between being unborn or dead. There is no difference because you are not living in either case. Perhaps we occupy other lives before and after life. If so, this would not make any sense according to current notions.

The notion that only one identity exists solves all the above problems. You can question if there is only one identity, why are you so lucky to be alive. Well perhaps there are more identities outside our universe. According to string theory our universe is a single brane floating in an ocean of other brains. Current views regarding the mind seem impossible and are left unanswered. My formula answers many questions and simplifies the theory of the mind.

I've reinstaured the deleted part on John Locke. It certainly gave you some start of an answer to that interesting question you brought on: "How is one identity in many "different" lives (each of which take up physical space) any different from multiple identities each living different lives?" This part, for example: according to Locke, "one may claim to be a reincarnation of Plato, therefore having the same soul. However, one would be the same person as Plato only if one had the same consciousness of Plato's thoughts and actions that he himself did. Therefore, self-identity is not based on the soul. One soul may have various personalities. Self-identity is not founded either on the body or the substance, argues Locke, as the substance may change while the person remains the same: "animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance", as the body of the animal grows and change during its life. Take for example a prince's soul which enters the body of a cobbler: to all exterior eyes, the cobbler would remain a cobbler. But to the prince himself, the cobbler would be himself, as he would be conscious of the prince's thoughts and acts, and not of the cobbler's life. A prince's consciousness in a cobbler body: thus the cobbler is, in fact, a prince." Lapaz 01:55, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

Encyclopdeias render the unkown in terms of the known. "Conciousness" is is neither the known - or the unkown - but the knowing. Dictoinaries define words, so there should be just a list of links to the the mainstream (or significant) religions, and any research based science articles that may exist - nothing else at all.

Let's assume people know the meaning of this fairly everyday word and point them to some stuff they haven't seen, but exits (i.e. churches and experiments ect.) 86.135.97.90 04:50, 11 April 2006 (UTC)

No offence or anything, but the article kind of lacks a good, clean definition of "consciousness." One definition I've run into is "consciousness = awareness" and human consciousness = awareness that one is actually aware". Terryeo 04:00, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

Maybe we should ask ourselves if we want the article to have a "clear definition" of consciousness, or rather to offer a debate on the problems at stake in this philosophical problem. Since philosophers have been discussing this matter for several centuries, I doubt we will agree on a "good and clean definition". Lapaz 01:53, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

See the discussion above at Talk:Consciousness#Reference for definition of consciousness. There is no consensus definition extant, either here on Wikipedia, among philosophers, or scientists. --Blainster 09:02, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

I seems impossible to have a clear definition of consciousness, at least without being circular. We know what it is because we are instances of it. But imagine describing it to an unconscious artificially intelligent computer. What meaning could any possible definition have to a non-conscious entity? In short, to know one, you gotta be one. [User:Kornbelt|Kornbelt]] Oct 28, 2006

There is some activity on thought that might interest people who contribute to this article. Alienus 04:30, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

Oh no, not more of....well, you know what I mean.--Lacatosias 07:33, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

Oh, yes. Alienus 07:35, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

I rv the deletion of the part on Locke. While it can certainly be discussed, I think that the talk subsection here entitled "Identical identities" clearly show that Locke has addressed this kind of problem. Lapaz 01:53, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

This practice is deprecated. Font's should be sized either on personal preferences, or by using the .references-small { font-size: 90%;} class. See the extensive discussion --Blainster 21:11, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

Could the voice in my head be considered consciousness, and worth mentioning? For example, when I do math, or try to make something I'm about to say more tactful, I use spoken words in my head to see how it sounds first. Sometimes I will even agree with myself and ask myself questions, and then answer them. Perhaps this article already mentions it in an obsure technical way, and therefore I missed it. However, if that is the case, I have a belief that laymen's terms never hurt anyone. Or maybe this falls under thought?

I added two weasel tags because there are many parts of the article, especially those two sections, which contain phrases that are too vague to describe the sources. Some examples:

• Some philosophers suggest that consciousness resists or even defies definition. Who?
• Some philosophers call our current experience phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness), as contrasted with access consciousness (A-consciousness) Again, who? (Fixed by removal)
• Some philosophers have concentrated on reflexive processes to link one instant to the next, some on discriminations and differences between things in conscious experience and others on the overall behaviour of the organism Again, who? (Fixed by removal)
• Other philosophers, such as Nicolas Malebranche, John Locke, David Hume and Immanuel Kant, also agreed with much of this description, although some avoid mentioning the viewing point (see further reading below). What part of the reading further below desribes the people who avoid mentioning the view point? (Fixed ??? please check)
• From the eighteenth to twentieth centuries many philosophers concentrated on relations, processes and thought as the most important aspects of consciousness. These aspects would later become known as "access consciousness" and this focus on relations allowed some philosophers to claim that individual consciousness was dependent on such factors as social relations, politics and ideology. (Fixed by explicit mention of philosophers, this introductory para is expanded below)
• Some electroneurobiological interpretations of consciousness characterize this loss of consciousness as a loss of the ability to resolve time (similar to playing an old phonographic record at very slow or very rapid speed), along a continuum that starts with inattention, continues on sleep, and arrives to coma and death. What electroneurobiological interpretations?
• Some say that it is as if two separate minds now share the same skull, but both still represent themselves as a single "I" to the outside world. Who say that?
• Some have even argued that empirical tests of consciousness are intrinsically impossible. However, some researchers have devised tests to detect what they feel are certain aspects of consciousness. Again, who?
• The application to consciousness is that, according to some philosophers, anything capable of passing the Turing test as well as a person is necessarily conscious. Which philosophers?
• For these reasons, some consider this thought experiment to be misleading Who consider it misleading?

