Spanish coup of July 1936

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Spanish coup of July 1936
Part of the Assault Guards fighting in Barcelona during the uprising
Date 17–21 July 1936 Location Spain Result Start of the Spanish Civil War Rebel failure to overthrow the Spanish government Government failure to fully suppress the rebellion
Belligerents
Spanish government	Army rebels
Commanders and leaders
Manuel Azaña José Giral Santiago Casares José Miaja	José Sanjurjo † Emilio Mola Francisco Franco Manuel Goded

The Spanish coup of July 1936

Following elections in November 1933, Spain entered what was called by the left-wing parties the "

José-María Gil-Robles, the leader of the right-wing Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights (CEDA), struggled to control his party's youth wing, which copied the youth movements of Germany and Italy. Monarchists, however, turned their attention to the fascist Falange Española, led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera.^[6] Open violence occurred in the streets of Spanish cities.^[7] Gil-Robles's CEDA continued to mimic the German Nazi Party and staged a rally in March 1934.^[8][9] Gil-Robles successfully used an anti-strike law to provoke and to break up unions, one at a time.^[10] Efforts to remove local councils from socialist control prompted a general strike, which was brutally put down, with the arrest of four deputies and other significant breaches of Articles 55 and 56 of the constitution.^[11]

On 26 September 1934, the CEDA announced it would no longer support the centrist Radical Republican Party's minority government, which was replaced by an RRP cabinet that included three members of the CEDA.^[12] A UGT general strike in early October 1934 was quickly put down throughout most of Spain.^[13] General Francisco Franco was put in informal command of the military effort against the Asturian miners' revolt of 1934 during which striking labourers had occupied several towns and the provincial capital.^[14] Around 30,000 workers had been called to arms in ten days.^[15] Franco's men, some brought in from Spain's army of Africa,^[16] acted horrifically by killing men, women and children and carrying out summary executions when the main cities of Asturias were retaken.^[17] About 1,000 workers and about 250 government soldiers were killed,^[18] which marked the effective end of the republic.^[19] Months of retaliation and repression by both sides followed, and torture was used on political prisoners. Bombings, shootings and political and religious killings were frequent in the streets. Political parties created armed militias.^[20][21] Gil-Robles once again prompted a cabinet collapse, and five members of Alejandro Lerroux's new government were conceded to CEDA. The military was purged of Republican members and reformed. Those loyal to Gil-Robles were promoted, and Franco was made chief of staff.^[22]

The

On 12 June, Prime Minister Casares Quiroga met General Juan Yagüe, who was accused of masterminding the growing conspiracy in North Africa. Yagüe managed, falsely, to convince Casares of his loyalty to the Republic.^[36] Mola held a meeting between garrison commanders in northern Spain on 15 June, and local authorities, on hearing of that meeting, surrounded it with civil guards.^[36] However, Casares ordered their removal and said that he trusted Mola.^[37] Mola began serious planning in the spring, but Franco hesitated until early July, which inspired other plotters to refer to him as "Miss Canary Islands 1936".^[34] Franco was a key player because of his prestige as a former director of the military academy, and as the man who suppressed the socialist uprising of 1934.^[34] He was well respected in the Spanish Moroccan army, Spain's strongest military force.^[37] He wrote a cryptic letter to Casares on 23 June which suggested that the military was disloyal but could be restrained if he were put in charge.^[37] Casares did nothing, and failed to arrest or to buy off Franco.^[37] Franco was due to be assigned control of Morocco in the new regime and largely sidelined.^[38] On July 5, an aircraft was chartered to take Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco;^[39] it arrived on July 14.^[39]

Murder of Calvo Sotelo

On 12 July 1936 in Madrid, a member of the Falange, Jorge Bardina, murdered lieutenant

The killing of Calvo Sotelo, a prominent member of Parliament, and the involvement of the police aroused suspicions and strong reactions among the government's opponents on the right.^{[42][nb 1]} Massive reprisals followed.^[40] Although the conservative Nationalist generals had already been in the advanced stages of a planned uprising, the event provided a catalyst and a convenient public justification for their coup, particularly that Spain had to be saved from anarchy by military, rather than democratic, means.^[40] The socialists and communists, led by Prieto, demanded for arms to be distributed to the people before the military took over, but the prime minister was hesitant.^[40]

Franco's plane landed in Gran Canaria on July 14, but since he was based in Tenerife, he would not have made the plane without the death of General Amado Balmes, the military commander in Gran Canaria, who was killed in a shooting on July 16.^[43] Whether his death was an accident, suicide or murder is unknown:^[43] Balmes reportedly shot himself in the stomach by accident and died shortly after. Some conspiracy theories suggest that he was murdered, but he would have had enough time to denounce his murderers if they had existed, and the officer who certified his death as an accident was not a conspirator and remained loyal to the Republic during the Civil War.^[44][45]

Beginning

The uprising was intended for 18 July, at 5 a.m. in Morocco; most garrisons in Spain were supposed to rise one day later.^[46] The rising was intended to be a swift coup d'état, but the government retained control of most of the country.^[47]

Rebel control in Spanish Morocco was all but certain. The 30,000-strong

On 18 July, Casares Quiroga refused an offer of help from the CNT and UGT and proclaimed that only Spanish Morocco had joined the rebels and that the populace should trust legal methods to deal with the uprising. Handing out weapons would be illegal. The CNT and the UGT proclaimed a general strike, which was in effect a mobilisation. They opened weapons caches, some buried since the 1934 risings.[48] The paramilitary forces were better trained than the army but often waited to see the outcome of militia action before either joining or suppressing the rebellion. Quick action by either the rebels or anarchist militias was often enough to decide the fate of a town.^[50]

Coup in military districts

In mid-1936, Peninsular Spain was divided into eight military districts, each home to one division. Most senior staff forming the local command layer were not involved in the conspiracy. Out of eight district commanders and commanders of respective divisions at the same time, there was only one engaged in the plot and adhered to the coup. Out of eight district chiefs of staff, there were three officers involved in the conspiracy,^[51] and three more joined the unfolding rebellion.^[52] The conspiracy relied mostly on mid-range staff and line officers; they were expected to take control of the garrisons and either overpower their seniors or persuade them to join. In some districts, like Zaragoza or Seville, the conspiracy network was well developed, and Mola was confident of success. In other districts, like Valencia or La Coruña, the network was sketchy, and the plotters took into account a possible failure.

