Italian invasion of Egypt
Italian invasion of Egypt | |||||||||
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Part of the Second World War | |||||||||
Western Desert 1940 | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Italy |
United Kingdom Free France | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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Strength | |||||||||
4 divisions 300 aircraft |
1 reinforced brigade 205 aircraft naval support | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
120 killed 410 wounded 6 aircraft |
40 killed 10 tanks 11 armoured cars 4 lorries |
The Italian invasion of Egypt (Operazione E) was an offensive in the
The 10th Army advanced about 65 mi (105 km) into Egypt against British screening forces of the
On 8 December, before the 10th Army was ready to resume its advance on Mersa Matruh, the British began Operation Compass, a five-day raid against the fortified Italian camps outside Sidi Barrani. The raid succeeded and the few units of the 10th Army in Egypt that were not destroyed were forced into a hurried retreat. The British pursued the remnants of the 10th Army along the coast to Sollum and across the border to Bardia, Tobruk, Derna, Mechili, Beda Fomm and El Agheila on the Gulf of Sirte. The British suffered casualties of 1,900 men killed and wounded during Compass and took 133,298 Italian and Libyan prisoners, 420 tanks, over 845 guns and many aircraft.
Background
Libya
Egypt
The British had based military forces in Egypt since 1882 but these were greatly reduced by the terms of the
In Libya, the Royal Italian Army had about 215,000 men and in Egypt the British had about 36,000 troops, with another 27,500 men training in Palestine.
The RAF also moved most of its bombers closer to the frontier and Malta was reinforced to threaten the Italian supply route to Libya. The HQ of the 6th Infantry Division, still lacking complete and fully trained units, was renamed the Western Desert Force on 17 June. In Tunisia, the French had eight divisions, capable only of limited operations and in Syria had three poorly armed and trained divisions, with about 40,000 troops and border guards, on occupation duties against the civilian population. Italian land and air forces in Libya greatly outnumbered the British in Egypt but suffered from poor morale and were handicapped by some inferior equipment. In Italian East Africa were another 130,000 Italian and East African troops with 400 guns, 200 light tanks and 20,000 lorries. On 10 June 1940 Italy declared war on France and Britain from 11 June. Canada declared war on Italy on 10 June and on 11 June, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa followed suit.[5]
Terrain
The winds of the Mediterranean |
---|
The
Bedouin tracks link wells (birs) and the easier traversed ground; desert navigation is by sun, star, compass and "desert sense", good perception of the environment gained by experience. (When the Italian invasion of Egypt began in September 1940, the Maletti Group, [Raggruppamento Maletti, Major-General Pietro Maletti], lacking experience of desert conditions, got lost leaving Sidi Omar, disappeared and had to be found by reconnaissance aircraft.) In spring and summer, days are miserably hot and nights very cold.[7] The Sirocco (Gibleh or Ghibli), a hot desert wind, blows clouds of fine sand, reducing visibility to a few yards and coating eyes, lungs, machinery, food and equipment. Motor vehicles and aircraft need special oil and air filters and the barren ground means that water and food as well as military stores, have to be transported from outside.[8]
Italian Army
In 1936, General
Morale was considered to be high and the army had recent experience of military operations. The Italian navy had prospered under the Fascist regime, which had paid for fast, well-built and well-armed ships and a large submarine fleet but the navy lacked experience and training. The air force had been ready for war in 1936 but had stagnated and was not considered by the British to be capable of maintaining a high rate of operations. The 5th Army (5ª Armata) in
Before the war, Balbo expressed his doubts to Mussolini
It is not the number of men which causes me anxiety but their weapons ... equipped with limited and very old pieces of artillery, almost lacking anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons ... it is useless to send more thousands of men if we cannot supply them with the indispensable requirements to move and fight.[13]
and demanding more equipment including 1,000 trucks, 100 water tankers, more medium tanks and anti-tank guns, which the Italian economy could not produce or the army transfer from elsewhere. In Rome, Badoglio, the chief-of-staff, fobbed him off with promises, "When you have the seventy medium tanks you will dominate the situation", as Balbo prepared to invade Egypt on 15 July.[14] After Balbo was killed in an accident, Benito Mussolini replaced him with Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, with orders to attack Egypt by 8 August. Graziani replied that the 10th Army was not properly equipped and that an attack could not possibly succeed; Mussolini ordered him to attack anyway.[15]
