German involvement in the Spanish Civil War
German involvement in the Spanish Civil War | |
---|---|
Nationalist forces | |
Conflict | Spanish Civil War |
German involvement in the Spanish Civil War commenced with the
The war provided combat experience with the latest technology for the German military. However, the intervention also posed the risk of escalating into a world war for which, Hitler was not ready. He therefore limited his aid, and instead encouraged
Nazi support for General Franco was motivated by several factors, including as a distraction from Hitler's central European strategy, and the creation of a Spanish state friendly to Germany to threaten France. It further provided an opportunity to train men and test equipment and tactics.
Military operations
Hitler decided to support the Nationalists in July 1936. The
Early intervention helped to ensure the Nationalists successes in the war's initial stages. The training they provided to the Nationalists proved as valuable, if not more so, than direct actions. From 29 July to 11 October the Germans transported 13,523 Moroccan troops and 270,100 kilograms of war material from
After a
German air crews supported the
In
On 24–25 July, Republican forces launched the Battle of the Ebro. Reconnaissance units of the Condor Legion warned Nationalists forces, but this went unheeded. 422 sorties by the Legion's aircraft had considerable effect. A reinforcement of the Legion enabled an important Nationalist counter-attack. At sea, the Maritime Reconnaissance Staffel of the Condor Legion acted against Republican shipping, ports, coastal communications and occasionally inland targets. The German North Sea Group around Spain, part of the Kriegsmarine, consisted of the pocket battleships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer, the light cruiser Köln, and four torpedo boats. In addition, Operation Ursula saw a group of German U-boats active around Spain, but was ultimately a failure.
Motivation and volunteers
In the years following the Spanish Civil War, Hitler gave several possible motives for German involvement. Among these were the distraction it provided from German re-militarisation; the prevention of the spread of communism to Western Europe; the creation of a state friendly to Germany to disrupt Britain and France; and the possibilities for economic expansion.[3] Although the offensive on Madrid was abandoned in March 1937, a series of attacks on weaker Republican-controlled areas was supported by Germany; despite prolonging the Civil War, it would help to distract the other western powers from Hitler's ambitions in central Europe.[8] The offensive on Vizcaya, a mining and industrial centre, would help fuel German industry.[9] On 27 June 1937, Hitler (in a speech at Würzburg) declared he supported Franco to gain control of Spanish ore.[10]
Discussions over German objectives for intervention occurred in January 1937. Germany was keen to avoid prompting a Europe-wide war, which at the time they felt committing further resources to Spain would do.[11] Contradictory views were held by German officials: Ernst von Weizsäcker suggested it was merely a matter of graceful withdrawal; Hermann Göring stated that Germany would never recognise a "red Spain". A joint Italian–German decision, that the last shipments would be made by the start of February, was agreed.[11] German aid would therefore prevent a Nationalist defeat with a minimum of commitment.[12]
Involvement in the Spanish Civil War had drawn Mussolini closer to Hitler, helping to get Mussolini's agreement for Hitler's plans for union (
Around 5,000 Germans and Austrians served with the
Non-Intervention Agreement
Non-intervention, and with it the
On 9 August, the Germans informed the British that 'no war materials had been sent from Germany and none will', which was blatantly false.[21] One German Ju 52 aircraft was captured when it came down in Republican territory. Its release would be required before Germany signed the Non-Intervention Pact.[22] There was a growing belief that countries would not abide by the agreement anyway.[23] Admiral Erich Raeder urged the German government to either back the Nationalists more completely, and bring Europe to the brink of war, or abandon them. On the 24th, Germany signed.[22][24] It was at this point that the Non-Intervention Committee was created to uphold the agreement, but the double-dealing of the USSR and Germany had already become apparent.[25] Germany consistently broke the agreement they had signed.[26]
It would have been better to call this the Intervention Committee, for the whole activity of its members consisted in explaining or concealing the participation of their countries in Spain
— Joachim von Ribbentrop, in his memoirs.[27]
The
Control plan
Observers were posted to Spanish ports and borders, and both Ribbentrop and Grandi were told by their governments to agree to the plan, significant shipments already having taken place.[34] The cost of the scheme was put at £898,000, of which Germany would pay 16 percent.[34] The German delegation appears to have hoped the control plan was effective.[35]
In May, the Committee noted an attack on the German
Early intervention
Following the military coup in Spain at the start of the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish Second Republic turned to the Soviet Union and France for support, and the Nationalists requested the support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.[42] The first attempt to secure German aviation was made on 22 July 1936, with a request for 10 transport aircraft. Franco contacted Hitler directly.[43] German ministers were split on whether to support the Nationalists, and possibly become embroiled in a European war as a result.[43] Ultimately Hitler decided to support the Nationalists on 25 or 26 July, but was still wary of provoking a Europe-wide war.[3][44]
The Reich Air Travel Ministry concluded that Nationalist forces would need at least 20 Ju 52s, flown by Deutsche Luft Hansa pilots, to carry the Army of Africa from Spanish Morocco to Spain.[3] This mission became known as Operation Magic Fire (German: Feuerzauber).[3][45] The joint Spanish-German Sociedad Hispano-Marroquí de Transportes (HISMA) "Spanish–Moroccan Transport Company" and an entirely German company, the Raw Materials and Good Purchasing Company (German: Rohstoffe-und-Waren-Einkaufsgesellschaft, ROWAK) were established.[3] This involvement was kept covert, hidden from both foreign and economic ministries, and funded with three million Reichsmark (equivalent to 14 million 2021 euros).[3][45]
The organisation and recruitment of German volunteers was also kept secret; by 27 July the call for pilots had been made in major German cities.[46] The first contingent of 86 men left on 1 August in civilian clothes, unaware of where they were going. They were accompanied with six biplane fighters, anti-aircraft guns and about 100 tons of other supplies.[46] They were placed at Tablada airfield near Seville, and accompanied by German air transport, they began the airlift of Franco's troops to Spain.[46]
Germany's involvement grew in September to encompass the Wehrmacht's other branches; Operation Magic Fire was renamed Operation Guido in November.[46] A wide belief was that the soldiers would train Spanish Nationalists, and not engage the Republicans.[47] In August, 155 tons of bombs were transferred from Germany through Portugal.[48] Other military aid was provided.[47] The head of the Kriegsmarine initially refused to provide submarines, but this changed after 24 October, upon the signing of the Rome–Berlin Axis, when it became clear that Mussolini's Italy would do the same. The Kriegsmarine also provided various surface ships and coordinated the movement of German supplies to Spain.[49] German U-boats were dispatched to Spanish waters under the codename Ursula.[49]
In the two weeks following 27 July, German transports moved nearly 2,500 troops of the Army of Africa to Spain;[3] 1,500 between 29 July and 5 August.[50] Transport planes were moved to Spain from Germany via San Remo in Italy.[3] German aircraft continued to provide cover for ship movements in the Strait of Gibraltar.[51] There were fuel shortages, but these eased as more fuel arrived from Germany.[51]
By 11 October, the mission's official end, 13,500 troops, 127 machine guns and 36
German air crews supported the
The existing command structure was replaced with the Winterübung Rügen, and the military units already in Spain were formed into a new legion, which was briefly called the Iron Rations (German: Eiserne Rationen) and the Iron Legion (German: Eiserne Legion) before Göring renamed it the Condor Legion (German: Legion Condor).[56] The first German chargé to Franco's government, General Wilhelm von Faupel,[nb 1] arrived in November, but was told not to interfere in military matters.[57] By mid-November, 20 German shipments had arrived in Spain, carrying supplies like ammunition, aviation fuel, rifles, grenades, radio equipment and both civilian and military vehicles.[49]
Göring (who controlled Rheinmetall-Borsig) supplied arms to the Republicans; shipped to Greece supposedly for their use, the arms were transferred by Bodosakis to ships supposedly sailing to Mexico. He was also supplying the Nationalists, who got the best and latest weapons while the Republicans got the oldest and least serviceable. This supply peaked in 1937–38. Nationalists identified 18 vessels to Republican ports from 3 January 1937 and 11 May 1938, and estimated that Göring received the equivalent of one pound sterling per rifle. An earlier shipment from Hamburg to Alicante on 1 October 1936 by the Welsh ship Bramhill had 19,000 rifles, 101 machine guns and more than 20 million cartridges for the CNT militia in Barcelona.[58] Nazi Germany also helped the propaganda war with a gift of a Telefunken transmitter for the newly created national radio service.
Condor Legion
The
The Nationalists were supported by German and Italian units and equipment during the
Faupel, in November–December, urged the creation of a single German unit of 15,000–30,000, believing it would be enough to turn the tide of the war to the Nationalists. Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff argued this would be insufficient, and that larger measures could provoke the wrath of the Spanish.[64] Between late 1936 and early 1937, new aircraft were sent to the Condor Legion.[61] Older aircraft were passed onto the Nationalists.[65] By the end of 1936, 7,000 Germans were in Spain.[66][nb 2] The British estimated that between January 1937 and August 1938, 320,000 rifles and 550,000 revolvers were transferred to the Nationalists from Germany.[67]
German forces also operated in the Battle of Jarama, which began with a Nationalist offensive on 6 February 1937. It included German-supplied ground forces, including two batteries of machine guns, a tank division, and the Condor Legion's anti-aircraft guns.[65] Bombing by both Republican and Nationalist aircraft helped ensure a stalemate.[68] It showed up the inadequacy of the Legion's aircraft, faced with superior Soviet-made fighters.[69][70] The Legion's efforts only partly mitigated what was a significant defeat for the Nationalists at the Battle of Guadalajara during March.[71]
A joint Italian–German general had been set up in January 1937 to advise Franco on war planning. The defeat of a significant Italian force and the growing Soviet superiority in tanks and aircraft led the Germans to support a plan to abandon the offensive on Madrid and instead concentrate a series of attacks on weaker Republican-controlled areas.[8] While many countries believed motorised troops to have been proven less effective than first thought, it was the inadequacy of the Italians as a fighting force that dominated German thought.[72]
The Vizcaya Campaign
The isolated area of
Durango had no anti-aircraft defence, and only minor other defences. According to the Basques, 250 civilians died on 31 March, including the priest, nuns and congregation of a church ceremony.
Several explanations were put forward by the Nationalists, including blaming the attack on the Republicans,[79] that the attack on the town had been a prolonged offensive. However, the nature of the operation itself makes this seem unlikely.[80][81] The offensive on Bilbao, when it eventually came on 11 July, was supported by ground units of the Condor Legion, and extensive air operations. It proved the worth of the Condor Legion to the Nationalist cause.[82]
Further campaigns
The Condor Legion also took part in the Battle of Brunete.[82] The Legion was sent from the north to reinforce the broken line.[83] There were repeated raids on Spanish Republican Army armoured vehicles and later defensive positions by both bombers and fighters based at Salamanca.[84] Spanish Republican Air Force aircraft were ineffective, despite Nationalist fears, compared with German aircraft.[85] The Legion lost eight aircraft, but claimed 18 victories. German tactics were also improved with the experience of Brunete, particularly the en masse use of tanks by the Nationalists.[86]
The Nationalists returned to focus on the capture of northern Spain. German test aircraft, with the latest models, faced an outdated Basque section (Escuadrilla vasca) of the Spanish Republican Air Force.
The Condor Legion began a week of strikes against Republican airfields, halted by the Republican advance on Teruel and the ensuing Battle of Teruel.[90] Both the Legion's land and air forces were used. Poor weather resulted in few flights, and the town fell to Republican forces on 6 January.[91] Up to 100 sorties a day were launched during the Nationalist's counter-offensive through the Alfambra valley. Teruel was retaken on 22 February.[91] The continued Nationalist offensive on Aragon in April–June 1937, including the Battle of Belchite, involved bombing raids and the use of the Legion's ground forces.[91]
The Legion was switched to focus in the north, towards the
On 24–25 July, Republican forces launched the last major offensive of the war, the Battle of the Ebro. Reconnaissance units of the Condor Legion had noticed a troop build-up, and warned Nationalists forces. The warning went unheeded.[97] Although the Republic gained ground, Republican forces failed to gain control of Gandesa, with 422 sorties by the Legion having considerable effect.[97] However, tensions in Czechoslovakia and a shortage of pilots in Germany led to the return of 250 pilots from the Legion. Although trained Spaniards made up some of the shortfall, Volkmann complained to central command in Berlin, which led to his recall in September.[98]
During the battle, which saw 113 days of fighting, only 10 aircraft were lost (some by accident); the Legion claimed around 100 Republican aircraft. Only five aircrew had been killed, and six captured.[98] Aid from Germany temporarily halted in mid-September.[99] Germany and Nationalist Spain settled the issue of German interests in Spanish mines.[100]
The Legion took a short break from active duty to receive new aircraft, including Bf 109Es, He 111Es and Js, and Hs 126As, bringing its strength to 96 aircraft, around a fifth of the Nationalist's force as a whole. Von Richthofen returned to Spain in overall command, with Hans Seidemann as chief of staff.[101] This reinforcement may have been the single most important intervention by a foreign side in the war, enabling a counterattack after the Battle of the Ebro.[100] It mainly took part in operations against the remaining Republican air force during January–February 1939, with considerable success.[102] It was rapidly dissolved.[103] The men returned on 26 May; the best aircraft were returned to Germany and the rest of the equipment bought by the new Spanish regime.[104]
The Condor Legion claimed to have destroyed 320 Republican aircraft through aerial combat and shot down another 52 using anti-aircraft guns.[105] They also claimed to have destroyed 60 ships. They lost 72 aircraft due to hostile action, and another 160 to accidents.[106]
Maritime operations
Condor Legion
The Maritime Reconnaissance Staffel 88 (German: Aufklärungsstaffel See 88) was the Condor Legion's maritime unit under the command of Karl Heinz Wolff. Operating independently of the land-based division, it acted against Republican shipping, ports, coastal communications and occasionally inland targets such as bridges.[106] It used floatplanes, starting with the Heinkel He 60, which began operating in October 1936.[106] Beginning in June, operations were expanded to allow attacks on all Republican ports, so long as no British ships were present. Ten ships were attacked in the second half of 1937; however, the Norwegian torpedoes being used proved ineffective, and strafing or bombing targets was used instead.[107]
The arrival of
Kriegsmarine
Overtly, the
On 29 May, Deutschland was attacked by two Republican planes.[111] It was claimed that their Soviet pilots had mistaken it for the Nationalist ship Canarias,[110] or else had been fired upon by it.[111] 32 sailors were killed, the Kriegsmarine's greatest loss of life in the war.[110] After a retaliatory attack on Almeria (Valencia had been the original target, but minefields posed too great a problem), Germany came close to withdrawing from the agreement, but British diplomatic efforts to keep Germany patrolling prevailed.[37][112]
After the Germans claimed that Leipzig had been attacked by an unidentified submarine off Oran, it formally withdrew from international patrols to enforce the agreement.[112] Republican minister of defense Indalecio Prieto considered a declaration of war on Germany, but Soviet fear of a world war prevented this.[113]
Operation Ursula
Operation Ursula (named after the daughter of Karl Dönitz) saw a group of German U-boats active around the waters near Spain against the Spanish Republican Navy, under the overall command of Hermann Boehm (Konteradmiral since 1934, and Vizeadmiral since 1 April 1937) in Berlin.[114] It began on 20 November 1936, with the movement of U-33 and U-34 from Wilhelmshaven. Any identification marks were obscured, and the whole mission was kept secret.[114]
They entered the Mediterranean on the night of 27–28 November, taking over from Italian submarine patrols. If damaged, they were to sail to
Outcome
Early intervention helped to ensure that the Nationalist faction survived the initial stages of the war; German involvement then steadily expanded. The training they provided to Nationalist force proved as valuable, if not more so, than direct actions.[116] Approximately 56,000 Nationalist soldiers were trained by various German detachments in Spain, who were technically proficient; these covered infantry, tanks and anti-tank units, air and anti-aircraft forces, and those trained in naval warfare.[116]
The Condor Legion spearheaded many Nationalist victories, particularly providing air dominance from 1937 onwards; 300 air-to-air victories were claimed, although this was dwarfed by some 900 claimed by Italian forces.[117] Spain provided a proving ground for German tank tactics, as well as aircraft tactics, the latter being only moderately successful. The air superiority which allowed certain parts of the Legion to excel would be replicated in the first year of World War II, until ultimately failing to prevail in the Battle of Britain.[118]
A total of approximately 16,000 German citizens fought in the Civil War, mostly as pilots, ground crew, artillery men, tank crew, and as military advisers and instructors. About 10,000 Germans was the maximum strength at any one time. Approximately 300 Germans were killed.[119] During the course of the war, Germany sent 732 combat aircraft and 110 trainer aircraft to Spain.[120] German aid to the Nationalists amounted to approximately £43,000,000 ($215,000,000) in 1939 prices (equivalent to £3 billion 2021).[119][nb 4] That was broken down in expenditure to 15.5 percent used for salaries and expenses, 21.9 percent used for direct delivery of supplies to Spain, and 62.6 percent expended on the Condor Legion. No detailed list of German supplies furnished to Spain has been found.[119] Franco had also agreed to sign over the output of six mines to help pay for German aid.[106][121][nb 5]
Political roles
Some Nazis were disappointed with Franco's resistance to installing more fascism. Historian James S. Corum states:
As an ardent Nazi, [Ambassador Wilhelm] Faupel disliked Catholicism as well as the Spanish upper classes, and encouraged the working-class extremist members of the Falange to build a fascist party. Faupel devoted long audiences with Franco to convincing him of the necessity of remolding the Falange in the image of the Nazi Party. Faupel's interference in internal Spanish politics ran counter to Franco's policy of building a nationalist coalition of businessmen, monarchists and conservative Catholics, as well as Falangists.[122]
Historian Robert H. Whealey provides more detail:
Whereas Franco's crusade was a counterrevolution, the arrogant Faupel associated the Falange with the "revolutionary" doctrines of National Socialism. He sought to provide Spain's poor with an alternative to "Jewish internationalist Marxist–Leninism".... The old fashioned Alfonsists and Carlists who surrounded Franco viewed the Falangists as classless troublemakers.[123]
From 1937 to 1948, the Franco regime was a hybrid as Franco fused the ideologically incompatible national-syndicalist
In 1937, Franco assumed as the tentative doctrine of his regime 26 out of the original 27 points.[125] Franco made himself jefe nacional (National Chief) of the new FET (Falange Española Tradicionalista; Traditionalist Spanish Phalanx) with a secretary, Junta Political and National Council to be named subsequently by himself. Five days later (24 April), the raised-arm salute of the Falange was made the official salute of the Nationalist regime.[126] In 1939, the personalist style heavily predominated, with ritualistic invocations of "Franco, Franco, Franco".[127] The Falangists' hymn, Cara al Sol, became the semi-national anthem of Franco's not-yet-established regime.
See also
References
Notes
- ^ See also: de:Wilhelm Faupel (in German)
- ^ By comparison, there were now 14,000 Italians supporting Franco's forces. (Thomas (1961). p. 337.).
- ^ Namely Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the USSR and Sweden. (Westwell (2004). p. 56.)
- ^ Westwell (2004) gives a figure of 500 million Reichsmarks (equivalent to 2 billion 2021 euros).
- ^ In 1937, Germany imported 1,600,000 tons of iron and 950,000 tons of pyrites from Spain. (Thomas (1961). p. 459.)
Citations
- ^ Carr (1971). p. 209.
- ^ Weinberg, Gerhard. A World in Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 page 177.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Westwell (2004). p. 16.
- ^ Llewellyn, Jennifer; Southey, Jim; Thompson, Steve (1 September 2015). "Nazi Germany and the Spanish Civil War". Nazi Germany. Retrieved 29 June 2020.
- OCLC 908389541.
- OCLC 957140981.
- OCLC 1139890125.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 29.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 30.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 459.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 341.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 342.
- ^ Cienciala (1968). p. 30.
- ^ Payne (1996). p. 250.
- ^ Payne (1996). p. 251.
- ^ Knight (1998). pp. 71–72.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 395.
- ^ Beevor (2006). p. 374.
- ^ Stone (1997). p. 134.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 257.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 259.
- ^ a b Alpert (1998). p. 44.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 260.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 261.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 263–264.
- ^ Stone (1997). p. 133.
- ^ Heydecker (1975). p. 174.
- ^ Alpert (1998). p. 61.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 278.
- ^ Preston (2006). p. 150.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 332.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 340.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 342–343.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 394.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 395–396.
- ^ a b Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 3.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 441.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 456.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 457.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). pp. 4–5.
- ^ Bulletin of International News (1937). p. 7.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 10.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 11.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 231–232.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 230.
- ^ a b c d Westwell (2004). p. 13.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 14.
- ^ a b c d Westwell (2004). p. 19.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 15.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 244.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 17.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 18.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 21.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 21–22.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 22–23.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 23.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 333.
- ^ Beevor (2006). pp. 366–368, 538 note 4.
- ^ Beevor (2006). p. 199.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 322.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 24.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 329.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 317.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 334.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 25.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 337.
- ^ Leitz (1996). p. 20.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 25–26.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 26.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 376.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 27.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 388.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 401–402.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 403.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 31.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 403–404.
- ^ "The legacy of Guernica". BBC website. BBC. 26 April 2007. Retrieved 6 June 2011.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 419.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 420.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 32–33.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 420–421.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 33.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 462.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 33–34.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 35.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 36.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 468–469.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 38.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 471.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 38–39.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 39.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 40.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 502.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 510.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 487.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 541.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 41.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 44.
- ^ Thomas (1961). p. 553.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 566.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 44–45.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 45.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 46.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 47.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 47–48.
- ^ a b c d Westwell (2004). p. 48.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 49.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 51.
- ^ Beevor (2006). p. 73.
- ^ a b c d Westwell (2004). p. 56.
- ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 440.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 57.
- ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 441–442.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 58.
- ^ a b c Westwell (2004). p. 60.
- ^ a b Westwell (2004). p. 87.
- ^ Westwell (2004). p. 88.
- ^ Westwell (2004). pp. 88–89.
- ^ a b c Thomas (1961). p. 634.
- ^ Howson (1998). p. 19.
- ^ Leitz (1996). pp. 81–92.
- ^ James S. Corum, "The Luftwaffe and the coalition air war in Spain, 1936–1939," Journal of Strategic Studies, (1995) 18:1, 68–90 quotation at p. 75.
- ISBN 9780813148632.
- ISBN 9780804700580.
- ^ Payne (1999), p. 269
- ^ Payne (1987), p. 172
- ^ Payne (1987), p. 234
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{{cite book}}
: Missing or empty|title=
(help) - Thomas, Hugh(1961). The Spanish Civil War (1 ed.). London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
- Thomas, Hugh (1987). The Spanish Civil War (2, illustrated ed.). London: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-241-89450-7.
- Westwell, Ian (2004). Condor Legion: The Wehrmacht's Training Ground. Spearhead. Vol. 15. Hersham, United Kingdom: Ian Allan publishing. ISBN 978-0-7110-3043-5.
- Whealey, Robert H. (1989). Hitler and Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813148632.
- S. A. H (7 August 1937). "Spain: the British Compromise Plan". Bulletin of International News. 14 (3). London: Royal Institute of International Affairs: 3–13. JSTOR 25639692.
Primary sources
- Schmitt, Bernadotte et al. eds. Documents on German foreign policy, 1918–1945. Series D (1937–1945) vol III: Germany and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (Washington: Government Printing Office; 1950) WorldCat library holdings