Bernal v. Fainter

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Bernal v. Fainter
Holding
The Texas statute requiring that a notary public be a United States citizen violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr. · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityMarshall, joined by Burger, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor
DissentRehnquist
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984), is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the state of Texas from barring noncitizens from applying for commission as a notary public.[1]

Background

A native of Mexico applied to be a notary public in Texas.[2] Citing a Texas law that required notaries public to be citizens of the United States, Texas' Secretary of State denied the application.[3] After losing an administrative appeal, the applicant filed a lawsuit in federal court.[4] The trial court ruled in favor of the applicant and found that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Texas' citizenship requirement did not pass either strict scrutiny or rational basis review.[5] The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the rational basis test was the proper standard of review and that under this standard, the citizenship requirement "bears a rational relationship to the state's interest in the proper and orderly handling of a countless variety of legal documents of importance to the state."[6]

Opinion of the Court

Citing

Texas Secretary of State, who is not required to be a citizen despite holding the "highest appointive position" in Texas.[13]

Dissenting opinion

Justice William Rehnquist wrote a one-sentence dissenting opinion stating: "I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Sugarman v. Dougall."[14] In Sugarman, Justice Rehnquist argued that alienage is not a suspect classification.[15]

See also

References

  1. ^ Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984).
  2. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 218.
  3. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 218 (noting that the application was denied under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., Art. 5949(2) (Vernon Supp.1984)).
  4. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 218 (citing Vargas v. Strake, C.A. No. B-79-147 (SD Tex., Oct. 9, 1981) (mem.)).
  5. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 218-19.
  6. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219 (citing Vargas v. Strake, 710 F.2d 190, 195 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  7. ^ Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
  8. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 419-22.
  9. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 422-27.
  10. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 425-27.
  11. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 426-27.
  12. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 428.
  13. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 422.
  14. ^ Bernal, 467 U.S. at 428 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
  15. ^ Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

External links