Donoghue v Stevenson
Donoghue v Stevenson | |
---|---|
Court | House of Lords |
Full case name | M'Alister (or Donoghue) (Pauper) v. Stevenson[Note 1] |
Decided | 26 May 1932 |
Citation(s) |
|
Transcript(s) | House of Lords transcript |
Case history | |
Prior action(s) | Outer House of the Court of Session ([1930] SN 117)[3] |
Appealed from | Inner House of the Court of Session ([1930] SN 138)[3] |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting |
|
Case opinions | |
Manufacturers have a legal duty of care to the ultimate consumers of their products if it is not possible for defects to be identified before the goods are received.[1]: 9 [4]: 643 | |
Keywords | |
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 was a
Also known as the "Paisley Snail" or "Snail in the Bottle" case, the case involved Mrs May Donoghue drinking a bottle of ginger beer in a café in Paisley, Renfrewshire. Unknown to her or anybody else, a decomposed snail was in the bottle. She fell ill, and subsequently sued the ginger beer manufacturer, Mr Stevenson. The House of Lords held that the manufacturer owed a duty of care to her, which was breached because it was reasonably foreseeable that failure to ensure the product's safety would lead to harm to consumers. There was also a sufficiently proximate relationship between consumers and product manufacturers.[5]
Prior to Donoghue v Stevenson, liability for personal injury in tort usually depended upon showing physical damage inflicted directly (
Background and facts
On the evening of Sunday 26 August 1928, during the
Donoghue drank some of the ice cream float. When her friend poured the remaining ginger beer into the tumbler, a decomposed snail also floated out of the bottle. Donoghue claimed that she felt ill from this sight, complaining of abdominal pain.[3][8] According to her later statements of facts, she was required to consult a doctor on 29 August and was admitted to Glasgow Royal Infirmary for "emergency treatment" on 16 September.[6]: 23 [9]: 7 She was subsequently diagnosed with severe gastroenteritis and shock.[3][7]: 566
The ginger beer had been manufactured by David Stevenson, who ran a company producing both ginger beer and lemonade at 11 and 12 Glen Lane, Paisley, less than a mile away from the Wellmeadow Café.[6]: 6–7 The contact details for the ginger beer manufacturer were on the bottle label and recorded by Donoghue's friend.[6]: 11
Donoghue subsequently contacted and instructed Walter Leechman, a local solicitor and city councillor whose firm had acted for the claimants in a factually similar case, Mullen v AG Barr & Co Ltd,[10] less than three weeks earlier[3] (see also George v Skivington).
Despite the ruling in Mullen, Leechman issued a
Condescendences
The full allegations made by Donoghue were presented in five condescendences, which claimed that Stevenson had a duty of care to Donoghue to ensure that snails did not get into his bottles of ginger beer, but that he had breached this duty by failing to provide a system to clean bottles effectively, a system that would usually be used in the business and was necessary given that the ginger beer was intended for human consumption.[6]: 22–23 The ineffectiveness of the cleaning system was alleged to result from the bottles being left in places "to which it was obvious that snails had freedom of access ... and in which, indeed, snails and snail trails were frequently found",[9]: 6 an allegation described by lawyer and author Matthew Chapman as "somewhat gratuitous".[6]: 7 This breach of duty was alleged to have caused Donoghue's subsequent illness.[9]: 7
Stevenson responded to the condescendences by denying that any of his bottles of ginger beer had contained snails and "that the alleged injuries are grossly exaggerated ... any illness suffered by the [claimant] was due to the bad condition of her own health at the time".[9]: 6–7 In response to the writ, Stevenson pleaded four main arguments:
- that the claim had no legal basis;
- that the facts could not be substantiated;
- that he had not caused Donoghue any injury;
- that the claimed amount was excessive.[6]: 22–23 [9]: 8
Legal background
Injuries resulting from defective products were normally claimed on the basis of a
Ansell v Waterhouse[13] had established in 1817 that legal liability could arise for an act or omission "contrary to the duty which the law casts on him in the particular case" (i.e. negligence).[14]: 105–106 However, there was no general duty of care and therefore no general liability for negligent behaviour. Only limited exceptions to this rule were made in which duties were found in specific circumstances, most of which had a contractual background.[4]: 643 [14]: 109 [15]: 86
The most difficult
