Army Service Forces
Army Service Forces | |
---|---|
Active | 9 March 1942 – 11 June 1946 |
Country | United States |
Branch | United States Army |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders |
The Army Service Forces was one of the three autonomous components of the
For most of its existence, the Army Service Forces was commanded by General
Six supply arms and services became part of the new organization: the
The service commands were the field agencies of the ASF. There were initially nine of these, each responsible for a different geographical region. In August 1942 the
Origins
By late 1941, there was dissatisfaction with the existing structure of the
The agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff could be divided into five groups:
- The Washington, DC. This was divided into five divisions, each with its own Assistant Chief of Staff. There were also three deputy chiefs of staff, one each for supply, administration and the air. The Deputy Chief for Air was also the chief of the AAF.[3]
- The two major commands, the AAF and GHQ. These were responsible for the preparation and training of air and ground combat units respectively. GHQ was also responsible for the defense of the continental United States, which was conducted through four defense commands,[4] the Central, Eastern, Southern and Western, which had been formed on 17 May 1941.[5] GHQ had been set up with the idea that it would command the forces overseas, as had occurred in World War I, but by early 1942 it was apparent that World War II would be fought in many theaters. The Chief of Staff was the chief of the WDGS and the commanding general of GHQ, but the two were quite separate entities.[1]
- The chiefs of the combat arms, service arms and administrative bureaus. These were located in Washington, DC, and had responsibility for training schools and the development of doctrine.[3]
- There were four armies that controlled the combat troops located in the United States, and nine corps areas that provided them with services and managed most military posts. In late 1941 the corps areas were engaged in the task of inducting civilians and mobilization of the Army.[3]
- There were also some miscellaneous installations, such as the United States Military Academy, United States Army Command and General Staff College and the ports of embarkation.[3]
The
Marshall called his staff together for a meeting on 3 February 1942, where he explained the new organization that he was considering. He wanted no more than three commands reporting to him, so everything which did not fit into the
The new organization was ordered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 28 February 1942 by Executive Order Number 9082 "Reorganizing the Army and the War Department".[9] Details were provided in War Department Circular No. 59, dated 2 March, and the new organization was publicly announced by the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, in a press release that day. It went into effect on 9 March, and Somervell assumed command of the United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS).[10] The Services of Supply was renamed the Army Service Forces (ASF) on 12 March 1943, as it was felt that the term "supply" did not accurately describe its broad range of activities.[11]
Insignia
According to the website of the U.S. Army
Organization
Staff divisions
The Army Service Forces brought together elements of five different components of the Army: elements of the War Department General Staff, especially its G-4 component; the Office of the Under Secretary of War; the eight administrative bureaus; the nine corps areas, which became the service commands; and the six supply arms and services, which became known as the technical services. Somervell commanded the Army Service Forces for most of its existence.[13] For most of the war, Styer was his chief of staff. He left for the Pacific on 18 April 1945, and was succeeded by Major General LeRoy Lutes.[14] In the directive that created the USASOS, Somervell created the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Resources, which was initially filled by Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay. He was responsible for the development of the Army Supply Program, the operation of the Lend-Lease program, and liaison with the War Production Board concerning the allocation of raw materials.[13] He was succeeded by Howard Bruce on 27 November 1944.[15]
Somervell organized his staff along functional lines, with divisions for requirements, resources, procurement, distribution, defense aid, operations, personnel, training and finance. This lasted just eight days before the procurement and distribution divisions were combined.[13] The requirements, resources and production divisions were placed under Clay in April 1942. In July 1942, new divisions were created production and purchases, but in December the production and resources divisions were merged. A renegotiating division was created in August 1943 to renegotiate contracts, and a Readjustment Division in November 1943 to handle the termination of contracts. The Defense Aid Division was renamed the International Division in April 1942. Its role was to ensure that supplies earmarked for use by Allied nations were shipped. From 1943 on it also became involved in the distribution of civil affairs and military government supplies.[16]
