Foundationalism

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Foundationalism concerns

coherence theory of justification, whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be established by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that each small region was solved correctly.[1]

Identifying the alternatives as either

rationalists emphasizing reason—but may blend both.[1]

In the 1930s, debate over foundationalism revived.

ontological relativity found any belief networked[clarification needed
] to one's beliefs on all of reality, while auxiliary beliefs somewhere in the vast network are readily modified to protect desired beliefs.

Classically, foundationalism had posited

cognitive access to justificatory means, externalists
find justification without such access.

History

Foundationalism was initiated by French

cogito ergo sum – 'I think therefore I am', or the belief that he was thinking – as his indubitable belief suitable as a foundation for knowledge.[3] This resolved Descartes' problem of the Evil Demon. Even if his beliefs about the external world were false, his beliefs about what he was experiencing were still indubitably true, even if those perceptions do not relate to anything in the world.[6]

Several other philosophers of the early modern period, including

G. W. F. Hegel, a proponent of coherentism.[8] Immanuel Kant's foundationalism rests on his theory of categories.[9]

In

J. G. Fichte in his book Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794/1795),[10] Wilhelm Windelband in his book Über die Gewißheit der Erkenntniss. (1873),[11] and Gottlob Frege in his book Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884).[12]

In contemporary philosophy, foundationalism has been defended by Edmund Husserl,[13] Bertrand Russell[14] and John McDowell.[15][16]

Definition

Foundationalism is an attempt to respond to the

justification to support it, but any justification also needs to be justified itself. If this goes on ad infinitum, it is not clear how anything in the chain could be justified. Foundationalism holds that there are 'basic beliefs' which serve as foundations to anchor the rest of our beliefs.[17] Strong versions of the theory assert that an indirectly justified belief is completely justified by basic beliefs; more moderate theories hold that indirectly justified beliefs require basic beliefs to be justified, but can be further justified by other factors.[18]

Since

theory of Forms, which shows the general concept as a model for the release of existence, which is only the faint copy of the Forms of eternity, that means, understanding the expression of objects leads to acquiring all knowledge, then acquiring knowledge accompanies achieving the truth. Achieving the truth means understanding the foundation. This idea still has some appeal in for example international relations studies.[20]

Classical foundationalism

Foundationalism holds basic beliefs exist, which are justified without reference to other beliefs, and that nonbasic beliefs must ultimately be justified by basic beliefs. Classical foundationalism maintains that basic beliefs must be infallible if they are to justify nonbasic beliefs, and that only deductive reasoning can be used to transfer justification from one belief to another.[21] Laurence BonJour has argued that the classical formulation of foundationalism requires basic beliefs to be infallible, incorrigible, indubitable, and certain if they are to be adequately justified.[22] Mental states and immediate experience are often taken as good candidates for basic beliefs because it is argued that beliefs about these do not need further support to be justified.[23]

Modest foundationalism

As an alternative to the classic view, modest foundationalism does not require that basic perceptual beliefs are infallible, but holds that it is reasonable to assume that perceptual beliefs are justified unless evidence to the contrary exists.[24] This is still foundationalism because it maintains that all non-basic beliefs must be ultimately justified by basic beliefs, but it does not require that basic beliefs are infallible and allows inductive reasoning as an acceptable form of inference.[25] For example, a belief that 'I see red' could be defeated with psychological evidence showing my mind to be confused or inattentive. Modest foundationalism can also be used to avoid the problem of inference. Even if perceptual beliefs are infallible, it is not clear that they can infallibly ground empirical knowledge (even if my belief that the table looks red to me is infallible, the inference to the belief that the table actually is red might not be infallible). Modest foundationalism does not require this link between perception and reality to be so strong; our perception of a table being yellow is adequate justification to believe that this is the case, even if it is not infallible.[24]

Reformed epistemology is a form of modest foundationalism which takes religious beliefs as basic because they are non-inferentially justified: their justification arises from religious experience, rather than prior beliefs. This takes a modest approach to foundationalism – religious beliefs are not taken to be infallible, but are assumed to be prima facie justified unless evidence arises to the contrary.[26]

Internalism and externalism

Foundationalism can take

infallible. Externalism maintains that it is unnecessary for the means of justification of a belief to be accessible to the believer.[28]

sense-data, meaning the conclusions we draw from our senses are usually true.[7]

Criticisms

Critics of foundationalism often argue that for a belief to be justified it must be supported by other beliefs;

externalist
foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.

According to

self-evident
or indubitable.

Wittgenstein's theory of language, drawing a parallel between postmodernism and late logical positivism that is united in critique of foundationalism.[29]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p 139.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h Ted Poston, "Foundationalism" (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  3. ^ a b Grenz & Franke 2001, p. 31
  4. ^ Hatfield, Gary (3 December 2008). "René Descartes". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 28 March 2013.
  5. ^ Skirry, Justin (13 September 2008). "René Descartes (1596—1650): Overview". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 28 March 2013.
  6. ^ Kind, Amy (18 November 2005). "Introspection". internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 28 March 2013.
  7. ^ a b c Fumerton, Richard (21 February 2000). "Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 19 August 2018.
  8. ^ James Kreines, Reason in the World: Hegel's Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 25: "Spinoza's foundationalism (Hegel argues) threatens to eliminate all determinate reality, leaving only one indeterminate substance."
  9. ^ Tom Rockmore, On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 65.
  10. ^ Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 236.
  11. ^ Frederick C. Beiser (2014), The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796–1880 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 517.
  12. ^ Tom Rockmore, On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 111.
  13. ^ Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, Cambridge University Press, p. 292.
  14. ^ Carlo Cellucci, Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View, Springer, 2017, p. 32.
  15. ^ John McDowell, Mind and World. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 29.
  16. ^ Roger F. Gibson, "McDowell's Direct Realism and Platonic Naturalism", Philosophical Issues Vol. 7, Perception (1996), pp. 275–281.
  17. ^ O'Brien 2006, pp. 61–62
  18. ^ Audi 2003, p. 194
  19. ^ Rorty, Richard (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press. pp. 165–173
  20. ^ Smith, Steve, Ownens Patrica, "Alternative approaches to international relations theory" in "The Globalisation of World Politics", Baylis, Smith and Owens, OUP, 4th ed, p177
  21. ^ Lemos 2007, pp. 50–51
  22. ^ BonJour 1985, p. 27
  23. ^ Dancy 1985, pp. 53–54
  24. ^ a b O'Brien 2006, pp. 72–74
  25. ^ Lemos 2007, p.55
  26. ^ O'Brien 2006, p. 184
  27. ^ O'Brien 2006, p.87
  28. ^ O'Brien 2006, p. 88
  29. ISBN 978-1-139-00051-2
    , retrieved 9 March 2023

Bibliography

External links