Operation Deny Flight
Operation Deny Flight | |||||||
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Part of the F-15C is met by maintenance personnel at Aviano Air Base during Operation Deny Flight | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
NATO United Nations | Republika Srpska | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Leighton W. Smith (1994–1995) |
Radovan Karadžić Ratko Mladić | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Several armored vehicles destroyed |
Operation Deny Flight was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (
The operation played an important role in shaping both the Bosnian War and NATO. The operation included the first combat engagement[14] in NATO's history, a 28 February 1994 air battle over Banja Luka, and in April 1994, NATO aircraft first bombed ground targets in an operation near Goražde. Cooperation between the UN and NATO during the operation also helped pave the way for future joint operations. Although it helped establish UN–NATO relations, Deny Flight led to conflict between the two organizations. Most notably, significant tension arose between the two after UN peacekeepers were taken as hostages in response to NATO bombing.
The operations of Deny Flight spanned more than two years of the Bosnian War and played an important role in the course of that conflict. The no-fly zone operations of Deny Flight proved successful in preventing significant use of air power by any side in the conflict. Additionally, the air strikes flown during Deny Flight led to Operation Deliberate Force, a massive NATO bombing campaign in Bosnia that played a key role in ending the war.
Background and Operation Sky Monitor
In October 1992, at the beginning of the Bosnian War, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 781. This resolution prohibited unauthorized military flights in Bosnian airspace. Following the resolution, NATO began Operation Sky Monitor during which NATO forces monitored violations of the no-fly zone, without taking any military action against violators. By April 1993, NATO forces had documented more than 500 violations of the no-fly zone.[15] In response to these "blatant" violations of Bosnian air space, and implicitly of resolution 781, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 816.[16]
While Resolution 781 prohibited only military flights, Resolution 816 prohibited all flights in Bosnian air space, except for those expressly authorized by the UN Flight Coordination Center in
Enforcement of no-fly zone
After its adoption, Operation Deny Flight was relatively successful in preventing fixed-wing aircraft from flying over restricted air space in Bosnia. During the monitoring phase of Operation Sky Monitor, unauthorized fixed-wing flights averaged twenty per month, but during Deny Flight, the average was three.[18] During the conflict, there were only an estimated 32 fixed-wing military aircraft in Bosnia, all of them former Yugoslav Air Force planes under the control of the Bosnian Serbs. Thus, NATO primarily needed to prevent incursions into Bosnian airspace from Croatia and Serbia.[19]
The first serious violation to the no-fly zone came on 28 February 1994, when six Serb
While Deny Flight was relatively successful in stopping flights of fixed-wing aircraft, NATO forces found it very difficult to stop helicopter flights, which presented a more complicated challenge. All sides in the conflict used helicopters extensively for non-military purposes, and some of these flights were authorized by the UN. Under the operation's rules of engagement, NATO fighters were only authorized to shoot down helicopters that committed a hostile act. Otherwise, NATO fighters issued orders to "land or exit", in other words, land the aircraft or leave the no-fly zone. Typically, helicopters in Bosnian airspace complied with these orders by landing, but then took off again after NATO forces departed.[23] None of the parties in the conflict respected the ban on helicopter flights, as evidenced when Ratko Mladić responded to a BBC journalist's question about his violation of the ban with the statement, "The commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces does not ride on a donkey."[24]
Deceptive markings on helicopters further complicated matters for NATO pilots. Many of the combatants painted their helicopters to look like those of organizations that the UN's Zagreb Flight Coordination Center had authorized to fly in restricted space. For example, the army of the
Close air support and air strikes
Even before Operation Deny Flight began, a number of US officials lobbied for a large role for NATO air power in Bosnia. In particular, as part of
In June 1993, partly in response to pressure from the United States, the Security Council passed
Due to the difficult "dual key" authorization measure,
Attack on Goražde
