Siege of Srebrenica
Siege of Srebrenica | |||||||||
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Part of the Bosnian War | |||||||||
A panorama of the town of Srebrenica | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Yugoslav People's Army (1992) volunteers (1995) |
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina NATO (1995) | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Ratko Mladić Radislav Krstić Zdravko Tolimir Milorad Pelemiš |
Naser Orić (May 1992 – April 1995) Ramiz Bećirović (WIA) (April–July 1995) | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
~1,500 soldiers (before Krivaja '95) 3,000 soldiers (during Krivaja '95) |
~6,000 soldiers Air Support | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Total: 9,377 war-related deaths in the Srebrenica municipality (1992–1995)[1] |
The siege of Srebrenica (
In July 1995, Srebrenica fell to the combined forces of the
Background
At the outbreak of the war, eastern Bosnia, a Bosniak-majority territory before the war,[11] was subjected to ethnic cleansing operations and numerous atrocities involving murder, rape on a massive scale, plundering, and forced relocation by Serb forces and paramilitary gangs.[12][2] Taking place throughout the municipalities of Srebrenica, Vlasenica, Rogatica, Bratunac, Višegrad, Zvornik and Foča,[13] the purpose of these operations was to create in eastern Bosnia a contiguous Serb-controlled land having a common border with Serbia.[5] Located in the heart of what Bosnian Serbs considered their territory, Srebrenica was seized by the paramilitary Serb Volunteer Guard (Serbian: Srpska dobrovoljačka garda, or SDG)[2] on 18 April 1992. According to a witness, "organized killings of the Muslim population began" on 21 April. On 6 May, a two-day battle between Serb and Muslim forces erupted in the town.[14] Naser Orić, a one-time member of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and former bodyguard of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, then assumed control of Srebrenica after helping local Bosniak forces drive the SDG and other Serb paramilitary units from the town[15] by 8 May. Goran Zekić, the leader of the Serb population in the municipality, was killed in the fighting. In June, the Muslim population of Srebrenica established a local "war council". By December 1992, they had managed to gain control of up to 95 percent of the Srebrenica municipality and half of the neighbouring Bratunac municipality.[14] By this time, Orić's forces had established a sixty-kilometer-long Bosniak enclave which stretched from Žepa in the south to the village of Kamenica in the north,[15] however only to be surrounded and in dire need of food by February 1993[16] while the population of the enclave grew to almost 40,000 as refugees from the surrounding ethnically cleansed towns and villages sought refuge in the town.[2] Indeed, most of the enclave's residents were not originally from Srebrenica, but from all around eastern Bosnia or Podrinje.[17]
Siege
In the words of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY):[18]
Between April 1992 and March 1993, the town of Srebrenica and the villages in the area held by Bosniaks were constantly subjected to Serb military assaults, including artillery attacks, sniper fire, as well as occasional bombing from aircraft. Each onslaught followed a similar pattern. Serb soldiers and paramilitaries surrounded a Bosniak village or hamlet, called upon the population to surrender their weapons, and then began with indiscriminate shelling and shooting. In most cases, they then entered the village or hamlet, expelled or killed the population, who offered no significant resistance, and destroyed their homes. During this period, Srebrenica was subjected to indiscriminate shelling from all directions on a daily basis. Potočari in particular was a daily target for Serb artillery and infantry because it was a sensitive point in the defence line around Srebrenica. Other Bosniak settlements were routinely attacked as well. All this resulted in a great number of refugees and casualties.
In his ICTY testimony, VRS Intelligence Chief Momir Nikolić recounted how Bosnian Serb forces were instructed to make life in Srebrenica unbearable in order to induce its civilian population to "leave en masse as soon as possible, realizing they cannot survive there." As part of this, Nikolić conceded that civilians were targeted and humanitarian aid blocked while fuel, food and other supplies for UN peacekeepers were halted so that "they could not be ready for combat".[19]
While the Bosnian Serbs enjoyed military superiority, they were outnumbered by the Bosniaks who adopted a type of guerrilla warfare, which in the second half of 1992 and up to early 1993 was quite successful.