The Operations Division was headed by LeRoy Lutes. In July 1942 he became the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, with the Operations Division (renamed the Plans Division) and Distribution Branch (upgraded to a staff division) assigned to him. In August a strategic planning division was added.[17] By July 1942 there were sixteen staff divisions, but only nine officers reporting directly to Somervell. The title of "assistant chief of staff" was replaced by "director" in May 1943. There were now six directors, for personnel, training, operations, materiel, finance and administration.[18] Later that year, the Distribution (renamed Stock Control), Storage and the Maintenance Divisions were grouped together under a Director of Supply, Major General Frank A. Heileman.[17]
The position of Director of Administration was created in May 1943, with responsibility for the
Technical Services
When the Services of Supply was formed on 9 March 1942, six supply arms and services became part of the new organization: the
A seventh technical service, the
-
Lieutenant General Levin H. Campbell Jr., Chief of Ordnance
-
Lieutenant General Edmund B. Gregory, Quartermaster General
-
Major General Charles P. Gross, Chief of Transportation
-
Major General Harry C. Ingles, Chief Signal Officer
-
Major General William N. Porter, Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service
-
Major General Norman T. Kirk, Surgeon General
-
Lieutenant General Eugene Reybold, Chief of Engineers
Each technical service had a chief based in Washington, DC, with a large staff, and field installations scattered across the country.
The chiefs of the technical services were all
The technical services developed military equipment, manufactured or purchased it, stored it in depots, maintained and repaired it, and issued it to the troops.[23] Each had its own budget, and together they accounted for half of the Army's appropriations. With installations in many Congressional districts, they had strong political support in the United States Congress.[33] The internal organizations of the technical services were determined by their chiefs. The Medical Department, Corps of Engineers, Chemical Warfare Service and Transportation Corps were organized along functional lines, whereas the Ordnance Department was organized along commodity lines; the Signal Corps and Quartermaster Corps used a combination of both.[34] ASF adjudicated jurisdictional disputes between the technical services,[27] but the chiefs had Army-wide technical authority and supervision responsibilities. ASF therefore functioned as a coordinating command.[35] Some standardization did result from the creation of ASF. ASF laid down certain principles of organization in the 1942 Services of Supply Organization Manual, and the ASF staff divisions pressed the technical services to adopt structures similar to that of ASF headquarters, as having this simplified their own work practices. However, with the exception the Transportation Corps, the technical services resisted this, as their organizational structures had evolved to suit their individual needs.[36]
This was especially true of the way in which they organized their field installations, which reported directly to the office of their respective chief. These included procurement districts, supply depots, ports, arsenals and schools. Only the Ordnance Department had its own manufacturing plants, known as government-owned, government-operated (GOGO) plants to distinguished them from government owned, privately operated enterprises. There were 73 of these, of which 21 were for
Service Commands
On 4 June 1920, the National Defense Act of 1920 abolished the old territorial divisions and replaced them with nine corps areas. Each had roughly the same population in 1920, and the idea was that each would control at least one division each of the Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserve.[38] The corps areas became responsible for defending the United States against invasion by Canada or Mexico.[39] The corps areas did not work out as well as hoped. During the 1920s and 1930s, many installations, particularly those belonging to the supply arms and services, were exempted from their control; their tactical organization failed to materialize due to budget shortfalls; and the best maneuver areas were in the IV and VIII Corps Areas. In July 1940, the control of tactical forces was removed from the corps areas with the creation of General Headquarters, United States Army, leaving the corps areas with administrative responsibilities only.[38]
The corps areas were renamed service commands on 10 July 1942. The new title reflected their status as administrative and supply agencies. Somervell saw them fulfilling the role of field agencies of the ASF. Army installations in the continental United States were divided into four categories. Class I installations were ASF installations, which were placed directly under the service commands; Class II installations were posts and stations of the Army Ground Forces; Class III installations were Army Air Forces bases; and Class IV installations were those which, on account of their technical nature, remained under the direct command of a chief of a technical or administrative service. These included the GOGO manufacturing plants, proving grounds, procurement offices and the ports of embarkation. Class I installations included recruiting stations, induction and reception centers, repair shops,
