Operation Totalize
Operation Totalize | |||||||
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Part of 88 mm anti-tank gun during Operation Totalize, 8 August 1944. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Canada United Kingdom Poland | Germany | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Guy Simonds Harry Crerar |
Kurt Meyer | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
85,000 men 2,000 aircraft 720 artillery pieces 3 infantry divisions 2 armoured divisions 2 armoured brigades[1] |
3 infantry divisions, 1 SS Panzer division 1 heavy tank battalion At least 74 tanks[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
At least 1,256[a] 146+ tanks[b] |
3,000 casualties[c] At least 45 tanks[5] |
Operation Totalize (also spelled Operation Totalise in recent British sources) was an offensive launched by Allied troops in the First Canadian Army during the later stages of Operation Overlord, from 8 to 9 August 1944.[6] The intention was to break through the German defences south of Caen on the eastern flank of the Allied positions in Normandy and exploit success by driving south, to capture the high ground north of the city of Falaise. The goal was to collapse the German front and cut off the retreat of German forces fighting the Allied armies further west. The battle is considered the inaugural operation of the First Canadian Army, which had been activated on 23 July.[7]
In the early hours of 8 August 1944, II Canadian Corps launched the attack using mechanized infantry. They broke through the German front lines and captured vital positions deep in the German defences. It was intended that two fresh armoured divisions would continue the attack but some hesitancy by these two comparatively inexperienced divisions and German armoured counter-attacks slowed the offensive. Having advanced 9 mi (14 km), the Allies were halted 7 mi (11 km) north of Falaise and forced to prepare a fresh attack.[5]
Background
Caen had been an objective of the British forces assaulting
The Germans retained their hold on the commanding terrain of the
Within 48 hours of the end of Operation Goodwood, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division launched an attack against the "formidable" German defences on Verrières Ridge.[12] The Canadians suffered over 1,300 casualties and territorial gains were minimal. From 25 July to 27 July, another attempt was made to take the ridge as part of Operation Spring. Poor execution resulted in around 1,500 Canadian casualties.[13][14] The Battle of Verrières Ridge had claimed upwards of 2,800 Canadian casualties.[15] While the ridge remained in German hands, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division gained a foothold on the ridge between the village of Verrières to St.Martin-de-Fontenay, which would allow the troops to assemble free of German observation while they prepared to launch Totalize.[16][17]
On 25 July, the American First Army began
Canadian plan
The German defences on Verrières Ridge remained very strong.
Simonds knew that infantry assaults supported by massed artillery had failed to overcome the German forward lines in Operation Atlantic and Operation Spring. During Operation Goodwood, a bombardment by aircraft of RAF Bomber Command had assisted British tanks to break through the German front but they had then suffered many casualties from intact German defences arrayed in depth beyond the bombing. Infantry had been unable to follow up quickly enough to support the leading tanks or to secure ground behind them (follow-up units were also slowed). To solve the tactical problem presented by the terrain and the deep defences, Simonds proposed a radical solution, the first large attack by mechanized infantry.[27]
Some field artillery regiments in Canadian and British infantry divisions had been temporarily equipped with M7 Priest 105 mm self-propelled guns for the landings. When they were replaced by towed QF 25-pounder gun-howitzers, these vehicles were superfluous to operations. Simonds had the Priests converted into "Kangaroo" armoured personnel carriers which would allow infantry to follow the tanks closely on any terrain.[26] Permission was first requested from the Americans, from whom the M7s had been borrowed, to convert them into APCs.[23]
Simonds made
The second phase would follow immediately. While the remaining four infantry brigades of the 2nd Canadian Division and 51st (Highland) Division cleared up the isolated German forward defences and the 3rd Canadian Division and 49th (West Riding) Division (I Corps) began subsidiary attacks to widen the base of the salient captured in the first phase, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 1st Polish Armoured Division would move up the corridor to Cramesnil and prepare to advance further south. To prepare for their attack, bombers of the US Eighth Air Force would bombard the German reserve positions at Hautmesnil. The ultimate objective was the high ground north of Falaise, 15 mi (24 km) beyond the start line.[30]
First Canadian Army attack
During the evening of 7 August 1944, the attacking forces formed up in six columns, four vehicles wide, comprising tanks, Kangaroo APCs, half tracks, self-propelled anti-tank guns and
The attack broke through the German defences in several places.[30] By dawn, the attacking columns from the 51st (Highland) Division had reached their intended positions. The infantry dismounted from their Kangaroo APCs within 200 yd (180 m) of their objectives at the villages of Cramensnil and Saint-Aignan de Cramesnil, rapidly over-running the defenders.[31] The columns from the 2nd Canadian Division were delayed by fog and unexpected opposition on their right flank but by noon on 8 August, the Allied forces had captured Verrières Ridge.[33] The novel methods used by Simonds ensured that the attackers suffered only a fraction of the loss which would have been incurred in a normal "dismounted" attack.[34] The Allies were poised to move against Cintheaux, 2 mi (3.2 km) south of their furthest penetration but Simonds ordered a halt, to allow field artillery and the 4th Canadian and 1st Polish armoured divisions to move into position for the second phase of the operation.[30]
Panzergruppe West
The counter-attack by the 12th SS Panzer Division failed but placed Meyer's tanks north of the target area that the Eighth Air Force bombarded, ready for the second phase of the Allied attack. Spared the effects of the bombing, the tanks slowed the advance of the 1st Polish Armoured Division, preventing a breakthrough east of the road. West of the road, the German infantry at Cintheaux held up the Canadian armoured formations. Neither division (both on their debut) pressed their attacks as hard as Simonds demanded and laagered (took up defensive positions) while vehicles and troops were supplied and rested when dark fell.[36]
To restore the momentum of the attack, Simonds ordered a column from the 4th Canadian Armoured Division to seize Hill 195, just to the west of the main road, halfway between Cintheaux and Falaise. Worthington Force with B, C and HQ companies of the
Aftermath
The early phases of the assault had been a great success, despite many casualties in the two Allied armoured divisions in their attempt to push towards Falaise. Formations of four divisions of the First Canadian Army held positions on Hill 195, directly north of Falaise. At the same time, Allied forces managed to inflict upwards of 1,500 casualties on the Germans. Major General
See also
Notes
Footnotes
- ^ Michael Reynolds quoting Stanisław Maczek, places the Polish losses during the operation at 656 men.[3] Copp wrote that Canadian losses included more than 600 men killed.[4]
- ^ Reynolds claims that the operation cost the Canadians over 80 tanks, while Maczek claims that the 1st Polish Armoured Division lost an additional 66 tanks.[3]
- ^ Copp states that German losses are estimated but did include 1,270 prisoners.[4]
- ^ American histories define the Battle of Normandy differently, as their forces left Normandy with Operation Cobra on 25 July, crossing into Brittany.[citation needed]
Citations
- ^ Hart 2004, p. 23.
