History of Guatemala: Difference between revisions

The earliest human settlements in Guatemala date back to the

In Monte Alto near

This lasted until around 900 AD, when the Classic Maya civilization collapsed. The Maya abandoned many of the cities of the central lowlands or were killed off by a drought-induced famine.^[14] Scientists debate the cause of the Classic Maya Collapse, but gaining currency is the Drought Theory discovered by physical scientists studying lakebeds, ancient pollen, and other tangible evidence.^[15]

Conquest era

Second-in-command to

Guatemala gained independence from

Guatemala's "Liberal Revolution" came in 1871 under the leadership of Justo Rufino Barrios, who worked to modernize the country, improve trade, and introduce new crops and manufacturing. During this era coffee became an important crop for Guatemala. Barrios had ambitions of reuniting Central America and took the country to war in an unsuccessful attempt to attain this, losing his life on the battlefield in 1885 against forces in El Salvador.

Early 20th century

The U.S.

In a highly popular move, the pair of officers then stepped aside and made way for a general election. This started what is called The Ten Years of Spring, a period of free speech and political activity, proposed land reform, and a perception that great progress could be made in Guatemala. A civilian president, Juan José Arévalo, was elected in 1945 and held the presidency until 1951. A former professor, he brought about social reforms, allowing new political parties and unions (with some restrictions), which placated the public.

Arana and Arbenz, still both highly regarded at the time, anticipated to soon succeed Arévalo. Arana tried to prematurely hasten the process of Arévalo's descent in a failed coup which brought about Arana's death in a controversial arrest-gone-wrong. This cleared the way for Arbenz to secure power; as he did in a landslide general election in 1951. Arbenz together with Arévalo further promoted the progressive social change that characterized the latter's presidency, clearing much of the old restrictions on political parties and labour unions, while also purging the army brass of its remaining pro-Arana officers—one of whom was Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas; a man who would play a major role in Guatemalan politics in the coming years. Arbenz also permitted the Communist Guatemalan Party of Labour to achieve legal status in 1952. The party subsequently gained a noticeable role in the government decision-making process that it had not had before.

Ethnic Conflict “The quest for democracy had united them, but the definition of democracy would divide them.”

The first demonstration of ethnic conflict occurred on October 22, 1944, just two days after Ponce’s demise. Violence occurred at a small town called Patzicia, where about one thousand Indians rose in spontaneous outbursts: “in honor of our General Ponce,” and “we want land.” More than twenty ladinos were killed during this demonstration. When the Junta learned about this, it reacted swiftly. They dispatched soldiers and what happened next could only be described as a “bloodbath.” At least nine hundred Indians were killed and it did not matter whether they were women, children or men. The Chief of Staff of the Guatemalan army described his actions as an “act of warning throughout the Republic for any disorders of this nature.”

The conflict in the countryside from 1952-1954 between the Ladinos and Indians was not a new occurrence, but rather a continuation of a dilemma fueled by a complicated mix of class, regional, political, and ethnic differences since the colonial times. It originated from the exploitation of cheap Indian labour which was justified by a variety of derogatory myths concerning Indian capacity for change, work, and accepting civic responsibilities.

The small cases of ethnic conflict in rural Guatemala between 1944 and 1952 started an intense response among the Ladino elite for increased vigilance in rural areas, the denial of rights recently won through the revolution to Indians, and the frequent use of the military and violence to suppress the most minor sign of simmering unrest. This fear of ethnic conflict, of violent Indian uprising inspired by the relaxation of centuries of vigilance, helps explain Ladino reaction to the rather reasonable reforms of the revolution. It was this fear, among many other elements, that helped prompt the overthrow of the revolution in 1954.

This article in general is written from a perspective that fails to recognize the plights and contributions of the Guatemalan Indians. They were often displayed as members of communism however this was not the case. The book "I, Rigoberta Menchu" details the struggles of the Indians. After having land stolen they endured many years of further land theft, horrible torture and rape of their women. This was at the hands of the government. They worked for pennies and even those were stolen by landowners. They watched their children die of malnutrition and sickness in the fincas. They eventually rose up in an attempt to regain their rights; but their story is not told here. It is suggested that anyone with further knowledge on these matters contributes to the article.