The boundaries of the service commands and the location of their headquarters were not changed, and they remained the same throughout the war with one exception. The
The idea of a unified command of many arms and services was a familiar one to Army officers—the division was an expression of the concept—but it had not been applied to the continental United States before. With the creation of GHQ in 1940, the command of an Army post had become separated from that of the combat units stationed there, who became tenants of a Class II installation.[43] At a Class II installation, there was a post commander who was responsible to the commanding general of the service command in which it was located. His job was to provide services to the AGF units stationed there. The principle was that the customer was always right, so the post commander complied with requests from the AGF units there. The increasingly stringent manpower situation from 1943 on meant that sometimes the post commander had to ask the AGF units for assistance.[44]
The technical services generally regarded their work as so specialized that it could only be carried out by dedicated field installations over which they had complete control. From the beginning, many procurement and storage installations were exempted from their control, becoming Class IV installations, and Gross successfully argued the case for the staging areas and ports of embarkation to also be exempt.[43] On the other hand, there were many installations that had formerly been centrally controlled that now became Class I installations. These included the named general hospitals. To the ASF staff these were more Army posts with buildings to be maintained, staff and patients to be fed, and utilities to be provided. Sometimes there were even German and Italian prisoners of war to be guarded. The Surgeon General argued that these administrative tasks were incidental to the function of hospitals.[45]
The
Insignia | Service Command | Commander | Headquarters | Location | Personnel | Reference |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
First Service Command |
Major General Sherman Miles | Boston, Massachusetts |
Connecticut, New Hampshire. Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont | 31,246 | [47][48] | |
Second Service Command | Major General Thomas A. Terry | Governors Island, New York |
Delaware, New Jersey, New York | 50,749 | [47][49] | |
Third Service Command | Major General Philip Hayes |
Baltimore, Maryland |
District of Columbia (until August 1942), Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia | 60,548 | [41][47][50] | |
Fourth Service Command | Major General William Bryden (until 15 January 1944); Major General Frederick Uhl (until 10 June 1945); Major General Edward H. Brooks |
Atlanta, Georgia |
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina | 175,166 | [47][51] | |
Fifth Service Command |
Major General Daniel Van Voorhis (until 2 July 1943); Major General Fred C. Wallace (until 2 December 1943); Major General James L. Collins |
Columbus, Ohio | Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia | 42,600 | [47][52] | |
Sixth Service Command |
Major General George Grunert (until September 1942); Major General Henry Aurand (until November 1944); Major General Russell Reynolds (until 23 May 1945); Major General David McCoach Jr. |
Chicago, Illinois |
Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan | 42,050 | [47][53] | |
Seventh Service Command |
Major General Frederick Uhl (until 10 January 1944); Major General Clarence Danielson |
Omaha, Nebraska | Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Wyoming, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota | 76,530 | [47][54] | |
Eighth Service Command | Major General Walton H. Walker |
Dallas, Texas |
Colorado, Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma | 147,952 | [47][55] | |
Ninth Service Command | Major General Kenyon Joyce (until 11 October 1943); Major General David McCoach Jr. (until 1 September 1944);Major General William Shedd |
Fort Douglas, Utah |
Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington | 106,991 | [47][56] | |
Military District of Washington | Major General John T. Lewis (until 6 September 1944); Major General Charles F. Thompson |
Washington, DC |
Washington, DC, Arlington County, Virginia | 18,079 | [41][47] | |
Northwest Service Command | Brigadier General James A. O'Connor (until 20 February 1944); Brigadier General Ludson D. Worsham (until 6 May 1944); Colonel Frederick S. Strong Jr. (until 30 June 1945) |
Whitehorse, Yukon Territory |
Alaska, British Columbia, Yukon Territory | [41][47] |
Operations
Although he had an Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, on the WDGS, it was to Somervell and the staff of ASF that Marshall turned to for advice on logistical matters, and it was Somervell who would attend the important wartime conferences.[57] Logistics and strategy were interdependent; no strategic plan could be put into effect without due consideration of the logistical constraints. The ASF identified four major influences of logistics on strategy:
