1985–1987 Watsonville Cannery strike

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1985–1987 Watsonville Cannery strike
DateSeptember 9, 1985 – March 11, 1987
(1 year, 6 months and 2 days)
Location
Caused byDisagreements over the terms of a new labor contract
GoalsUnion sought to prevent cuts in wages and benefits
Methods
Resulted inUnion and companies agreed to new industry-wide labor contract that preserved employee benefits, but included wage cuts
Parties
  • Richard A. Shaw Frozen Foods
  • Watsonville Canning Company

The 1985–1987 Watsonville Cannery strike was a

labor strike that involved over 1,000 workers at two food processing facilities in Watsonville, California, United States. The facilities were owned by Watsonville Canning and Richard A. Shaw Inc., two of the largest frozen food processors in the United States, while the workers were all union members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) Local
912. The strike began on September 9, 1985, and completely ended about 18 months later, on March 11, 1987.

The city of Watsonville has historically been a center for the

Latinos. Around that same time, changes in the food processing industry caused the Watsonville plants to become less profitable, and in 1982, Watsonville Canning (the single-largest frozen food processor in the United States) negotiated an hourly wage decrease for their union employees from $7.06 to $6.66. In 1985, their labor contract had expired, and Watsonville Canning began pushing for further wage and employee benefits reductions. Richard A. Shaw Inc., another major food processing company in the city, similarly began requesting wage and benefits reductions, which were opposed by the local union. On September 9, union members from both companies began a strike, with picketing
commencing shortly thereafter.

The strike received significant support from the local Latino community, with support coming from

civil rights leaders Cesar Chavez and Jesse Jackson were supportive of the strikers, viewing the labor dispute as part of a larger struggle for civil rights for Latinos in the United States. Additional support came from organized labor activists in both northern California and nationwide, and the strike was characterized by its militancy and rank-and-file leadership. The strikers elected their own Strike Committee that managed the overall daily operations of the strike, and the Teamsters for a Democratic Union also contributed to organizing the strike. On February 14, 1986, Shaw and Local 912 agreed to an hourly wage of $5.85, which soon became the industry standard. However, the strike continued against Watsonville Canning through 1986. In August, the company tried to decertify the union in an election, but failed, and subsequently the company (which had taken on a large debt during this time) declared bankruptcy, with the plant being sold. A tentative contract was reached with the new owners in March 1987 that set wages to the industry standard but contained cuts to medical benefits. While the IBT declared the strike over, several workers continued the dispute as a wildcat strike
that lasted for about a week before the company agreed to include medical benefits, with the strike finally coming to an end on March 11.

Labor historians note the significance of the strike as one of the few successful strikes in the United States during the 1980s, compared to other strikes of the time such as the

union-busting". In Watsonville, the strike coincided with increased political activity from the Latino community. Oscar Rios, a union organizer
during the strike, was elected as the city's first Latino mayor several years later, stating, "The strikers helped change the politics in our city and county". However, in the years following the strike, most of the major food processors relocated from the city, with only one frozen food plant left in the city by 2000.

Background

Food processing industry in Watsonville

Partial view of Watsonville and surrounding agricultural area near the Pajaro River

Brussels sprouts, and cauliflower.[3] By the 1950s, food processors in the city began freezing this food instead of canning,[3] and soon the city was home to eight frozen food plants,[note 1] earning it the nickname of the "frozen food capital of the world".[5][11][6] By 1986, the city, with a population of about 27,000,[note 2] was processing about 40 percent of the frozen broccoli, Brussels sprouts, green peppers, and spinach produced in the United States.[1]

By the mid-1980s, the city's industry was dominated by two firms in particular: the Watsonville Canning Company and Richard A. Shaw Inc.[15][12] Together, these two companies accounted for about 80 percent of Watsonville's frozen food output.[16] These two firms were also the largest frozen food processors in the United States.[17] Watsonville Canning, the larger of the two,[7] was the largest frozen food processing company in the United States.[18] It employed about 5,000 people and processed roughly half of the United States's supply of frozen vegetables.[19] The company, which by the 1980s was owned by Watsonville native Mort Console,[3] produced frozen vegetables for Birds Eye and private supermarket brands.[16]

Latinos in the area

In 1900, Watsonville had a population of 3,528, of which only 118 were from

farmworkers, and the city became a center of a growing Latino population.[21] Through the 1980s and 1990s, the city grew at an annual rate of about 38 percent, due in large part to Latino immigration,[22] and many during this time were able to rise into the middle class.[12] By the 1980s, Latinos made up a majority of the city's population,[2][3] making it the first California city north of Fresno to hold that distinction.[14] Among frozen food workers in the city, nine out of ten were Latino.[19]

However, despite the change in demographics, white Americans still held most of the economic and political power in the city.[3] Discrimination against Latinos was common in Watsonville, with housing discrimination being a major issue.[23] In 1969, some Latino students at Watsonville High School held a walkout and boycott of classes, demanding that more Latino teachers and employees be hired by the school.[23] By 1985, the mayor, fire chief and police chief were all white,[3] and only one member of the city council was Latino.[23] Additionally, Watsonville Canning was white-owned.[3] Regarding the economic disparities between Latinos and white Americans, scholar Erik Davis once referred to Watsonville as "a poor town with a large, struggling migrant population".[24]

Union activity

Through the 1930s and 1940s,

industrial dispute for the next three decades.[26][30]

Local 912

In 1952,[16] with assistance from the owners of Watsonville Canning,[26] IBT Local 912 was organized in Watsonville to represent cannery workers in the city,[26][16] and by 1986, they represented almost all of the roughly 4,000 food processing workers in Watsonville.[12] By the mid-1990s, roughly one out of every four Watsonville residents were members of Local 912.[32][9][10] This local union was closely aligned with the local business interests,[19] leading to some researchers calling it a "company union"[33] that "was controlled by a corrupt leadership".[34] According to activist Frank Bardacke, "the bosses allowed the union officials a good deal of personal power, as long as they refrained from challenging the employer's prerogatives in production or encouraging workers to organize themselves".[35] Some of the union leaders would socialize and play poker with cannery officials,[12][3] and Richard King, who served as the secretary-treasurer for several years[26] before becoming the local's president in 1967,[7] was the father-in-law of a business partner at Richard A. Shaw.[26] As the head of the local, he was generally uninvolved in union activities, rarely attending union meetings,[26] and some rank and file union members were critical of his accommodationist approach to labor-management relations.[36]

In 1985, about 70 percent of Local 912's membership was Latino,[36] and more Latinos voted in Teamsters elections than they did in municipal elections.[9][10][32] However, the local was dominated by white Americans who were largely disconnected from these members' concerns.[19][5] Union meetings were held only in English and, until the mid-1980s, only one person on the local's leadership, a business agent who had been appointed by the local in 1968, spoke Spanish.[26] Additionally, while women made up the majority of Local 912 membership, they were not represented on the local leadership,[36] and few attended union meetings due to a lack of child care coverage from the local and the bureaucratic and parliamentarian nature of the meetings.[35] Despite these issues, the local had managed to negotiate some of the highest wages for food processing workers in the country, with a base hourly pay up to $7.05 for most workers and up to $12 for machine operators, plus employee benefits.[12]

Changes in the industry in the 1980s

In 1973, Local 912 membership peaked at about 7,000 members, with peak season employment in the Watsonville canneries reaching about 10,000.

consumer preferences away from frozen or canned foods and towards more fresh food options.[12][3] Between 1975 and 1983, over a dozen major canneries in California closed, leading to roughly 15,000 lost jobs, with only about 19,000 workers remaining in California canneries.[12] According to academic Patricia Zavella, in the years leading up to 1985, "the global restructuring of agriculture ... prompted local farmers and processors to expand acreage in Mexico, grow new crops locally for the fresh market, and downsize food processing in Watsonville".[10]

Wage decreases at Watsonville Canning

Food processing companies in Watsonville responded to these changing market trends by renegotiating labor contracts with Local 912. In 1982, Watsonville Canning negotiated an agreement with Local 912 wherein they would reduce their hourly wages from the industry standard of $7.06 to $6.66.[note 3] The company argued that the pay cut was necessary due to a decline in business,[3] claiming that the company was near bankruptcy[37] and the cuts would allow the company to remain profitable.[7] Additionally, the company agreed to restore the wages if business improved.[37] The cuts gave Watsonville Canning a competitive edge over the other food processing plants in Watsonville,[40] with the company seeing a five percent increase in business during 1985.[3] Soon after these changes were implemented at Watsonville Canning, other food processors began requesting similar wage decreases from the union.[37][3][7]

