Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War
During the
A plan to control materials coming into the country was put forward in early 1937, effectively subjecting the
Non-Intervention Agreement
Italy and Germany supported the
On 3 August 1936,
On 7 August 1936, France unilaterally declared non-intervention.
There was popular support in both countries for the plan, but in the United Kingdom, the
A report, Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement in Spain, was drawn up in London, sponsored by the
On 5 August 1936, the United States made it known that it would follow a policy of non-intervention but did not announce it officially.[21] Its isolationism on the Spanish war would later be identified as disastrous by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles.[22] Five days later, the Glenn L. Martin Company enquired whether the government would allow the sale of eight bombers to the Spanish Republican Air Force; the response was negative. The United States also confirmed it would not take part in several mediation attempts, including one by the Organization of American States.[21] Mexico soon became the first state to support the Republicans openly. On 15 August, the United Kingdom banned exports of war material to Spain.[21] Neurath also agreed to the pact and suggested for volunteers, many of whom would eventually form the International Brigades, to be included. Italy similarly agreed[21] and signed on 21 August after a determined diplomatic offensive by Britain and France.[9] The surprising reversal of views has been put down to the growing belief that countries could not abide by the agreement anyway.[21] Admiral Erich Raeder urged the German government to back the Nationalists more completely and then bring Europe to the brink of war or to abandon the Nationalists. On the 24th, Germany signed.[13][23]
The Soviet Union was keen not to be left out. On 23 August 1936, it agreed to the Non-Intervention Agreement,
It was then that the Non-Intervention Committee was created to uphold the agreement, but the double-dealing of the Soviets and the Germans had already become apparent.[27] The agreement also removed the need for a declaration of neutrality, which would have granted the Nationalists and Republicans control over neutrals in the areas they controlled, and had little legal standing.[28] In the United Kingdom, part of the reasoning was based on an exaggerated belief in German and Italian preparedness for war.[28]
Many historians argue that the British policy of non-intervention was a product of
Non-Intervention Committee
It is not so much a case of taking actual steps immediately, as of pacifying the aroused feelings of the Leftist parties... by the very establishment of such a Committee.
The ostensible purpose of the Non-Intervention Committee (1936–1939) was to prevent personnel and
The Committee first met in London on 9 September 1936 and was attended by representatives of solely European countries and did not include
It would have been better to call this the Intervention Committee, for the whole activity of its members consisted in explaining or concealing the participation of their countries in Spain
— Joachim von Ribbentrop in his memoirs.[37]
The second meeting took place on 14 September 1936.
On 12 November 1936, significant changes were put in place to the functioning of the committee with the ratification of plans to post observers to Spanish frontiers and ports to prevent breaches of the agreement. That had been delayed by Italian and German demands for air transport to be included, which was perhaps a delaying tactic because of the impossibility to doing so effectively.
The outcome of the Spanish war was settled in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin – at any rate not in Spain.
— George Orwell, in "Looking Back on the Spanish War".[50]
On 10 December 1936, Álvarez put the Republic's case to the League of Nations, further demanding that the League condemn the Italian and German decision to recognise the Nationalists.[51] He pointed to the risk of the Spanish war spreading and suggested that the Non-Intervention Committee was ineffective.[52] That charge was denied by Lord Cranborne and Édouard Viénot, the British and French representatives respectively, who appealed to the League to endorse the mediation plan.[52] The League condemned intervention, urged its council's members to support non-intervention and commended mediation.[52] It then closed discussion on Spain, leaving it to the committee.[53] The mediation plan, however, was soon dropped.[52] Britain and France continued to consider and to put forward plans to prevent foreign volunteers outside the committee.[52]
On 6 January 1937, the first opportunity after the winter
Control plan
Observers were posted to Spanish ports and borders, and both Ribbentrop and Grandi were told to agree to the plan, significant shipments already having taken place.[63] Portugal would not accept observers although it agreed to personnel attached to the British embassy in Lisbon. The cost of the scheme was put at £898,000; Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union would each pay 16%; the other 20% would be met by the other 22 countries.[63] Zones of patrol were assigned to each of the four states; an International Board was set up to administer the scheme. The setting up of the scheme took until April. For the Republicans, that seemed like adding insult to injury since the wholesale transfer of arms to the Nationalists would now be policed by the very countries supplying them.[62] Despite accusations that 60,000 Italians were now in Spain[64] and Grandi's announcement that he hoped that no Italian volunteer would leave until the war was over,[64] the German delegation appears to have hoped the control plan was effective.[65] There were Italian assurances that Italy would not break up non-intervention.[66]