Prelude
10th Army
The ten divisions of the 10th Army (Lieutenant-General Mario Berti) comprised the XX Corpo d'Armata (XX Corps), XXI Corpo d'Armata (XXI Corps),
Squadra 5
Operational commands of the Regia Aeronautica (
Regia Marina
Berti could expect little support from the
Italian plans
Three times, deadlines were set for an Italian invasion and cancelled; the first plan was intended to coincide with an expected German invasion of England on 15 July 1940. Balbo took all the trucks from the 5th Army and the M11/39 medium tanks being delivered from Italy, to reinforce the 10th Army for a crossing of the frontier wire and an occupation of Sollum as soon as war was declared. After a British counter-attack was repulsed and the Italian armies were replenished, the advance would continue. Although this plan was based on a realistic appreciation of what the Italian armies in Libya could achieve, it fell through when the invasion of England was cancelled.[21][b] The second plan, for 22 August, was for a limited advance to Sollum and Shawni el Aujerin to the east, with three columns moving on three lines of advance. Once Sollum had been occupied, an advance on Sidi Barrani would be considered, an example of advance-in-mass, used on the northern front in the Ethiopian War. The Italian non-motorized infantry divisions were to use the only road but the summer heat in August, which would have affected them most, led to another postponement.[22]
The third plan was for an invasion on 9 September with Sidi Barrani as the objective, which Graziani disclosed to his staff six days before Mussolini ordered the invasion. The non-motorised, metropolitan divisions would advance along the coast and attack through Halfaya Pass, occupy Sollum and continue to Sidi Barrani. A southern column of the Libyan divisions and the Maletti Group was to advance along the Dayr al Hamra–Bir ar Rabiyah–Bir Enba track, to outflank the British on the escarpment. The Maletti Group was to drive south and east through the desert but the Italian staff failed to provide proper maps and navigation equipment; when moving to its assembly and jumping-off points, the group got lost and XXIII Corps Headquarters had to send aircraft to help lead the group into position; the Libyan divisions arriving late at the rendezvous near Fort Capuzzo.[23]
The embarrassment of the Maletti Group added to doubts about the lack of lorries, transport aircraft and British domination of the terrain, which led to another change of plan. The fourth plan was set for 13 September, with Sidi Barrani and the area to the south as the objective. The 10th Army, with only five divisions, due to the shortage of transport and the tanks of the Maletti Group, would advance in mass down the coast road, occupy Sollum and advance through Buq Buq to Sidi Barrani. The 10th Army was to consolidate at Sidi Barrani and bring up supplies, destroy a British counter-attack and resume the advance to Matruh. The non-motorized infantry divisions were to use the coast road because they would be ineffective anywhere else. A similar operation had been conducted on the northern front in Ethiopia but went against mobile warfare theory, for which there were ample forces to execute. Graziani believed the only way to defeat the British was by mass, having overestimated their strength.[24]
Western Desert Force
Against an estimated 250,000 Italian troops based in Libya and about 250,000 more in Italian East Africa, Wavell had a ration strength of about 36,000 troops in Egypt; fourteen non-brigaded battalions of British infantry; the 2nd New Zealand Division (Major-General Bernard Freyberg) with one infantry brigade, an understrength cavalry regiment, a machine gun battalion and a field artillery regiment. The 4th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse) had two infantry brigades and some artillery, the 7th Armoured Division (Major-General Sir Michael Creagh) had two armoured brigades with two armoured regiments each instead of three.[25] The 7th Support Group, with three motorised infantry battalions, artillery, engineers and machine-gunners, was to harass the Italians and to fight delaying actions between the border and Matruh if attacked but to retain the capacity to engage the main Italian force.[26]
At Matruh an infantry force would await the Italian attack, while from the escarpment on the desert flank the bulk of the 7th Armoured Division, would be ready to counter-attack. The covering force was to exaggerate its size and the 7th Support Group was to use its mobility to cover the desert flank, while along the coast road, the 3rd
Border skirmishes
On 17 June, using the headquarters of the British
Some Italian troops were unaware that war had been declared and seventy were captured on the track to Sidi Omar.