Contract negotiations

In early 1985, the union and Watsonville Canning entered into negotiations for a new labor contract,

terrorist attack" on the workers.[47] In defending the policy changes, Smiley Verduzco, an executive at Watsonville Canning, stated that there had been work slowdowns prior to the changes.[3]

Around the same time, Shaw also left the industry-wide agreement and began pushing for terms similar to what Watsonville Canning had.[7] Shaw proposed a base hourly pay reduction from $7.06 to $6.66,[1][39] with new hires earning $4.43 per hour.[1] Additionally, the company was pushing for 25 takeaways in employee benefits.[39] As it became apparent that an agreement between Local 912 and both Watsonville Canning and Shaw was unlikely to be reached, the companies began preparing for possible strike action.[48] Watsonville Canning began to stockpile its product during mid-1985,[41] and additionally secured $18 million in credit from Wells Fargo.[7] In an article for the Los Angeles Times, union officials stated that the speedups and policy changes made during mid-1985 were intended to force a strike in sentiments that were echoed by Charles Craypo, head of the economics department at the University of Notre Dame, who said, "Companies today are taking the offensive, doing things to weaken unions and sometimes forcing them into strikes that they can’t win".[3] Don McIntosh, editor of the Northwest Labor Press, stated that the company had recently hired an anti-union law firm and, on their advice, were attempting to provoke a strike, hire permanent replacements, and decertify the union in a government-administered decertification election that would involve voting from those permanent replacements.[7] Speaking about the policy changes and wage reductions, King said, "The companies are trying to break the union here and send us back into the 1950's".[1]

In comparison to Watsonville Canning, Local 912 was unprepared for a strike.

single mothers.[3][11][57][52] According to academic Margie Brown-Coronel, the strike was not only to oppose the company's wage decreases and benefits reductions, but "also ... to protest lack of leadership and support required of the Teamsters Union".[19] The strike was somewhat unique in that rank and file members initiated the action, which was then supported by the international union.[40][58] Meanwhile, other food processors in the area agreed to extend their $7.06 agreements with the union for another year in order to see the outcome of the labor dispute.[39]

Course of the strike

Early activities during the strike

The food processing workers began their strike on September 9, 1985.[59] At 5 a.m. that Monday, union members met at the union hall and were given picket signs and sent to the gates of the two frozen food plants.[15] At Watsonville Canning, the strikers formed a picket line that stretched for eight city blocks, while at Shaw, the line was a third of a mile long.[15] Many of the picket signs were written in both English and Spanish, and many of the strikers brought their children with them.[60] In response to the picketing, the district attorney and Console, who stated that he "feared for [his] personal safety", requested Santa Cruz County Superior Court[3] Judge William Kelsay to issue a temporary restraining order against the strikers, which he granted at 8 p.m. that day,[15] within 15 hours of the start of the strike.[7] As part of the restraining order, there could be no more than four pickets within 20 feet (6.1 m) of each of Watsonville Canning's eight gates, pickets could not be within 10 feet (3.0 m) of each other, and only people going to work at the plant could congregate within 100 yards (91 m) of the plant.[15][7] The restraining order significantly hampered the effectiveness of the strike,[15][3] with each plant limited to only 60 pickets.[47]

Soon after the strike began, the Watsonville City Council increased funding for their

riot gear dispersed the crowd that had gathered to protest the arrests.[15] Around the same time, Judge Kelsay upgraded the restraining order to an injunction.[15]

Community support for the strike

To make up for the lost wages, strikers received a weekly

power structure in the majority-Latino city.[58] In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Mike Herald, the head of a group of several community churches that provided charitable services to the strikers, expressed this opinion, saying, "The city’s white power structure has lined up on one side and the strikers on the other".[3] Within the first few weeks, two support groups were formed to assist the strike, and the strikers began receiving donations from various Chicano groups such as the League of United Latin American Citizens and the Mexican American Political Association.[63][18] Activists from nearby universities, such as Stanford University[42] and the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), also participated in supporting the strike.[64][65][53]

Teamsters for a Democratic Union

One of the groups involved in the strike were the Detroit-based Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU),[12] a group within the IBT that had been formed in the 1970s with the intent to challenge the conservative old guard and push for more militant union with more of an emphasis on rank-and-file leadership.[28] The TDU had become involved in Local 912 activities in the early 1980s when it campaigned for union meetings to be held in both English and Spanish[66] Some TDU members in Local 912 were active in pushing for a strike in mid-1985,[67] and at the start of the strike, the TDU chapter in Watsonville attempted to fill the power vacuum in the strike leadership.[15] The TDU also pushed for weekly strike meetings and attempted to raise the weekly strike pay from $55 to $100.[16]

Strikebreakers and instances of violence

In order to continue operations during the strike, the two companies began hiring strikebreakers shortly after the strike began.[10][45] These workers were paid slightly over $5 per hour,[note 7] with no employee benefits or guaranteed job security.[6] For roughly the first two months of the strike, the plants operated with about 80 to 100 strikebreakers, whereas before the strike these plants operated with between 1,000 and 2,000 employees.[39] As a result, the plants operated at a reduced production level.[1] Through the strike, there was a high turnover rate among the replacement workers,[6][15] with many working only a few weeks before quitting.[16] However, by September 1986, Watsonville Canning had about 900 replacement workers in their employment.[30]

"Just because you’re

Catholic
doesn’t mean you can’t throw rocks at scabs".

Gloria Betancourt, a strike leader, discussing instances of violence against strikebreakers[7]

Police accompanied the strikebreakers to and from the plants,

esquiroles" (the Spanish word for "scab").[12][10] Some violent outbreaks occurred in the first few months of the strike,[3] including attacks on strikebreakers.[12][7] Some of the strikebreakers' cars were vandalized,[16] and strikebreakers used sand-filled socks to bust out the windows on the buses that carried the strikebreakers to and from the plants.[7] Additionally, one striker was arrested for attempting to throw a Molotov cocktail at one of these buses.[1] During the strike, three cars that were owned by company executives were destroyed,[3] and instances of arson increased during that time.[1] Several homes were firebombed, and two fires at properties owned by Watsonville Canning resulted in about $1 million in damages.[3] In total, four instances of arson resulted in damages of about $2 million.[1][18] Despite this, no major injuries were reported from strike-related activities.[3]

Late 1985

On October 6, the Watsonville TDU helped to organize a "Solidarity Day" rally in Watsonville that included a march to the Watsonville Canning plant,[41] with about 3,000 supporters participating.[68][8] Several days later, on October 15, about 400 strikers met to elect their own Strike Committee that would function independently of either the IBT or the TDU.[41] Regarding the creation of this group, Gloria Betancourt, one of the rank-and-file union members who was elected to the committee, said, "We didn't trust the union officials anymore. We felt as workers we had to form our own Strike Committee".[41] This strike committee, composed of workers from both plants,[41] handled the day-to-day operations of the strike,[54] which included, among other things, 24-hour picketing and food distribution.[57] The same month that the strike committee was formed, Watsonville Canning presented their final proposal to Local 912.[3] The company offered a base hourly pay of $5.05,[39][12] as well as a preference for the replacement workers over the striking workers.[3] On October 28, 1985,[16] union members voted 800–1 to reject this offer.[39] On November 3,[50] the strike committee called for another rally, which was again attended by about 3,000 supporters.[45] The following month, Local 912 held officer elections in which the more moderate incumbent members of the union were challenged by more militant candidates, including Betancourt, who was the first Mexican women to run for president in the local's history.[36] While several members of this slate were elected, Betancourt lost her bid.[61] King, meanwhile, was not reelected as an officer of the union.[note 8] This trend of more militant union members winning Local 912 elections continued in next December's elections,[50] though again Betancourt lost her bid for president.[69]