In April 1994, Bosnian Serbs forces launched an attack on the UN Safe Area of Goražde. Initially, US Secretary of Defense William Perry told reporters that the United States would "not enter the war to stop" the Serbs from overrunning Goražde, and other senior officials publicly downplayed the possibility of using air strikes.[29] Several days into the attack, however, a number of UNPROFOR soldiers were injured, and one was killed by Serb fire. Thus, General Michael Rose, the UNPROFOR Commander, requested NATO strikes under the mandate of UNSCR 836.[30]
On 10 April, in response to the request, two US Air Force
As Mladić had promised, the Bosnian Serb army around Goražde attempted to shoot down NATO aircraft. On 15 April 1994, a French
Sarajevo
In February 1994 (when air strikes were originally threatened), NATO had created a heavy weapons exclusion zone around
On 22 September, UNPROFOR again requested NATO air support in the Sarajevo area after Serb forces attacked a French
Banja Luka incident
On 28 February 1994, a NATO
Attack on Bihać, bombing of Udbina and hostages
In October and November 1994, during the
In recognition of the situation, the Security Council passed
After the strikes at Otoka and Dvor, Bosnian Serb forces continued to target NATO aircraft with surface-to-air missiles, while advancing against the Bihać enclave. On 24 November, Serb forces fired radar-guided missiles at two British
Shortly after the suspension of NATO flights, former US President Jimmy Carter personally negotiated a four-month ceasefire in Bosnia. Although there were some violations of this ceasefire, most of the parties in the conflict heeded it. NATO ordered its planes back in the air, but due to the diminished hostilities, they did not engage in any significant operations for the next several months.[43] The reduced tensions resulting from the Carter ceasefire and the cessation of NATO air operations also led to the release of most of the UNPROFOR hostages over the next several weeks.[44][45][46]
Expansion of the air campaign in 1995
Although 1994 ended peacefully with the Carter ceasefire, NATO continued planning for new operations. Both NATO and UN officials believed that after the ceasefire expired in March, the fighting would resume. As such, planners at the Balkans Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) began drawing up plans for new air operations. By late December, the planners developed a plan called "Dead Eye", designed to eliminate Serb SAM capabilities, so that NATO could regain uncontested
Bombing of Pale and the hostage crisis
While NATO was planning its new strategy, the ceasefire expired, and, as predicted, fighting resumed. As the fighting gradually widened, Bosnian Muslim forces launched a large-scale offensive in the area of Sarajevo. In response to the attack, the Bosnian Serbs seized heavy weapons from a UN-guarded depot, and began shelling targets.
Facing a second hostage crisis, General Smith and other top UN commanders began shifting strategies. The UN began to redeploy its forces to more defensible locations, so that they would be harder to attack or take hostage. More importantly, Gen. Rose established the UN Rapid Reaction Force, a heavily armed unit with more aggressive rules of engagement, designed to take offensive action if necessary to prevent hostage-taking and enforce peace agreements.[51]
Downing of Scott O'Grady
After the seizure of the 377 hostages, NATO did not carry out further air strikes, but it did continue regular air patrol operations in support of the no-fly zone. On 2 June 1995, Captain
After O'Grady was shot down, tensions increased greatly between NATO and the Bosnian Serbs. A number of US commanders called for immediate retaliatory air strikes; however, the Serbs still held the majority of the hostages seized after the bombing of Pale. The threat to the hostages prevented NATO from acting more forcefully, and the Serbs released 121 hostages immediately after the incident in an effort to cool tensions. Nonetheless, the situation remained explosive for the next six days until O'Grady was rescued on 8 June by the
On 11 August,
Response to Srebrenica
A month after the O'Grady incident, on 6 July, the
On 11 July, NATO prepared for a large-scale mission in Srebrenica involving 60 aircraft. At 2:30 PM, the first wave of the assault, two Dutch F-16s, bombed two Serb tanks on the outskirts of the town. Two USAF F-16s were dispatched next to attack an artillery piece, but they failed to find their target. Soon thereafter, Bosnian Serb troops seized several Dutch peacekeepers as hostages and threatened to kill them if NATO did not call off its attacks. The Dutch commander reported this back to his government, and Dutch Defense Minister Joris Voorhoeve immediately telephoned the NATO operations center and ordered an end to the attacks.[60]
By the end of the day, Srebrenica had fallen to Bosnian Serb forces, who began a brutal campaign of
The London Conference