At the Court of Session, the claimants argued that although there was no direct evidence that the manufacturer had been negligent in preparing the ginger beer, negligence could be presumed (res ipsa loquitur) from the mere presence of dead mice in ginger beer bottles. However, the court ruled against the claimants.[6]: 16–17 The majority held that on a factual basis AG Barr & Co Ltd had rebutted a presumption of negligence and that on a legal basis product manufacturers only owed a duty of care to the ultimate consumers if there was a contractual relationship between the parties; if the dangerousness of the product was intentionally withheld from the consumer (in which case there might also be a claim for fraud); or if there was no warning of the intrinsic dangerousness of certain products, such as explosives.[3][6]: 17–18
Only
However, neither of the circumstances in which negligence could be found in
Judgment
Court of Session, Outer House
The first
The case was heard by Lord Moncrieff in the Outer House on 27 June 1930. In his judgment, delivered on the same day, he held that, as a general principle, there should be liability for negligent preparation of food.[6]: 25–26
I am unhesitatingly of opinion that those who deal with the production of food or produce fluids for beverage purposes ought not to be heard to plead ignorance of the active danger which will be associated with their products, as a consequence of any imperfect observation of cleanliness at any stage in the course of the process of manufacture ... Tainted food when offered for sale is, in my opinion, amongst the most subtly potent of 'dangerous goods', and to deal in or prepare such food is highly relevant to infer a duty. I fail to see why the fact that the danger has been introduced by an act of negligence and does not advertise itself, should release the negligent manufacturer from a duty, or afford him a supplementary defence.[16]: 4, 6
Court of Session, Inner House
Stevenson appealed the case to the
House of Lords
Donoghue filed a petition to appeal to the
The petition was granted and the appeal was heard 10 and 11 December 1931 by
Stevenson's counsel,
The House of Lords gave judgment on 26 May 1932 after an unusually long delay of over five months since the hearing.[Note 4][18]: 236–237 The court held by a majority of 3–2 that Donoghue's case disclosed a cause of action.[7]: 562 The majority consisted of Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton and Lord Macmillan.[7]: 562
At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of "culpa", is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot, in a practical world, be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.[11]: 44
He supported this broad test by citing
Lord Atkin then rejected cases that did not support his approach and cited Benjamin N. Cardozo in the New York case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.[20] in favour of his view.[6]: 42 [11]: 46–56
He concluded:
If your Lordships accept the view that this pleading discloses a relevant cause of action, you will be affirming the proposition that by Scots and English law alike a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care. It is a proposition which I venture to say no one in Scotland or England who was not a lawyer would for one moment doubt. It will be an advantage to make it clear that the law in this matter, as in most others, is in accordance with sound common sense. I think that this appeal should be allowed.[11]: 57
Lord Thankerton further argued that it was impossible "to catalogue finally, amid the ever-varying types of human relationships, those relationships in which a duty to exercise care arises apart from contract" and commented that he "should be sorry to think that the meticulous care of the manufacturer to exclude interference or inspection by the [seller] should relieve the [seller] of any responsibility to the consumer without any corresponding assumption of duty by the manufacturer".[6]: 51–52 [11]: 60
Lord Macmillan held that, according to this standard, Stevenson had demonstrated carelessness by leaving bottles where snails could access them; that he owed Donoghue a duty of care as commercial manufacturer of food and drink; and that Donoghue's injury was reasonably foreseeable. He therefore found that Donoghue had a cause of action and commented that he was "happy to think that in ... relation to the practical problem of everyday life which this appeal presents ... the principles of [English and Scots law] are sufficiently consonant with justice and common sense to admit of the claim which the appellant seeks to establish."[6]: 47–48 [11]: 71–72
The minority consisted of Lord Buckmaster and Lord Tomlin.