Agrarian Reform and UFCo Conflict

In 1953 when the Agrarian Reform was put into practice, one of the largest U.S. companies, the United Fruit Company, had lost 250,000 out of 350,000 manzanas. According to the decree 900 this land had to be taken and redistributed for the agricultural purposes, mainly to the peasant communities and the natives. What remaining land UFCo held was thousands of acres in pastures as well as substantial forest reserves. The Guatemalan government had offered a Q 609,572 in compensation for the rest of the taken land.

The company fought the land expropriation and made a number of arguments. The first one attacked the wording of the Law. The Agrarian Reform Law focused on land development and agriculture, therefore anything in pasture, specified forest cover and cultivated land was to be left untouched by the expropriators. The company argued that most of the land that was taken from them was in fact cultivated and in use. So they claimed it was illegal to take it away. The second argument they had was against the amount of land taken and unsatisfactory compensation offered in comparison. The value of rural property was based on self-declared assessment for the tax purposes. Arevalo’s administration had called for new assessments in 1945, which had to be complete by 1948. UFCo had submitted the assessment by the due date; however when the Agrarian Reform was implemented the company declared that they want the value of its property changed. The government had investigated in 1951, but new assessment was never complete. UFCo used that to say that 1948 assessment was outdated and claimed its land value was a lot greater. They had estimated it as high as Q 15,854,849, which was almost twenty times more than what the Guatemalan government had offered.

As a result U.S. State Department and the embassy actively began to support of UFCo. The Guatemalan government had to fight the pressure because although U.S. had recognized, in words, that Guatemala had the right to conduct their own politics and business, U.S. representatives also claimed that they had to interfere because UFCo was their company that had brought in a lot of profit and harming the interests of that company was harming the U.S. economy. Arbenz did not have much choice except either to yield or to fight back. His administration explained that in order for Guatemala to improve its economy the Agrarian Reform was necessary, therefore Arbenz claimed he would adopt policies for a nationalist economic development if necessary. He argued that all foreign investment would be subject to Guatemalan laws. Arbenz was firm in promoting the Agrarian Reform and within a couple of years had acted quickly. He claimed that Guatemalan government was not prepared to make an exception for U.S. concerning decree 900.

Because Arbenz could not be pressured to take into consideration the arguments made to prevent expropriation from UFCo, his government was undermined with propaganda. For U.S. the national security was also highly important. They had combined both political and economic interests. The fear of allowing communist practices in Guatemala was shared by the urban elite and middle classes. All the papers, such as El Imparcial, were organized to critique communism and especially the government’s acceptance of it. The opposing political parties organized anticommunism campaigns. Thousands of people were present at the periodic rallies and the membership in anticommunist organizations had grown steadily. Another group that criticized the government was the church. Despite the warning that constitutionally the church was not allowed to interfere with the politics, the church paper Accion social cristiana published articles. One of them was against PGT, a faction Arbenz was attempting to support. The leader of the PGT Jose Fortuny was compared to the devil. The campaign against the communism was exaggerated. Arbenz’ government was attempting to be neutral; however constant pressure eventually had led him to rely more heavily on more dedicated reformers in revolutionary organizations.

In government, although Arbenz had attempted to appoint various representatives into cabinet, eventually the moderate representatives had were forces out of the leading positions. There had been a radicalization in major government parties. Those who thought that revolution was an effort to bring about electoral democracy and economic and social reforms either resigned or could not maintain their place in the parties. Some of these moderates who were forced out of the parties had complained that communists were taking over their positions. The propaganda was highly influential because even other Central America countries had concerns about the communism. The public opinion, the U.S. journalists and politicians, was leaning more towards the U.S. interference. By 1952 ‘Liberation army’, had invaded several towns in Oriente. Any attempt to appeal to the United Nation to stop the U.S. invasion had failed. By the June of 1954 Arbenz had resigned.