Madrid (1st Division)

The district commander general

The district commander, José Fernández Villa-Abrille, and his chief of staff, Juan Cantero Ortega, were loyal to the government. The conspiracy network was headed by the staff officer comandante José Cuesta Monereo, who built an efficient structure, described by some as a "parallel staff". A few days before the coup Villa-Abrille was invited to join. He declined, but nothing is known of him taking action against the plotters. According to Mola's plan, Queipo de Llano was to assume command of the rebel Seville troops. On July 18, Cuesta organised Queipo de Llano's takeover of the garrison. Villa-Abrile was incapacitated and detained, later tried by the Nationalists and sentenced to prison. At the time of the coup, Cantero was on leave in Algeciras, where he assumed a wait-and-see attitude. He returned to Seville early August; the victorious Nationalists released him from all functions.^[61]

Valencia (3rd Division)

Neither the district commander, Fernando Martínez Monje [es], nor his chief of staff, Adolfo Machinandiarena Berga, was involved in the plot. The local conspiracy junta missed officers on critical positions. The most important of these officers was Bartolomé Barba Hernández [es], but he excelled in ensuring civilian, rather than military, support. General Manuel González Carrasco [es], who was initially marked to lead the rebels, was reassigned by Mola to lead the Barcelona rising and was reassigned to Valencia shortly before the coup. On July 18, a few conspirators tried to persuade Martínez to join the insurgency, but the commander remained ambiguous, which was the position also adopted by Machinandiarena. Engulfed by doubts, González Carrasco remained rather passive. Many conspiring officers were ready to join the coup once orders were given by divisional command. For about two weeks, the Valencia garrison did not take a firm position. Eventually, Barba and González Carrasco fled to the Nationalist zone. Martínez was reassigned to non-combat positions, and Machinandiarena was detained and tried and later also by the Nationalists.^[62]

Barcelona (4th Division)

The district commander,

Both the district commander, Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer, and his chief of staff, Federico Montaner Canet [es], were active conspirators. The conspiracy network was firm, and Mola was confident that the Zaragoza troops would help the coup. Though the conspiracy network was not extensive, the fact that both key military men were involved in the plot led to almost all troops in the district obeying the orders of the rebellious command. A few loyalist officers were quickly overwhelmed by the rebels. Despite his age Cabanellas led the action, and Montaner supported him as the chief of staff. As had been planned, Cabanellas remained in command of the Zaragoza military district after the successful coup.^[64]

Burgos (6th Division)

The district commander,

The district commander general Nicolás Molero Lobo [es] was not involved in the plot. The key person among the conspirators was the chief of staff, Anselmo López-Maristany, but in June he was posted to Madrid, and he kept co-ordinating the plot in Valladolid from the capital. His successor as chief of staff, Juan Quero Orozco, was not involved in the plot and was not aware of it unfolding. On the evening of July 18, a group of senior officers from Madrid, including Saliquet, Uzquiano, López-Maristany and Martín-Montalvo, led the takeover of the military structures, which involved a shootout with men of Molero, who was eventually detained. Later, Molero was tried by the Nationalists and sentenced to prison. Quero remained passive and eventually joined the rebels. In line with initial planning, the command of the Valladolid district was assumed by Andrés Saliquet.^[66]

La Coruña (8th Division)

The district commander, Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo [es], was not aware of the conspiracy. The chief of staff, Luis Tovar Figueras, maintained sporadic and loose contacts with UME, but he neither took part in the conspiracy nor took any action against it. Key among the plotters was Fermín Gutiérrez Soto, a high-ranking member of the divisional staff. On July 18 and 19, the conspiracy network remained relatively disorganised, and no resolute action had been taken. Suspicious of his staff, in the early hours of July 20, Salcedo ordered the detention of both Tovar and Gutiérrez. It was the rapid counteraction of Gutiérrez and coronel Martin Alonso that produced the detention of Salcedo, who was later tried and executed. Tovar adhered to the coup. Given the sketchy insurgency scheme in La Coruña, Mola's plan did not envision any specific individual as local commander following the coup, a role that was temporarily assumed by Enrique Cánovas Lacruz, who had refused to take the rebel command a few times before he eventually accepted it.^[67]

Aftermath

Despite the ruthlessness and determination of the supporters of the coup, the rebels failed to take any major cities, with the critical exception of

The Nationalist area of control contained roughly 11 million of Spain's population of 25 million.^[76] The rebels had secured the support of around half of Spain's territorial army, some 60,000 men. In Republican units, however, up to 90% of officers rebelled, defected or merely disappeared, and their loyalty to the Republic was put into doubt. Therefore, some would later turn up in Nationalist ranks, which considerably reduced the units' effectiveness, as a new command structure had to be fashioned. No such problem occurred in Nationalist units.

• List of Spanish Nationalist military equipment of the Spanish Civil War
• List of Spanish Republican military equipment of the Spanish Civil War

References

Notes

Citations