D-Day naval deceptions
Taxable, Glimmer and Big Drum | |
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Part of Cap d'Antifer, Pas-de-Calais, Normandy | |
Date | 5–6 June 1944 |
Executed by |
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Outcome | Limited success in deceiving the Axis as to Allied intentions |
Operations Taxable, Glimmer and Big Drum were tactical military deceptions conducted on 6 June 1944 in support of the Allied landings in Normandy. The operations formed the naval component of Operation Bodyguard, a wider series of tactical and strategic deceptions surrounding the invasion.
Small boats, along with aircraft from RAF Bomber Command, simulated invasion fleets approaching Cap d'Antifer, Pas-de-Calais and Normandy. Glimmer and Taxable played on the German belief, amplified by Allied deception efforts over the preceding months, that the main invasion force would land in the Calais region. Big Drum was positioned on the western flank of the real invasion force to try to confuse German forces about the scale of the landings. These operations complemented Operation Titanic, which was intended to confuse the Germans about the D-Day airborne forces.
It is unclear whether the operations were successful, due to the complexity of their execution, poor weather, and lack of response from German forces. It is possible that they contributed to the overall confusion of D-Day as part of the wider Bodyguard plan.
Background
Glimmer, Taxable and Big Drum were World War II deception operations. They were conducted as part of Operation Bodyguard, a broad strategic military deception intended to support the Allied invasion of German-occupied France in June 1944. Bodyguard was designed to confuse the Axis high command as to Allied intentions during the lead-up to the invasion. The London Controlling Section (LCS) had spent some time convincing German commanders that the fictional First United States Army Group (FUSAG) represented the bulk of the Allied invasion force. FUSAG's existence was fabricated through Operation Fortitude South.[1]
The Allied story for FUSAG was that the army group, based in south-east
In preparation for the coming landings, Allied scientists had worked on techniques for obscuring the size and disposition of an invasion force.
Allied planners proposed that small boats, towing large radar reflecting balloons (code named Filbert) and carrying both Moonshine jamming and standard wireless equipment (for transmitting fake traffic), would advance toward the French coast under a cloud of Window. The chaff and other countermeasures would hide the small size of the naval force while wireless traffic would play on the FUSAG story to mislead the Germans into expecting a major landing. A third deceptive force, Operation Big Drum, would use radar countermeasures on the western flank of the true invasion fleet. This operation was intended to lend confusion as to the extent of the landings in Normandy.[4][5]
Glimmer and Taxable
Glimmer and Taxable were very similar operations. They were executed in the early hours of 6 June 1944 while the invasion fleet was approaching Normandy. Taxable simulated an invasion force approaching
The larger of the two operations, Taxable, was carried out by 18 small boats, a mix of
The air operations for Glimmer were conducted by
Glimmer elicited more response from German forces than Taxable including reconnaissance planes sent to investigate the "fleet". After completing their assignment (which, unlike Taxable, did not include laying mines) the ships returned to port, reaching their berths by 13:00 on D-Day.[11]
Big Drum
Big Drum was similar to the other D-Day naval deceptions, but without an airborne component. Task Force C consisted of four HDMLs, whose job was to operate as a distraction on the western flank of the invasion. The plan originally called for the task force, which was attached to Force U (the westernmost convoy of the invasion fleet), to operate radar jamming equipment as it approached the French coast, holding 2 miles (3.2 km) off shore until first light. After the Germans failed to respond, the ships moved to within 1.5 miles (2.4 km) of the coast. No response, either in the air or on the shore, was observed, and the convoy returned safely to Newhaven.[12]
Impact
Taxable, Glimmer and Big Drum were complicated in execution, requiring coordination of air and naval forces. Launched in poor weather conditions, Taxable did not appear to have the desired effect and failed to elicit any significant response from the Germans. The reaction to Glimmer was more encouraging. The attacks on the bomber squadrons indicated, at least to the satisfaction of RAF Bomber Command, that the Germans believed a genuine threat existed. There is no evidence that Big Drum elicited any specific response from the shore. According to historian Mary Barbier, the adverse conditions and complexity of the operations contributed to the limited enemy response.[11]
From intelligence intercepts it appears that German forces in the Pas de Calais region reported an invasion fleet. In addition, there are reports of the decoys being fired on by shore batteries in that area. In an 11 June report on the operations, Lieutenant Commander Ian Cox (who was in charge of deception units) indicated that German forces had been convinced by the fake radio traffic.[7] Intercepted dispatches from Hiroshi Ōshima, the Japanese ambassador to Germany, made reference to the naval deceptions. An 8 June dispatch referred to the Calais region and stated "an enemy squadron that had been operating there has now withdrawn".[3]
Although disappointed not to have seen any action during the night of D-Day, and still unsure of their actual impact, the bomber crews felt proud of the operations.
References
Citations
- ^ Latimer (2001), pp. 218–232
- ^ Latimer (2001), pp. 232–234
- ^ a b c Holt (2004), pp. 578–579
- ^ a b c d Barbier (2007), pp. 70–71
- ^ a b West (2010), p. 277
- ^ a b c Bateman (2009), p. 68
- ^ a b c d Barbier (2007), pp. 108–109
- ^ Levine (2011), p. 269
- ^ Brickhill (1977), pp. 207–208
- ISBN 9781473835054.
- ^ a b c Barbier (2007), pp. 110–111
- ^ Barbier (2007), pp. 111–112
- ^ Wilson (2008), p. 362
Bibliography
- Barbier, Mary (2007). D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-99479-2.
- Bateman, Alex (2009). No. 617 'Dambusters' Sqn. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84603-429-9.
- ISBN 0-237-44886-6.
- Holt, Thaddeus (2004). The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. New York: ISBN 0-7432-5042-7.
- ISBN 978-1-58567-381-0.
- Levine, Joshua (2011). Operation Fortitude: The True Story of the Key Spy Operation of WWII That Saved D-Day. London: HarperCollins UK. ISBN 978-0-00-741324-9.
- Wilson, Kevin (2008). Men of Air: The Doomed Youth of Bomber Command. London: Hachette UK. ISBN 978-0-297-85704-4.
- ISBN 978-0-8108-7377-3.
Further reading
- ISBN 978-0-14-195926-9.