Operation Trio
Operation Trio | ||||||||
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Part of World War II in Yugoslavia | ||||||||
Tito and the main force of the Partisans withdrew into the Zelengora ("green mountain") mountains to escape the Axis offensive | ||||||||
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Belligerents | ||||||||
Chetniks (East Bosnian) | Partisans | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
Units involved | ||||||||
| Unknown |
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Strength | ||||||||
around 4,000 men[2] | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | ||||||||
11 killed 15 wounded 1 missing 220 killed 556 wounded 173 missing 82 killed 149 wounded 121 missing[3] Unknown number of Sandžak Chetniks |
74 killed 102 wounded 3 missing[3] |
1,646 killed 719 wounded 2,626 captured (259 executed)[3] many defected to Chetniks |
Operation Trio (
Operation Trio consisted of two parts, Trio I and Trio II. Together they comprised one element of the Axis effort known as the Third Enemy Offensive (Serbo-Croatian Latin: Treća neprijateljska ofenziva) in post-war Yugoslav historiography. The joint Italian-Chetnik offensive in Montenegro and eastern Herzegovina formed the other element. The Third Enemy Offensive forms part of the Seven Enemy Offensives framework in Yugoslav historiography.
The operation was of limited effectiveness due to several factors, including preemptive action by the Ustaše militia and Italian delays. The area of operations straddled the
Operation Trio coincided with and contributed to the polarisation of the almost exclusively Serb rebels in eastern Bosnia into two groups: the Serb-chauvinist Chetniks and the multi-ethnic and communist-led Partisans. Encouraged by Chetnik propaganda against
Background
Foča Republic
During
Insurgent forces
At the end of 1941, there were six Partisan detachments in eastern Bosnia, with about 7,300 fighters operating in the
Both the Partisan Supreme Headquarters and the Partisan General Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina were based in the area of operations, with Tito's supreme headquarters directly controlling the
In early January 1942, the Partisan Supreme Headquarters decided to permit fighters who were not willing to formally become Partisans to fight alongside Partisan units. These "volunteer detachments" were under the control of the supreme headquarters of the renamed People's Liberation Partisan and Volunteer Army of Yugoslavia, and were established from former Chetnik-aligned fighters as the
In February 1942, Major Jezdimir Dangić and other former Royal Yugoslav Army officers (many of whom had allegiance to the Serbian puppet regime of Milan Nedić or Draža Mihailović) entered eastern Bosnia from occupied Serbia, where some of them had withdrawn to avoid Operation Southeast Croatia. They started to re-form Chetnik units in eastern Bosnia and began agitating against the Partisans on a "conservative, Serb-nationalist and anti-Muslim basis".[12] Other Chetnik units crossed into eastern Bosnia from occupied Serbia and attacked the Partisans. They included the "Chetnik Proletarian Shock Brigade", a unit of 200 fighters under Captain Dragoslav Račić,[13] and another group under Captain Milorad Momčilović.[12]
The Partisan forces in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina initially consisted almost entirely of Serb peasants, and this made much of the rank and file of both Partisan and volunteer detachments highly susceptible to pro-Chetnik agitation, accommodations with Chetnik forces in the local area and hostility towards non-Serbs. The Partisan moves towards multi-ethnic recruiting,
The 2nd Proletarian Brigade was formed at Čajniče on 1 March from Partisan forces that had withdrawn from occupied Serbia after Operation Uzice.[15] In early March the Partisans began collecting the most loyal fighters from each Partisan detachment into "shock companies" and established structures for the development of "shock battalions" and "shock brigades".[15] At the same time, Partisan forces that had been dispersed by Operation Southeast Croatia were threatening the Tuzla-Doboj railway line.[16] In mid-March the 1st East Bosnian Shock Battalion was established at Srednje (outside Sarajevo), and by the end of the month the 2nd East Bosnian Shock Battalion had been established in Drinjača (near Zvornik);[17] it incorporated the remaining 240 fighters of the Majevica Partisan Detachment.[18]
The concentration of the most reliable fighters into proletarian brigades, shock battalions and shock companies weakened the integrity of the four remaining Partisan detachments in eastern Bosnia, but enabled the Partisan Supreme Headquarters to concentrate its best forces in mobile units to undertake successful offensive operations against the Chetniks. They captured several towns in March, including Vlasenica and Srebrenica.[19] Partisan operations were threatening the railway network throughout eastern Bosnia, including around Sarajevo, by the end of March.[16] Many Bosnian Chetniks deserted to the Partisans, often joining as complete units under their previous Chetnik commanders. These former Chetnik units became units of the "Volunteer Army", which reached a strength of around 7,000–8,000 fighters by the end of March. Their loyalty and military value to the Partisans was very limited.[20]
On 25 March the Partisan General Staff of Serbia advised the Partisan Supreme Headquarters that the Serbian Partisan movement had been "extinguished", largely as a result of Operation Uzice and subsequent operations by the German occupation forces and their Serb collaborators. This was a significant setback for the Partisan cause, as Tito had always considered that a return to Serbia was a necessary ingredient for a successful revolution.[21]
