Operation Uzice
This article's factual accuracy is disputed. (June 2015) |
Operation Uzice | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of World War II in Yugoslavia | ||||||||
| ||||||||
Belligerents | ||||||||
September 27: |
September 27: Chetniks | |||||||
November 1 on: |
November 1 on: |
November 1 on: | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
Franz Böhme | Draža Mihailović | Josip Broz Tito | ||||||
Strength | ||||||||
Around 3,000 (a proportion of which did not participate)[2] | Around 20,000[1] | |||||||
Casualties and losses | ||||||||
Unknown | Unknown |
4,180 killed c. 3,800 missing c. 6,700 wounded[1] |
Operation Uzice was the first major counter-insurgency operation by the
After the offensive commenced on 20 September 1941, the Partisans initially received assistance from local
Background
Užice Uprising
On July 7, 1941, while Chetnik forces were still inactive,
By September 1941, after seeing the considerable success of the uprising, and observing its wide, and growing, support among the populace, the Chetniks realized that if they did not join the fight, they would likely forfeit their standing as the leaders of Serbian resistance.[5] On September 12, German intelligence reported that Chetnik units are taking up positions alongside the Partisans. Reporting on the events to the government-in-exile, Yugoslav politician Dr. Miloš Sekulić stated that the Chetnik resistance has a "defensive character", while the Partisans managed to unite elements of the Yugoslav people inclined toward active resistance.[6]
In mid-September 1941, Josip Broz Tito and the Partisan General Staff moved from Belgrade to the Užice Republic where the Partisans had by now formed 25 new military detachments.[7] A few days later on September 19, Tito met with Draža Mihailović in order to negotiate an alliance between Partisans and Chetniks, but they failed to reach an agreement. Tito was in favor of a joint full-scale offensive, while Mihailović considered a general uprising to be premature and dangerous, as he deemed it would trigger reprisals. Chetnik support for the rebellion was partial: of some 5,000–10,000 available men, the Chetniks fielded about 3,000 in the area, while an unknown proportion of these did not enter the fighting.[8]
German reaction
In the meantime, on 16 September 1941 Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel issued an order applying to all Europe to kill 50–100 hostages for every German soldier killed.[1] German commander Franz Böhme ordered Keitel's directive to be carried out in Serbia in the most drastic manner and that with no exception one hundred hostages would be executed for every German killed.[9] Invested by Hitler with total authority and told to "restore order for the longer term in the entire area by the most radical means", Böhme made it clear from the beginning that he intended if necessary to wage war against the whole Serbian population by considering all civilians as enemies.[10] He was also instructed to apply the order directive concerning the taking of hostages not just to attacks concerning German military personnel, but also ethnic Germans, Bulgarian military personnel, individuals in the service of the occupation authority, and eventually to members of the Serbian administration. Each act of insurgency was to be considered of "communist" origin. The German military declared Serbia a war zone, and villages began to be torched.[11] Ten German soldiers having been killed in a joint Partisan-Chetnik attack on Kraljevo, 1,700 hostages were shot on 20 October. Several other thousand hostages were executed during the following weeks in reprisals against the insurgents’ attacks.
Initial operations
To clear this territory, the German Army employed its
Chetnik attack
By the beginning of October, several small towns in Serbia were in the hands of Partisan or Chetnik groups. While distrustful of each other, Partisans and Chetniks started taking joint actions and besieging larger towns. Their respective commands were set in Užice and Požega, 15 km apart.[12] During October, all hopes of a continued cooperation were drained away in sporadic bickering and outright violations of agreements. During these weeks it also became obvious that, while the Partisan command had no doubts about continuing the struggle, the Chetniks were wavering and looking for a way of giving up the fight against the Germans and directing all their power against the Partisans. A process of polarization took place, taking several weeks and producing shifts in loyalties. The Chetnik detachments of Rev. Vlada Zečević and Lieutenant Ratko Martinović switched to the Partisans during this time.[13]
Tito and Mihailović met again on October 26 or 27, 1941 in the town of Brajići near Ravna Gora in a final attempt to achieve an understanding, but found consensus only on secondary issues.[14] Mihailović rejected principal points of Tito's proposal including the establishment of common headquarters, joint military actions against the Germans and quisling formations, establishment of a combined staff for the supply of troops, and the formation of national liberation committees.[15] Mihailović did not arrive at the meeting in good faith. The Chetnik command had already dispatched to Belgrade Colonel Branislav Pantić and Captain Nenad Mitrović, two of Mihailović's aides, where they contacted German intelligence officer Captain Josef Matl on October 28. They informed the Abwehr that they have been empowered by Colonel Mihailović to establish contact with Prime Minister Milan Nedić and the appropriate Wehrmacht command posts to inform them that the Colonel was willing to "place himself and his men at their disposal for fighting communism". The two representatives further gave the Germans their commander's guarantee for the "definitive clearing of communist bands in Serbian territory" and requested aid from the occupation forces in the form of "about 5,000 rifles, 350 machine guns, and 20 heavy machine guns".[16]