In January 1993, ARBiH soldiers
The VRS shelled Srebrenica on 12 April 1993, killing at least 56 people and wounding 73.[30] Within weeks, the town's population swelled from 9,000 to 40,000 as Bosniak refugees fled from the surrounding countryside.[19] However, neither this counterattack nor the United Nations' designation of the town as a "safe area" ended Orić's raids against neighbouring Serb villages, which persisted at a rate of 3–4 per week as Bosniak forces searched for food to steal from the surrounding countryside. As a result, the VRS warned the UN peacekeeping units in Srebrenica that Bosnian Serb forces would retaliate against the town's civilian population if Bosniak forces continued attacking Serb villages.[19] The situation in Srebrenica subsequently worsened, with the refugees and townspeople running out of food and water. Despite this, the VRS only occasionally permitted humanitarian aid to the besieged town.[31] In one instance, the VRS permitted the evacuation of about 5,000 Bosniak women and children from Srebrenica. During these evacuations, six children were crushed to death while clambering to board a bus destined for Tuzla.[32] Afterwards, the VRS made an offer that would allow the UN to send in any number of trucks and buses into the enclave to evacuate its Bosniak population. However, this offer was rejected by many in the United Nations, the United States and the Bosnian government, who claimed that arranging an evacuation would "assist the process of ethnic cleansing." [31][32]
In 1994, the
Bosniak raids from the town intensified in the beginning of 1995, with Orić's forces being ordered by the ARBiH to "reconnoiter, disrupt, divert and demoralize" VRS soldiers, who subsequently retaliated with counterattacks of their own.[19] In March 1995, Radovan Karadžić, President of the Republika Srpska, issued Directive 7, setting out the long-term strategy for VRS forces surrounding Srebrenica and Žepa. The aim of the VRS was to be to "complete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Žepa as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two enclaves. By planned and well thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica."[36] During this time, Orić ordered the murder of many political opponents[37] and profited from smuggling supplies on the black market.[38][37] At night, his men would break out from the enclave and participate in illicit trade with Bosnian Serb villagers and would also often loot the Serb countryside.[38]
In the last two weeks of June, a VRS unit was ambushed twenty kilometers northwest of the Srebrenica enclave. By this time Orić had already been transferred to the Bosniak-held town of Tuzla,[19] ostensibly to participate in a "command training" exercise.[39] He was replaced by his deputy, Major Ramiz Bećirović,[40] who had been seriously injured in a helicopter crash two months earlier and was barely able to walk.[41] Orić's departure effectively left Srebrenica without effective leadership.[37] Despite this, ARBiH headquarters ordered another attack against Bosnian Serb units on the Sarajevo-Zvornik road for the evening of 25–26 June. With a force of 150 men, Bosniak forces inflicted forty casualties VRS casualties and seized weapons, radios and livestock.[19] Mladić then contacted the UN headquarters in Sarajevo and indicated that he would no longer tolerate Bosniak incursions into the Bosnian Serb countryside.[31] Bosnian Serb forces retaliated by shelling Srebrenica, prompting the Bosniaks to respond that the VRS was again shelling a UN safe area.[19]
In contrast to Srebrenica, the peacekeeping unit in Žepa managed to safely evacuate over 10'000 civilians, who were spared the fate of those in Srebrenica.
Fall of Srebrenica
Operation Krivaja '95
Operation Krivaja '95 Oпeрaциja Криваја '95 | ||||||||
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Part of the Bosnian War | ||||||||
A map depicting the capture of Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces | ||||||||
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Belligerents | ||||||||
Army of Republika Srpska Serb Volunteer Guard Scorpions paramilitary unit Police, volunteers and paramilitaries from Yugoslavia Greek volunteers Russian volunteers | Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) |
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Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
Ratko Mladić Radislav Krstić Zdravko Tolimir Milenko Živanović Milorad Pelemiš | Ramiz Bećirović |
Thomas Karremans | ||||||
Strength | ||||||||
1,500–2,000 soldiers 200–300 volunteers 100 volunteers | 6,000 soldiers | 270 peacekeepers | ||||||
Casualties and losses | ||||||||
Unknown | More than 8,000 civilians dead and 35,632 evacuated | 1 peacekeeper killed, hundreds taken hostage |
Operation Krivaja '95 (Serbian: Oпeрaциja Криваја '95, Bosnian: Operacija Krivaja '95) was the codename of a military operation launched by the VRS against formations of the ARBIH in the UN enclave of Srebrenica. Launched on 6 July 1995, the operation ended the three-year-long siege of the town and was followed by the Srebrenica massacre, which has been ruled a crime of genocide by international courts of law.