Lord Buckmaster dismissed George v Skivington,[21] opining that "few cases can have lived so dangerously and lived so long",[11]: 37 and rejected Heaven as a tabula in naufragio (Latin: literally "plank in a shipwreck") that was unrelated to Donoghue's case; both "should be buried so securely that their perturbed spirits shall no longer vex the law".[11]: 42 He concluded that there was no common law support for Donoghue's claim and supported Lord Anderson's judgment in Mullen.[6]: 44–46
In a case like the present, where the goods of the defenders are widely distributed throughout Scotland, it would seem little short of outrageous to make them responsible to members of the public for the condition of the contents of every bottle which issues from their works. It is obvious that, if such responsibility attached to the defenders, they might be called on to meet claims of damages which they could not possibly investigate or insure.[11]: 43
Lord Tomlin concurred with Lord Buckmaster. While he agreed with Lord Atkin that the duty of care a manufacturer owed to its consumers was the same regardless of the product they produced, he held that no general duty of care existed and that the fact the product was in a sealed container made no difference to the finding of a such duty.[6]: 50 [11]: 57–58 He further endorsed concerns that Lord Atkin's broader test of liability would have allowed everyone injured in the Versailles rail accident to be able to claim compensation from the manufacturer of the axle that broke and caused the crash.[3][11]: 57
The suggested ratio decidendi (Latin: the reason for the decision) of the case has varied from the narrowest, jokingly suggested by Julius Stone, that there was merely a duty "not to sell opaque bottles of beverage containing dead snails to Scots widows",[23] to the widest, suggested by Lord Normand, who had been one of Stevenson's counsel, that Lord Atkin's neighbour principle was the ratio.[24]: 756–757 [1]: 7
Although the neighbour principle was a critical part of Lord Atkin's reasoning, and was therefore part of the ratio of his judgment, neither of the other judges in the majority expressly endorsed the principle.[1]: 7–8 Robert Heuston therefore suggests that case only supports the claims there can be duties in tort even if there is no contract; that manufacturers owe a duty of care to the ultimate consumers of their goods; and possibly that negligence is a separate tort. "No amount of posthumous citation can of itself transfer with retrospective effect a proposition from the status of obiter dictum [passing comments] to that of ratio decidendi."[1]: 9
Subsequent events
The legal basis for the claim now settled, the case was returned to the Court of Session for a hearing scheduled for January 1933. In the hearing, Donoghue would have to prove the factual elements of the case that she had claimed, including that there had been a snail in the ginger beer as a result of Stevenson's negligence and that this snail had caused her illness.