--Hcx0331 03:45, 26 Jul 2006

Yep, you have a point. I have put comments next to your items. Please check the changes for sufficiency. Robinhw 09:18, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

How about "Consciousness" derives from Latin conscientia which primarily means moral conscience - if that is not a Tautology then what is it? --134.184.67.185 11:30, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

May i add a section of levels of awereness? something like this:"Levels of consciousness"

-Not aware (Sub-conscious)
-Weak awareness (Phenomenal consciousness)
-Self-awareness
 -awareness of ones existense
 -awareness of ones observation
 -awareness of ones calculation
 -awareness of ones psychological aspects
	

I just need some help to complete the list and to make it more representative to reality.. Ressonans 00:32, 18 aug 2006 (GMT)

I have ceased using the term "consciousness" because it no longer "stands for" the awareness aspect of Spirituality. For my own use, I now use the term Apapsyche: apas (sanskrit work,working) + psyche (Greek self,soul, and mind} = Operational Energy of the Soul. The tendency and inclintion of those who have not personally visited the Esoteric within themselves is to perceive of "consciousness" as something that one can "think" about, and apply like paint to any difficult to esplain phenomenon.

In other words, part of the defintion of "consciousness" it seems to me, is that the term is first and foremost an "abstract term". It "stands for" a reality that cannot be known intellectually [by one brain and thinking], and can only be known experientially. One must be in an altered state of awareness in order to perceive the reality of "consciousness". Short of that, one may reference it by its abstrat label, that of "consciousness".... but it should be made abundantly clear that, what the abstrat term stands for may not be known by ones brain and thinking.

It seems to me that the thrust of what is developing is an attempt to push "consciousness" into the MIND, and this would be an error. Consciousnes is a dimension of ones Spirituality, and is also of a permanent and absolute nature, wereas the MIND is not permanent, in an absolute ssense, and it is not part of the Spiritual realm. Indeed, in Eastern mysticism it is explained that it is Spiritual energy that sustains the operations of the MIND. ______________________ Docjp 15:53, 19 October 2006 (UTC)

And then I looked at this article and change my mind. It's a mortal sin!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:36, 1 September 2006 (UTC)

First, I notive that the introduction to the article really doesn't state what consciousness is. I took the liberty of adding a sentence which I think is an okay summary of the general attitudes towards consciousness––that it denotes an overall or general level of awareness that pervades and serves as the backdrop for specific mental operations, etc. I think that what is meant by consciousness is really something like this (and perhaps it could be phrased better), as a sort of constant state of awareness.

I think it would be nice to see someone add in a little about Ryle's take on consciousness. Ryle is, in my thought, a very underappreciated philosopher who is really quite significant. He wrote the seminal text on consciousness and mind in ordinary language philosophy. Perhaps I could add a little once I go back and read over what I have been reading. Ryle provides several arguments against consciousness, but I think it is quite alright, and perhaps necessary, to present a linguistic take on consciousness. Of course, I haven't read the entire article so this may have been done already.

Another significant aspect of Ryle's critique of consciousness, and very interesting and notable for the purposes of this article, is his overview of the various common language uses of the term in contrast with the philosophical usage. It is quite enlightening. If no one else here has read Ryle, or is willing to contribute, then, with permission, I would be willing to add some of this stuff in myself some weekend. Drifter 02:09, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

Ryle was a behaviourist with a clear agenda of demoting phenomenal consciousness to a "ghost in the machine". The pre-existing text was balanced because it described how there are two aspects to consciousness, Ryle's approach being covered by access consciousness. In view of this I removed your addition that seemed to describe phenomenal consciousness as access consciousness (awareness). Of course Ryle's pupils, such as Dennett, might maintain that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. They are entitled to hold this view but an encyclopedia article cannot support a particular viewpoint. Geometer 08:57, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