- The availability of supplies and resources in the United States at the time of the operation;
- Shipping and transport capacity in the United States;
- The capacity of the beaches and ports in the theater of operations, and the ability to move supplies from them to the combat areas; and
- The enemy's ability to interfere with the logistical support.[58]
Sledgehammer
The most important strategic decision of the war was to concentrate on the war in Europe against Germany rather than the Pacific War against Japan. This made sound logistical sense: the distance across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom was half that across the Pacific to Australia, the largest ports in the United States were on the Atlantic coast, most of the industry was located in the northeast, and the railway network was oriented to the movement of goods there. This meant that forces could be deployed to the UK much faster than to the Pacific. Resources were not adequate to permit simultaneous action in both in 1942, so the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to build up the forces in the UK. This activity up was codenamed Operation Bolero.[58][59]
Action was desirable to relieve the pressure on Britain and the Soviet Union. Bolero was to be followed by an emergency assault across the English Channel in the event of indications of a sudden German or Soviet collapse in 1942, codenamed Operation Sledgehammer, and a major one in 1943, codenamed Operation Roundup. Roundup required a million American troops to be moved to the UK by the 1 April 1943 target date. The ASF staff determined that the major constraints were the availability of shipping in the United States, and the capacity of British ports to handle the volume of cargo. The War Shipping Administration agreed to provide 70 to 100 sailings in June, July and August 1942 to take advantage of the long Summer daylight hours in the UK.[60]
Somervell also approached
The ability of the United States to conduct Sledgehammer and Roundup was hampered by a shortage of
Bolero
Chaos had resulted during World War I because the organization of the SOS in France was different from that of the War Department, and an important lesson of that war was the need for the theater SOS organization to parallel the one the United States.[65] Marshall and Somervell wanted it led by someone familiar with the SOS organization, and selected Major General John C. H. Lee, who had previously commanded the Pacific Ports of Embarkation in the United States. Each branch head in SOS headquarters was asked to nominate his best two men, one of whom was selected by Somervell and Lee for SOS-ETO headquarters, while the other remained in Washington.[66]
Somervell was disturbed by the proposed troop basis of the
That month, the War Production Board sent Somervell a report by the economist Simon Kuznets, which concluded that the purchasing agencies had been so preoccupied with placing contracts and expediting production of military goods that in the process they had exceeded the ability of the economy to produce them. The result of the uncontrolled purchasing would be widespread shortages of raw materials. Somervell and Patterson were skeptical, but agreed that setting unrealistic production targets was counterproductive. The matter was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who cut the military spending by $13 billion to $80 billion (equivalent to cutting by $192 billion to $1,180 billion in 2023). The planned strength of the Army was reduced by 300,000 and there practice of issuing only 50 percent of the equipment allowance of units in training was extended.[68]
North Africa
The increase in service troops in ETOUSA came too late. The flow of Bolero supplies overwhelmed the service units in the UK, and were stored in depots without proper markings, and without records being kept of what was in each depot. The result was that equipment required for Torch could not be located in time, and on 8 September Lee had to ask for it to be shipped from the United States. USASOS was unable to ship the requested 260,000 measurement tons (290,000 m3) of supplies in time, but with frantic efforts the technical services were able to ship 132,000 measurement tons (150,000 m3); another eight shiploads followed that would join convoys en route from the UK to North Africa.[69] The Western Task Force was loaded in the United States, at Norfolk and Newport News. By 27 September it was clear that the ports of Morocco could not handle the required stores, and the Navy could not provide escorts for multiple convoys. Given a choice between reducing the number of personnel or the number of vehicles, the latter option was chosen.[70]
The Torch landings went reasonably well, and the initial objectives were attained, but poor planning and execution, and stiff German and Italian resistance caused a drawn-out campaign, and the difficulty of shipping supplies mounted. In January 1943, the
The North African campaign raised new logistical concerns. One was the unanticipated requirement for civilian relief supplies. This was the responsibility of a civilian agency, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, but competition for shipping, port and transportation resources soon arose between military and civil requirements. It became apparent that civilian relief had to be at least a component of military planning. It was agreed that civil affairs would be a military responsibility for the first 90 days of a major operation, and a civilian section was added to ASF headquarters in July 1943. In November responsibility for civilian relief was transferred to the military.[73]