Donoghue had moved to 101 Maitland Street with her son, Henry, around February 1931. He moved out when he married in 1937, after which she moved to 156 Jamieson Street. She continued to work as a shop assistant. In February 1945, Donoghue divorced her husband, from whom she had separated in 1928 and who now had two sons by another woman, and reverted to using her maiden name.[6]: 5–6 [25]: 7
She died of a
Stevenson's business was taken over by his widow, Mary, and his son, the third David Stevenson in the family. It became a
The Wellmeadow Café, where the snail had been found, closed around 1931; the building was demolished in 1959. Minghella, its owner, subsequently became a labourer; he died on 20 March 1970.[6]: 2–3
Significance
Lord Atkin's neighbour principle, that people must take reasonable care not to injure others who could foreseeably be affected by their action or inaction, was supported by reference to the biblical Great Commandment (to love one’s neighbour as oneself) and the Parable of the Good Samaritan (defining who that “neighbour” was).[27]: 212–213
The neighbour principle itself was first mentioned in relation to law by Francis Buller[Note 6] in An Introduction to the Law relative to Trials at Nisi Prius, which was printed in 1768.[27]: 212
Of Injuries arising from Negligence or Folly. Every man ought to take reasonable care that he does not injure his neighbour; therefore, wherever a man receives any hurt through the default of another, though the same were not wilful, yet if it be occasioned by negligence or folly, the law gives him an action to recover damages for the injury so sustained.[28]
In precedent, there was an
Two cases from the
This principle was relied on in MacPherson, in which a car wheel collapsed, injuring MacPherson. The manufacturer was sued in negligence and the court held that manufacturers could owe their ultimate consumers a duty of care in limited circumstances.[6]: 104–106 [31]: 414
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully ... If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow.[20]: 389–390
Lord Atkin used the concept of legal neighbours in an address to the
[A man] is not to injure his neighbour by acts of negligence; and that certainly covers a very large field of the law. I doubt whether the whole law of tort could not be comprised in the golden maxim to do unto your neighbour as you would that he should do unto you.[Note 7][33]: 30
Precedent
The case was reviewed by Frederick Pollock in a 1933 edition of Law Quarterly Review, in which he commented that there was no doubt as to the importance of the decision and that "a notable step has been made in enlarging and clarifying our conception of a citizen's duty before the law ... not to turn dangerous or noxious things loose on the world".[34]: 22 However, Donoghue otherwise attracted little attention; it was understood only as precedent that manufacturers were liable for injuries their goods cause their ultimate consumers rather than that there was a general principle of liability in negligence.[35]: 61
The majority of the Court of Appeal (
: 116–117Hedley Byrne v Heller
In Hedley Byrne, Hedley Byrne,
The application of Donoghue was discussed and, while all the judges agreed that it would be taking Donoghue too far to immediately apply it to Hedley Byrne, Lord Devlin suggested that "what Lord Atkin did was to use his general conception [the neighbour principle] to open up a category of cases giving rise to a special duty" and that the case could incrementally expand the duty of care.[6]: 128–129 [37]: 524–525
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co
Home Office was the culmination of a movement from duties of care being found in specific circumstances to using the neighbour principle as a general duty of care.[39]: 150 In Home Office, the Home Office had in 1962 taken a group of boys from a borstal to Brownsea Island in Poole Harbour, where seven had escaped overnight and collided one yacht with another belonging to Dorset Yacht Company.[38]: 1025 The company sued the Home Office for negligence and a preliminary issue, whether the Home Office owed a duty of care to Dorset Yacht Company, was found in the company's favour by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The case was appealed to the House of Lords, who held by a majority that the Home Office did owe a duty of care.[6]: 129–130
Lord Reid, giving the leading judgment, rejected the argument that there was no precedent for the claim, instead acknowledging "a steady trend towards regarding the law of negligence as depending on principle so that, when a new point emerges, one should ask not whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles [from Donoghue] apply to it".[38]: 1026–1027 Donoghue, he argued, should therefore be applied in almost all circumstances.[6]: 132–133
[Donoghue] may be regarded as a milestone, and the well-known passage in Lord Atkin's speech should I think be regarded as a statement of principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we can and should say that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion.[38]: 1027
In the sole dissenting judgment, Viscount Dilhorne held that the neighbour principle could not have been intended to be applied in all circumstances and that it could only be used to determine to whom a duty of care is owed rather than if one exists.[38]: 1043–1042 Judges, he opined, "are concerned not with what the law should be but with what it is. The absence of authority shows that no such duty [to Dorset Yacht Company] now exists. If there should be one, that is, in my view, a matter for the legislature and not for the courts".[38]: 1045 Chapman comments "that this conclusion appeared ... distinctly quaint, old-fashioned and even untenable in the light of [Donoghue] shows how far the law had moved in the four decades which separated the two House of Lords decisions".[6]: 134
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman
In 1990, the House of Lords revised Lord Atkin's "neighbour" principle to encompass public policy concerns articulated in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman.[40] The three-stage Caparo test for establishing a duty of care requires (i) foreseeability of damage, (ii) a relationship characterised by the law as one of proximity or neighbourhood and (iii) that the situation should be one in which the court considers it would be fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of given scope on one party for the benefit of the other. In other jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, there is now a two-part test for novel fact situations, where the establishment of a duty must be balanced against applicable policy matters.
