Józef Unrug
Admiral Józef Unrug | |
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Invasion of Poland (1939) | |
Awards |
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Józef Unrug (
Józef Michał Hubert Unrug was born in Brandenburg an der Havel into a noble family of Prussian and Polish descent. He was the son of Thaddäus Gustav von Unruh, a Generalmajor in the Prussian Army. His aristocratic family was extremely wealthy and he grew up as very much a member of the elite.[1]
After graduating from the gymnasium in Dresden, Unrug completed naval college in 1907 and began his service in the Imperial German Navy. The major intellectual influence on the Imperial German Navy from the 1890s onward was the 1890 book The Influence of Sea Power upon History by the American historian Alfred Thayer Mahan.[2] German Emperor Wilhelm II had read it and enthusiastically embraced the book's message that whatever nation had the most powerful "blue water navy" would dominate all of the world's oceans and would always be the world's greatest power.[2] Starting in 1898, the German Navy was transformed from a "green water navy" meant to operate in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea into a "blue water navy" meant to dominate all of the world's seas as it was believed that sea power always equaled world power in accordance with Mahan's theories.[3] Mahan's theories about sea power and world power remained the dominant intellectual basis of all German naval thinking right up to 1945 as The Influence of Sea Power Upon History became the "Bible" of the German navy.[2] In common with all other German naval officers, Unrug had to read Mahan's book as part of his officer's education.
Unrug was a romantic who was disenchanted with modern Germany and came to see in the Poles the sort of romanticism and passion that he found missing in Germany.[4] Unrug grew up speaking German, but he was of partially Polish descent on his father's side.[5] During World War I, he commanded a U-boat, and was promoted to command the training-submarine half-flotilla. In 1914, he was a lieutenant commander in the Imperial German Navy in command of a submarine, but he was distrusted by the senior command and was assigned to training duties in the Baltic instead of a combat command.[5] The Polish historian Władysław Szarski described Unrug as an aloof man who few knew well, but was very "serious" about his duties and was "extremely just and principled".[1]
Career
In 1919, after
One of the most skilled officers in the Polish Navy, Unrug was quickly promoted to
Unrug and Admiral
The Polish historian Jacek Lubecki noted that the "prodigious" increase in naval spending took place despite Piłsudski's doubts, which he attributed to the decay of the Sanation regime as Piłsudski's mental facilities declined.[11] Piłsudski had created a very "personalistic" dictatorship with power concentrated into his hands, and with his mental decline the regime was plunged into "chaos", leading to a very haphazard and confusing decision-making process, which allowed Admiral Unrug to press successfully for greater naval spending over Piłsudski's doubts.[12] Lubecki argued the money spent on the Marynarka was "squandered" as he contended that money spent on buying expensive destroyers and submarines would have been better spent on building up a motorized tank and anti-tank forces for the Army instead.[9] A force of considerable assistance to the Marynarka was the Maritime and Colonial League, a society made up of people influenced by Mahan who believed that building a "blue water navy" would make Poland into a world power and allow Poland to acquire a colonial empire in Asia and Africa.[13] Apart from advocating navalism, the Maritime and Colonial League was also supportive of the Sanation regime at a time when the Great Depression had damaged the popularity of the regime.
In 1932, Unrug and Commander Tadeusz Morgenstern-Podjazd were summoned to a meeting with Piłsudski and were ordered to send the destroyer ORP Wicher under command of Morgenstern-Podjazd into the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland).[14] The cruise of the Wicher resulted in the Danzig crisis of 1932, the successful resolution of which did much to raise the prestige of the Marynarka in Poland.[14] In the aftermath of the Danzig crisis with the successful use of gunboat diplomacy, Piłsudski approved a six-year expansion plan for the navy, ordering two Grom-class destroyers and two Orzeł-class submarines. The principal problem with Polish defense spending was the far greater size of the German economy-for example, the total Polish defense spending in the five years 1934-1939 for the Army, Navy and Air Force combined amounted to just one-tenth of the Luftwaffe's budget for the year 1939.[15] As such, no matter how much money was devoted to the Marynarka, the Kriegsmarine would always be the greater force, making the plans for a "green water navy" capable of dominating the Baltic impractical. Despite the economical problems, in 1936 it was announced in Polish newspapers that the Marynarka was committed to a "maximum plan" of buying two battleships that would cost 70, 000, 000 zlotys each plus two heavy cruisers.[16] By 1938, Polish newspapers were reporting that the "maximum plan" now envisioned a fleet of 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 heavy cruisers, 12 destroyers, 24 torpedo boats, 24 submarines, 16 minesweepers and 1 mine-layer.[17] The "maximum plan" which went well beyond Poland's economic capacity at the time was a "fantasy", and in practice the Marynarka had to settle in 1938 for a construction plan of two destroyers, two submarines, four minesweepers and seven motor torpedo boats.[13] Reflecting the economic problems caused by the Great Depression, the Sanation regime planned to raise part of the necessary funds to pay for the scaled down "maximum plan" via public subscription.[13]
