Attack on Nibeiwa
Attack on Nibeiwa | |||||||
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Part of Second World War | |||||||
Map of the Italian invasion of Egypt | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Italy | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Pietro Maletti † | |||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Maletti Group | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
5,000 soldiers 47 tanks |
4,100 soldiers 23 tanks | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
56 killed 27 tanks disabled/broken down |
819 killed 1,338 wounded 2,000 prisoners 28 tanks | ||||||
The Attack on Nibeiwa took place on 9 December 1940 near Nibeiwa,
The British had fought a delaying action during the Italian advance with the 7th Support Group of the
The British and Indian infantry rehearsed an attack with the infantry tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment in late November and another rehearsal was announced for early December, which was actually the attack. On the night of 9/10 December the attack began with diversions on the east side as the main force closed up from the west. The real attack took the Italians by surprise, destroyed the 28 tanks before their crews could react and then broke into the camp. The Italian and Libyan garrison resisted the attack with great determination but were systematically overrun by a combination of tanks, artillery firing from point-blank range and infantry. The Italian and Libyan troops suffered 4,157 casualties for a British loss of 56 men killed and 27 tanks disabled or broken down. The success at Nibeiwa began the collapse of the Italian position in Egypt.
Background
Italian invasion of Egypt
The Italian invasion of Egypt (Operazione E) by the
Western Desert Force
The British
Maletti Group
The I Medium Tank Battalion (Major Victor Ceva) and the II Medium Tank Battalion (Major Eugenio Campanile) and their M11/39 tanks of the
Prelude
Nibeiwa
Nibeiwa was about 12 mi (20 km) south of Sidi Barrani; the camp was a double stone walled rectangle about 0.62 by 1.24 mi (1 by 2 km), with shelters every 50 yd (46 m) behind an
British plan
Training Exercise No.1 was held from 25 to 26 November near Matruh, on a model marked to resemble the Italian camps at Nibeiwa and the Tummars, and the troops were told that another rehearsal would be run in early December. The exercise was useful in providing experience in night moves under moonlight and attack tactics against a defensive position in the desert. A Method of Attack on an entrenched Camp in the Desert was distributed to units ready for Training Exercise No.2.[9]
The 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division were reinforced with the British 16th Infantry Brigade, the 7th RTR and the Matruh Garrison Force of a Coldstream Guards battalion and a battery of field artillery; the 7th Indian Brigade was to act as a reserve and protect the lines of communication. Guarded by the Support Group, the rest of 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division were to drive between Nibeiwa and the Sofafi camps and then attack Nibeiwa from the west with the
On the night of 6/7 December, the 4th Indian Division left camp for Training Exercise No.2 in a cold wind that raised dust and concealed the lorries of the 4th and 6th New Zealand Reserve Mechanical Transport companies as they drove spread out over the desert, in air formation (no lorry to be within 250 yd (230 m) of another).[13] After driving for 50 mi (80 km) the force rendezvoused at Bir Kenayis, about 30 mi (48 km) south of Matruh and dug slit trenches. The troops rested on 7 December, unseen by Italian air reconnaissance, and were told that the attack was the real one that evening. On 8 December, the advance continued into a bright, cold windless day at about 8 mph (13 km/h) at the front and in 40 mph (64 km/h) bursts at the back, with everyone expecting to be attacked by Italian aircraft that did not appear.[13] By late afternoon, the Indians were 15 mi (24 km) south-east of Nibeiwa, 100 mi (160 km) west of their jumping-off point. At dusk two battalions of the 11th Indian Brigade and the 7th RTR moved off and drove in moonlight to a position 6 mi (9.7 km) south-west of Nibeiwa; before sunrise the units assembled at a jumping-off point 4,000 yd (2.3 mi; 3.7 km) north-west of the camp. The third battalion drove about 3 mi (4.8 km) short of the east side of the camp, which was on a flat plateau with a shallow valley on that side.[14]
Battle
British aircraft bombed the camps and flew overhead all night, to disguise the sound of the ground force vehicles and to keep Italian aircraft grounded.[15] At 3:00 a.m., after the Indians had advanced on foot to the perimeter, they came upon listening posts and commenced firing, at which the Italian garrison sent up flares and returned fire. When the garrison ceased firing, the Indians shifted position and fired again, Under cover of the noise on the east side of Nibeiwa, the British tanks and lorries drove round the west side of the camp, and at 6:00 a.m. the Indians on the east side retired. A bombardment by British artillery began from the east, to mislead the Italians. At 7:15 a.m. the artillery of the 4th Indian Division fired on Nibewa from the south-east, around 7:00 a.m. and at 7:30 a.m. the tanks began the attack with the 31st Field Battery RA and flanked by the Bren Carrier platoons of the Indian infantry.[16][17] The Italians had concentrated their 28 M11/39 tanks beyond the perimeter wall, where the tank crews were caught while warming engines.[18]
The Italian tank crews had no time to react before their tanks were knocked out.[19] The British tanks broke down the walls and drove into the camp, where the Italians had just breakfasted; Maletti advanced with a machine-gun and was killed by a gunshot wound. At 7:45 a.m. the British and Indian infantry followed up on board lorries, which stopped 700 yd (640 m) away for the men to disembark and charge into the camp. The Italian and Libyan artillerymen stood by their guns but found that even field artillery shells fired at 30 yd (27 m) range were ineffective against the armour of the Matilda tanks. The Italian and Libyan infantry fought on and isolated parties stalked British tanks with hand grenades but the British methodically occupied the camp, tanks artillery and infantry co-operating to reduce isolated pockets of resistance.[20] By 10:40 a.m. the last Italian resistance was overcome and large amounts of supplies and water were discovered intact.[21]
Aftermath
Analysis
Australian war correspondent Alan Moorehead visited Nibeiwa after the battle. To reach it, he had to move around destroyed lorries and Bren Carriers that had run onto mines, and past square holes in the ground which had been dug for machine-gun posts. Dead lay around the fort; derelict light tanks were at the west wall, where the Maletti Group had made its last stand. Other tanks were inside the camp facing in all directions.[22] The capture of Nibeiwa camp cleared the way for the next stage of the British attack, when the remaining operational tanks and the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade moved west of the Tummar camps and the 16th Infantry Brigade closed up to the area vacated by the Indian brigade.[23] The Western Desert Force completed the capture of the camps and captured Sidi Barrani, destroying two Italian divisions by 10 December, as two more divisions were caught on the Mersa Matruh–Sidi Barrani road and forced to surrender. By the time that Sidi Barrani was captured on 11 December, the WDF bag had increased to 38,300 prisoners, 73 tanks and 422 guns for a loss of 133 men killed, 387 wounded and eight missing.[24] On 28 December, planning with photographs from reconnaissance aircraft and night patrol reports began for the capture of Bardia, which would not have the benefit of surprise as the attack on Nibeiwa did, as it had far less extensive defences and was too far from neighbouring camps to be supported. The defences of Bardia were reminiscent of the defensive structures used in the First World War, and British artillery would be much more important than it had been at Nibeiwa. The experience of the attack there was important for the plan to use a combination of shock, firepower, tanks and the mobility of the Infantry tanks to break into the port defences.[25]
Casualties
In 1954, the British official historian I. S. O. Playfair wrote that the attackers took 2,000 Italian and Libyan prisoners and a large quantity of supplies and water for a British loss of 56 men.[26] In 1979 the Italian official history gave a total of 819 Italian and Libyan soldiers killed, along with Maletti and 1,338 men wounded.[27]
Subsequent operations
The attack on Tummar West began at 1:50 p.m., after the 7th RTR had refuelled and artillery had bombarded the defences for an hour. Another approach from the north-west was made, the tanks broke through the perimeter and were followed twenty minutes later by the infantry. The defenders held out for longer than the Nibeiwa garrison but by 4:00 p.m. Tummar West was overrun except for the north-eastern corner. The tanks moved on to Tummar East, the greater part of which was captured by nightfall. The 4th Armoured Brigade had advanced to Azziziya, where the garrison of 400 men surrendered, light patrols of the 7th Hussars pushed forward to cut the road from Sidi Barrani to Buq Buq, while armoured cars of the 11th Hussars ranged further west. The 7th Armoured Brigade were held in reserve ready to intercept an Italian counter-attack.[28] The 2nd Libyan Division lost 26 officers and 1,327 men killed, 32 officers and 804 men wounded, with the survivors being taken prisoner.[29]
See also
- List of British military equipment of World War II
- List of Italian military equipment in World War II
References
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, pp. 27–28.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, pp. 27–28, 35–37.
- ^ Playfair 1954, p. 262.
- ^ Pitt 2001, p. 102.
- ^ Parri nd.
- ^ Christie 1999, p. 32.
- ^ Christie 1999, p. 57.
- ^ Montanari 1985, pp. 204, 306.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 92.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Playfair 1954, pp. 262–263.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 88.
- ^ a b Henderson 2003, p. 21.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 98.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 38.
- ^ Playfair 1954, p. 267.
- ^ Walker 2003, p. 62.
- ^ Playfair 1954, pp. 267–268.
- ^ Playfair 1954, p. 268.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, pp. 38–39.
- ^ Moorehead 2009, pp. 61–64.
- ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 39.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 100.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 107.
- ^ Playfair 1954, pp. 266–268.
- ^ IOH 1979, I Annex 32.
- ^ Playfair 1954, pp. 268–269.
- ^ IOH 1979, p. 375.
Bibliography
Books
- Henderson, J. H. (2003) [1954]. RMT. Official history of the 4th and 6th Reserve Mechanical Transport Companies, 2 NZEF. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939–45 (online, New Zealand Electronic Text Centre ed.). Wellington, NZ: War History Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs. OCLC 173284169. Retrieved 29 June 2017.
- La prima offensiva britannica in Africa settentrionale (ottobre 1940 – febbraio 1941) I. annexe 32 [The First British Offensive in North Africa (October 1940 – February 1941)] (in Italian). Roma: Esercito. Corpo di stato maggiore. Ufficio storico. 1979. OCLC 6863876.
- OCLC 59637091.
- Montanari, Mario (1985). Sidi el Barrani (giugno 1940 – febbraio 1941) [Sidi Barrani (June 1940 – February 1941)]. Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale (in Italian). Vol. I. Roma: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito. OCLC 868634287.
- ISBN 978-1-84513-391-7.
- Parri, M. "Storia del 32° Rgt. Carri dalla Costituzione del Reggimento fino al termine del Secondo Conflitto Mondiale" [History of the 32nd Armoured Regiment from its Establishment until the end of the Second World War]. www.associocarri.it (in Italian). no date. Retrieved 25 July 2015.
- Pitt, B. (2001) [1980]. The Crucible of War: Wavell's Command. Vol. I (Cassell ed.). London: Jonathan Cape. ISBN 978-0-304-35950-9– via Archive Foundation.
- ISBN 978-1-84574-065-8.
- Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship. London: Brassey's UK. ISBN 978-0-08-040983-2.
- Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts; Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN 978-1-86126-646-0.
Theses
- Christie, H. R. (1999). Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940 – December 1940 (MA). Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. OCLC 465212715. A116763. Archived from the originalon 16 February 2015. Retrieved 28 June 2017 – via Archive Foundation.