Victory disease

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, painted by Adolph Northen
in the 19th century
Diorama depicting the periscope-view from the US submarine USS Nautilus attacking a Japanese aircraft carrier at the Battle of Midway
Custer's last stand
, 1877

Victory disease occurs in military history when complacency or arrogance, brought on by a victory or a series of victories, makes an engagement end disastrously for a commander and his forces.[1]

A commander may disdain the enemy, and believe his own invincibility, leading his troops to disaster. That commander may employ

overconfident commander may disregard military intelligence
that would enable the commander to realize that new tactics are needed.

Though "victory disease" does not inevitably foretell defeat, it often precedes it. The term is also applied outside the military world in areas such as psychology, business, or marketing.

Origin

The origin of the term (戦勝病, senshoubyou, in

Much of Japan's arrogance is attributed to the performance of Admiral Matome Ugaki. From overriding decisions to ignoring the evolving conflict in the Pacific, Ugaki's tactics incited tension and doubt in other Japanese military personnel before the Midway operation.[5]

Although the Japanese had planned to establish a perimeter and go on the defensive, victories encouraged them to continue expanding to an extent that strained logistics and the navy. This culminated in the Battle of Midway in 1942, a catastrophic defeat of the Japanese navy. All four Japanese aircraft carriers involved were sunk, and the hitherto unstoppable Japanese advance was blunted.[citation needed]

History

Pre-modern

19th century

20th century

See also

References

  1. .
  2. ]
  3. ^ Kennedy, David M. (1 March 1999). "Victory at Sea". The Atlantic.
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  5. .
  6. ^ "Battle of Agincourt | Facts, Summary, & Significance | Britannica". www.britannica.com. Retrieved 2023-07-15.
  7. ^ Alessandro Giorgi, Cronaca della Seconda Guerra Mondiale 1939-1945, Editoriale Lupo, Vicchio, Firenze, 2013, ISBN 978-8890874802
  8. ^ Thorpe, D. R. (1 November 2006). "What we failed to learn from Suez". Daily Telegraph. London. Retrieved 5 July 2016.
  9. .

External links