In May 1937, the Committee noted two attacks on the patrol's ships in the
Discussions on patrols remained complicated. Britain and France offered to replace Germany and Italy in patrols of their sections, but the last two believed that the patrols would be too partial.[74] Germany and Italy requested land controls to be kept and belligerent rights to be given to the Nationalists, so that rights of search could be used by both the Republicans and Nationalists to replace naval patrols.[71][74] The French considered abandoning border controls[75] or perhaps leaving non-intervention. However, the French were reliant on the British, who wished to continue with patrols.[71] Britain and France thus continued to labour over non-intervention; although they judged it effective, some 42 ships were estimated to have escaped inspection between April and the end of July. The air route had not been covered.[76] The Nationalists' debt to Germany reached 150 million Reichsmark.[77] On 9 July, the Dutch ambassador suggested for Britain to draft a compromise.[78] Lord Plymouth called the 'compromise plan for the control of non-intervention'. Naval patrols would be replaced by observers in ports and ships, and land control measures would be resumed.[79][80] Belligerent rights would not be granted until substantial progress was made on volunteer withdrawal.[80] The French were furious and considered that Britain was moving towards Germany and Italy.[79] Grandi demanded the discussion of belligerent rights before volunteer rights; Maisky insisted for volunteers to be discussed first.[81][82]
Conference of Nyon and onwards
In 1937, all powers were prepared to give up on non-intervention. Ciano complained to his government that Italian forces in Italy were ready but not being used; the Soviet Union was not prepared to discuss belligerent rights;[83] Delbos was considering proposing mediation by Roosevelt and the Pope and simultaneously preparing French war plans; and Britain's new prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, saw securing a friendship with the Italian Benito Mussolini as a top priority.[84] Eden confided he wished Franco to win and so Italian and Germany involvement would be scaled back; Chamberlain considered Spain a troublesome complication to be forgotten.[84] By the end of July 1937, the committee was in deadlock, and the aims of a successful outcome to the Spanish Civil War was looking unlikely for the Republic.[85] Unrestricted Italian submarine warfare began on 12 August.[85] The British Admiralty believed that a significant control effort was the best solution of four that were put forward in response to attacks on British shipping.[86] On 27 August, the Committee decided that naval patrols did not justify their expense and would be replaced, as planned, with observers at ports.[84]
A leaky dam, better than no dam at all.
— Anthony Eden on non-intervention.[87]
The
On 27 June 1938, Maisky agreed to send of two commissions to Spain, enumerate foreign volunteer forces and bring about their withdrawal. That was estimated to cost £1,750,000 to £2,250,000, which was borne by member countries of the committee.[96] The Nationalists wished to prevent the fall of the favourable Chamberlain government in the United Kingdom and so were seen to accept the plan.[97] With much bemoaning, the Republicans also accepted the plan. The Nationalists demanded belligerent rights and then withdrawals of 10,000 from each side, which amounted to a rejection of the plan.[98] Following the Munich Agreement, which was judged by Chamberlain to have been a success, Britain would host similar mediation in Spain.[99] Negrín would propose the removal of the International Brigades, most of whom were now Spaniards, at the last meeting of the League of Nations, thereby showing his contempt for the committee.[100] Similarly, Italians would leave Spain under the Anglo-Italian agreement, not through the committee.[101]
Britain and France recognised the Nationalist government on 27 February 1939.[102] Clement Attlee criticised the way it had been agreed, calling it 'a gross betrayal... two and a half years of hypocritical pretence of non-intervention'.[103]
References
Notes
- ^ See also German involvement in the Spanish Civil War
- ^ Alpert (1998) p. 65 notes that rank-and-file members of the Labour Party may have opposed it.
- ^ Involved were Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. (Thomas (1961). p. 277.)
- Abdication Crisisbroke in the United Kingdom on 3 December and occupied the minds of the British public. (Thomas (1961). p. 335.)
- U.S. House of Representatives. (Thomas (1961). p. 338.)
Citations
- ISBN 9780375755156.
- ISBN 978-0521459327.
- ^ Ángel Viñas, La Soledad de la República Archived 30 June 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Stone (1997). p. 133.
- ^ a b Beevor (2006). p. 374.