Operazione E
9–10 September
The XXIII Corpo d'Armata (XXIII Corps) was to lead the 10th Army attack to Sidi Barrani in Egypt along the coast road with non-motorised and motorised formations. The corps had been given more lorries; the 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" and 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" were part-motorised, the 1st CC.NN. Division "23 Marzo" was motorised, as were the Maletti Group and the 1st Tank Group (1° Raggruppamento Carri). The part-motorised infantry divisions would move by shuttling forward and the non-motorized infantry would have to march the 60 mi (97 km) to Sidi Barrani.[33] Bergonzoli wanted the 1st Tank Group as an advanced guard, two motorised infantry divisions in line and one motorised division in reserve. The two Libyan non-motorised infantry divisions would have to move on foot, with the Maletti Group bringing up the rear.[33] The 1st Tank Group was held back in reserve, except for the LXII Tank Battalion "L" attached to the 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" and the LXIII Tank Battalion "L", which was attached to the 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica". The 2nd Tank Group stayed at Bardia except for the IX Tank Battalion "L" attached to the 2nd Libyan Division. The II Tank Battalion "M" was with the Maletti Group, which had three fully-motorised Libyan infantry battalions.[34]
On 9 September, the activity of the Royal Italian Air Force increased and bombers from 55 Squadron, 113 Squadron and 211 Squadron RAF retaliated with attacks on Italian airfields, transport, supply dumps and a raid on Tobruk by 21 aircraft. Later in the day, 27 Italian fighters made a sweep over Buq Buq and the RAF flew more sorties against Italian airfields. British air reconnaissance revealed much ground movement at Bardia, Sidi Azeiz, Gabr Saleh and in the direction of Sidi Omar, on the frontier wire, from the west, which was interpreted as the beginning of the Italian invasion. The forward move of the 10th Army showed the limits of Italian mobility and navigation, when the Maletti Group got lost moving up to Sidi Omar. On 10 September, the armoured cars of the 11th Hussars spotted the Maletti Group and a thick mist shielded the British as they shadowed the slow Italian assembly. As the mist cleared, the hussars were attacked by Italian aircraft, tanks and artillery.[13]
13–14 September
On 13 September the 1st CC.NN. Division "23 Marzo" re-took Fort Capuzzo and a bombardment fell on Musaid, just over the Egyptian side of the border, which was then occupied. Artillery-fire and bombing began on Sollum airfield and barracks (which were empty), which raised a dust cloud. When the dust cleared the Italian army could be seen drawn up, ready to advance against the British covering force of the 3rd Coldstream Guards, some field artillery, an extra infantry battalion and a machine-gun company. The Italians advanced along the coast with two divisions leading, behind a screen of motorcyclists, tanks, motorised infantry and artillery.[34] The Italian formation made an easy target for artillery and aircraft but the 1st Libyan Division soon occupied Sollum barracks and began to move down the escarpment to the port.[35]
On the inland plateau, an Italian advance towards Halfaya Pass was opposed by a covering force of a 3rd Coldstream company, a Northumberland Fusilier platoon and some artillery, which began to withdraw in the afternoon, as more Italian infantry and tanks arrived.[35] During the evening, two columns of the 2nd Libyan Division, the 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" and the Maletti Group from Musaid and the 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" from Sidi Omar, converged on the pass.[35] Next day, the Italian units on the escarpment began to descend through the pass, towards the Italian force advancing along the road from Sollum. A squadron of the 11th Hussars, the 2nd Rifle Brigade and cruiser tanks of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment (1st RTR) harassed the Italian force on the escarpment. Just after noon, the British troops on the coast retreated to Buq Buq and met reinforcements from the 11th Hussars and a motorised company of Troupes de marine (French marines), which was enough to maintain contact with the Italians. The British withdrew to Alam Hamid on 15 September and Alam el Dab on 16 September, trying to inflict maximum losses without being pinned down and destroying the coast road as they went, damage which was made worse by the amount of Italian traffic.[36]