Operation PBSUCCESS

Main article

Operation PBSUCCESS

The Communist Party was never the center of the Communist movement in Guatemala until

After Jacobo Arbenz came to power in 1951, he extended political freedom, allowing Communists in Guatemala to participate in politics. This move by Arbenz let many opponents in Ubico’s regime to recognize themselves as Communists. By 1952, Arbenz supported a land reform, and took unused agricultural land, about 225,000 acres (910 km²), from owners who had large properties, and made it available to rural workers and farmers. These lands were to be taken from the United Fruit Company with compensation; however, the UFC believed the compensation was not enough. Meantime, Arbenz allowed the Communist Party to organize and include leaders notably his adviser who were leftist. The propaganda effort that was led by United Fruit Company against the revolution in Guatemala persuaded the U.S. government to fight against communism in Guatemala. The United States clutched on small details to prove the existence of widespread Communism in Guatemala. The Eisenhower administration at the time in the U.S. were not happy about the Arbenz government, they considered Arbenz to be too close to Communism; there have been reports that Arbenz’s wife was a Communist and part of the Communist Party in Guatemala. Even though it was impossible for the U.S. to gather evidence and information about Guatemala’s relations to the Soviet Union, Americans wanted to believe that Communism existed in Guatemala. Many groups of Guatemalan exiles were armed and trained by the CIA, and commanded by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas they invaded Guatemala on June 18, 1954. The Americans called it an Anti-Communist Coup against Arbenz. The coup was supported by CIA radio broadcasts and so the Guatemalan army refused to resist the coup, Arbenz was forced to resign. In 1954 a military government replaced Arbenz' government and disbanded the legislature and they arrested communist leaders, Castillo Armas became president.

Arbenz was elected without a secret ballot. He considered himself a communist and joined the Communist Party in 1957. His land reform, designed by the Communist Party, was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, which he then purged. His regime openly praised Stalin, relied on the communists for key decisions, and received arms from the Soviet bloc.^[17] He killed hundreds of his opponents.^[18] The CIA intervened because it feared that a communist dictatorship would become a Soviet beachhead in the Western Hemisphere.^[19]

Arbenz proceeded to nationalize and redistribute un-utilized land owned by the

1976 Guatemala earthquake

Civil war

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Main article Guatemalan Civil War

The Guatemalan Civil War (1960–96) involved the government, right-wing paramilitary organizations, and left-wing insurgents. A variety of factors contributed: social and economic injustice and racism against the indigenous population, the 1954 coup which reversed reforms, weak civilian control of the military, Marxist ideology advocating violent revolution instead of democratic participation and reform, the United States support of the government, and Cuban support of the insurgents. The Historical Clarification Commission (commonly known as the "Truth Commission") after the war estimated that more than 200,000 people were killed — the vast majority of whom were civilian indigenous people. 93% of the human rights abuses reported to the Commission were attributed to the military or other government-supported actors.[2] It also determined that in several instances the government was responsible for acts of genocide.^[22]

In response to the increasingly autocratic rule of Gen.

Shortly after President Julio César Méndez Montenegro took office in 1966, the army launched a major counterinsurgency campaign that largely broke up the guerrilla movement in the countryside. The guerrillas then concentrated their attacks in Guatemala City, where they assassinated many leading figures, including U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein in 1968. Méndez Montenegro was the only civilian to head Guatemala until the inauguration of Vinicio Cerezo in 1986.

On March 23, 1982, army troops commanded by junior officers staged a

Ríos Montt was by this time a lay pastor in the evangelical Protestant

Guerrilla forces and their leftist allies denounced Ríos Montt who sought to defeat the guerrillas with military actions and economic reforms; in his words, "rifles and beans". In May 1982, the Conference of Catholic Bishops accused Ríos Montt of responsibility for growing militarization of the country and for continuing military massacres of civilians. An army officer was quoted in the

The government began to form local civilian defense patrols (PACs). Participation was in theory voluntary, but in practice, many rural Guatemalan men (including young boys and the elderly), especially in the northwest, had no choice but to join either the PACs or be tarred as guerrillas. At their peak, the PACs are estimated to have included 1 million conscripts. Ríos Montt's conscript army and PACs recaptured essentially all guerrilla territory — guerrilla activity lessened and was largely limited to hit-and-run operations. However, Ríos Montt won this partial victory at an enormous cost in civilian deaths.

Ríos Montt's brief presidency was probably the most violent period of the 36-year internal conflict, which resulted in thousands of deaths of mostly unarmed indigenous civilians. Although leftist guerrillas and right-wing death squads also engaged in summary executions, forced disappearances, and torture of noncombatants, the vast majority of human rights violations were carried out by the Guatemalan military and the PACs they controlled. The internal conflict is described in great detail in the reports of the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) and the Archbishop's Office for Human Rights (ODHAG). The CEH estimates that government forces were responsible for 93% of the violations; ODHAG earlier estimated that government forces were responsible for 80%.