Shaw settles with strikers

In February 1986, after several months on strike, the workers from Richard A. Shaw settled with that company,[45][15] ending their strike on February 14.[61] As part of the agreement, the workers accepted an hourly pay rate of $5.85,[45] which, while higher than the $5.05 Shaw had proposed prior to the strike, was still significantly lower than the previous industry standard.[61] The agreement affected about 900 union employees of Shaw, who ultimately took a 17 percent pay cut.[16] Additionally, the contract contained language that would allow the company and union to renegotiate wages if Watsonville Canning settled with their employees for a lower rate.[61] According to Chavelo Moreno, a member of the Strike Committee, the agreement set a wage ceiling for industry, which made it more difficult for the Watsonville Canning employees to negotiate a higher rate.[61] In July 1986, union employees at another Watsonville plant accepted a pay rate of $5.85 per hour,[16] cementing that as the new industry standard.[30] However, the language of this master agreement that the IBT had with the industry included a "me-too" clause that would not allow Watsonville Canning to undercut this rate.[7] According to Local 912 President Leon Ellis, the local had agreed to the $1.21 pay cut after Shaw disclosed their financial information to the union that proved that the company was losing money.[3] The local had also requested that Watsonville Canning disclose their private financial information as part of contract negotiations, but Verduzco stated that the company would only do so if the union paid a $500,000 fine.[3] In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, he said, "I don’t trust those hoodlums; they want to run this company out of business. We are a privately held corporation. Our financial statements are our financial statements; they don’t belong to the people".[3]

Early 1986

Civil rights activists Cesar Chavez (left) and Jesse Jackson were both vocal supporters of the strikers.

On

presidency of the United States in the 1988 Democratic Party presidential primaries, again addressed the crowd, where he drew comparisons between the strike and the Selma to Montgomery marches during the civil rights movement.[63] While the IBT had been reluctant to allow Jackson to speak, the Strike Committee was in full support.[63] Jackson was one of the most vocal national advocates for the strikers,[13][65] and members of his National Rainbow Coalition participated in picketing and other forms of support for the strike.[72] In 1988, Betancourt served as a delegate for Jackson at the 1988 Democratic National Convention.[69]

Local 912 targets Wells Fargo and company moves to decertify

Around mid-1986, Local 912 began to focus its attention on Wells Fargo for its role as a major financial backer of Watsonville Canning. This idea to put pressure on Wells Fargo had initially been proposed in November 1985 by UFW president and civil rights activist Cesar Chavez.[50] In May 1986, the IBT voted to pressure Wells Fargo, allowing Local 912 to campaign for northern California labor unions and groups to withdraw their funds from Wells Fargo if the strike did not end on terms favorable to the union.[50] Despite this vote, the international union did little in active campaigning against Wells Fargo, and that same month, the IBT voted to "undertake economic sanctions" against Watsonville Canning but stopped short of calling for a full boycott of Watsonville Canning products.[63] In July 1986, Chavez met with strikers in Watsonville and pushed for a boycott against Wells Fargo.[73] The Strike Committee's decision to meet with Chavez was against the wishes of the IBT, who were opposed to the UFW and had competed directly against that union in organizing farm workers in the 1970s.[73]

A color photograph of the front of a building, with a sign reading "WELLS FARGO" above the entryway
The headquarters for Wells Fargo in San Francisco

By this time, many of the strikers had taken on other jobs to support themselves, and some left Watsonville altogether.

decertify Local 912.[73] A vote was scheduled that would include both striking union members and non-striking workers to decide whether Local 912 would continue to represent the workforce at Watsonville Canning.[73] Local 912 began gathering union members, including those who had moved as far away as Texas and Mexico, to return to Watsonville to vote against decertification.[45][7] Console, meanwhile, hired additional strikebreakers, sometimes doubling the number of workers on a line and hiring many for four-hour shifts in order to bolster the non-union vote.[73] In a narrow election, the union members won out over the non-union employees, with the decertification effort failing in a 914–848.[45][50]

Console goes into default, sells Watsonville Canning

Following the failed decertification vote, Console's financial situation deteriorated, and Watsonville Canning closed for 11 days before reopening with funding from a new $930,000 loan from Wells Fargo.

corporate campaign" against Watsonville Canning's creditors for the past three months.[3] That same month, the California Department of Food and Agriculture announced that they were opening an investigation into Watsonville Canning.[43][18] By this point, Wells Fargo had loaned the company $23 million,[44] and Watsonville Canning owed the bank $18 million, in addition to $7 million it owed to its growers.[18] In December 1986, saddled with this debt, Console closed the plant down for one month.[71] Two months later, Wells Fargo declared that Console was in default on his loans.[71] At this point, in order to avoid bankruptcy,[7][15] Console was forced to sell the plant.[71]