In late-June 1995, Ratko Mladić made the decision to launch an attack on Srebrenica, which evidence indicates was always part of his long-term strategy.[19] However, the Serbs did not expect Srebrenica to be an easy conquest.[19] With 100 members of the Greek Volunteer Guard,[42] together with 2,000–3,000 reinforcements and 200–300 members of the Serb Volunteer Guard, the Bosnian Serbs could hardly muster 4,000–5,000 men for the offensives against Srebrenica and Žepa. Of these, it was estimated that only 2,000 would take part in the thrust to capture Srebrenica in July 1995.[43] The Bosniaks, not as well-armed as their opponents, had a military force of 6,000 men within the town, about one-third or one-half of whom were armed.[44] 1,500 of these were professional soldiers and 1,500 were armed militiamen.[38] Also in the town were the 570 lightly-armed peacekeepers of the Dutch battalion (DUTCHBAT).[45]
On 2 July,
At midday on 11 July, Dutch NATO planes arrived from Italy and struck a Bosnian Serb tank,[49] before being forced to cease operations after General Mladić threatened to "destroy" both the Dutch soldiers and the Bosniak population of Srebrenica unless airstrikes were called off.[52] That afternoon, Mladić, accompanied by General Živanović (then Commander of the Drina Corps), General Krstić (then Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps) and other Bosnian Serb officers, took a triumphant walk through the deserted streets of the town of Srebrenica. The moment was captured on film by Serbian journalist Zoran Petrović Piroćanac.[53] Mladić posed for television cameras, before declaring that Srebrenica had been "returned forever to the Serbs." Later, Thom Karremans, the commander of the Dutch troops in the town, drank a toast with Mladić which was filmed for Serb television. Off-camera, however, Mladić warned Karremans that the UN compound in Potočari, where thousands of Bosniak refugees had gathered, would be shelled by the VRS if NATO planes reappeared.[45]
Aftermath
Srebrenica massacre
On 12 July, buses began arriving to take Bosniak women and children to Bosniak-held territory while Dutch troops helped Bosnian Serb forces in separating all men from the ages of 15 to 65. Some of the men were killed or beaten on the spot, while women were raped.[54]
The fall of the town was followed by a massacre of prisoners taken by the VRS forces and civilian refugees who had been handed over to the VRS by Dutchbat troops after they had sought shelter on the Dutchbat base at Potočari. The ICTY Trial Chamber was satisfied that the total number executed was likely to have been within the range of 7,000 to 8,000. The bodies were disposed of in unmarked mass graves which were subsequently reopened and the contents mingled and relocated. The killings and their concealment, carried out in an organised and systematic manner, were subsequently confirmed by the ICTY to have been a crime of genocide pursuant to the United Nations
For example, on 14 July 1995, prisoners from Bratunac were bussed northward to a school in the village of Pilica, north of Zvornik. As at other detention facilities, there was no food or water and several men died in the school gym from heat and dehydration. The men were held at the Pilica school for two nights. On 16 July 1995, following a now familiar pattern, the men were called out of the school and loaded onto buses with their hands tied behind their backs. They were then driven to the Branjevo Military Farm, where groups of 10 were lined up and shot systematically.[56]
One of the survivors recalled:
When they opened fire, I threw myself on the ground ... And one man fell on my head. I think that he was killed on the spot. And I could feel the hot blood pouring over me ... I could hear one man crying for help. He was begging them to kill him. And they simply said "Let him suffer. We'll kill him later."
— Witness Q [56]
Dražen Erdemović – who confessed to killing at least 70 Bosniaks – was a member of the VRS 10th Sabotage Detachment (a Main Staff subordinate unit) and participated in the mass execution. Erdemović appeared as a prosecution witness and testified: "The men in front of us were ordered to turn their backs. When those men turned their backs to us, we shot at them. We were given orders to shoot."[56]
Erdemović said that all but one of the victims wore civilian clothes and that, except for one person who tried to escape, they offered no resistance before being shot. Sometimes the executioners were particularly cruel. When some of the soldiers recognised acquaintances from Srebrenica, they beat and humiliated them before killing them. Erdemović had to persuade his fellow soldiers to stop using a machine gun for the killings; while it mortally wounded the prisoners it did not cause death immediately and prolonged their suffering.
There were no survivors to explain exactly what had happened in the Dom Kultura.[56] Over a year later, it was still possible to find physical evidence of this atrocity. As in Kravica, many traces of blood, hair and body tissue were found in the building, with cartridges and shells littered throughout the two storeys.[56] It could also be established that explosives and machine guns had been used. Human remains and personal possessions were found under the stage, where blood had dripped down through the floorboards.
Čančari Road 12 was the site of the re-interment of at least 174 bodies, moved here from the mass grave at the Branjevo Military Farm.[56] Only 43 were complete sets of remains, most of which established that death had taken place as there result of rifle fire. Of the 313 various body parts found, 145 displayed gunshot wounds of a severity likely to prove fatal.[57]
Casualties
After the Bosnian War, the Bosnian Book of the Dead documented 9,377 violent deaths amongst citizens of Srebrenica municipality (combatants and civilians) of all ethnicities that occurred in the Srebrenica municipality from 1992 to 1995.[58] The RDC established that at least 5,233 Bosnian-Muslim civilians were killed in Srebrenica during the war.[23] Most estimates put the number of Bosniak men and boys killed in the July 1995 massacre at more than 8,000;[54] the list of Bosniaks killed during this period compiled by the Bosnian Federal Commission of Missing Persons contains 8,372 names.[5] In 2003, Serbs comprised 95 percent of the population of the Srebrenica municipality.[59]
The Bosnian Book of the Dead, Part I, page 173-174 clarifies:
"In 1995, 9,726 persons were killed, out of which 9,022 Bosniaks, and of that number, 8,594 were killed in July 1995. According to the data we have compiled, in the period from 11 July 1995 until 31 July 1995, which can be related to the fall of the UN Safe Zone of Srebrenica and the mass killings of civilians and prisoners of war, that occurred after the fall of Srebrenica, 8,331 persons were killed in total. Of those, 5,113 were from Srebrenica, 1,766 from Bratunac, 900 from Vlasenica, 437 from Zvornik and 115 from Rogatica/Žepa. Out of these 8,372 persons, 1,416 were soldiers."[60]
Indictments and trials
At his trial, VRS General Radislav Krstić was found by the ICTY to have been the person primarily directing Krivaja '95 from 6 July onward, at least until the arrival of Ratko Mladić on 9 July. The ICTY determined that the initial objective of Krivaja '95 had been to "reduce the United Nations-protected safe area of Srebrenica to its urban core" as a step towards "the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosniak population into a humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminating the enclave", and that after the surrounding area had fallen the VRS forces were then ordered to take the town itself. The ICTY found Krstić guilty of participating in two criminal plans, initially to ethnically cleanse the Srebrenica enclave of all Bosniak civilians and later to kill the military-aged men of Srebrenica. He was found guilty of murder, persecutions and aiding and abetting genocide.[55]
On 31 May 2007, Zdravko Tolimir, a long-time fugitive and a former general in the VRS indicted by the Prosecutor of the ICTY on genocide charges relating to Srebrenica was arrested.[61] On 12 December 2012, Tolimir was convicted of genocide and sentenced to life imprisonment.[62] In May 2011, VRS General Ratko Mladić was arrested in a village in northern Serbia by three special units of the Serbian security forces.[63] The next year, his trial began before the ICTY in The Hague on charges relating to his participation as VRS commander in the criminal conspiracy to perpetrate the Srebrenica genocide.[64]
In 2010, seven high level VRS commanders were convicted of various crimes related to the genocide in Srebrenica including,
In 2016,
Momir Nikolić, who served as Assistant Chief of Security and Intelligence for the Bratunac Brigade, Drina Corp of the VRS, pleaded guilty for crimes against humanity in front of the ICTY and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Together with another former VRS soldier who pleaded guilty, Dražen Erdemović, he testified in front of the ICTY against Karadžić, Mladić and Beara, providing valuable information about the execution and timeline of the massacre.[66]
Finally, on 22 November 2017, general
Bosniak commander Naser Orić was arrested by
Notes
- ^ Research and Documentation Center, "Human Losses in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995 Part I, pp. 173–174. | http://www.mnemos.ba/en/home/Download
- ^ a b c d e Alvarez 2010, p. 141.
- ^ a b c Klip & Sluiter 2005, p. 601.
- ^ Nalepa 2012, p. 334.
- ^ a b c Mojzes 2011, p. 178.
- ^ a b Ramet 2006, p. 382.
- ^ a b Ramet 2006, p. 428.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 427.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 429.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 433.
- ^ Hoare 2010, p. 125.
- ^ Leydesdorff 2011, p. xi.
- ^ Nowak 1998, p. 107.
- ^ a b Yamashita 2004, p. 87.
- ^ a b c Ingrao 2012, p. 217.
- ^ Proctor & Smith 2013, p. 125.
- ^ Acquaviva et al. 2011, p. 206.
- ^ a b c ICTY & 30 June 2006, p. 39.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Ingrao 2012, p. 218.
- ^ Wagner 2008, p. 29.
- ^ a b Acquaviva et al. 2011, p. 218.
- ^ a b Ingrao 2012, pp. 217–218.
- ^ a b RDC 2013.
- ^ "The Myth of Bratunac: A Blatant Numbers Game". Research and Documentation Center. Archived from the original on 8 May 2009. Retrieved 22 December 2010.
- ^ Ingrao 2012, p. 128.
- ^ Shawcross 2002, p. 97.
- ^ Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 179.
- ^ Mojzes 2011, p. 180.
- ^ Nettelfield 2010, p. 78.
- ^ Yamashita 2004, p. 88.
- ^ a b c Mojzes 2011, p. 179.
- ^ a b Rohde 1998, p. 46.
- ^ Nettelfield 2010, p. 80.
- ^ Ingrao 2012, p. 216.
- ^ Ingrao 2012, pp. 216–217.
- ^ Nettelfield 2010, p. 79.
- ^ a b c Schindler 2007, p. 229.
- ^ a b c Heidenrich 2001, p. 170.
- ^ Schindler 2007, p. 223.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 331.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 352.
- ^ Smith & 5 January 2003.
- ^ Ingrao 2013, p. 218.
- ^ CIA 2002, p. 321.
- ^ a b c d e f Naimark 2011, p. 3.
- ^ CNN & 11 July 1995.
- ^ a b c Ingrao 2012, p. 219.
- ^ a b BBC & 17 May 2012.
- ^ a b Naimark 2011, p. 4.
- ^ Ingrao 2012, pp. 219–220.
- ^ Ingrao 2012, pp. 220–221.
- ^ Mojzes 2011, p. 181.
- ^ Dobbs & 24 January 2012.
- ^ a b Naimark 2011, p. 6.
- ^ a b ICTY & Radislav Krstić CIS.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j ICTY & 2 August 2001.
- ^ Manning & 16 May 2000, pp. 18–21.
- ^ Nalepa 2012, p. 336.
- ^ Bideleux & Jeffries 2006, pp. 387–388.
- ^ Research and Documentation Center, "Human Losses in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995 | http://www.mnemos.ba/en/home/Download
- ^ VOA & 1 June 2007.
- ^ BBC & 12 December 2012.
- ^ BBC & 26 May 2011.
- ^ ICTY & 16 December 2011.
- ^ The Hindu & 24 March 2016.
- ^ Sense Agency & 13 February 2012.
- ^ "UN hails conviction of Mladic, the 'epitome of evil,' a momentous victory for justice". UN News Centre. 22 November 2017. Retrieved 23 November 2017.
- ^ Owen Bowcott, Julian Borger (22 November 2017). "Ratko Mladić convicted of war crimes and genocide at UN tribunal". The Guardian. Event occurs at 11:00. Retrieved 23 November 2017.
- ^ Bideleux & Jeffries 2006, p. 387.
- ^ a b BBC & 30 June 2006.
- ^ SE Times & 4 July 2008.