At the beginning of the Danzig crisis in May 1939, Unrug shifted the two naval rifle battalions assigned to defend
World War II
During the 1939
Despite having effectively given up control of Poland's naval vessels, Unrug remained in command of multiple military units, which he tasked with protecting the Polish Corridor from German attacks. Polish opposition to the advancing Germans was described as "fierce" and the Wehrmacht did not reach the headland connecting the Hel to the mainland until 9 September 1939.[20] Unrug had about 2,000 men under his control in the Hel.[21] The narrow Hel peninsula was a natural defensive barrier as there were limited avenues of attack for a force advancing onto the peninsula and in addition the peninsula had been partially fortified starting in 1936.[22] The campaign started on 11 September 1939 when the Wehrmacht's 207th Infantry Division took the village of Władysławowo, cutting the Hel off from the mainland.[23] The 207th Infantry Division began to march up the Hel while the Poles staged a slow fighting retreat.[23] The forests and sand dunes of the Hel aided the defenders.[24] At the narrowest part of the Hel between the villages of Chałupy and Kuźnica, only one company at a time could advance, which allowed the Poles during the course of fierce fighting to halt successive German attempts to advance up the peninsula despite the latter having two battleships, the Schleswig-Holstein and the Schliesen, together with a destroyer flotilla and the Luftwaffe, providing fire support.[22] Conditions for the Polish defenders on the Hel were hellish as the Luftwaffe bombed them incessantly while the powerful guns of the Schleswig-Holstein and the Schliesen pounded them constantly.[22]
On 20 September 1939, Adolf Hitler arrived at the Kasino hotel in Zoppot (modern Sopot) on the other side of the Bay of Danzig to watch the spectacular sight of the two battleships blasting away with their 11-inch guns to hammer the Polish defenders on the Hel.[23] A popular story has that Unrug forbade his gunners who wanted to fire at the Kasino hotel because it would be dishonorable to kill a head of state.[1] But there are no documents supporting this story and Szarski has pointed out that it is not clear if Unrug actually knew that Hitler was staying at the Kasino hotel.[1] Furthermore, under international law the hotel was considered a civilian facility, which would make shooting at it a war crime.[1] The Polish coastal artillery struck back, managing to damage the Schleswig-Holstein and the destroyer Leberecht Maas.[22] The heavy bombardments provoked a brief mutiny among some of the soldiers on the Hel who wanted to surrender, which was put down by Unrug.[25] The mutineers were not professional soldiers or sailors, but rather local reservists who had been called up just before the war, and many of whom could see their homes across the bay.[1] Unrug did not execute any of the mutineers, through under Polish military law he was obliged to.[1] The morale of some of the other Polish defenders helped as Unrug discovered on 30 September when he visited the Lasowski battery at the tip of the Hel whose gunners demanded to fight on to the bitter end, prompting Unrug to break down in tears, saying he had never seen braver men.[25] The news from the Lasowski battery commander and the other battery commanders was less encouraging as Unrug was informed that the batteries were almost out of artillery shells while the supply of food had been almost exhausted.[26] On the same day, the Poles had exploded a cache of buried explosives, which nearly severed the Hel and turned the upper part of it into an island.[27] The explosion had temporarily halted the German advance.[27]
On 1 October 1939, however, after both
Unrug spent the rest of
Unrug's spirit and unbowed attitude proved to be an inspiration to his fellow prisoners.[31] At the Colditz castle, Unrug served as one of the co-leaders of the Polish POWs being held there together with General Tadeusz Piskor.[32] General Piskor was the most senior Polish officer held at Colditz, but Unrug was older than him and spoke fluent German, so in practice the two men shared the leadership.[32] The Polish historian Mieczysław B. Biskupski wrote that Admiral Unrug "...was perhaps not the greatest tactician of the interwar navy, but his conduct in German captivity was the stuff of legend".[33]
Post-war exile
After Poland was taken over by the
Exhumation and state funeral
On 24 September 2018 Admiral of the fleet Joseph Unrug and his wife Zofia (died 1980) were exhumed and transferred with a guard of honour at the French port of Brest for reburial in the Polish port of Gdynia, Poland, after a delay of 45 years.[34] A state funeral was held in Oksywie on 2 October 2018 in the presence of Andrzej Duda, the President of Poland among other members of the Polish government and leaders of the Polish Armed Forces. The chief mourner was Christophe Unrug, the admiral's grandson and, by happenstance, the current mayor of Montrésor in France.[35]
In September 2018, Polish President Andrzej Duda had posthumously promoted
Honours and awards
- Gold Cross of the Virtuti Militari
- Polonia Restituta, Commanders' Cross
- Gold Cross of Merits with Swords
- Gold Cross of Merit
- Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour (France)
- Iron Cross, First and Second Classes (German Empire)
- Order of Dannebrog(Denmark)
- Order of the White Elephant (Siam)
- Royal Order of the Sword (Sweden)
See also
- Polish Navy
- Polish Defensive War
- Jerzy Świrski
References
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Zalesiński, Łukasz (5 October 2019). "Pole by Choice". Polska Zbrojna. Retrieved 11 January 2021.