After the events at Srebrenica, sixteen nations met at the London Conference, which began on 21 July 1995, to consider new options for Bosnia. As a result of the conference, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave General Bernard Janvier, the UN military commander, the authority to request NATO airstrikes without consulting civilian UN officials.[63] The North Atlantic Council, NATO's top political body, and the UN also agreed to use NATO air strikes in response to attacks on any of the other safe areas in Bosnia. The participants at the conference also agreed in principle to the use of large-scale NATO air strikes in response to future acts of Serb aggression.[64]
Operation Deliberate Force
On 28 August 1995, a mortar shell slammed
Until 20 September 1995, when Operation Deliberate Force ended, the role played by Deny Flight was minimal. After the suspension of Operation Deliberate Force; however, several further operations were carried out under Deny Flight. On 4 October 1995, Deny Flight aircraft fired HARM missiles after being targeted by surface-to-air missiles. On 8 October 1995, the UN requested close air support near Tuzla. Due to bad weather conditions, NATO aircraft were unable to locate their targets, but on 9 October, in the final combat engagement of Deny Flight, NATO aircraft returned and destroyed a Serb command and control bunker.[12]
Termination of Deny Flight
After the adoption of the
Structure of forces
Throughout the course of its operation, Deny Flight was directed by
To simplify the chain of command and coordinate activities, NATO established the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy, which assumed practical day-to-day control of Deny Flight and reported to the commander of the 5ATAF. Each squadron participating in the operation sent a liaison officer to the CAOC to ensure coordination.
Twelve NATO countries provided forces to Operation Deny Flight:
Impact and legacy
Operation Deny Flight lasted for 983 days and included 100,420 sorties[71] carried out by 4,500 personnel from 12 NATO countries.[12] It included the first combat engagement in NATO history, the Banja Luka incident, and many of NATO's first out of area operations. As such, Deny Flight "represented a momentous act, if only in symbolic terms, in that the alliance assumed a combat mission in a nondefensive capacity and out-of-area".[72] Beyond this symbolic effect, Deny Flight had important consequences for NATO military policy, international relations, and the war in Bosnia.
Effect on military policy
As one of the first major combat tests of NATO airforces, Deny Flight provided several important military lessons. Most importantly, Deny Flight helped to prove the effectiveness, or drive the development of several technologies. For example, during the operation, the
The four NATO aircraft shot down during Operation Deny Flight also forced NATO members to consider new defensive measures for their aircraft, including increased stealth capabilities.
Effect on the Atlantic relationship
Operation Deny Flight, and other NATO operations during the Bosnian War, resulted in significant tension within NATO and the
Deny Flight also helped set the path for future UN-NATO relations. Throughout the operation, NATO "felt the frustration of having its wings clipped by a parallel UN authority",
Effect on the Bosnian War
Deny Flight also played a significant role in shaping the
While the material impact of Deny Flight was minimal, it did have a significant political impact. From the very beginning, according to Michael Beale, "the operation's implied objective was to demonstrate UN and NATO determination to stabilize the situation in Bosnia so that a peaceful settlement could be achieved".[23] Given the many violations of Deny Flight by helicopters, and the frequent failure of coordination between NATO and the UN, it is uncertain whether Deny Flight accomplished this mission. Nonetheless, NATO's limited air strikes under Deny Flight "demonstrated its determination to protect United Nations personnel" and Bosnian civilians, according to Michael R. Gordon, chief military correspondent for The New York Times. This determination eventually held the key to peace.[30]
See also
- 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
- Operation Deliberate Force
Notes
- ^ Sudetic, Chuck (1992-09-04). "U.N. Relief Plane Reported Downed on Bosnia Mission". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-10-05.
- ^ Fisk, Robert (1992-09-04). "UN fears aid aircraft was shot down by missile". The Independent. London. Archived from the original on 2022-05-24. Retrieved 2009-10-05.
- ^ a b NATO enforcing no-fly zone in Bosnia Associated Press, 13 April 1993
- ^ "DASSAULT-AVIATION ÉTENDARD IVM/P/PM".
- ^ Cook, Nick (1 March 2002). "Plus ca change ..? NATO aircraft are still particularly vulnerable to attack from certain forms of guided missiles". Interavia Business & Technology. Archived from the original on 4 November 2012.
- ^ "Aviation Safety Network". Flight Safety Foundation. 14 January 2024.
- ^ "F-18 Hornet ejection history". Archived from the original on 2012-01-19. Retrieved 2011-06-20.
- ^ "U.S. Jet Crashes in Adriatic, Pilot Dies". Los Angeles Times. Associated Press. 29 April 1994. Retrieved 12 April 2023.
- ^ Evan Thomas (19 June 1995). "An American Hero". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 8 August 2014.
- ^ West flexes muscle, Karadzic warns against action
- ^ ISBN 1-84176-290-3
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m AFSOUTH Fact Sheet
- ^ Air pictorial: journal of the Air League, Volume 57. Air League of the British Empire, 1995
- ^ Conflict in the Balkans: NATO Craft Down 4 Serb Warplanes Attacking Bosnia
- ^ Beale, pp. 19–20
- ^ a b "Resolution 816"
- ^ Beale, p. 19
- ^ a b c d e f g h Simmons
- ^ Beale, pp. 21
- ^ Beale, pp. 2–3
- ^ Owen, p. 21
- ^ Serbian officially admitted 5 Aircraft lost (Serbian)
- ^ a b c Beale, p. 20
- ^ "Ratko Mladic's very personal war"
- ^ Beale, pp. 19–21
- ^ Safire
- ^ Starr (1993)
- ^ Beale, p. 22
- ^ Gordon (April 5, 1994)
- ^ a b Gordon (April 11, 1994)
- ^ Burg, p. 147
- ^ Beale, p. 25
- ^ Bucknam, p. 137
- ^ Operation Deny Flight Archived 2011-05-13 at the Wayback Machine AFSOUTH Fact sheets
- ^ Bucknam, p. 163
- ISBN 978-1598845303.
- ^ Beale, p. 28
- ^ Sudetic
- ^ a b Bucknam, pp. 182–83
- ^ "NATO, Expanding Bosnia Role, Strikes a Serbian Base in Croatia"
- ^ a b Beale, p. 29
- ^ Bucknam, pp. 183–84
- ^ Beale, p. 32
- ^ "Serbs Release 55 Canadians But Renew Attack on Enclave"
- ^ "Bosnian Serb leader parlays with Carter, promises peace moves"
- ^ "Carter Undertakes Bosnia Peace Initiative"
- ^ Bucknam, pp. 204–205
- ^ Beale, p. 33
- ^ Ripley, p. 23
- ^ Bucknam, p. 215
- ^ Bucknam, p. 216
- ^ Bucknam, p. 218
- ^ Bucknam, p. 220
- ^ "Deny Flight shootdown may put USAF on the offensive"
- ^ a b Predator/MQ-9 Reaper June 2010, p. 16
- ^ Major Robert C. Nolan II: The Pilotless Air Force?. The Research DepartmentAir Command and Staff College, March 1997, page 6
- ^ "University of Texas at Arlington". Archived from the original on 2012-04-02. Retrieved 2010-06-16.
- ^ Bucknam, pp. 246–247
- ^ Bucknam, p. 248
- ^ Bucknam, p. 249
- ^ Rohde, p. 354.
- ^ Bucknam, pp. 250–252
- ^ Beale, p. 34
- ^ Bucknam, p. 253
- ^ Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs
- ^ Davis
- ^ Beale, p. 36
- ^ a b Davis, p. 48
- ^ a b c Bucnman, p. 63
- ^ Bucknam, p. 198
- ^ Allied command structures in the new NATO, p. 39
- ^ Papacosma
- ^ Slick
- ^ Boot, p. 347
- ^ "Flexing Joint Muscle: Mixed air groups aboard carriers"
- ^ "RAF Harriers could add teeth to RN carriers"
- ^ Spence
- ^ Moore, pp. 28–29
- ^ Foster, p. 15
- ^ Foster, p. 16
- ^ Burg, pp. 149–150
- ^ Foster, p. 17
- ^ Allin, p. 25
- ^ Starr (1995)
- ^ Allin, p. 26
- ^ Wallander, p. 719
- ^ Leurdijk
- ^ a b Schulte, p. 28
- ^ Holbrooke, p. 102
- ^ Schulte, p. 21
- ^ Owen
References
Books
- Beale, Michael (1997). Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina. OCLC 39892597.
- OCLC 69104262.
- Bucknam, Mark (2003). Responsibility of Command. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press. OCLC 52199670.
