Hare quota
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In the study of
The Hare quota was used in the original proposal for a single transferable vote (STV-Hare) system, but has since been almost entirely supplanted for this use by the more mathematically-accurate Droop quota.
However, the quota continues to be used in setting
Formula
The Hare quota may be given as:
where
- Total votes = the total valid poll; that is, the number of valid (unspoilt) votes cast in an election.
- Total seats = the total number of seats to be filled in the election.
Use in STV
In an STV election a candidate who reaches the quota is elected while any votes a candidate receives above the quota in many cases have the opportunity to be transferred to another candidate in accordance to the voter's next usable marked preference. Thus the quota is used both to determine who is elected and to determine the number of surplus votes when a person is elected with quota. When the Droop quota is used, often about a quota of votes are not used to elect anyone (a much lower proportion that under the first-past-the-post voting system) so the quota is a cue to the number of votes that are used to actually elect someone.[2]
The Hare quota was devised by
Example
To see how the Hare quota works in an STV election, imagine an election in which there are two seats to be filled and three candidates: Andrea, Brad, and Carter. One hundred voters voted, each casting one vote and marking a back-up preference to be used only in case the first preference candidate is un-electable or elected with surplus. There are 100 ballots showing preferences as follows:
Number of voters |
60 voters |
26 voters |
14 voters |
1st preference | Andrea | Brad | Carter |
2nd preference | Carter | Andrea | Andrea |
Because there are 100 voters and 2 seats, the Hare quota is:
To begin the count the first preferences cast for each candidate are tallied and are as follows:
- Andrea: 60
- Brad: 26
- Carter: 14
Andrea has more than 50 votes. She therefore has reached the quota and is declared elected. She has 10 votes more than the quota so these votes are transferred to Carter, as specified on the ballots. The tallies of the remaining candidates therefore now become:
- Brad: 26
- Carter: 24
At this stage, there are only two candidates remaining and one seat open. The most popular candidate is declared elected and the other is declared defeated.
Although Brad has not reached the quota, he is declared elected since he has more votes than Carter.
The winners are therefore Andrea and Brad.
Use in party-list PR
Hong Kong and Brazil use the Hare quota in largest-remainder systems.
In Brazil's largest remainder system the Hare quota is used to set the minimum number of seats allocated to each party or coalition. Remaining seats are allocated according to the D'Hondt method.[4] This procedure is used for the Federal Chamber of Deputies, State Assemblies, Municipal and Federal District Chambers.
In Hong Kong
For geographical constituencies, the SAR government adopted weakly-proportional representation using the largest remainder method with Hare quota in 1997[citation needed]. Typically, largest remainders paired with the Hare quota produces unbiased results that are difficult to manipulate.[1] However, the combination of extremely small districts, no electoral thresholds, and low led to a system that parties could manipulate using careful vote management.
By running candidates on separate tickets, Hong Kong parties aimed to ensure they received no seats in the first step of apportionment, but still received enough votes to take several of the remainder seats when running against a divided opposition.
Comparison with the Droop quota
Criticisms
The Hare quota is often criticised for favouring the smaller parties at the expense of the larger ones.[citation needed]
Under certain circumstances, the Hare quota can also lead to a situation in which the outcome of the election depends on the order in which the votes were counted. Under the whole vote method of transferring surplus votes, when a candidate fulfils the quota, it is not obvious which of their votes should be distributed as surplus votes and which should get "used up" electing the candidate, staying with the candidate as the quota. Rather than partially distributing full votes, as under the whole vote method, one can fully distribute fractional votes as in the
The Hare quota in Hong Kong's largest remainder system, 1998–2012
In some cases, it leads to the fragmentation and infighting of the electoral alliances. In Hong Kong, the
In
In
In
The Hare quota used in Hong Kong's largest remainder system also encourages the multiplication of political parties and nonpartisan candidates.[8] The vote share of the largest party Democratic Party dropped significantly, from 43 per cent in 1998 to 29 per cent in 2000, to 21 per cent in 2004, rising slightly to 20 per cent in 2008 and falling again to 14 per cent in 2012.[8] As under the Hare quota largest remainder method the broad alliance wins little or no seat bonus, whereas much smaller lists win larger bonuses in the elections, politicians and potential allies are motivated to diverge rather than to coalesce.[8] On the other hands, candidate with radical stand won seats starting from 2004, which expanded the exposure of radical stand among Hong Kong general public.
The adoption of the Hare quota system by the Beijing government on the eve of the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong was seen as the measure to curb the dominance of the
The Communist regime...realized full well that the appearance of political parties was inevitable whenever there were elections, particularly popular elections. It nevertheless did not want to see the rise of anti-Communist political parties in Hong Kong. Nor could China tolerate the domination of the legislature by a powerful political party, which then could use the veto powers at the legislature's disposal to 'blackmail' the executive or to bring about stalemate between the executive and legislative branches...In devising the electoral arrangements for the first legislature of the HKSAR, therefore, China strove to impede the development of local political parties, particularly those with pro-democratic and anti-Communist inclinations.[8]
By installing the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, Beijing ensured the pro-Beijing politicians who received only roughly 40 per cent of the support and were defeated by the pro-democratic candidates in 1995 could return a corresponding number of seats in the legislature.[8]
References
- ^ ISBN 978-3-319-64707-4.
- ^ Baily, PR in large constituencies (1872) (hathitrust online)
- ^ Baily, PR in large constituencies (1872) (hathitrust online)
- ^ (in Portuguese) Brazilian Electoral Code, (Law 4737/1965), Articles 106 to 109.
- ^ Tsang, Jasper Yok Sing (11 March 2008). "Divide then conquer". South China Morning Post. Hong Kong. p. A17.
- ^ Ma Ngok (25 July 2008). 港式比例代表制 議會四分五裂 [Hong Kong-style proportional representation is divided]. Ming Pao (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Hong Kong. p. A31.
- ^ Choy, Ivan Chi Keung (31 July 2008). 港式選舉淪為變相多議席單票制 [Hong Kong-style elections become a multi-seat multi-seat single-vote system]. Ming Pao (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Hong Kong. p. A29.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Carey, John M. "Electoral Formula and Fragmentation in Hong Kong" (PDF).
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