- ^ Stone (1997). p. 134.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 257.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 257–258.
- ^ a b Alpert (1998). p. 45.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 258.
- ^ Alpert (1998). pp. 45–46.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 259.
- ^ a b Alpert (1998). p. 44.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 279.
- ^ Alpert (1998). p. 46.
- ^ a b Preston (2006). p. 143.
- ^ Alpert (1998). p. 65.
- ^ Warwick University. Retrieved 21 July 2021.
- ISBN 0750921587.
- ^ Preston (2006). p. 144.
- ^ a b c d e Thomas (1961). p. 260.
- ^ Preston (2004) p. 145.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 261.
- ^ a b Alpert (1998). p. 51.
- ^ Stone (1997). p. 137.
- ^ a b Preston (2006). p. 136.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 263–4.
- ^ a b Alpert (1998). p. 59.
- ^ Scott Ramsay. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939". International History Review 41:3 (2019): 604–623. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1428211.
- ^ Ramsay, Scott. "Ideological Foundations of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War: Foreign Office Perceptions of Political Polarisation in Spain, 1931-1936." Diplomacy & Statecraft 31, no. 1 (2020): 44–64.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 278.
- ^ Beevor (2006). p. 378.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 277.
- ^ Alpert (1998). p. 61.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 278–9.
- ^ Preston (2006). p. 150.
- ^ Heydecker, Leeb (1975). p. 174.
- ^ Beevor (2006). p. 385.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 281.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 283.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 283–4.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 284.
- ^ a b Preston (2006). p. 159.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 285.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 331.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 332.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 333.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 334.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 334–5.
- ^ Orwell (1953). p. 169.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 335–5.
- ^ a b c d e Thomas (1961). p. 336.
- ^ Alpert (1998). p. 105.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 338.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 339.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 340.
- ^ Alpert (1998). p. 104.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 341.
- ^ Irish Statute Book: Spanish Civil War (Non-Intervention) Act, 1937
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 341–2.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 342–3.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 395.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 394.
- ^ a b Alpert (1998). p. 115.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 395–6.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 396.
- ^ a b Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 3.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 439–440.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 441.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 456.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 457.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). pp. 4–5.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 6.
- ^ a b Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 7.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 8.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 458.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 459.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 9.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 463.
- ^ a b Bulletin of International News (1937). pp. 9–10.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 464.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 11.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). pp. 11–12.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 467.
- ^ a b The English Historical Review (1975). p. 104.
- ^ The English Historical Review (1975). p. 105.
- ^ Blinkhorn (1988). p. 48.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 475–6.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 476.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 477.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 502.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 503.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 514.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 523.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 538.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 541.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 542.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 552.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 555.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 557.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 561.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 583.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 584.
Sources
- Books
- Alpert, Michael (29 March 1998). A New International History of the Spanish Civil War. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-312-21043-4.
- ISBN 978-0-297-84832-5.
- Blinkhorn, Martin (1988). Democracy and Civil War in Spain 1931–1939. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-415-00699-6.
- Heydecker, Joe Julius; Leeb, Johannes (1975). The Nuremberg Trial: A History of Nazi Germany as Revealed Through the Testimony at Nuremberg. Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-8371-8131-8.
- Secker and Warburg.
- Preston, Paul (2006). The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, revolution and revenge (3 ed.). HarperCollins.
- Stone, Glyn (1997). "Sir Robert Vansittart and Spain, 1931–1941". In Otte, Thomas G.; Pagedas, Constantine A. (eds.). Personalities, war and diplomacy: essays in international history. Routledge.
- Thomas, Hugh(1961). The Spanish Civil War (1 ed.). London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
- Journals
- S. A. H (7 August 1937). "Spain: the British Compromise Plan". Bulletin of International News. 14 (3). London: Royal Institute of International Affairs: 3–13. JSTOR 25639692.
- Peter Gretton (January 1975). "The Nyon Conference - The Naval Aspect". The English Historical Review. 90 (354). London: Oxford University Press: 103–112. JSTOR 567512.
External links
- Jennifer L. Foray, Dutch Involvement in the Spanish Civil War, Columbia Historical Review (Spring 2001)
- Spartacus Educational summary
- "Trabajadores: The Spanish Civil War through the eyes of organised labour", a digitised collection of more than 13,000 pages of documents from the archives of the British Trades Union Congress held in the Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick