Operation Sana
Operation Sana | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Bosnian War | |||||||||
Objectives of Operation Sana () on the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina | |||||||||
| |||||||||
Belligerents | |||||||||
Bosnia and Herzegovina | Republika Srpska | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Atif Dudaković Mehmed Alagić |
Željko Ražnatović | ||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
Bosnian Police |
State Security Service | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
15,000 (initially) ~25,000 (peak) |
8,000 (initially) 24,000 (peak) | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
178 killed 588 wounded 41 captured |
900 killed ~1,000 wounded | ||||||||
Thousands of Serb civilians displaced |
Operation Sana (
The HV and HVO launched
The operation commenced during a NATO bombing campaign against the VRS, codenamed Operation Deliberate Force, which targeted Bosnian Serb air defences, artillery and storage facilities initially in the area of Sarajevo, but also elsewhere in the country. Operation Sana, alongside concurrent HV and HVO offensives, sparked debate among military analysts as to whether the ground assaults or NATO's airstrikes were more responsible for ending the Bosnian War. Also in question was to what extent the advances of the ARBiH, HVO and HV were assisted by the airstrikes, and conversely, to what extent they hampered the VRS.
Background
As the
The JNA and the VRS in Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the
Prelude
By 1995, the ARBiH and the HVO had developed into better-organised forces employing comparably large numbers of artillery pieces and good defensive fortifications. The VRS was not capable of penetrating their defences even where its forces employed sound military tactics, for instance in the
In the final days of August 1995, NATO launched an air campaign targeting the VRS, codenamed Operation Deliberate Force. It was launched in response to the second Markale massacre of 28 August, which came on the heels of the Srebrenica massacre.[12] Airstrikes began on 30 August, initially targeting VRS air defences, and striking targets near Sarajevo. The campaign was briefly suspended on 1 September[13] and its scope was expanded to target artillery and storage facilities around the city.[14] The bombing resumed on 5 September, and its scope extended to VRS air defences near Banja Luka by 9 September as NATO had nearly exhausted its list of targets near Sarajevo. On 13 September, the Bosnian Serbs accepted NATO's demand for the establishment of an exclusion zone around Sarajevo and the campaign ceased.[15]
As the NATO bombing generally targeted VRS around Sarajevo, western Bosnia remained relatively calm following Operation Storm, except for probing attacks launched by the VRS, HVO or ARBiH near
Order of battle
The 15,000-strong ARBiH 5th Corps, commanded by
The 2nd Krajina Corps, commanded by Major General Radivoje Tomanić, and the 30th Infantry Division of the 1st Krajina Corps, commanded by Major General Momir Zec, were the VRS formations in the area. Tomanić, who set up his headquarters in Drvar, was in overall command in western Bosnia. Tomanić and Zec commanded a combined force of approximately 22,000 troops. The need to defend against both ARBiH corps and the combined HV and HVO force meant that the VRS had only 8,000 troops facing the 5th Corps. They were organised in six infantry or light infantry brigades stationed on the Grabež Plateau and near Bosanska Krupa and Otoka.[16]
Group | Unit | Notes |
---|---|---|
South | 501st Mountain Brigade | Under command of Lieutenant General Atif Dudaković; Only some elements of the 5th Military Police Battalion were deployed; The assault against the VRS at the Grabež Plateau was supported by the Croatian Army artillery
|
502nd Mountain Brigade | ||
510th Liberation Brigade | ||
517th Light Brigade | ||
5th Military Police Battalion | ||
North | 503rd Mountain Brigade | Under command of Brigadier Mirsad Selmanović |
505th Mountain Brigade
| ||
506th Liberation Brigade | ||
511th Mountain Brigade |
Area | Unit | Notes |
---|---|---|
Grabež Plateau | 15th Bihać Infantry Brigade | |
17th Ključ Infantry Brigade | reinforced with a battalion of the 6th Sanska Infantry Brigade | |
3rd Petrovac Infantry Brigade | ||
1st Serbian Infantry Brigade | likely deployed, but unconfirmed | |
Bosanska Krupa and Otoka | 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade | |
1st Novi Grad Infantry Brigade |
Timeline
First stage
On 13 September, the ARBiH launched its advance, codenamed Sana 95, from Bihać towards the Sana River. The initial advance was undertaken by OG South and spearheaded by the 502nd Mountain Brigade against VRS positions on the Grabež Plateau south of the town. As its defences yielded to the ground assault supported by HV artillery fire, the VRS started to retreat south towards Bosanski Petrovac, alongside civilians fleeing the area. The ARBiH pursued the retreating VRS, capturing Kulen Vakuf the next day, and Bosanski Petrovac on 15 September. That same day, the ARBiH linked up with the HV approximately 12 kilometres (7.5 miles) southeast of Bosanski Petrovac. The HV had captured Drvar and reached the Oštrelj Pass, as part of Operation Maestral 2.[17] Both forces mistook the other for the VRS, leading to a friendly fire incident.[22]
Even though the left flank of the
OG Centre began its advance towards Sanski Most against the 1st Drvar and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Drina infantry brigades, which were remnants of the VRS units which had pulled out of Drvar at the end of Operation Maestral 2.[17] OG North moved against Novi Grad as well as towards Sanski Most on the left flank of OG Centre, against opposition from the 1st Novigrad and 11th Krupa brigades and the former Drvar garrison. OG South, stripped of all its units except the 501st Brigade, and the 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade which had been transferred from 7th Corps, was tasked with capturing Mrkonjić Grad on the right flank of OG Centre.[24]
When the ARBiH approached Novi Grad and Sanski Most on 18–19 September, it encountered 14,000 additional VRS troops of the Prijedor OG 10 of the 1st Krajina Corps under the command of
VRS counteroffensive
On 20–22 September, the VRS 5th Kozara and 6th Sanska brigades managed to push OG Centre back approximately six kilometres (3.7 miles), while parts of OG North had to withdraw from some areas they had captured. OG North was able to continue its advance near Novi Grad and towards
The counteroffensive commenced on the night of 23/24 September, with the VRS 65th Protection Regiment, 16th Krajina and 43rd Motorised brigades and SDG troops attacking OG North. Fighting lasted for six days and was personally overseen by Mladić. VRS forces pushed the ARBiH back to Bosanska Krupa and Otoka, but the advance had to be stopped to divert forces to defend Mrkonjić Grad. By 1 October, OG South had pushed the VRS 17th Ključ Brigade back to within three kilometres (1.9 miles) of Mrkonjić Grad. The 16th Motorised Brigade was redeployed from Bosanska Krupa to Mrkonjić Grad, under the command of Colonel Milenko Lazić's OG 2 of the 30th Division. OG 2, supported by the SDG, the Red Berets, a Bosnian Serb special police brigade, and at least one battalion of the 1st Armoured Brigade, started to drive OG South back north towards Ključ. OG South had only received one additional independent battalion from the 7th Corps as reinforcement. The reinforced VRS 5th Kozara and 6th Sanska infantry brigades (organised as the Prijedor OG) moved south from Sanski Most towards Ključ to complete a pincer movement aimed at destroying OG South. The counterattack had gained momentum by 3 October, and the VRS advanced within one kilometre (0.62 miles) of Ključ, covering seventeen kilometres (11 miles) in three days. The 16th Motorised Brigade was again redeployed, this time to reinforce VRS positions at Mount Ozren near Doboj.[28] The remaining VRS forces, bolstered by the addition of the 2nd Reconnaissance Sabotage Detachment of the 2nd Corps,[29] continued their attacks against Ključ, but had made only small advances by 8–9 October, as OG South had finally received more reinforcements from the 7th Corps,[28] specifically the 707th and 717th brigades.[30] Since Ključ was still in jeopardy, the ARBiH requested HV and HVO assistance.[31]
Capture of Sanski Most
The HV and HVO agreed to assist the ARBiH, and launched Operation Southern Move to relieve the situation in Ključ. In this operation, the HV and the HVO fielded 11,000–12,000 troops who captured Mrkonjić Grad from three VRS brigades, thus relieving the pressure on the ARBiH in Ključ. The HV and the HVO then captured the Bočac Hydroelectric Power Station, the last remaining electrical power source available to the Bosnian Serbs in western Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 11 October, the HV and HVO reached a point on Mount Manjača, 25 kilometres (16 miles) south of Banja Luka.[32]
By 9 October, the ARBiH 5th Corps had received approximately 10,000 troops as reinforcements, including the ARBiH Guards Brigade,[33] the 17th Krajina Mountain, 717th Mountain, 708th Light, and 712th Mountain brigades, and the 7th Reconnaissance-Sabotage Battalion.[34] The Guards Brigade was used to reinforce OG Centre, which also received the 501st Brigade from OG South, while the latter now comprised five brigades previously subordinated to the 7th Corps.[33]
That day, the 5th Corps launched a fresh attack towards Sanski Most, employing OGs Centre and South to capture the town. The assault, spearheaded by the 502nd and 510th brigades, penetrated VRS defences manned by the 15th Bihać and 17th Ključ Brigades, forcing Zeljaja to withdraw his troops to the town itself to avoid encirclement. On 10 October, elements of the VRS 43rd Motorised and 11th Dubica brigades launched an unsuccessful attempt to halt the ARBiH advance on the outskirts of Sanski Most.[33] The 502nd Brigade, the Guards Brigade and the 5th Military Police Battalion subsequently captured the town.[35]
Despite the fact that a ceasefire was scheduled to come into force throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina on 12 October, OG Centre continued its advance northeast of Sanski Most, engaging the bulk of the VRS 43rd Motorised Brigade in a series of clashes. This fighting resulted in little change to the territory held by either side by 20 October, when fighting died down.[33]
Aftermath
Operation Sana, as well as Operation Maestral 2, were crucial in applying pressure on the VRS in the final weeks of the Bosnian War.[33] A Central Intelligence Agency analysis comparing the effects of Operation Deliberate Force, Sana and Maestral 2 on the VRS noted that the NATO campaign did not degrade the combat capability of the VRS as much as was initially assumed, because the airstrikes were never primarily directed at field-deployed units, rather they targeted the command and control infrastructure of the Bosnian Serb military. The analysis concluded that, while NATO degraded the capabilities of the VRS, the final HV, HVO and ARBiH offensives inflicted the most damage.[36] It further noted that those offensives, rather than the NATO bombing, were responsible for bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war.[37] Author Robert C. Owen argues that the HV, HVO and ARBiH would not have advanced as rapidly as they did had NATO not intervened and denied the VRS its long-range communications.[38]
Operation Sana and Operation Southern Move established the 51%–49% distribution of territory controlled by the ARBiH and HVO on the one hand and the VRS on the other, as envisaged in plans put forward by the Contact Group. The ARBiH, HVO and HV ultimately consented to the maintenance of the ceasefire of 12 October. According to British historian Marko Attila Hoare, their acquiescence was secured following massive diplomatic pressure from the West, and the alleged threat of US airstrikes against the ARBiH if it breached the ceasefire. The Bosnian War ended with the acceptance of the Dayton Agreement by all sides in November 1995.[39]
The offensive resulted in 178 dead, 588 wounded and 41 captured ARBiH troops. Bosnian Serb losses were 900 killed and more than 1,000 wounded.
Operation Sana, along with the near-concurrent Operation Maestral 2, created a large number of Serb refugees from the areas previously controlled by the VRS. Bosnian Serb sources document approximately 40,000 refugees in September 1995, encompassing the entire contemporary Bosnian Serb populations of the towns of Jajce, Šipovo, Mrkonjić Grad and Donji Vakuf having fled or been evacuated.[42] At the time, the UN spokesman in Sarajevo estimated the number of refugees at 20,000.[43] Fighting in October caused a further 30,000–40,000 refugees to flee Sanski Most and another 10,000 to flee Mrkonjić Grad and its surroundings.[44]
Footnotes
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 382.
- ^ a b Ramet 2006, p. 427.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 428.
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 136.
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 137.
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 143–144.
- ^ Bellamy 10 October 1992.
- ^ Burns 12 May 1992.
- ^ Ramet 1995, pp. 407–408.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 299.
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 376–377.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 377.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 378.
- ^ Ripley 1999, p. 133.
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 379.
- ^ a b c CIA 2002, p. 380.
- ^ a b c d e f CIA 2002, p. 382.
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 381–382.
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 418, n. 646.
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 418, n. 647.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 418, n. 650.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 420, n. 696.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 420, n. 699.
- ^ a b c d CIA 2002, p. 383.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 420, n. 703.
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 383–384.
- ^ Milutinović 28 February 1997.
- ^ a b CIA 2002, p. 389.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 424, n. 803.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 424, n. 802.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 390.
- ^ CIA 2002, pp. 390–391.
- ^ a b c d e CIA 2002, p. 391.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 425, n. 811.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 425, n. 814.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 395.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 396.
- ^ Owen 2010, p. 219.
- ^ Hoare 2010, p. 132.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 465.
- ^ The Irish Times 28 October 1995.
- ^ Beelman 13 September 1995.
- ^ O'Connor 14 September 1995.
- ^ Pomfret 12 October 1995.
References
- Books
- ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
- Hoare, Marko Attila (2010). "The War of Yugoslav Succession". In Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.). Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 111–136. ISBN 978-1-139-48750-4.
- Owen, Robert C. (2010). A History of Air Warfare. ISBN 978-1-59797-433-2.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (1995). Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation. Durham, North Carolina: ISBN 978-0-8223-1548-3.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building And Legitimation, 1918–2006. Bloomington, Indiana: ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8.
- Ripley, Tim (1999). Operation Deliberate Force: The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995. ISBN 978-0-9536650-0-6.
- News reports
- Beelman, Maud S. (13 September 1995). "Croats and Muslims Advance; Thousands More Refugees on the Move". Associated Press.
- Bellamy, Christopher (10 October 1992). "Croatia built 'web of contacts' to evade weapons embargo". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 November 2012.
- Burns, John F. (12 May 1992). "Pessimism Is Overshadowing Hope in Effort to End Yugoslav Fighting". The New York Times. Archivedfrom the original on 19 December 2013.
- O'Connor, Mike (14 September 1995). "Bosnian Serb Civilians Flee Joint Muslim-Croat Attack". The New York Times.
- Milutinović, Milovan (28 February 1997). "Kako je smenjivan general Ratko Mladic (2)" [How was General Ratko Mladic Dismissed (2)]. NIN (in Serbian).
- Pomfret, John (12 October 1995). "Bosnia's 'Ethnic Cleansers' Strike Again". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 8 August 2014.
- Spolar, Christine (30 October 1995). "New Wave of 'Ethnic Cleansing'; Initial Interviews in Serb-Held Banja Luka Point Up Tactic Anew". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 8 August 2014.
- "Two mass graves discovered in north west Bosnia". The Irish Times. 28 October 1995. Archived from the original on 8 August 2014.