16 September
The uncommitted part of the 1st Tank Group followed the 1st Libyan Division and the 2nd Libyan Division towards Bir Thidan el Khadim. At Alam el Dab near Sidi Barrani, about fifty Italian tanks, motorised infantry and artillery tried an outflanking move, which forced the Coldstream Guards to retreat.[37] The armoured group was engaged by British field artillery and made no further move but by dark the 1st CC.NN. Division "23 Marzo" had occupied Sidi Barrani. Above the escarpment, the British covering forces fell back parallel to those on the coast road and the threat from the desert flank did not materialise. British aircraft flew many reconnaissance and bombing sorties and Squadra 5 made sweeps with up to 100 fighters and bombers on British forward airfields and defensive positions.[38] The British anticipated that the Italian advance would stop at Sidi Barrani and Sofafi and began to observe the positions with the 11th Hussars, as the 7th Support Group withdrew to rest and the 7th Armoured Division prepared to confront an advance on Matruh. Italian radio broadcasts about the invasion suggested that the advance would continue from Sidi Barrani but it soon appeared that the Italians were digging-in on an arc to the south and south-west at Maktila, Tummar (east), Tummar (west), Nibeiwa and on top of the escarpment at Sofafi as divisions further back occupied Buq Buq, Sidi Omar and Halfaya Pass.[39]
Aftermath
Analysis
The 10th Army advanced about 12 mi (19 km) a day to enable the non-motorised units to keep up and at Sidi Barrani, built fortified camps. No bold mechanised strokes or flanking movements had been made by the armoured units, XXIII Corpo d'Armata had guarded the infantry instead and the 10th Army suffered fewer than 550 casualties during the advance. The Maletti Group, the 1st Tank Group and the 1st CC.NN. Division "23rd Marzo" had failed to operate according to Italian armoured warfare theory. Lack of preparation, training and organisation had led to blunders in assembling and directing the Maletti Group and over-caution with the other tank battalions of 1st Tank Group. The rushed motorisation of the 1st CC.NN. Division "23rd Marzo", which had not been trained as a motorised division, disorganised the relationship between drivers and infantry.[37]
The advance reached Sidi Barrani with modest losses but failed to do much damage to the British.
The greatest possible credit is due to Brigadier
John Campbell, MC, commanding the Artillery, for the cool and efficient way in which this withdrawal was carried out, also to the troops for their endurance and tactical skill.— Wavell[41]
Repair works began on the coast road, renamed Via della Vittoria from Bardia and construction of a water pipe begun, which were not expected to be ready before mid-December, after which the advance would be resumed as far as Matruh.[38]
Mussolini wrote on 26 October
Forty days after the capture of Sidi Barrani I ask myself the question, to whom has this long halt been any use—to us or to the enemy? I do not hesitate to answer, it has been of much use, indeed, more to the enemy…. It is time to ask whether you feel you wish to continue to command.[42]
and two days later, on 28 October, the Italians invaded Greece, beginning the
Casualties
In 1971, Kenneth Macksey wrote that the 10th Army suffered 530 casualties, 120 killed and 410 wounded against a British loss of "but forty men...and little equipment".[43] In 1993, Harold Raugh wrote of about 2,000 Italian casualties against less than fifty British.[44] In 1995, the writers of the informal German official history, Germany and the Second World War, noted that equipment losses for both sides had not been accurately tabulated.[45] In 1997, Giorgio Bocca wrote that the Western Desert Force suffered casualties of forty men killed, ten tanks, eleven armoured cars and four lorries destroyed.[46] In his 1999 MA thesis, Howard Christie wrote that from 9 to 16 September, the 10th Army suffered casualties of 120 men killed and 410 wounded. Several tanks and lorries broke down and six aircraft were lost, two to accidents.[37]