In the aftermath of this, Wells Fargo sold the company,[45] and new ownership of the plant was established in February 1987.[43][18] The owner of this new company, named Norcal Frozen Foods,[38] was a grower who was owed $5 million from Watsonville Canning,[50] and 18 other growers who were owed money from Watsonville Canning were also part of this company.[71] On February 28, 400 strikers elected a new negotiating committee to reach a deal with these new owners,[71] and on Friday, March 6, a tentative agreement had been reached that would see an end to the strike.[71] The deal would set hourly wages at $5.85, the industry standard, and was approved by both the negotiating committee and union leadership.[71] However, many union members were opposed to the agreement because it would deny many of them medical benefits that they had had before the strike.[75] Ultimately, the union members voted to wait one week before voting on whether or not to approve the contract.[71][50][75] However, with the tentative agreement, the IBT announced that the strike was over, and as a result, they ended strike benefits, locked members who continued to strike out of the union hall, and stated that the union may go into trusteeship if strike activities did not cease.[75] Without IBT approval, the members of Local 912 continued their labor dispute as a wildcat strike.[51]

Hunger strike, religious pilgrimage, and end of the strike

A color photograph of a brick building, a church
On March 9, several strikers walked on their knees from the plant to St. Patrick's Catholic Church to protest the lack of medical benefits.

In defiance of the IBT, six women,

religious procession, with more than 20 women and several men walking on their knees for four city blocks.[76] The procession, which ended at St. Patrick's Catholic Church[77] over 1 mile (1.6 km) from the plant,[51] included prayers to Our Lady of Guadalupe[10] and the leader of the procession chanting, "“As long as God is in Heaven, I will never give up".[77] A special mass was held, with the local priest urging the strikers to continue the protest until their medical benefits were part of the contract.[76] The pilgrimage was a tactic that had been used by UFW members during a strike about 15 years earlier.[51] Later that night, contract negotiations between Local 912 and the company resumed.[75]

On March 11, a new contract that preserved the workers' medical benefits was ratified,[45] passing in a vote of 543–21.[18] In addition to the medical benefits, the three-year contract[38] workers maintained their seniority rights and received strike amnesty.[10] With regards to pay, the workers accepted the new industry standard of $5.85,[38][53][43][18] although an incentive pay plan could raise their hourly wages up to $6.61.[38] Additionally, the contract allowed for negotiations on economic terms to start again in February 1988 and 1989.[38] In celebration of the end of the strike, union members held a parade down Watsonville's Main Street.[50] However, due to the wage reduction, many of the strikers viewed the outcome less as an outright victory and more as a compromise.[77] According to Betancourt, "It was not what we wanted, but it was still a victory".[76]

Aftermath and legacy

Impact in Watsonville

In total, the IBT spent roughly $5 million in strike benefits over the course of the strike.[38][13][16] According to municipal officials, the strike cost the city government about $1 million in police overtime and lost sales.[3] A 1986 article from the Los Angeles Times stated that the strike had "devastated" Watsonville, highlighting the increased rates of violence and the impact on the local economy.[3] That same article states that Watsonville had seen an uptick in domestic violence cases and rates of alcoholism, as well as an increase in prostitution.[3] With a reduced income, many of the strikers saw their savings decline significantly,[16] and some permanently relocated from Watsonville.[45][7]

After the strike, the plant reopened with a

unemployment rate in Watsonville remained high compared to the rest of the state.[80][81]

Political developments in Watsonville

The strike coincided with a federal court case, Gomez v. City of Watsonville, that dealt with the lack of Latino representation in Watsonville city politics.[82] The court's decision led to an electoral district system that could better represent the ethnic demographics of the city, and in the following years, several Latinos were elected to city council and other government positions.[79][6][57] In 1991, three Latinos were elected to the city council, and Oscar Rios, a union organizer from San Francisco who had moved to Watsonville during the strike, was later elected the city's first Latino mayor.[46] Discussing the link between the strike and the shifting politics, Rios stated, "The strikers helped change the politics in our city and county".[43] In 2017, some of the individuals who had been involved in the strike gathered at the Watsonville Public Library to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the strike.[53]

Later analysis and legacy

The strike is noted for being one of the largest and most important in the United States during the 1980s.