- Burg, Steven; Shoup, Paul (1999). The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Armonk: M.E. Sharper. OCLC 44955248.
- Davis, Bradley (2000). "The Planning Background". Deliberate Force. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press. OCLC 43095788.
- Foster, Edward (1995). NATO's Military in the Age of Crisis Management. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. OCLC 32775929.
- OCLC 40545454.
- Moore, Rebecca (2007). NATO's New Mission. Westport: Praeger Security International. OCLC 74966600.
- ISBN 1-57906-033-1.
- Ripley, Tim (2001). Conflict in the Balkans, 1991–2000. London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84176-290-3.
- OCLC 37329422.
Articles
- Allin, Dana (2002). NATO's Balkan Interventions. Adelphi Paper 347. International Institute for Strategic Studies. ISBN 0-19-851676-2.
- "Bosnian Serb leader parlays with Carter, promises peace moves". Deutsche Presse-Agentur. December 15, 1994.
- Cohen, Roger (November 22, 1994). "NATO, Expanding Bosnia Role, Strikes a Serbian Base in Croatia". The New York Times.
- Cohen, Roger (December 9, 1995). "Serbs Release 55 Canadians But Renew Attack on Enclave". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-04-28.
- "Deny Flight shootdown may put USAF on the offensive". Jane's Defence Weekly. June 24, 1995.
- "Flexing Joint Muscle: Mixed air groups aboard carriers". Jane's Navy International. December 1997.
- Gordon, Michael (April 11, 1994). "Conflict in the Balkans: NATO; Modest Air Operation in Bosnia Crosses a Major Political Frontier". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-02-17.
- Gordon, Michael (April 5, 1994). "No 'Green Light' for Serb Attacks, Clinton Says". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-02-17.
- Gordon, Michael R. (1 March 1994). "Conflict in the Balkans: NATO Craft Down 4 Serb Warplanes Attacking Bosnia". The New York Times. Retrieved 2012-11-17.
- Leurdijk, Dick (1997). "Before and after Dayton: The UN and NATO in the former Yugoslavia". Third World Quarterly.
- Owen, Robert (Summer 1997). "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1". Airpower Journal.
- "RAF Harriers could add teeth to RN carriers". Jane's Defence Weekly. June 26, 1996.
- "Ratko Mladic's very personal war". BBC World Service. July 26, 2008. Retrieved 2009-03-08.
- Safire, William (November 23, 1995). "Essay: Biting Bosnia's Bullet". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-02-16.
- Cohen, Roger (29 August 1995). "Shelling Kills Dozens in Sarajevo; U.S. Urges NATO to Strike Serbs". The New York Times. Retrieved 2012-11-16.
- Simmons, Dean (May 1997). "Air operations over Bosnia". United States Naval Institute Proceedings.
- Slick, Anthony (May 1995). "Working the swing role into the 21st century--The F/A-18D". Marine Corps Gazette.
- Spence, Mike (October 2000). "Lessons for combined rules of engagement". United States Naval Institute. Proceedings.
- Starr, Barbara (August 14, 1993). "Deny Flight forces poised for Bosnia strikes". Jane's Defence Weekly.
- Starr, Barbara (January 28, 1995). "The Jane's Interview". Jane's Defence Weekly.
- Sudetic, Chuck (November 19, 1994). "Napalm and Cluster Bombs Dropped on Bosnian Town". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-04-28.
- Williams, Daniel; Devroy, Ann (December 15, 1994). "Carter Undertakes Bosnia Peace Initiative". The Washington Post.
- JSTOR 2601379. (subscription required for viewing)
Web resources
- "Operation Deny Flight". AFSOUTH Fact Sheets. NATO Regional Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe. Archived from the original on 2011-05-13. Retrieved 2011-04-17.
- "Resolution 816" (PDF). United Nations Security Council Resolutions. UN Security Council. Retrieved 2009-02-17.
External links
- "AFSOUTH Fact sheets: Operation Deny Flight". Regional Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe. Allied Joint Force Command Naples. 18 July 2003. Archived from the original on 13 May 2011. Retrieved 2011-04-17.
- "Military: Operation Deny Flight". GlobalSecurity.org. 27 April 2005. Retrieved 2009-02-18.