After more than a month of disagreements and minor collisions, the events culminated on November 1 in a massed Chetnik attack in and around the town of Užice where the Partisans had their headquarters. Apparently underestimating the Partisans' numbers, the Chetnik forces were quickly beaten back. Captain
Aftermath
Mihailović eventually realized that his force was unable to protect civilians against German reprisals.[18] The attitude of some of his officers had accelerated the breakup with the Partisans. Faced with indiscipline and a lack of ammunition, he soon found his troops decimated by the conflict with both Germans and Partisans.[20]
Following the defeat, Mihailović was left with greatly reduced troops. German Captain Josef Matl and Chetnik Colonel Branislav Pantić (one of two Chetnik delegates to the occupation authorities in Belgrade) arranged a meeting between Mihailović and German military intelligence (Abwehr) representatives. The meeting took place in the village of Divci on November 11, while the exact circumstances of the meeting remain controversial. There are indications that Mihailović offered to cease activities in the towns and along the major communication lines, but ultimately no agreement was reached at the time due to German demands for the complete surrender of the Chetniks.[21] After the negotiations, an attempt was made by the Germans to arrest Mihailović.[20] Mihailović's negotiations with the enemy were carefully kept secret from both the Partisans, the Yugoslav government-in-exile, and from the British and their representative Captain Hudson.
German forces and their allies advanced from the north and east towards Užice, and by the 2nd half of November the Partisan forces were in full retreat. On November 25, the final phase of the German offensive against both rebel groups began. Tito and Mihailović had one last phone conversation: Tito announced that he would defend his positions, while Mihailović said that he would disperse. Ultimately, on November 29, the Partisans, including their headquarters which were stationed there, left Užice.[18]
On December 10, a bounty was put on Mihailović's head, while he himself narrowly escaped capture.[22] Faced with the impact of the German offensive, Mihailović decided to temporarily disband most of his forces and keep only a small staff. The remnants of his Chetniks retreated to the hills of Ravna Gora, but were under German attack throughout December.[23]
Both Tito and Mihailović had suffered a heavy setback. Tito had been surprised by the scale of the uprising, and had found himself managing inexperienced peasant fighters who were reluctant to move away from their towns, or to accept authority and indoctrination. Mihailović had also been unable to impose discipline on his officers, and had not received sufficient help from the British.[20]
After leaving Užice, the Partisans headed for Sandžak, into Italian-occupied territory. Some detachments failed to retreat on time and were dispersed or destroyed. After the main Partisan forces left for Sandžak, only parts of five Partisan detachments were present in Serbia.[7]
See also
- World War II in Yugoslavia
- Seven enemy offensives
- Resistance during World War II
- Anti-partisan operations in World War II
Notes
- ^ ISBN 0-7137-1922-2
- ^ a b Tomasevich (1975)
- ^ Tomasevich (1975), pp.145–155
- ^ Johnson, C.A. (1962) Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937–1945, Stanford University Press, California, pp.159–169
- ^ a b Tomasevich (1975), p. 135
- ^ Tomasevich (1975), p. 136
- ^ Yugoslav Lexicographical Institute. 1980.
- ^ Tomasevich (1975), p.142
- ^ Roberts (1973), pp.31–32
- ^ Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann, War Of Extermination: The German Military In World War II, Berghahn Books, 2004, pp.43–45
- ^ Pavlowitch (2008), p.60
- ^ Pavlowitch (2008), pp. 61–62
- ^ Tomasevich (1975), p. 141
- ^ Pavlowitch (2008), p. 62
- ^ Ramet (2006), p. 143
- ^ Tomasevich (1975), p. 148
- ^ Roberts (1973), pp. 34–35
- ^ a b c Pavlowitch (2008), p. 63
- ^ Eds. (1995) Tito's Victory: Theory into reality (Washington DC : National Defense University)
- ^ a b c Pavlowitch (2008), p. 65
- ^ Branko Miljuš, La Révolution yougoslave, L'Âge d'homme, 1982, p. 119
- ^ Pavlowitch (2008), pp. 65–66
- ^ Roberts (1973), pp. 37–38
References
- Beckett I.F.W. (ed., 1988) The Roots of Counter-Insurgency, Blandford Press, London. ISBN 0-7137-1922-2
- Cohen, Philip J.; Riesman, David (1996). Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 0-89096-760-1.
- Hoare, Marko Attila (2006). Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks 1941–1943. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19726-380-1.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (2008). Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-1-85065-895-5.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2004. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0271016299.
- Shepherd, Ben (2012). Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-04891-1.
- Roberts, Walter R. (1973). Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941–1945. Rutgers University Press. ISBN 9780813507408.
- Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks. Vol. 1. San Francisco: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-0857-6.