Convoy HG 76
| Convoy HG 76 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Second World War | |||||||
 Map of the Bay of Biscay and the South-western Approaches | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
.svg){kind=small} Germany |
 United Kingdom | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Karl Dönitz |
Raymond Fitzmaurice Frederick Walker | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
Wolfpack Seeräuber 10 U-boats |
HG 76 32 merchant ships 24 escorts | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 5 U-boats destroyed |
2 merchant ships sunk 2 escorts sunk | ||||||
Convoy HG 76 (19 to 23 December 1941) was an
Two
Background
The attack on HG 76 was the last in a series of U-boat pack attacks on Gibraltar convoys which had started in the summer of 1941. Before this the
For the Allies the introduction of stable escort groups had created the conditions the development of convoy protection tactics, giving a measure of success in countering the wolf pack threat. It was recognised that air cover was needed to counter shadowing aircraft and to seek out approaching U-boats and for reinforcement to convoys under attack to provide sufficient ships to hunt U-boats to destruction rather than simply driving them off, as so often happened. The first requirement was met with the commissioning of HMS Audacity, the first in a series of merchant aircraft carriers, the second by reinforcing the escorts and by the formation of an Anti-Submarine Warfare force at Gibraltar, which would sweep ahead of a homeward bound convoy, to attack and destroy patrolling U-boats. The new measures had been introduced by the time Convoy HG 76 sailed.
Prelude
HMS Audacity
Audacity participated in the escort of Convoy OG 76 of twenty merchant ships, which sailed from Liverpool for Gibraltar on 31 October. The escort carrier embarked
On 8 November, Kampfgeschwader 40 (KG 40) sent six Focke-Wulf Condor aircraft to locate Convoy SL 91, bound for Liverpool from Freetown, Sierra Leone. Near noon, the radar on Audacity detected two of the Condors and a Martlet patrol was sent to intercept. One Condor escaped into a cloud but two Martlets caught the second, which shot down one Martlet before being shot down by the other Martlet. About three hours later, another Condor was shot down by a Martlet making a head-on attack and a fourth Condor escaped. KG 40 had lost a third of its operational aircraft and failed to direct any U-boats onto either convoy, Convoy OG 76 making a safe arrival at Gibraltar late on 11 November. The presence of Audacity was now known to KG 40 and to BdU.[2]
Convoy HG 76
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Convoy HG 76 comprised 32 ships homeward bound from
Seeräuber
Since August 1940, Dönitz had ended the practice of U-boats freelancing and sending only one report per day. U-boat commanders were ordered to signal whenever they found a convoy and shadow it rather than attack. The commander was to send short homing signals every thirty minutes, to guide other U-boats to the convoy. When the pack had assembled, Dönitz gave the order to attack, usually at night, so that the U-boats could fire their torpedoes on the surface. For the tactic to work, U-boats had to signal their positions to Dönitz at Kerneval (across the river from the submarine base at Lorient in Brittany).[7][a] Closer to land, when Condors on tracking patrol (Fühlungshalter) sighted a convoy, the wireless operator reported its position and course to the BdU and relays of Condors remained over the convoy.[9] When the pack had rendezvoused near the convoy, surface attacks would be made on successive nights, the U-boats withdrawing during the day.[10]
In mid December, BdU was informed that a convoy was assembling at Gibraltar. German agents in Algeciras, in neutral Spain, could see the harbour, without hindrance from the Spanish authorities. BdU began to assemble a patrol line, code-named Seeräuber (Pirate), preparatory to launching a pack attack. Seeräuber was an ad hoc group, as the previous Gruppe Steuben, had disbanded following a fruitless pursuit of southbound Convoy OS 12. Gruppe Seeräuber comprised seven U-boats; U-67 was already in position after a failed attack on Convoy OG 77; U-434 and U-574 from Gruppe Steuben had refuelled from a clandestine depot ship in Vigo harbour, U-127 and U-131 had arrived from Germany and U-107 and U-108 from bases in France. Five of the seven were Type IX boats, which Dönitz considered unsuitable for pack attacks and five of the seven crews were inexperienced, being on their first patrols.[11] The pack had orders to sink Audacity at all costs and was reinforced later by three more boats; U-108 sank a Portuguese freighter sailing independently on 14 December.[12]
Battle
14–15 December