Another important development was the program for re-equipping the
China-Burma-India
Although the war against Germany had top priority, ASF did not neglect the war against Japan. After the Casablanca Conference, Somervell flew to
Somervell pressed the British for permission for American troops to take over the running of the Bengal and Assam Railway and the barge traffic on the Brahmaputra River. For a time, Marshall considered having Somervell replace Stilwell, with Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers taking over ASF. While happy for the Americans to take over the river traffic, the British at first balked at handing over control of the railway to the Americans, but agreed in October 1943. Somervell appointed Colonel Paul F. Yount, who had operated the Iranian railway to Tehran, to head it and arranged for additional construction equipment, engineer supplies and service troops to be sent to CBI.[78] By July, the railway had exceeded the 22,000 short tons (20,000 t) per month target set at the Quebec Conference for 1 January 1946. In August, 16,439 cars rolled along it, an average of 530 per day, compared with 327 in March. By September, the it was carrying 6,537 long tons (6,642 t) per day, and there was still ten percent capacity to spare.[79]
Shipping crisis
Somervell did not directly involve himself in the affairs of the ETO nearly as much, for fear that Eisenhower and Lee would resent it,[80] but in October 1944, a major shipping crisis developed that threatened to derail the global war effort. Inadequate port facilities created congestion at the ports in Europe, with ships left waiting for weeks to discharge. This was exacerbated by a similar crisis in the Southwest Pacific Area, also the result of a lack of port capacity. Lee insisted that the supplies the ships carried were required, and that use of ships as floating warehouses allowed him to meet critical requests from Eisenhower.[81]
By 20 October over 240 vessels were awaiting discharge in Northwest Europe, and Somervell informed Lee that he could expect no more ships carrying rations, vehicles or ammunition until he made headway with reducing the backlogs.[82] Somervell sent Clay to ETO to resolve problems at the port of Cherbourg,[83] and Brigadier General John M. Franklin, the Assistant Chief of Transportation for water transportation, to advise the ETO on improving turnaround time and developing more realistic estimates of port capacity.[82] He arrived in France on 28 October, and was appointed the Assistant Chief of Transportation of COMZ and ETOUSA.[84]
In November, he chairman of the
Somervell suggested cuts be made to the shipping allocated to the British import program, Lend-Lease shipments to the UK and Soviet Union, and to civilian relief. The WSA and the Maritime Commission opposed this, seeing no reason why civilians should have to tighten their belts due to the inability of American theater commanders to make efficient use of the shipping supplied to them. Somervell cancelled sailings to both ETO and SWPA. The crisis subsided after the opening of the port of Antwerp in November, but Somervell sent Gross to ETO the following month to advise on making better use of the available port capacity.[88]
Manhattan Project
ASF was also responsible for the
Groves reported to the Military Policy Committee, which consisted of Styer,
Abolished
On 30 August 1945, Marshall created a board head by Lieutenant General
Eisenhower succeeded Marshall as Chief of Staff on 19 November 1945,[96] and Somervell's retirement was announced on 26 December, effective 30 April 1946.[97] He was succeeded as commnder of ASF by Lutes on 1 January 1946.[98] On 13 May 1946, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9722, which amended Executive Order 9082, and gave the Secretary of War thirty days "to reassign to such agencies and officers of the War Department as he may deem appropriate the functions, duties, and powers heretofore assigned to the service of supply command and to the Commanding General, Services of Supply.[99] War Department Circular 138 abolishing ASF was issued the following day implementing the new organization, effective 11 June 1946.[100]
The Army Service Forces was successful in terms of the mission given to it by Marshall when it was created in March 1942: it relieved him of the burden of having large numbers of people reporting to him, and gave him a single person who could handle logistics. Much of the criticism of the ASF involved the personality of Somervell, but it was his energy, drive, and determination to achieve efficiencies that made the ASF the organization that it was.[97] In the new organization, Lutes became the Director of Service, Supply and Procurement on the WDGS. The position was later renamed the Director of Logistics. Procedures developed by the ASF remained in place. On 1 November 1948, the technical services were subordinated to the Director of Logistics, and the administrative services to the Director of Personnel and Administration.[101]
Notes
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 26.