Planning
Planning for Operation Trio and the associated
Detailed planning and orders for Operation Trio were finalised at a conference in
Significant delays in finalising arrangements for Operation Trio were caused by disagreements regarding where it would commence, who would be in command, the involvement of Chetniks and NDH forces, how to deal with the demarcation line between the German and Italian zones of occupation, and what local authorities would be put in place as localities were cleared of insurgents. The NDH contributed to the mutual suspicion between the Germans and Italians. The Italian demands prevailed, because they were committing larger forces to the operation.[24] The decision was ultimately made to target all insurgents in eastern Bosnia between Sarajevo and the Drina. Throughout the preparation for Operation Trio, the Italians looked for opportunities to cross over the demarcation line and expand their sphere of influence into eastern Bosnia to take advantage of German weakness in the NDH. Bader's final orders for the operation granted several key Italian demands, including military control over civil affairs in the area of operations, fair treatment of the local population,[25] and treating non-resisting Chetniks as prisoners of war.[26]
Bader was named tactical commander of the combined forces (known as
The original planned start date of 15 April was pushed back when the Italians had problems moving to their start positions and later had trouble providing transport to establish
In early April, Dangić travelled to
After several months of increasing tension between the factions struggling for power within the insurgency, the first of the pro-Chetnik coups occurred, in the Ozren Partisan Detachment. It was sparked by the arrest and execution on 18 April of pro-Chetnik agitator Bogdan Jovićić by Vukmanović-Tempo and the newly formed 1st East Bosnian Shock Battalion. Fighting ensued between pro-Chetnik members of the detachment and the shock battalion. Vukmanović-Tempo then abandoned the Ozren Partisan Detachment, taking the detachment staff and remaining loyal Partisans with him.[35]
Operation
On 18 April, Bader informed Roatta of the need to take action immediately to relieve the besieged Croatian garrison at
More pro-Chetnik coups occurred in the second half of April. The first was in one of the remaining battalions of the Romanija Partisan Detachment, followed by all three battalions of the Zvijezda Partisan Detachment. The political commissars of every company were killed. By the start of May, coups had also occurred in battalions of the Kalinovik Partisan Detachment and the Foča Volunteer Detachment.[41]
On 8–9 May 1942, another pro-Chetnik coup occurred in the recently created Zenica Partisan Detachment, and about 30 communists and their supporters were killed. About 100 remaining Partisan fighters from the Ozren and Zenica detachments were incorporated into the 3rd East Bosnian Shock Battalion.[18]
The Italians believed the German-NDH preliminary operation had been designed to avoid the need to involve the Italians in clearing eastern Bosnia, thereby preventing them from expanding their sphere of influence. The second phase of the operation (known as Trio II or "Operation Foča") commenced on 7 May, and was a fairly minor joint operation to capture Foča and Kalinovik, but by then the Partisan Supreme Headquarters and main force had already evacuated Foča, which was captured on 10 May. After Italian complaints and political manoeuvrings, Roatta took over direct control of the operation on that day, but the fighting was already over.[37][36] Despite their attempts to avoid fighting, the Partisans suffered significant losses.[42]
Aftermath
After clearing the larger towns of the Birač region of Partisans and Chetniks, the Black Legion committed large-scale atrocities against Serbs and Jews in the region, including massacring about 890 people from Vlasenica after raping the women and girls.[31][43]
Along with the three East Bosnian shock battalions, the Partisan General Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina first attempted to cross the Bosna to follow the Partisan Supreme Headquarters and main force to western Bosnia, but instead retreated to Birač, where they joined forces with the Birač Detachment at the end of May.[18] The Birač Partisan Detachment was the only Partisan or volunteer detachment in East Bosnia not to suffer a pro-Chetnik coup in March–May 1942.[41] By June–July 1942, the Partisans in eastern Bosnia had been reduced to a strength of around 600 fighters.[12]
In mid-May, Operation Trio was followed by the joint
After Operation Trio and the joint Italian-Chetnik offensive, the Partisans formed three more proletarian brigades, consisting mainly of Montenegrins. Operation Trio contributed to the decision of the Partisan Supreme Headquarters to withdraw to western Bosnia in the Partisan Long March, which commenced in late June 1942.[45]
While incurring significant casualties fighting the Black Legion, the Chetnik movement in eastern Bosnia benefited from the mass desertion of Partisans and the many pro-Chetnik coups in Partisan and volunteer detachments. Despite their lack of unity, the Chetnik movement thrived in eastern Bosnia for the remainder of 1942 because some Chetnik leaders made accommodations with the Ustaše regime and as many Chetniks and Partisans were unwilling to kill fellow Bosnian Serbs of the opposing faction.[46]
See also
- Anti-partisan operations in World War II
- Resistance during World War II
Footnotes
- ^ Rodogno 2006, p. 310.