Subsequent operations
On 17 September, the Mediterranean Fleet began to harass Italian communications and Benghazi harbour was mined. A destroyer and two merchant ships were sunk by torpedo and a destroyer hit a mine at Benghazi and sank. RAF Blenheims destroyed three aircraft on the ground at Benina. The road on the escarpment near Sollum was bombarded by a navy gunboat and targets near Sidi Barrani by two destroyers, from which fires and explosions were seen. Captured Italians spoke of damage, casualties and a loss of morale. An attempt to bombard Bardia by the cruiser HMS Kent and two destroyers was thwarted by Italian torpedo bombers, which hit the stern of Kent and put it out of action. Bombardments continued during the lull, which led to camps and depots being moved inland. Small British columns on land were set up to work with armoured car patrols, moving close to the Italian camps, gleaning information and dominating the vicinity.[47]
Operation Compass
On 8 December the British began
Orders of Battle 10 June 1940
5th Army
Air Marshal Italo Balbo, Supreme Commander Italian Forces in North Africa. Details taken from Christie (1999) unless specified.[49]
- 5th Army (Western Sector Tripolitania, General Italo Gariboldi)[50]
- X Corps (Generale di Corpo d'armata [Lieutenant-General] Alberto Barbieri from 10 June)
- XX Corps (Generale di Corpo d'armata Ferdinando Cona)
- XXIII Corps (Generale di Corpo d'armata Annibale Bergonzoli)
- 2nd Libyan Division (5th Army reserve)
10th Army
- 10th Army (Eastern Sector, Cyrenaica, General Mario Berti [on leave in Italy, Gariboldi deputising])
- Lorenzo Dalmazzo)
- XXII Corps (Generale di Corpo d'armata Enrico Mannella)
- 1st Libyan Division (10th Army reserve)
Squadra 5 (June 1940)
On 10 June 1940 there were 363 Italian aircraft in North Africa of which 306 were operational and 57 were trainers; 179 aircraft were unserviceable.[c]
- Bomber
- 10th Stormo (Wing): 30 Savoia-Marchetti SM.79
- 14th Stormo: 12 SM.79, 1 Fiat BR.20
- 15th Stormo: 35 SM.79, 8 Savoia-Marchetti SM.81, 3 BR.20
- 33rd Stormo: 31 SM.79
- 10th Stormo (Wing): 30
- Fighter
- 2nd Stormo: 36 Fiat CR.42
- 50th Stormo: 11 Breda Ba.65 (ground attack), 3 IMAM Ro.41 (reconnaissance), 23 Caproni Ca.310 (light bomber/reconnaissance)
- X Group: 27 Fiat CR.42
- 2nd Stormo: 36
- Reconnaissance
- LXIV Group: 8 IMAM Ro.37bis, 5 RO.1bis
- LXXIII Group: 6 RO.37bis, 1 RO.1bis
- 143rd Squadron: CANT Z.501/6 (maritime reconnaissance)
- Colonial
- I Gruppo Aviazione Presidio Coloniale: 18 Caproni Ca.309, CA.310, RO.37 (light bomber/reconnaissance)
- II Gruppo Aviazione Presidio Coloniale: 21 CA.309, CA.310 and RO.37 (light bomber/reconnaissance)
Western Desert Force (WDF)
- Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell
- Commander Western Desert Force: Lieutenant-General R. N. O'Connor
- 7th Armoured Division (Major-General Michael Creagh)
- 4th Armoured Brigade, Mersa Matruh
- 1st Royal Tank Regiment
- 6th Royal Tank Regiment
- 7th Armoured Brigade, Sidi Suleiman
- 7th Hussars
- 8th Hussars
- 7th Support Group (Motorised Infantry Brigade) Sidi Barrani
- 1st K.R.R.C. Battalion
- 2nd Motor Battalion (The Rifle Brigade)
- 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards
- 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers
- 3rd Royal Horse Artillery
- F Battery, 4th Royal Horse Artillery
- 11th Hussars (attached to 7th Support Group from 7th Armoured Brigade)
- 4th Armoured Brigade, Mersa Matruh
Sidi Barrani
Operations on the Libyan–Egyptian Border
- Cairo Infantry Brigade – Garrison for Mersa Matruh
Other Commonwealth Forces in Egypt
- 4th Indian Division (less one infantry brigade) Nile Delta
- 5th Indian Infantry Brigade
- 11th Indian Infantry Brigade
- Divisional Troops
- 6th Australian Division (forming, Nile delta)
- 2nd New Zealand Division (forming, Nile delta)
Orders of battle, September 1940
10th Army