I'm not sure I would agree that Ryle is a behaviorist. He is a logical behaviorist, but that is very different. I can't see how phenomenal consciousness can't be taken as a constant sort of awareness. For me, this seems the best way to explain general consciousness. I did not say that phenomenal consciousness was awareness of things etc., but that it was constituted by a general, overall sense of awareness that pervades and permates all conscious thoughts and experiences. However, if you are so sure that this is biased, I invite you and everyone else here to tell me, in the opening paragraphs of the article, what consciousness is supposed to be. I am not denying it or rejecting it, I do in some sense believe there to be consciousness. So my invitation should not be taken as smug or rhetorical. The point stands that the openning of the article has no definition of consciousness. It is said various qualities which are taken to be associated with consciousness, such as subjectivity, but as it is there is absolutely no mention of what consciousness per se is taken to be. If I asked you "what is consciousness," a question that would hypothetically lead one to look up an article on consciousness on wikipedia.org, would it at all be a sufficient response to say "Consciousness is a quality of the mind generally regarded to comprise qualities such as subjectivity, self-awareness, sentience, sapience, and the ability to perceive the relationship between oneself and one's environment."? I do not think it is. If someone were to respond to me in this fashion, I would take them to be evading the question, or I would take them to not really know the answer. It is a very weak response that lacks any sense of a coherent unity that could be taken to describe consciousness in a satisfactory and complete manner.

The intro deliberately evades the question. I support that approach because anything else would be way too contentious! The text explains that there are disagreements about the where, when and how of consciousness. Geometer 10:26, 9 October 2006 (UTC)

I do not wish, however, to get into questions of definition. I myself am somewhat of a Wittgensteinian and so you may easily guess my position on definitions. However, consciousness, as the subject of this article, is used in a peculiar way by academics as opposed to how it is used in ordinary language. As such, we cannot make appeal to arguments such as "anyone should be able to intuit what we mean by consciousness." It is, though, an entirely valid response to say that different thinkers have different conceptions of consciousness. The purpose of the article, it seems (I have not read it all), is to convey these varied and many times dissimilar conceptions. However, is there no common thread that permeates these?

In the end, the main point is that the openning paragraphs are entirely inadequate and provide little information. Even if taken purely as introductory, I think that they classify as weak. If my definition of phenomenal consciousness offends you or at all seems wrong, I will refrain from editing the article any further and merely hope that someone will please revise the opening to be more clear and satisfactory as an introduction/summary of the rest of the article. Drifter 06:06, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

The problem with consciousness is that there are two approaches. Some people concentrate on access consciousness, consciousness of things, that is similar to awareness. Others concentrate on phenomenal consciousness, which is very similar to the cogito or Kant's phenomenal world ie: we are a phenomenon. There is no single, universally adopted definition. Geometer 11:05, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

With all

no. patrickw 14:14, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

Re the sentence: "There is speculation, especially among religious groups, and maybe some evidence, that consciousness may exist after death or before birth.

I read (skimmed) the article to find a pointer to that evidence or more discussion on those points and found none. Maybe it should be marked with "citation needed" or similar?

Rhkramer 23:49, 22 September 2006 (UTC)

An external link pointing to a free podcast on the iTunes store (no advertising) of a new book presenting a philosophical introduction to Awareness that is being syndicated as it goes to print was added and then removed as SPAM. If anyone is interested in having the podcast added as an external link, the information is:

• An Introduction to Awareness podcast Philosophical introduction to Awareness

I removed the following section from the article following the cleanup necessary to save

Free will and consciousness

Chris King in the article Chaos, Quantum-transactions and Consciousness (2003), starts from Einstein’s

energy-momentum relation (retrocausality and supercausality

), and states that all quantum objects are constantly faced with bifurcations which force the system to operate choices. King quotes Eccles, Penrose and Hameroff who proved the existence of quantum structures in living systems and arrives to the conclusion that life is moved not only by mechanical causes but also by final causes (attractors). According to King, a new and innovative description of the relation between mind and brain derives from this constant state of choice in which living structures are immersed. This constant state of choice would force living systems into a state of free will which would be common to all the levels and structures of life, from molecules to macrostructures, and organisms. This constant state of free will, would originate chaotic dynamics which organize in fractal structures. Starting from these premises King suggests two separate levels of explanation of consciousness. In the first level, information flows from the mind to the brain, through free will; in the second level, information flows from the brain to the mind, thanks to the selection and amplification of signals performed by fractal structures. King’s considers mind to be immaterial, and its organization would be the consequence of the cohesive properties of –E (

syntropy

). King suggests that, in order to understand what consciousness really is, it is necessary to start from free will, because at this level it becomes necessary to definitely refuse any attempt to use mechanical approaches (http://www.sintropia.it/english/2006-eng-3.htm).

I made some small changes yesterday, with regard to the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness. They were deleted. I am new to Wikipedia, and don't know the right procedures. But it is clear that the article as it stands is quite right wrong. Access consciousness, for instance, is defined "as the processing of the thing itself in experience". But subjects needn't be phenomenally conscious - ie, experience - anything of which they are also access conscious. And processing is not sufficient for access consciousness: it is availability for global processing that is needed.

Is there a good word for the combination of waking sensorium, imagination, memory being recalled, and sleep dreams? In other words, consciousness + dreaming? 216.179.3.247 17:42, 25 March 2007 (UTC)

Phenomenal consciousness is the term you are seeking. —The preceding

unsigned comment was added by 86.14.5.30 (talk

) 07:59, 13 April 2007 (UTC).