- ^ Hart 2004, p. 32.
- ^ a b Reynolds 2001, p. 246.
- ^ a b Copp 2004, p. 211.
- ^ a b Wilmot 1997, p. 414.
- ^ Wilmot 1997, pp. 410–414.
- ^ Bercuson 2004, p. 229.
- ^ Van der Vat 2003, p. 110.
- ^ Bercuson 2004, p. 215.
- ^ Van der Vat 2003, p. 157.
- ^ Van der Vat 2003, p. 161.
- ^ Bercuson 2004, p. 222
- ^ Reid 2005, p. 52.
- ^ Stacey & Bond 1960, p. 194.
- ^ Zuehlke 2001, pp. 166–168.
- ^ a b Bercuson 2004, p. 226.
- ^ Reid 2005, p. 57.
- ^ Wilmot 1997, pp. 390–392.
- ^ Wilmot 1997, p. 393.
- ^ Wilmot 1997, p. 394.
- ^ Wilmot 1997, p. 410.
- ^ Delaforce 2003, p. 138.
- ^ a b c d Van der Vat 2003, p. 166.
- ^ a b D'Este 2004, p. 423.
- ^ Bercuson 2004, p. 221.
- ^ a b c d Bercuson 2004, p. 228.
- ^ Van der Vat 2003, pp. 160, 166.
- ^ Perrun 2003, p. 139.
- ^ Van der Vat 2003, p. 165.
- ^ a b c d Zuehlke 2001, p. 168.
- ^ a b Wilmot 1997, p. 412.
- ^ Roy 1984, p. 166.
- ^ Roy 1984, p. 167.
- ^ Wilmot 1997, p. 413.
- ^ D'Este 2004, pp. 424, 422.
- ^ Bercuson 2004, pp. 229–230.
- ^ Bercuson 2004, p. 230.
- ^ Cawthorne 2005, p. 125.
- ^ Bercuson 2004, pp. 230–232.
Sources
- ISBN 0-88995-305-8.
- Cawthorne, Nigel (2005). Victory in World War II. Arcturus. ISBN 1-84193-351-1.
- ISBN 978-0-8020-3780-0.
- Delaforce, Patrick (2003) [1994]. The Polar Bears: From Normandy to the Relief of Holland with the 49th Division. Sutton Publishing. ISBN 0-7509-3194-9.
- D'Este, Carlo (2004) [1983]. Decision in Normandy: The Real Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-101761-9.
- Hart, Stephen (2004). Road to Falaise. Battle Zone Normandy. Sutton. ISBN 0-7509-3016-0.
- Perrun, Jody (January 2003). "Best-Laid Plans: Guy Simonds and Operation Totalize, 7–10 August 1944". The Journal of Military History. 67 (1): 137–173. S2CID 159737875.
- ISBN 1-896941-40-0.
- Reynolds, Michael (2001) [1997]. Steel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-1-885119-44-5.
- Roy, Reginald (1984). 1944 – The Canadians in Normandy. Macmillan of Canada. ISBN 0-7715-9796-7.
- OCLC 606015967. Archived from the original(PDF) on 12 September 2008. Retrieved 1 June 2017.
- Trew, Simon; Badsey, Stephen (2004). Battle for Caen. Battle Zone Normandy. Cheltenham: The History Press. ISBN 0-7509-3010-1.
- Van der Vat, Dan (2003). D-Day; The Greatest Invasion, A People's History. Madison Press. ISBN 1-55192-586-9.
- ISBN 1-85326-677-9.
- Zuehlke, Mark (2001). The Canadian Military Atlas: Canada's Battlefields from the French and Indian Wars to Kosovo. Stoddart. ISBN 978-0-7737-3289-6.
Further reading
- ISSN 1195-8472. Retrieved 6 March 2014.
- Napier, S. (2015). Armoured Campaign in Normandy June–August 1944. Stroud: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7509-6270-4.
- Perrun, J. C. (1999). Missed Opportunities: First Canadian Army and the Air Plan for Operation Totalize, 7–10 August 1944 (PDF) (MA). Ottawa: Carleton University. ISBN 978-0-612-43322-9. Retrieved 19 May 2014.