Comparative law
The judgment and reasoning of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson is very similar to the judgment and reasoning applied by Cardozo CJ in the American case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,[41] four years earlier. Although the similarity in approach has been noted by commentators,[42] the decision is Palsgraf was not cited in either argument or in the judgments in Donoghue, although Lord Atkin did refer to an earlier decision of Cardozo J: MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co..[43]
As a metaphor
Today the far reaching changes of the decision for the law of torts is sufficiently well recognised that the case's name is used as a metaphor. For example, Barclays Bank v W J Simms [1980] 1 QB 677 has been described as "the Donoghue v Stevenson of restitution for mistake."[44] It has also been stated that Slade's Case "could be said to be the Donoghue v. Stevenson of contract."[45] Similarly, Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd[46] has been called "the Donoghue v Stevenson of Tourism Law".[47]
Commemoration
In 1990, a pilgrimage to Paisley was organised by the Canadian Bar Association, the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society of Scotland. This included a conference in Paisley Town Hall entitled "The Pilgrimage to Paisley: a Salute to Donoghue v Stevenson".[6]: 173–174 A memorial commemorating the case was unveiled at the conference on the site of the former Wellmeadow Café[3][48] and a bench was added in 1992; both were replaced in 2012.[49]
In 1996, retired Canadian judge Martin Taylor together with David Hay
Existence of the snail
In a speech scheduled to be delivered in May 1942 (although delayed by the
To be quite candid, I detest that snail ... I think that [Lord Normand] did not reveal to you that when the law had been settled by the House of Lords, the case went back to Edinburgh to be tried on the facts. And at that trial it was found that there never was a snail in the bottle at all. That intruding gastropod was as much a legal fiction as the
Casual Ejector.[6]: 170–171
This allegation, suggests Chapman, established itself as a legal myth;[6]: 172 it was repeated by Lord Justice Jenkins in a 1954 Court of Appeal practice note.[52]: 1483 However, both MacKinnon and Jenkins were unaware that the trial had not gone ahead because of Stevenson's death, and the events following the case were only published in response to the practice note.[53] As Donoghue's factual claims were therefore never tested in court, it is generally held that what happened in the Wellmeadow Café is not proven and will not be known for certain.[1]: 2 [3][4]: 643 [6]: 172
Notes
- ^ Although the friend was not named and has not been identified, she is referred to as "she" in the House of Lords judgment.[3][7]: 605 It has been suggested that this information was provided by counsel during the hearing.[6]: 5
- ^ Minghella's surname was incorrectly spelt as "Minchella" in law reports of Donoghue v Stevenson.[6]: 2
- Alan Roger suggests that the delay gave Lord Macmillan time to rewrite his speech).[18]: 247
- ^ It has also been reported that the case was settled for £100 (by William McBryde on the basis of information from Lord Macmillan, which he probably heard from Lord Normand, one of Stevenson's counsel) and £500 (by Thomas Donoghue, May Donoghue's grandson; however, this amount is likely to be an exaggeration as it was the amount Donoghue originally claimed).[6]: 173 [25]: 9
- ^ Although authorship of An Introduction to the Law relative to Trials at Nisi Prius has also been attributed to Lord Bathurst.[6]: 87
References
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- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Taylor, Martin R. (2004). "Mrs Donoghue's Journey". Donoghue v Stevenson Digital Resources. Scottish Council of Law Reporting. Retrieved 7 September 2012.