On August 8, 1983, Ríos Montt was deposed by his own Minister of Defense, General

, won the first election held under the new constitution with almost 70% of the vote, and took office on January 14, 1986.

1986 to 1996: from constitution to peace accords

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Upon its inauguration in January 1986, President Cerezo's civilian government announced that its top priorities would be to end the political violence and establish the rule of law. Reforms included new laws of

amparo

(court-ordered protection), the creation of a legislative human rights committee, and the establishment in 1987 of the Office of Human Rights Ombudsman. The Supreme Court also embarked on a series of reforms to fight corruption and improve legal system efficiency.

With Cerezo's election, the military moved away from governing and returned to the more traditional role of providing internal security, specifically by fighting armed insurgents. The first two years of Cerezo's administration were characterized by a stable economy and a marked decrease in political violence. Dissatisfied military personnel made two coup attempts in May 1988 and May 1989, but military leadership supported the constitutional order. The government was heavily criticized for its unwillingness to investigate or prosecute cases of human rights violations.

The final two years of Cerezo's government also were marked by a failing economy, strikes, protest marches, and allegations of widespread corruption. The government's inability to deal with many of the nation's problems — such as infant mortality, illiteracy, deficient health and social services, and rising levels of violence — contributed to popular discontent.

Presidential and congressional elections were held on November 11, 1990. After a runoff ballot,

Congress

, Serrano entered into a tenuous alliance with the Christian Democrats and the National Union of the Center (UCN).

The Serrano administration's record was mixed. It had some success in consolidating

On June 5, 1993, Congress, pursuant to the 1985 constitution, elected the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro de León Carpio, to complete Serrano's presidential term. De León was not a member of any political party; lacking a political base but with strong popular support, he launched an ambitious anticorruption campaign to "purify" Congress and the Supreme Court, demanding the resignations of all members of the two bodies.

Despite considerable congressional resistance, presidential and popular pressure led to a November 1993 agreement brokered by the Catholic Church between the administration and Congress. This package of constitutional reforms was approved by popular referendum on January 30, 1994. In August 1994, a new Congress was elected to complete the unexpired term. Controlled by the anti-corruption parties — the populist

President Portillo pledged to maintain strong ties to the United States, further enhance Guatemala's growing cooperation with Mexico, and participate actively in the integration process in Central America and the Western Hemisphere. Domestically, he vowed to support continued liberalization of the economy, increase investment in human capital and infrastructure, establish an independent central bank, and increase revenue by stricter enforcement of tax collections rather than increasing taxation. Portillo also promised to continue the peace process, appoint a civilian defense minister, reform the armed forces, replace the military presidential security service with a civilian one, and strengthen protection of human rights. He appointed a pluralist cabinet, including indigenous members and others not affiliated with the FRG ruling party.

Progress in carrying out Portillo's reform agenda during his first year in office was slow. As a result, public support for the government sank to nearly record lows by early 2001. Although the administration made progress on such issues as taking state responsibility for past human rights cases and supporting human rights in international fora, it failed to show significant advances on combating impunity in past human rights cases, military reforms, a fiscal pact to help finance peace implementation, and legislation to increase political participation.

Faced with a high crime rate, a public corruption problem, often violent harassment and intimidation by unknown assailants of human rights activists, judicial workers, journalists, and witnesses in human rights trials, the government began serious attempts in 2001 to open a national dialogue to discuss the considerable challenges facing the country.

In July 2003, the

On November 9, 2003, Óscar Berger, a former mayor of Guatemala city, won the presidential election with 38.8% of the vote. However, because he failed to achieve a fifty percent majority, he won a runoff election on December 28, defeating the center-left candidate Álvaro Colom. Ríos Montt trailed a distant third with just 11%.

In early October 2005, Guatemala was devastated by Hurricane Stan, a relatively weak storm that triggered a flooding disaster that left at least 1,500 people dead.

The 2007 presidential election was won by the centre-left Álvaro Colóm.

See also

• History of the Americas
• History of Central America
• History of Latin America
• History of North America
• History of the west coast of North America
• List of Presidents of Guatemala
• Politics of Guatemala
• Spanish colonization of the Americas

Notes