Operation Ironside

Operation Ironside
Part of Operation Bodyguard
Ironside was one of several plans within the larger Operation Bodyguard deception (contemporary boundaries shown).
Operational scope	Political deception
Location	Bay of Biscay
Planned	December 1943 – March 1944
Planned by	London Controlling Section
Target	Bordeaux
Date	May–July 1944
Executed by	Agents Bronx, Tate, Rudloff and Garbo

Operation Ironside was a Second World War

As Ironside was a marginal operation, and they were worried about exposing agents as false, the Twenty Committee for the most part used less important agents and added words of caution to the messages they sent, reducing the impact of the story. Allied landings around Bordeaux may also have seemed implausible because it was beyond air cover from the UK and lacked the normal physical elements (such as naval activities and dummy landing craft) associated with an invasion.

After the operation closed, at the end of June 1944, the threat of invasion from the United States was informally kept alive. It was revisited as Ironside II in mid-July as support for

Operation Ironside formed part of Operation Bodyguard, a broad strategic

Overall planning for Bodyguard and Ironside rested with John Bevan and the London Controlling Section (LCS). The LCS had been set up in 1942 following successes in deception in the Middle East by Dudley Clarke. After initial attempts at deception planning the department was tasked with bringing Bodyguard to fruition.^[1] One of their most useful deception channels was through double agents. During the early stages of the war, the Abwehr (German intelligence) had sent spies to Britain, but all of them either surrendered or were captured. Some, along with other volunteers, were used as an extensive misinformation network under the control of the Twenty Committee.^[5]

At first, Bevan suggested that the fictional invasion force should stage from the American East Coast. Newman Smith, based out of New York and responsible for the US elements of the deception, felt this was an unrealistic story and suggested a large force from the US might conceivably reinforce a bridgehead established by units from the UK. Formations intended for Normandy could be "re-purposed" for the initial invasion.^[9][11] The final plan earmarked two Overlord divisions for the assault with the supposed reinforcements consisting of six real divisions (the 26th, 94th, 95th, and 104th Infantry, and the 10th and 11th Armored) under the notional command of Lieutenant General Lloyd Fredendall.^[9]

Ironside began on 23 May 1944 with the aim of having the threat established by 29 May and continued until 28 June (22 days after the Normandy landings). It was implemented via double agents, in Britain and the United States, under the control of the Twenty Committee.^[8] The operation did not receive any resources from the Allied navies or airforce, so the deception had no physical element. This meant that Ironside had none of the traditional accompaniments to an invasion, including reconnaissance flights, bombardment, and naval operations. As a result, the Twenty Committee was cautious about using important agents to pass over the deception.^[8][12]

The lead was given to the less important Agent Bronx, a Peruvian socialite named

Agent Tate (a Dane sent to England in 1941 and turned double shortly after) opened the operation, on 23 May, in a message to his German handlers stating that a friend from the US had identified an expeditionary force, consisting of six divisions, preparing to sail.^[8] On 29 May, Bronx sent a telegram identifying an invasion targeted at the Bordeaux region within a month, using the code "dentist" to say she was certain of the information. She also sent a follow-up letter explaining that the information came from a drunken British officer in the Four Hundred Club who had later sworn her to secrecy. According to Bronx, the officer had boasted about an airborne assault in the Bordeaux region that would be in the papers the following morning. The next day he had told her the operation had been delayed by a month.^[12][13]

Although many messages were sent by agents, the Twenty Committee considered that Ironside was quite unrealistic and as a result was cautious about promoting it too heavily. Most of the information was sent with words of caution or uncertainty to ensure that the agent would not be compromised.

German intelligence documents indicate that there was never strong belief that the Allies were ready to land in the Bordeaux region. Intercepted situation reports suggested that the Germans believed rumours of landings in the area to be "cover operations of small caliber" and part of the cover for a main Allied thrust at Calais (in itself a deception called Operation Fortitude South).^[8] Axis commanders had considered the idea and conducted exercises in preparation, and training continued in the region after D-Day.^[15] Following the Normandy invasion, the Allies had expected both German divisions in the Bordeaux area to mobilize. In the end, only the 17th SS Panzer Division moved north, and even they were delayed by several days, while the 11th Panzer Division remained to guard the region.^[4]

Historians are divided over whether the deception played a major role in the German response. Most, such as historian Ben McIntyre, agree that Ironside added to the general picture of confusion for the German commanders. McIntyre quotes senior Allied figures, such as John Masterman (chair of the Twenty committee) and Hugh Astor (MI5), who attributed the delayed German response in part to Ironside.^[4] Michael Howard dismisses the impact of the operation saying that there is "no evidence that anyone took them seriously".^[3]

Part of the problem was that Bordeaux may not have appeared a plausible Allied target because it was out of range of fighter aircraft cover from the United Kingdom.^[12] Historian Terry Crowdy's analysis is that Ironside may have suffered simply from lack of resources. In common with other, higher-impact, Bodyguard deceptions it preyed on a concern that the Allies knew Hitler and the German High Command had discussed. Crowdy suggests that with physical deception, and more effort, Ironside could have succeeded in the same way as deceptions aimed against Calais, Normandy and the Mediterranean.^[14]

John Bevan had asked Newman Smith to retain the threat of a US invasion force beyond 28 June when the initial deception was supposed to have ended. Agent Rudloff sent messages on 10, 12 and 18 July referring to the Ironside force.