- ^ a b c Epkenhans 2003, p. 17.
- ^ Epkenhans 2003, p. 22.
- ^ Gusejnova 2016, p. 61.
- ^ a b c d e f Reid 1984, p. 26.
- ^ Stoker 2003, p. 67-68.
- ^ a b c Haarr 2013, p. 44.
- ^ Haarr 2013, p. 44-45.
- ^ a b c d Lubecki 2011, p. 42.
- ^ a b c d Stoker 2003, p. 171.
- ^ Lubecki 2011, p. 42-43.
- ^ Lubecki 2011, p. 42=43.
- ^ a b c Stoker 2003, p. 176.
- ^ a b Jędrzejewicz 1982, p. 308.
- ^ "A Killing Field". The Economist. 5 September 2019. Retrieved 9 January 2021.
- ^ Stoker 2003, p. 175.
- ^ Stoker 2003, p. 175-176.
- ^ Peszke 1999, p. 33.
- ^ a b c d e f Haarr 2013, p. 45.
- ^ Haarr 2013, p. 49.
- ^ Hargreaves 2010, p. 261.
- ^ a b c d e f Reid 1984, p. 4.
- ^ a b c Moorhouse 2019, p. 226.
- ^ Hargreaves 2010, p. 262.
- ^ a b Moorhouse 2019, p. 305.
- ^ Moorhouse 2019, p. 305-306.
- ^ a b Dunn, John; Stoker, Donald. "Blood on the Baltic". Naval History Magazine. Retrieved 11 January 2021.
- ^ a b Moorhouse 2019, p. 306.
- ^ "Pomink historii: Srebrna Góra – Twierdza Srebrnogórska, nowożytna warownia górska z XVIII wieku" (in Polish). Nid.pl. 2013-04-18. Retrieved 2014-04-06.
- ^ a b Reid 1984, p. 27.
- ^ Kazimierz Sławiński: Wspomnienie o kontradmirale, "Morze" Monthly, 9/1973, p.17
- ^ a b Reid 1984, p. 25.
- ^ Biskupski 2002, p. 425.
- ^ Frachet, Stéphane (2018-09-25). "Indre-et-Loire : la dépouille de l'amiral Unrug, héros polonais, rentre au pays". Le Parisien (in French).
- ISSN 1752-0339. Retrieved 2018-12-20.
Books and articles
- Biskupski, Mieczysław (Fall 2002). "Review of Poland's Navy, 1918-1945 by Michael Alfred Peszke". The Polish Review. 47 (4): 424–426.
- Epkenhans, Michael (2003). "Wilhelm II and 'his navy' 1888-1918". In Annika Mombauer; Wilhelm Deist (eds.). The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 12–36. ISBN 1139440608.
- Gusejnova, Dina (2016). European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107120624.
- Haarr, Geirr H. (2013). The Gathering Storm: The Naval War in Northern Europe September 1939 - April 1940. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing. ISBN 978-1848321403.
- Jędrzejewicz, Wacław (1982). Piłsudski, a Life for Poland. New York: Hippocrene Books. ISBN 0882546333.
- Hargreaves, Richard (2010). Blitzkrieg Unleashed: The German Invasion of Poland 1939. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0811707244.
- Lubecki, Jacek (Winter 2011). "Jozef Pilsudski's Influence on the Polish Armed Forces of the Interwar Period". The Polish Review. 52 (1/2): 23–45. S2CID 254434126.
- Moorhouse, Roger (2019). Poland 1939: The Outbreak of World War II. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 978-0465095384.
- Peszke, Michael Alfred (1999). Poland's Navy, 1918-1945. New York: Hippocrene Books I. ISBN 0781806720.
- Reid, Patrick (1984). Colditz: The Full Story. London: Macmillan Press. ISBN 0760346518.
- Stoker, Donald (2003). Britain, France and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic, 1919 -1939: Grand Strategy and Failure. London: Routeldge. ISBN 1135774226.