- 10th Army Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, Supreme Commander of the Italian Forces in North Africa
- XXI Corps (10th Army Reserve, Tobruk)
- 61st Infantry Division "Sirte"
- 2nd CC.NN. Division "28 Ottobre"
- LX Tank Battalion "L" (L3/35 tankettes, from the 60th Infantry Division "Sabratha")
- XXII Corps, Generale di Divisione (Major-General) Enrico Mannella
- 64th Infantry Division "Catanzaro"
- 4th CC.NN. Division "3 Gennaio"
- XXIII Corps, Generale di Corpo d'Armata (Lieutenant-General) Annibale Bergonzoli
- 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" (part-motorised for the invasion)
- 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" (part-motorised for the invasion)
- Libyan Divisions Group, Generale di Divisione Giuseppe Gallina
- 1st Libyan Division (non-motorised)
- 2nd Libyan Division (non-motorised)
- 1st CC.NN. Division "23 Marzo" (Reserve, motorised for the invasion of Egypt)
- XXI Corps (10th Army Reserve, Tobruk)
- Libyan Tank Command Comando Carri Armati della Libia, Generale di Divisione (Major-General) Valentino Babini
- 1st Tank Group
- I Tank Battalion "M" / 4th Tank Infantry Regiment (M11/39 tanks, reserve to XXIII Corps)
- XXI Tank Battalion "L" (L3/35 tankettes, from XXI Corps)
- LXII Tank Battalion "L" (L3/35 tankettes, from the 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica")
- LXIII Tank Battalion "L"(L3/35 tankettes, from the 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene")
- 2nd Tank Group
- II Tank Battalion "M" / 4th Tank Infantry Regiment (M11/39 tanks)
- IX Tank Battalion "L" (L3/35 tankettes, from the 2nd Libyan Division)
- XX Tank Battalion "L"(L3/33 and L3/35 tankettes, from XX Corps)
- LXI Tank Battalion "L" (L3/33 and L3/35 tankettes, from the 61st Infantry Division "Sirte")
- Maletti Group (attached XXIII Corps)
- Mixed Tank Battalion (1 × company from the II Tank Battalion "M" and 1 × company from the LX Tank Battalion "L")
- I Libyan Infantry Battalion
- V Libyan Infantry Battalion
- XIX Libyan Infantry Battalion
- V Tank Battalion "L" (L3/35 tankettes)
- 1st Tank Group
Squadra 5, 1 September 1940
Gruppo | Squadriglie | Type | No. | Duties | Base/s |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 APC[d] | 12, 89, 104 | Ca 309 | 21 | armed reconnaissance | Mellaha |
7 | 6. 86, 98 | Ba 88 | 32 | ground attack | Derna |
8 | 92, 93, 94 | CR 42 | 11 | day fighter, escort | Derna |
10 | 84, 90, 91 | CR 42 | 22 | day fighter, escort | Bir el Gobi |
12 | 159, 160 | Ba 65, CR 32 | 7, 10 | ground attack | Tobruk T2 |
13 | 77, 78, 82 | CR 42 | 28 | day fighter | Berka |
16 | 167, 168 | CR 32, Ba 65 | 10, 5 | ground attack | Tobruk T2 |
32 | 57, 58 | SM 79 | 5 | armed reconnaissance, anti-shipping |
Derna |
33 | 59, 60 | SM 79 | — | anti-shipping | Benina |
35 | 43, 44 | SM 79 | — | day bombing | Bir el Bhera |
36 | 45, 46 | SM 79 | — | day bombing | Bir el Bhera |
44 | 6, 7 | SM 79 | 11 | day bombing | El Adem |
46 | 20, 21 | SM 79 | — | day bombing | Benina |
47 | 53, 54 | SM 81, SM 79 | — | day bombing | Benina |
54 | 218, 219 | SM 81 | 13 | night bombing | Ain el Gazala |
63 | 41, 113 | Ro 37 | 16 | armed reconnaissance | (Cirenaica) |
64 | 136 | Ro 37 | — | armed reconnaissance | Gambut |
145 | 604, 610 | SM 74, SM 75 | 3, 4 | transport | Benghazi |
147 | 601, 602, 603 | SM 75 | 13 | transport | Benghazi, Tobruk |
148 | 605, 606 | SM 73 | 7 | transport | Benghazi |
151 | 366, 367, 368 | CR 42 | 30 | day fighter | Derna, Ain el Gazala |
BAS[e] | 99, 26 | Ca 309 | 6, 6 | armed reconnaissance | Hon, Kufra |
67 | 115 | Ro 37 | 10 | armed reconnaissance | (Libya) |
73 | 136, 137 | Ro 37, Ca 310 | 7, 6 | armed reconnaissance | Menastir |
Autonomo[f] | 145 | Z 501 | 6 | armed reconnaissance, convoy escort, air–sea rescue | Benghazi |
Autonomo | 175 | SM 79 | 5 | armed reconnaissance | Gambut, T5 |
Western Desert Force
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East: General Sir Archibald Wavell Commander Western Desert Force: Lieutenant-General R. N. O'Connor
- Corps Troops
- 7th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (Matildas)
- 1st Royal Horse Artillery
- 104th Royal Horse Artillery
- 51st Field Regiment R.A.
- 7th Medium Regiments R.A.
- 64th Medium Regiments R.A.