- ^ a b c d Millett 1954, p. 21.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Conn, Engelman & Fairchild 1961, p. 28.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 28–29.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 29–31.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 32–34.
- ^ a b "Executive Order 9082 Reorganizing the Army and the War Department". The American Presidency Project. Retrieved 15 August 2021.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 1.
- ^ "Department of the Army Staff Support". United States Army Institute of Heraldry. Retrieved 16 August 2021.
- ^ a b c Millett 1954, pp. 338–339.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 339, 428.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 430.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 343–344.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 345–346.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 352.
- ^ a b c Millett 1954, p. 354.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 101–102.
- ^ Hewes 2005, p. 100.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 361.
- ^ a b c Millett 1954, pp. 297–298.
- ^ Wardlow 1951, pp. 50–55.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 298–299.
- ^ Wardlow 1951, pp. 62–65.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, p. 302.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 311.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 139, 371, 429.
- ^ Bland & Stevens 1996, pp. 9–10.
- ^ Green, Thomson & Roots 1955, p. 95.
- ^ Ohl 1994, p. 66.
- ^ Hewes 2005, p. 97.
- ^ Hewes 2005, p. 98.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 309.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 305.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 304–308.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 312–313.
- ^ Conn, Engelman & Fairchild 1961, p. 17.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 315.
- ^ a b c d Millett 1954, pp. 316–317.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 337.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 319–322.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 336.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 324–325.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 327–328.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Millett 1954, pp. 429–430.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 19.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 26.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 33.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 40.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 48.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 53.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 59.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 65.
- ^ Clay 2010, p. 74.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 138.
- ^ a b Lutes 1993, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 57–58.
- ^ a b c d Ohl 1994, pp. 181–183.
- ^ Lutes 1993, p. 35.
- ^ a b Ohl 1994, pp. 183–185.
- ^ Coll, Keith & Rosenthal 1958, pp. 360–365.
- ^ Coll, Keith & Rosenthal 1958, pp. 369–372, 376–379.
- ^ Waddell 1994, p. 4.
- ^ Ruppenthal 1953, pp. 33–37.
- ^ Ohl 1994, pp. 187–189.
- ^ Smith 1959, pp. 154–156.
- ^ Ohl 1994, pp. 190–192.
- ^ Lutes 1993, pp. 36–37.
- ^ a b Ohl 1994, pp. 192–193.
- ^ Lutes 1993, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Ohl 1994, pp. 194–195.
- ^ Leighton & Coakley 1954, p. 515.
- ^ Ohl 1994, pp. 195–196.
- ^ Viongras 1957, p. 167.
- ^ Ohl 1994, pp. 202–203.
- ^ a b Ohl 1994, pp. 216–221.
- ^ Romanus & Sunderland 1956, pp. 270–271.
- ^ Ohl 1994, p. 228.
- ^ Ohl 1994, pp. 231–233.