References
- Books
- Acquaviva, Guido; Whiting, Alex; Cassese, Antonio; Fan, Mary (2011). International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary. ISBN 978-0-19-957678-4.
- Alvarez, Alex (2010). Genocidal Crimes. ISBN 978-0-203-92665-9.
- Bideleux, Robert; Jeffries, Ian (2006). The Balkans: A Post-Communist History. ISBN 978-0-203-96911-3.
- Burg, Steven L.; Shoup, Paul S. (1999). The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. ISBN 978-0-7656-3189-3.
- Central Intelligence Agency (2002). Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995. OCLC 50396958.
- Heidenrich, John G. (2001). How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen. ISBN 0-275-96987-8.
- ISBN 978-0-521-71616-1.
- Ingrao, Charles (2012). Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative. ISBN 978-1-55753-617-4.
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- Leydesdorff, Selma (2011). Surviving the Bosnian Genocide: The Women of Srebrenica Speak. ISBN 978-0-253-35669-7.
- Mojzes, Paul (2011). Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the 20th Century. ISBN 978-1-4422-0665-6.
- Naimark, Norman M. (2011). "Srebrenica in the History of Genocide: A Prologue". In Adler, Nanci Dale; Leydesdorff, Selma; ISBN 978-1-4128-1204-7.
- Nalepa, Monika (2012). "Reconciliation, Refugee Returns, and the Impact of International Justice: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina". In Williams, Melissa S.; Nagy, Rosemary; Elster, Jon (eds.). Transitional Justice. ISBN 978-0-8147-0497-4.
- Nettelfield, Lara J. (2010). Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ISBN 978-0-521-76380-6.
- Nowak, Manfred (1998). Post-War Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-90-411-1020-6.
- Proctor, James D.; Smith, David M. (2013). Geography and Ethics: Journeys in a Moral Terrain. ISBN 978-0-415-18969-9.
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- ISBN 978-0-8133-3533-9.
- Schindler, John R. (2007). Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad. Zenith Press. ISBN 978-1-61673-964-5.
- Shawcross, William (2002). Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict. New York, New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-74322-577-9.
- Wagner, Sarah E. (2008). To Know Where He Lies: DNA Technology and the Search for Srebrenica's Missing. ISBN 978-0-520-25575-3.
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- News articles
- "Bosnian Muslim guilty but freed". BBC. 30 June 2006.
- "Ratko Mladic arrested: Bosnia war crimes suspect held". BBC. 26 May 2011.
- "Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica". BBC. 17 May 2012.
- "Bosnian Serb Zdravko Tolimir convicted over Srebrenica". BBC. 12 December 2012.
- "1,500 Bosnian Serb troops overran the enclave of Srebrenica". CNN. 11 July 1995.
- "Radovan Karadzic sentenced to 40-year imprisonment for Srebrenica genocide, war crimes". The Hindu. 24 March 2016.
- Dobbs, Michael (24 January 2012). "What did we know— and when did we know it?". Foreign Policy.
- "Serbs angered by ICTY overturn of Oric conviction". SE Times. 4 July 2008.
- Smith, Helena (5 January 2003). "Greece faces shame of role in Serb massacre". The Guardian.
- "Bosnian Serb War Crimes Fugitive on His Way to the Hague". VOA. 1 June 2007.
- ICTY documents
- Manning, Dean (16 May 2000). "Srebrenica Investigation: Summary of Forensic Evidence – Execution Points and Mass Graves" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Archived from the original (PDF) on 1 March 2011.
- "Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić (Fourth Amended Indictment)" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 16 December 2011. IT-09-92-PT.
- "Prosecutor v. Naser Orić (Trial Judgment)" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 30 June 2006. IT-03-68-T.
- "Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (Trial Judgment)" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2 August 2001. IT-98-33-T.
- "Radislav Krstić – Case Information Sheet" (PDF). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. IT-98-33.
- Other documents and sources
- RDC (2013). "Pojedinačan popis broja ratnih žrtava u svim općinama BiH". Prometej.ba. Retrieved 4 August 2014.
- Sense Agency (13 February 2012). "Momir Nikolić: How 'Evil' in Srebrenica was Prepared". Retrieved 26 August 2017.