Convoy HG 76 sailed from Gibraltar on 14 December 1941, in company with a small convoy bound for Cape Town and was reported almost immediately by German agents across the bay, who reported the composition, escort strength and departure time of the convoy; BdU was confused by an agent report that the convoy had returned to port. The first sightings of Convoy HG 76 were made by
16–18 December
At noon on 16 December, Convoy HG 76 was sighted and its position reported by a Focke-Wulf Condor of I/KG 40 patrolling from
On the night of 17/18 December, the U-boats attacked again but failed to torpedo any ships; U-107 was forced under water by Pentstemon and after a failed torpedo attack, U-67 was forced to retire by Convolvulus.[6] At 9:06 a.m. on 18 December, Stanley gained an Asdic contact at 6 nmi (11 km; 6.9 mi) and fifty depth charges were dropped by the escorts.[18] After thirty minutes U-434 surfaced and the crew abandoned ship just before it rolled over and sank, north of Madeira, 42 members of the crew being rescued and taken prisoner.[18] Before noon, the radar on Audacity indicated two aircraft and Martlets were scrambled to intercept but the guns on both aircraft jammed and the Condors escaped. The rest of the day was quiet but the Admiralty signalled that three more U-boats were en route.[18] In the early hours of 18/19 December, Stanley sighted U-574 astern at 4:00 a.m., sent a sighting report, was hit by a torpedo and blew up. Stork following behind, swung behind the stern of Stanley, gained an Asdic contact and dropped a pattern of depth charges, then turned after 0.5 nmi (0.93 km; 0.58 mi) to attack again.[19]
A U-boat shot to the surface 200 yd (180 m) ahead and a chase began; Walker tried to ram the U-boat but found that it could turn inside the turning circle of Stork, nearly as fast. The ship fired on the U-boat, illuminated it with snowflake Flares and managed to ram it just forward of the conning tower, scraping over the hull of the submarine. As the U-boat emerged from under the stern, depth charges set for shallow were dropped, blowing up the U-boat. The bows of Stork were crushed and bent sideways and the Asdic dome under the hull was smashed.Soon afterwards, U-108 torpedoed Ruckinge, which was abandoned and sunk later by Samphire. Focke-Wulf Condors arrived, one was shot down in another head-on attack and a second aircraft was damaged. When more Condors reached the convoy in the afternoon, a Martlet pilot made such a determined head-on attack that he collided with the Condor, destroying it and coming back with its aerial round his tail-wheel; the night of 18/19 December was quiet.[19]
19–21 December
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At 7:30 a.m., a Condor appeared to shadow the convoy and a Martlet chased it away before returning for lack of fuel. In the afternoon a Martlet spotted two U-boats and the convoy made an emergency turn. The U-boats were forced to submerge and Martlets patrolled overhead keeping them down for as long as their fuel lasted. It was so dark that the aircraft were guided to the flight deck with hand torches and again the night was quiet.[19] U-107 maintained contact and the wolf pack was joined by U-71, U-567 (commanded by the ace Engelbert Endrass) and U-751 from Bordeaux and the three original wolf pack boats U-67, U-107 and U-108 re-joined Seeräuber by 21 December.[6] On 21 December, 802 NAS was down to three operational Martlets, take-off and landing was dangerous in the heavy swell and the pilots were very tired. After the last patrol, the commander of Audacity ordered the ship out of the convoy 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi) to the starboard as usual but no escorts could be spared.[20] At 8:33 p.m. during the night of 21/22 December, a ship at the rear of the convoy was torpedoed by U-751 and nearby ships fired snowflakes, illuminating the area to both sides. U-567 saw the silhouette of Audacity at close range torpedoed it at 8:37 p.m.. As the carrier sank by the stern, two more torpedoes from U-751 hit it, a big explosion blew off the bows and the ship began to sink at the head.[21] At 10:10 p.m., Audacity sank head first at 43° 45' N, 19° 54' W, about 500 nmi (930 km; 580 mi) west of Cape Finisterre.[22]
22–23 December
At 12:40 a.m. on the night of 21/22 December, U-567 was sunk by depth charges from Deptford, two hours after gaining an Asdic contact; Deptford then collided with Stork, damaging them both. U-67 fired torpedoes at a
Aftermath
Despite the loss of Audacity and the three other ships, the safe arrival of 30 ships and the destruction of three U-boats (U-127 was not included and U-567 not confirmed until after the war) was judged to be an outstanding victory.[25] It also confirmed Walker as the Royal Navy's foremost expert in anti-submarine warfare. The loss of five of the nine U-boats and Endrass, one of the most experienced U-boat commanders, was considered a grievous blow by Dönitz; his loss was concealed from the U-boat men for several weeks.[26]
Order of battle
Allied forces
Convoy HG 76 comprised 32 merchant ships and 17 escorts.