- ^ a b Ruppenthal 1959, pp. 128–130.
- ^ Ohl 1994, p. 232.
- ^ Wardlow 1951, pp. 287–289.
- ^ "4-590 Memorandum for General Somervell, November 22, 1944". George C. Marshall Foundation. Retrieved 3 June 2021.
- ^ Ballantine 1947, p. 240.
- ^ Ballantine 1947, p. 216.
- ^ Ohl 1994, pp. 233–234.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 37.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 42.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 74.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 77.
- ^ Jones 1985, p. 242.
- ^ Millett 1954, p. 47.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 421–425.
- ^ "Chronologies". Eisenhower Presidential Library. Retrieved 18 September 2021.
- ^ a b Millett 1954, pp. 417–419.
- ^ Lutes 1993, p. 277.
- ^ "Executive Order 9722—Reassignment of the Functions of the Service of Supply Command and the Commanding General, Services of Supply". The American Presidency Project. Retrieved 19 September 2021.
- ^ Hewes 2005, p. 158.
- ^ Millett 1954, pp. 425–427.
References
- Ballantine, Duncan S. (1947). U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. OCLC 1175973933.
- Bland, Larry I.; Stevens, Sharon Ritenour, eds. (1996). The Papers of George Catlett Marshall. Vol. 4, "Aggressive and Determined Leadership", June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved 14 September 2021.
- Clay, Steven E. (2010). US Army Order of Battle 1919–1941 (PDF). Vol. 1: The Arms: Major Commands and Infantry Organizations. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press. OCLC 637712205. Retrieved 16 September 2021.
- Coll, Blanche D.; Keith, Jean E.; Rosenthal, Herbert H. (1958). The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. OCLC 934025581. Retrieved 31 January 2020.
- Conn, Stetson; Engelman, Rose C.; Fairchild, Byron (1961). Guarding the United States and Its Outposts (PDF). Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Department of the Army. OCLC 1348044.
- Green, Constance McLaughlin; Thomson, Henry C.; Roots, Peter C. (1955). The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War (PDF). Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. OCLC 18105901. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
- Hewes, James E. Jr. (2005) [1975]. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963. Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific. OCLC 182881451.
- Jones, Vincent (1985). Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 10913875. Archived from the original(PDF) on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 25 August 2013.
- Leighton, Richard M.; Coakley, Robert W. (1954). Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943 (PDF). Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Retrieved 20 September 2021.
- OCLC 847595465. Retrieved 20 September 2021.
- OCLC 631289493.
- Ohl, John Kennedy (1994). Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in World War II. DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois Press. OCLC 1023086738.
- Romanus, Charles F.; Sunderland, Riley (1956). Stilwell's Command Problems (PDF). Washington, D. C: Center of Military History, United States Army. OCLC 1259571.
- Ruppenthal, Roland G. (1953). Logistical Support of the Armies (PDF). United States Army in World War II – The European Theater of Operations. Vol. I, May 1941 – September 1944. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army. OCLC 640653201.
- Ruppenthal, Roland G. (1959). Logistical Support of the Armies (PDF). United States Army in World War II – The European Theater of Operations. Vol. II, September 1944 – May 1945. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army. OCLC 8743709. Retrieved 6 March 2020.
- Smith, R. Elberton (1959). The Army and Economic Mobilization (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. OCLC 23225857.
- Viongras, Marcel (1957). Rearming the French (PDF). OCLC 1013190668. Retrieved 25 October 2015.
- Waddell, Steve R. (1994). United States Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign. Contributions in Military Studies, No. 155. Westport, Connecticut ; London: Greenwood Press. OCLC 467960939.
- Wardlow, Chester (1951). The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization and Operations (PDF). Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. OCLC 1580082. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
External links
- Bolin, Robert (1943). Army Service Forces, Organization Manual. U.S. Army Administrative Publications. Washington, D.C.: Army Service Forces, Department of the Army. OCLC 84408333.