Battle of Tashan
Battle of Tashan | |||||||
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Part of the Chinese Civil War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
National Revolutionary Army | People's Liberation Army | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) Luo Qi (罗奇) | Cheng Zihua (程子华) | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
95,000 | 55,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
9,549 killed | 23,774 (7,878 killed) |
The Battle of Tashan (
The name "Tashan" (塔山), literally translated to "Pagoda Mountain", was short for Tashanbao (塔山堡, meaning "Pagoda Mountain fort"). Contrary to its name, there were neither pagoda nor mountains and the only defensive bunkers were the ones hastily built by the communists temporarily for the upcoming battle. The place was actually a village of 100 or so households, some 30 km away from Jinzhou, with the main road to Jinzhou passing directly through the center of the village.
Prelude
After encircling Jinzhou, the communists were facing an incoming Nationalist reinforcement of a total of 11 divisions (not counting the Nationalist air and naval assets), and were well aware of the importance of stopping Nationalist reinforcements from reaching Jinzhou. The PLA deployed a total of eight divisions and an
However, the local communist commanders, especially those of 4th Column, resented Luo Ronghuan’s decision to send Su Jing. After he arrived at the headquarters of 4th Column, they jokingly referred to him as the equivalent of an ancient Chinese imperial army overseer, feeling that Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao were doubtful they were competent enough to accomplish their assigned mission. Luckily, the excellent work of the political commissar of the 4th Column, Mo Wenhua (莫文骅), was able to resolve the issue and the communists avoided the kind of factional disputes that existed in the nationalist camp.
Order of battle
Attackers: National Revolutionary Army (Nationalist) order of battle:
- The 54th Army (3 divisions)
- The 62nd Army (3 divisions)
- 2 divisions from the 39th Army
- 21st Division of the 92nd Army
- The 62nd Division
- The Independent 95th Division
- Naval and air assets
Defenders: People's Liberation Army (Communist) order of battle:
- The 4th Column (3 divisions)
- The 11th Column (3 divisions)
- ReheIndependent 4th Division
- ReheIndependent 6th Division
- An artillery brigade
Battle
The battle started before dawn on October 10, 1948, at 3:00 AM, with the Nationalists successfully launching a surprise attack with numerical and technical superiority, taking the Fishing Mountain (Da Yu Shan,打鱼山)Island at low tide. Da Yu Shan Island was a critical position, in that whoever controlled the islands would threaten the flank of Tashan. The grave danger was realized by the commander of the communist 4th Column, Wu Kehua (吴克华), who immediately ordered a counterattack to retake the island. The mission was successfully accomplished, and the island remained firmly in communist hands for the remainder of the battle.
Although Nationalist aircraft dropped over 5,000 heavy bombs on communist positions—which were also pounded by Nationalist naval shelling—the attack was not well coordinated because Nationalist commanders on the ground lacked the authority to command air and naval assets, which were under the direct control of Chiang Kai-shek and his high command. As a result, the communists were able to dig in underground without suffering significant casualties, despite most of their fortifications above the ground being demolished by Nationalist attacks from air and sea. Despite Nationalist encouragements including a half-million-dollar incentive reward for each troop, repeated Nationalist charges against communist positions were beaten back—the communists even at one point used Nationalist corpses to improvise temporary fortifications, which proved to be a psychological shock to the attacking Nationalist troops. As a result, the Nationalists were unable to advance any further towards Jinzhou.
On October 15 the news of the fall of Jinzhou had reached Nationalist reinforcements at Tashan. Realizing there was no longer any reason for further attack, and fearful of an all-out counterattack by the communists—who now had additional troops freed up from the conquest of Jinzhou to reinforce Tashan—the Nationalists made a hasty retreat at noon, leaving behind a total of 6,549 killed. The battle concluded with a victory for the communists, whose casualties included 7,827 killed, 15,922 wounded, three captured and 22 missing.
Outcome
The communists' successful repelling of Nationalist forces at Tashan was one of the most important factors contributing to the Nationalist loss in the
It wasn't only the commanders sent by Chiang Kai-shek who could not get along with the local commanders; they also could not get along with each other. Que Hanqian was constantly interfered with by Luo Qi (罗奇), the other senior commander was also sent by Chiang, and Luo Qi constantly filed secret reports to Chiang informing on other commanders’ behavior, including Que Hanqian, who was accused by Luo Qi of not being enthusiastic about his mission. It was obvious that Nationalist commanders were not able to effectively conduct operations under such conditions. Not only were the Nationalist frontline commanders unable to effectively command their army units, they were also completely incapable of directing any air and naval assets. Chiang had ordered the Nationalist air force and navy to provide support, but without giving any authority to commanders on the ground to use them directly; even Que Hanqian and Luo Qi could not direct air and naval assets without going through Chiang first. As a result, Nationalist naval shelling and air strikes were not coordinated with ground offensives to any great effect. Another reason for ineffective Nationalist air and naval operations was that all Nationalist officers, including Chiang himself, had doubts as to the success of the mission, and the Nationalists were faced with a dilemma: should they risk the few valuable air and naval assets they had to a plausible lost cause (especially when the overall situation in Northeast China would not change for the better even if the battle was won), or should they preserve these resources to be used elsewhere where the Nationalists had brighter prospect? The decision was difficult and certainly limited the usage of these assets.
The personality of the Nationalist commanders was also a contributor factor to their defeat. Hou Jingru (侯镜如) and Hui De’an (惠德安), the commander and deputy commander of the Qinhuangdao-Jinxi garrison, were capable commanders originally tasked to assist Chen Tie. However, despite their excellence, Hou and Hui were extremely loyal and blindly obedient to Chiang Kai-shek and would not voice any complaints regarding their superior's mistakes. This was evidenced by the fact that, after the 21st Division of the NRA 92nd Army under the command of Hou Jingru was annihilated in the Autumn Offensive of 1947 in Northeast China (which was not his fault), Hou did not voice any complaints to his superior Chen Cheng and Chiang. As a capable military commander, Hou Jingru had reached the same conclusion as his superior Chen Cheng: Northeast China was a lost cause for the Nationalists, who would be much better off if they had given up the region and use the freed troops elsewhere where they were in better positions, and recapture the region when things had turned better. However, unlike his outspoken superior Chen Cheng, who openly advocated this idea, Hou kept quiet and faithfully carried on to the end the impossible tasks set by Chiang. Hou had earned Chiang's deep trust, but this would come at a heavy price: when Chiang personally sent two of his senior officers to replace the much more capable Chen Tie, Hou and Hui did not voice their concern regarding two new commanders' incompetence. At the same time, Hou and Hui were also aware of the Nationalist problems they could not solve, and not wanting to be scapegoats for failure, the two chose to wait by not going to help the two new senior commanders, who out of jealousy did not want them to be involved anyway.
The primary reason Chiang Kai-shek decided to intrude on the
See also
- Outline of the Chinese Civil War
- National Revolutionary Army
- History of the People's Liberation Army
References
This article includes a improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (September 2014) ) |
- Zhu, Zongzhen and Wang, Chaoguang, Liberation War History, 1st Edition, Social Scientific Literary Publishing House in ISBN 7-80149-207-2(set)
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