Merchant ships
Data from Hague (2000), unless specified.[27]
| Name | Flag | Tonnage (GRT)
|
Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjutant (1922) |  United Kingdom
|
1,931 | |
| Algerian (1924) | United Kingdom
|
2,315 | |
| Alresford (1922) | United Kingdom
|
2,472 | |
| Annavore (1921) |  Norway
|
3,324 | 4,800 tons iron pyrites, sunk 21 December 1941 by U-567 43° 55' N, 19° 50' W, 34 killed, 4 survivors[28] |
| Baron Newlands (1928) | United Kingdom
|
3,386 | |
| Benwood (1910) | Norway
|
3,931 | |
| Blairatholl (1925) | United Kingdom
|
3,319 | |
| Cisneros (1926) | United Kingdom
|
1,886 | |
| Clan Macinnes (1920) | United Kingdom
|
4,672 | |
| Cressado (1913) | United Kingdom
|
1,228 | Rear-Admiral Oswald Dawson |
| Disa (1918) |  Sweden
|
2,002 | |
| Empire Darwin (1941) | United Kingdom
|
6,765 | CAM ship |
| Fagersten (1921) | Norway
|
2,342 | |
| Finland (1939) | United Kingdom
|
1,375 | |
| Fylingdale (1924) | United Kingdom
|
3,918 | |
| Lago (1929) | Norway
|
2,552 | |
| Lisbeth (1922) | Norway
|
2,732 | |
| Meta (1930) | United Kingdom
|
1,575 | |
| Ocean Coast (1935) | United Kingdom
|
1,173 | |
| Ogmore Castle (1919) | United Kingdom
|
2,481 | |
| Ottinge (1940) | United Kingdom
|
2,870 | |
| Ousel (1922) | United Kingdom
|
1,533 | |
| Portsea (1938) | United Kingdom
|
1,583 | |
| Ruckinge (1939) | United Kingdom
|
2,869 | 2,500 tons general cargo, damaged 19 December 1941 by U-108, 2 killed, scuttled 38° 20' N, 17° 15' W by Samphire[27] |
| San Gorg (1919) | United Kingdom
|
615 | |
| Sheaf Crown (1929) | United Kingdom
|
4,868 | |
| Shuna (1937) | United Kingdom
|
1,575 | |
| Spero (1922) | United Kingdom
|
1,589 | Convoy Commodore, Vice-Admiral Raymond Fitzmaurice |
| Switzerland (1922) | United Kingdom
|
1,291 | |
| Thyra (1925) | Sweden
|
1,796 | |
| Tintern Abbey (1939) | United Kingdom
|
2,471 | |
| Vanellus (1921) | United Kingdom
|
1,886 |
Convoy escorts
Relays of escort ships accompanied the convoy during its journey.[29]
Force H hunting group
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| HMS Croome |  Royal Navy
|
Destroyer | |
| HMS Gurkha | Royal Navy
|
Destroyer | |
| HMS Foxhound | Royal Navy
|
Destroyer | |
| HMAS Nestor |  Royal Australian Navy
|
Destroyer | Sank U-127 14 December 1941 |
U-boats
Gruppe Seerauber was assembled on 14 December 1941, comprising seven U-boats, reinforced on 21 December by three more. Four U-boats were destroyed attacking the convoy and another by the Gibraltar Strike Force. (Data from Rohwer and Hümmelchen (2005) unless indicated.)[6]
| Number | Type | Navy | Contact | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U-67 | IXC |
Kriegsmarine | 14 December 1941 | |
| U-71 | VIIC |
Kriegsmarine | 21 December 1941 | Reinforcement |
| U-107 | IXB |
Kriegsmarine | 14 December 1941 | |
| U-108 | IXB |
Kriegsmarine | 14 December 1941 | Sank Ruckinge[30] |
| U-127 | IXC |
Kriegsmarine | 14 December 1941 | Destroyed 15 December by Nestor, Force H hunting group |
| U-131 | IXC |
Kriegsmarine | 14 December 1941 | Destroyed 17 December 1941 by Stork, Penstemon and Martlet |
| U-434 | VIIC |
Kriegsmarine | 14 December 1941 | Destroyed 18 December by Stanley |
| U-567 | VIIC |
Kriegsmarine | December 1941 | Reinforcement; sank Annavore, destroyed 21/22 December 1941 by Deptford |
| U-574 | VIIC |
Kriegsmarine | 14 December 1941 | Sank Stanley, destroyed 19 December 1941 by Stork |
| U-751 | VIIC |
Kriegsmarine | December 1941 | Reinforcement, sank Audacity |
Notes
- ^ If the British could break into naval Enigma, the position reports would be read.[8]
- ^ In 2005, Rohwer and Hümmelchen wrote that the U-boat was scuttled.[6]
Footnotes
- ^ a b Forczyk 2010, p. 38.