- ^ Milazzo 1975, p. 69.
- ^ a b c Rodogno 2006, p. 442.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 186–188.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 208.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 83.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 159.
- ^ Hehn 1971, p. 350; Pavlowitch 2002, p. 141, official name of the occupied territory.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 185.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 192–195.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 181–183.
- ^ a b c d Tomasevich 1975, p. 161.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 199.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 196–201.
- ^ a b Hoare 2006, p. 165.
- ^ a b Shepherd 2012, p. 171.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 190–191.
- ^ a b c Hoare 2006, pp. 235–236.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 202.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 183–184.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 233.
- ^ Tomasevich 2001, p. 414.
- ^ a b Rodogno 2006, pp. 310–311.
- ^ Virtue 2011, p. 20.
- ^ Virtue 2011, pp. 22–23.
- ^ a b c Pavlowitch 2008, pp. 118–119.
- ^ Thomas & Mikulan 1995, p. 12.
- ^ Herzstein 1988, p. 68.
- ^ Shepherd 2012, p. 172.
- ^ a b Virtue 2011, p. 24.
- ^ a b Hoare 2006, p. 203.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 208.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 210.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 96 & 209.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 205–206.
- ^ a b c Burgwyn 2013, p. 115.
- ^ a b Virtue 2011, pp. 25–27.
- ^ Shepherd 2012, p. 175.
- ^ Shepherd 2012, pp. 173–175.
- ^ Geografski institut JNA 1952, p. 12.
- ^ a b Hoare 2006, p. 207.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2008, p. 119.
- S2CID 189395814.
- ^ Pavlowitch 2008, p. 124.
- ^ Hoare 2006, p. 234.
- ^ Hoare 2006, pp. 290–295.
References
Books
- ISBN 978-1-936274-30-7.
- Geografski institut JNA (1952). "Neprijateljska Ofanziva u Istočnoj Bosni, Crnoj Gori i Hercegovini (od 20 Aprila do Sredine Juna 1942 godine)" [Enemy offensive in eastern Bosnia, Montenegro and Herzegovina (from 20 April to mid-June 1942)]. Istorijski atlas oslobodilačkog rata naroda Jugoslavije [Historical Atlas of the Yugoslav Peoples Liberation War]. Belgrade, Yugoslavia: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA [Military History Institute of the JNA].
- Hehn, Paul N. (1979). The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerillas in World War II. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Herzstein, Robert Edwin (1988). Waldheim: The Missing Years. New York: Arbor House. ISBN 0-87795-959-5.
- ISBN 0-19726-380-1.
- Milazzo, Matteo J. (1975). The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-1589-8.
- ISBN 978-1-85065-476-6.
- Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (2008). Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-1-85065-895-5.
- Rodogno, Davide (2006). Fascism's European Empire. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-52184-515-7.
- ISBN 978-0-674-04891-1.
- Thomas, Nigel; Mikulan, Krunoslav (1995). Axis Forces in Yugoslavia 1941–45. New York: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-473-3.
- ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
- Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Vol. 2. San Francisco: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-3615-2.
Articles
- Hehn, Paul N. (1971). "Serbia, Croatia and Germany 1941–1945: Civil War and Revolution in the Balkans". Canadian Slavonic Papers. 13 (4). Toronto: University of Alberta: 344–373. ISSN 0008-5006. Retrieved 8 April 2012.
- Virtue, Nicolas Gladstone (2011). "Occupation Duty In The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Italian Second Army And Its Allies In The Balkans, 1941–43". Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. 14 (1). Calgary: Centre of Military and Strategic Studies: 344–373. ISSN 1488-559X.
Further reading
- ISBN 1-92963-135-9.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2004. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-271-01629-9.