- ^ a b c Patten, Keith (2012). "Personal injury: Snail trail". New Law Journal. 162 (7513): 643–645. Archived from the original on 22 April 2013. Retrieved 2 September 2012.
- ^ a b c d Baksi, Catherine (3 October 2019). "Landmarks in law: the case of the dead snail in the ginger beer". The Guardian. Retrieved 14 April 2024.
- ^ ISBN 9780854900497. Archived from the originalon 18 April 2011. Retrieved 10 September 2012.
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- ^ a b c Coleman, Clive (20 November 2009). "The legal case of the snail found in ginger beer". BBC News. Retrieved 10 September 2012.
- ^ Milligan, W. R. Donoghue v Stevenson Appeal Papers: The Appellant's Case. Chapman, Watson & Co. Retrieved 11 September 2012.
- ScotCS20 March 1929).
- ^ UKHL26 May 1932).
- ^ UK Retail Price Index inflation figures are based on data from Clark, Gregory (2017). "The Annual RPI and Average Earnings for Britain, 1209 to Present (New Series)". MeasuringWorth. Retrieved 11 June 2022.
- ^ Ansell v Waterhouse, 1817 M & S 385.
- ^ ISBN 9780199571802.
- ^ Ferrari, Franco (1994). "Donoghue v. Stevenson's 60th Anniversary". Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law. 1 (1): 81–90. Retrieved 18 September 2012.[permanent dead link]
- ^ a b c d e Donoghue v Stevenson Appeal Papers: The Appendix (Opinions). Chapman, Watson & Co. Retrieved 15 September 2012.
- ^ a b c Normand, W. G.; Clyde, J. L. Donoghue v Stevenson Appeal Papers: The Respondent's Case. Hugh Patron & Sons Ltd. Retrieved 16 September 2012.
- ^ Rodger, Alan (April 1992). "Lord Macmillan's speech in Donoghue v Stevenson". Law Quarterly Review. 108 (2): 236–259.
- ^ EWCA1883).
- ^ a b MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 NY 382 (New York Court of Appeals 14 March 1916).
- ^ George v Skivington, 5 LR Ex 1 (Exchequer of Pleas 1869).
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- ^ Leviticus 19:18 (King James)
- ^ Lord Atkin (1932). "Law as an Educational Subject". Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law. 1932: 27–31.
- ^ Pollock, Frederick (1933). "The Snail in the Bottle, and Thereafter". Law Quarterly Review. 49 (1): 22–26.
- ^ a b c Buxton, Richard (2009). "How the common law gets made: Hedley Byrne and other cautionary tales". Law Quarterly Review. 125 (1): 60–78.
- EWCA15 December 1950).
- ^ UKHL28 May 1963).
- ^ UKHL6 May 1970).
- .
- UKHL8 February 1990).
- ^ Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)
- ISBN 978-90-247-2787-2.
- ^ MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) cited in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 598
- ISBN 978-0-19-876377-2.
- ^ Samuel, Geoffrey (1978). "The Reality of Contract in English Law". Tulsa Law Review. 13 (3): 508–524.
- ^ Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1972] EWCA 8
- ^ Atherton, Trudie-Ann; Atherton, Trevor C. (1999). "The Legalities of Overbooking, Overcrowding, Delay and Disappointment: Lessons for the Sydney 2000 Olympics". New South Wales Law Journal. 22 (3): 858.
- ^ Stephanie Todd (18 August 2003). "May owes fame to slug". BBC News. Retrieved 26 September 2012.
- ^ "New "snail bench" is in place". Paisley Daily Express. 20 April 2012. Retrieved 26 September 2012.
- ^ Todd, Stephanie (18 August 2003). "Slug's trail to silver screen". BBC News. Retrieved 26 September 2012.
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- ^ Ashton-Cross, D. I. C. (October 1955). "Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562". Law Quarterly Review. 71 (4): 472.