- 7th Armoured Division
- 4th Armoured Brigade
- 7th Armoured Brigade
- Support Group (Infantry Brigade)
- Divisional Troops
- 4th Indian Division
- 5th Indian Infantry Brigade
- 11th Indian Infantry Brigade
- Divisional Troops
- 16th Infantry Brigade (att. 4th Indian Division until 11 December 1940)
- 6th Australian Division (from mid-December)[56]
- 16th Australian Infantry Brigade
- 17th Australian Infantry Brigade
- 16th Infantry Brigade (det. 4th Indian Division 11 December)
- Divisional troops
- 7th RTR (det. 7th Armoured Division)
- Selby Force (a Brigade Group for the defence of Mersa Matruh)[g]
See also
- List of Italian military equipment in World War II
- List of British military equipment of World War II
- List of World War II battles
- North African campaign timeline
Notes
- ^ Sources give conflicting data, Santoro listed 110 bombers, 135 fighters, 45 ground-attack aircraft, six long-range reconnaissance aircraft and four torpedo-bombers.[20]
- ^ The Italians considered forming a mechanised force to invade Egypt, followed by garrison troops to maintain the lines of communication. Two divisions and a brigade of Libyan troops could be fully motorised and join the tanks and motorised artillery, which would have created an all-arms force. Graziani rejected the suggestion since the rest of the army would lose its supply transport. The Tank Command Libya (Comando carri della Libia), three or four artillery regiments and a motorised infantry division could have been formed according to the new mechanised warfare theory but Graziani favoured strength in numbers.[22]
- ^ Squadra 5 was the air force command responsible for Libya, with its HQ in Tripoli in western Libya,, having superseded Aeronautica della Libia on 15 July 1940. Settore Ovest (west) was based at Tripoli and Settore Est (east) at Tobruk, to simplify the administration of the Squadra over such great distances.[51]
- ^ Aviazione Presidio Coloniale (desert reconnaissance and supply)[53]
- ^ Battaglione Aviazione Sahariana, squadrons which guarded the oases in southern Libya.[54]
- ^ Under Squadra 5 command.[55]
- ^ The Western Desert Force consisted of about 31,000 soldiers, 120 guns, 275 tanks and sixty armoured cars. The Italian 10th Army inside Egypt consisted of 80,000 troops, 250 guns and 125 tanks. The 4th Indian Division was exchanged with the 6th Australian Division for the pursuit after the first part of Operation Compass.[57]
Footnotes
- ^ a b Playfair 1959, pp. 38–39, 92.
- ^ Jackson 2006, pp. 117–119.
- ^ a b Playfair 1959, pp. 19, 93.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 32, 93, 97–98, 375.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 32, 93, 97, 100, 375.
- ^ Luck 1989, p. 92.
- ^ a b Playfair 1959, pp. 115–116.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 149.
- ^ Maiolo 2010, p. 197.
- ^ Macksey 1971, p. 24.
- ^ Jowett 2000, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Schreiber 2015, pp. 66–67.
- ^ a b c d e Macksey 1971, p. 38.
- ^ Macksey 1971, p. 28.
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 207.
- ^ Schreiber 2015, p. 65.
- ^ a b Schreiber 2015a, pp. 271–272.
- ^ Dunning 1998, p. 10.
- ^ Mollo 1981, p. 92; Schreiber 2015a, p. 272.
- ^ a b Schreiber 2015a, p. 272.
- ^ Christie 1999, pp. 51–52.
- ^ a b Christie 1999, p. 52.
- ^ Christie 1999, pp. 52–53.
- ^ Christie 1999, pp. 53–54.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 92–93.
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 205.
- ^ Macksey 1971, p. 40; Playfair 1959, pp. 209–210.
- ^ Macksey 1971, pp. 28–29.
- ^ Mead 2007, p. 331.
- ^ Macksey 1971, p. 26.
- ^ a b Pitt 1980, p. 32.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 119, 205.
- ^ a b Christie 1999, p. 54.
- ^ a b Christie 1999, pp. 54–55.
- ^ a b c Playfair 1959, pp. 209–210.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 210, 211.
- ^ a b c d Christie 1999, p. 55.
- ^ a b Playfair 1959, p. 211.
- ^ Macksey 1971, pp. 47, 68; Playfair 1959, p. 211.
- ^ Christie 1999, p. 56.
- ^ Gazette & 37609.
- ^ a b Macksey 1971, p. 47.
- ^ Macksey 1971, p. 41.
- ^ Raugh 1993, p. 85.
- ^ Schreiber 2015a, p. 276.
- ^ Bocca 1997, p. 16.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 211–212.
- ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 211, 257–294, 351–366.
- ^ Christie 1999, pp. 65, 68–79, 82, 104.
- ^ Greene, Massignani & Blennemann 1990, p. 17.
- ^ Dunning 1998, p. 11.
- ^ Dunning 1998, pp. 26, 188.
- ^ Dunning 1998, p. 26.
- ^ Dunning 1998, pp. 129–130.
- ^ Dunning 1998, p. 13.
- ^ Playfair 1959, p. 265, 271.
- ^ Christie 1999, p. 86.
References
- Bocca, Giorgio (1997) [1969]. Storia d'Italia nella guerra fascista 1940–1943 [History of Italy in the Fascist War]. Oscar Storia No. 128 (Mondadori, Roma ed.). Bari: Laterza. ISBN 978-88-04-42699-8.
- Christie, H. R. (1999). Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940 – December 1940 (MA). Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. OCLC 465212715. DTIC ADA367611. Retrieved 8 March 2015.
- Dunning, C. (1998). Courage Alone: The Italian Air Force 1940–1943. Aldershot: Hikoki. ISBN 1-902109-02-3.
- Greene, J.; Massignani, A.; Blennemann, U. (1990). Mare Nostrum: The War in the Mediterranean, being a Study on Aspects of the Italian Army, Navy and Air Forces, with Comments on the German and Allied War Contribution in the Mediterranean & North Africa Fighting in World War II (2nd online ed.). Watsonville, CA: Jack Greene. OCLC 26647786.
- ISBN 978-1-85285-417-1.
- Jowett, Philip S. (2000). The Italian Army 1940–45: Europe 1940–1943. Vol. I. Oxford/New York: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-864-8.
- ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3– via Archive Foundation.
- ISBN 978-0-440-20802-0.
- ISBN 978-0-345-02434-3. Battle Book Number 22.
- Maiolo, Joe (2010). Cry Havoc: The Arms Race and the Second World War 1931–1941. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-6519-9– via Archive Foundation.
- Mead, Richard (2007). Churchill's Lions: A Biographical Guide to the Key British Generals of World War II. Stroud: Spellmount. ISBN 978-1-86227-431-0.
- Mollo, Andrew (1981). The Armed Forces of World War II. New York: ISBN 978-0-517-54478-5– via Archive Foundation.
- "Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940". The London Gazette (Supplement). No. 37609. 13 June 1946. pp. 2997–3006.
- Pitt, B. (1980). The Crucible of War: Wavell's Command. Vol. I (2001 ed.). London: Cassell. ISBN 978-0-304-35950-9– via Archive Foundation.
- OCLC 888934805.
- Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship (1st ed.). London: Brassey's. ISBN 978-0-08-040983-2.
- Schreiber, G.; et al. (2015) [1995]. Falla, P. S. (ed.). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. ISBN 978-0-19-873832-9.
- Schreiber, G. "Part I: Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939–1940. Chapter 1: "Mussolini's Non-belligerence": 4. The Italian Fighting Forces (a) Equipment and Organisation". In Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel (2015).
- Schreiber, G.; et al. (2015a) [1995]. Falla, P. S. (ed.). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. ISBN 978-0-19-873832-9.
- Schreiber, G. "Part I: Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939–1940. Chapter 3: The Strategic Dilemma of the summer and autumn of 1940: An Alternative or Interim Strategy (c) The Offensive against Sidi Barrani". In Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel (2015a).
Further reading
- Bauer, E. (2000) [1979]. Young, Peter (ed.). The History of World War II (Orbis: London, rev. ed.). New York: Galahad Books. ISBN 978-1-85605-552-9.
- ISBN 978-0-415-30535-8.
- ISBN 978-0-395-41056-1.
- Dando, N. (2014). The Impact of Terrain on British Operations and Doctrine in North Africa 1940–1943 (PhD). Plymouth University. OCLC 885436735. Retrieved 25 March 2015.
- OCLC 1056143039.
- Titterton, G. A. (2002) [1952]. Brown, David (ed.). The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: September 1939 – October 1940. Naval Staff Histories. Vol. I. Frank Cass. ISBN 978-0-7146-5179-8.
- Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Marlborough: Crowood. ISBN 978-1-86126-646-0.
External links
- The Italian Army in Egypt during World War II
- "Bush Battles". Time Magazine. 12 August 1940. Archived from the originalon May 4, 2008. Retrieved July 15, 2009.