- ^ a b Terraine 1999, pp. 395–396.
- ^ Terraine 1999, p. 396.
- ^ Wemyss 2003, pp. 19–21.
- ^ a b Kaplan 2014, p. 120.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 126.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2001, pp. 106–108.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2001, p. 108.
- ^ Air 2001, p. 107.
- ^ Roskill 1957, pp. 354–355.
- ^ Blair 2000, p. 409.
- ^ Terraine 1999, p. 396; Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 126.
- ^ Blair 2000, p. 410.
- ^ Terraine 1999, p. 725; Richards 1974, p. 351.
- ^ a b Richards 1974, p. 351.
- ^ Roskill 1957, p. 478.
- ^ a b Terraine 1999, pp. 396–397.
- ^ a b c Kaplan 2014, p. 121.
- ^ a b c Terraine 1999, p. 398.
- ^ Kaplan 2014, p. 133.
- ^ Terraine 1999, pp. 398–399.
- ^ Roskill 1957, p. 479; Hobbs 2013, p. 198.
- ^ Kaplan 2014, p. 122; Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 126.
- ^ Terraine 1999, p. 399.
- ^ Roskill 1957, p. 479.
- ^ Kaplan 2014, p. 123; Terraine 1999, p. 399; Blair 2000, p. 417.
- ^ a b Hague 2000, p. 179.
- ^ Hague 2000, p. 179; Jordan 2006, p. 557.
- ^ Hague.
- ^ Jordan 2006, pp. 119, 509.
References
- ISBN 978-0-304-35260-9.
- Forczyk, R. (2010). Fw 200 Condor vs Atlantic Convoy: 1941–43. Duel. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-917-1.
- Hague, A. "Convoy HG.76". Arnold Hague Convoy Database. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
- Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System 1939–1945: Its Organisation, Defence and Operation. London: Chatham. ISBN 1-86176-147-3.
- Hobbs, David (2013). British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development and Service Histories. Barnsley: Seaforth (Pen & Sword Books). ISBN 978-1-84832-138-0.
- Jordan, Roger W. (2006) [1999]. The World's Merchant Fleets 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships (2nd ed.). London: Chatham/Lionel Leventhal. ISBN 978-1-86176-293-1.
- Kaplan, P. (2014) [2013]. Grey Wolves: The U-boat War 1939–1945 (Skyhorse Publishing ed.). Barnsley: Pen and Sword Maritime. ISBN 978-1-62873-727-1.
- Richards, D. (1974) [1953]. Royal Air Force 1939–1945: The Fight At Odds. Vol. I (pbk. ed.). London: ISBN 978-0-11-771592-9. Retrieved 6 February 2016.
- Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-257-3.
- OCLC 881709135. Retrieved 21 December 2015.
- ISBN 978-0-7538-1130-6.
- ISBN 978-1-84022-201-2.
- The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (Air 41/10). Public Record Office War Histories No. 248 (repr. HMSO, London ed.). Richmond, Surrey: ISBN 978-1-903365-30-4.
- Wemyss, D. E. G. (2003) [1955]. Relentless Pursuit. London: Cerberus. ISBN 1-84145-023-5.
Further reading
- Kemp, Paul (1997). U-boats Destroyed: German Submarine Losses in the World Wars. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-515-2.
- Van der Vat, Dan (1988). The Atlantic Campaign: World War II's Great Struggle at Sea. New York: Harper & Row. ISBN 978-0-340-37751-2– via Archive Foundation.