Arizona copper mine strike of 1983 and the 1938 pecan shellers' strike in San Antonio.[88] Speaking further of the relation between this strike and older strikes, labor historian Myrna Cherkoss Donahoe compared the militant nature of the rank-and-file Watsonville strikers to those of the CIO strikes of the 1930s.[8]

Notes

  1. ^ Multiple sources state that there were eight frozen food plants in Watsonville at the time.[5][6][7][8][4] However, academic Patricia Zavella stated that there were eleven plants in Watsonville.[9][10]
  2. ^ Sources vary slightly on the population, with sources differing between 25,000,[12] 27,000,[13] and 28,000.[14]
  3. ^ These figures are given in several sources.[7][39] Additionally, several sources state an hourly wage decrease of 40 cents.[40][3][16] However, one source states that the wage decrease was from $7.75 to $6.66.[37]
  4. ^ Sources vary considerably on the proposed wage reductions made by Watsonville Canning, with sources giving proposed hourly wages of $5.05,[37] $4.75,[42][3] $4.65,[7][41] $4.45,[43] and $4.25.[44][8][45][12][1] Some sources expressed the wage decreases as a percentage of the workers' initial pay, with values of "almost 30 percent",[13] "40 percent",[19] and "cut almost in half".[30] The Christian Science Monitor reported that the pay decreases were approximately equal to a 30 perecent decrease for production workers and a 60 percent decrease for skilled workers.[36]
  5. ^ According to Linda Dailey Paulson of the St. James Encyclopedia of Labor History Worldwide, "the reported number of striking workers varied widely".[16] Several sources state that the strike affected about 1,000 workers.[49][44][11][6][13][3][50][30][25][51] However, this figure may only apply to workers from Watsonville Canning, as several sources report that that company employed about 1,000 people,[7][8] while one source states that about 900 employees from Shaw went on strike.[16] Other figures for the number of strikers involved include 1,100;[52] 1,500;[53][40] 1,600;[19][54] 1,700;[55][12][1][15] and 2,000.[43][36] According to one source, the strike "at its height" involved about 1,700 workers.[56]
  6. ^ Most sources state the value was $55,[10][38][11][6][13][3][16] though one source gives the value as $50.[53]
  7. ^ Sources vary on the exact hourly pay rate, with different values of $5.05[6] and $5.16.[30][16]
  8. ^ Sources differ slightly, with one source stating he declined to run for reelection,[61] one stating that he retired,[18] and another stating he resigned.[7]

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n The New York Times 1985, p. 28.
  2. ^ a b Takash 1997, p. 417.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an Corwin 1986.
  4. ^ a b Flores 1997, p. 215.
  5. ^ a b c Trumpbour & Bernard 2009, p. 133.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Bardacke 1995.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa McIntosh 2017.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h Donahoe 2009, p. 446.
  9. ^ a b c Zavella 2011, p. 101.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Zavella 2020, p. 110.
  11. ^ a b c d e f Amott & Matthaei 1996, p. 90.
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Lindsey 1986, p. 6.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g Lindsey 1987, p. 14.
  14. ^ a b c Castillo 2014, p. 41.
  15. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v Shapiro 2016a.
  16. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Paulson 2004, p. 411.
  17. ^ Zavella 2020, p. 109, "the two largest frozen food companies in the United States"; Erlich 1985, "two of the largest packers of frozen vegetables in the United States"; Tisbe 2017, "two of the largest frozen food companies at the time"; The New York Times 1985, p. 28, "two of the country's largest frozen-food plants"; Todd 2018, "the two largest frozen food companies in the United States".
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  33. ^ Flores 1997, p. 220, "Watsonville's IBT Local 912 was formed in 1952 with the assistance of Watsonville Canning's owners, the Console family, and operated for all intents and purposes as a company union".
  34. ^ Donahoe 2009, p. 446, "Similar to many Teamster locals, Local 912 was controlled by a corrupt leadership and not responsive to the needs of the workforce, especially immigrants and women".
  35. ^ a b Flores 1997, p. 221.
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  70. ^ Kwik 1986.
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  83. ^ Tisbe 2017, "the longest national strike of its time".
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Sources

Further reading