Mirgorod direction offensive

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Mirgorod direction offensive
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
Date3 August 1943 – 25 August 1943
Location
Okhtyrka
Result Soviet victory
Belligerents
 Germany  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Nazi Germany Erich von Manstein Soviet Union Nikolai Vatutin
Strength
XLVIII Panzercorps,
LII Armeecorps
,
90 Tanks
40th Army,
27th Army,
6th Guards Army,
600 Tanks[1]
Casualties and losses
400 Tanks

The Mirgorod direction offensive (3 August 1943 – 23 August 1943) was an operation conducted as part of

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev between the Red Army and Wehrmacht forces. It was one of the operations that followed the Battle of Kursk. In the offensive, the Red Army pushed through the Wehrmacht lines after the Wehrmacht retreated after the Battle of Kursk. It represented a turning point on the Eastern Front
.

Prelude

During the

XLVIII Panzercorps and LII Armeecorps returned to their old, well fortified positions, stretching to some 60 kilometres west of Tomarovka. Their combat strength had been reduced by as much as 50% following the Battle.[1][2]

Advance towards Hadiach (Gadac) and Mirgorod beyond.

The Battle

Early on 3 August 1943, after a heavy

167th Infantry Division to a depth of 100 km[2]b between Tomarovka and Belgorod on the northern flank, and as far as Okhtyrka
.
West of
Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 and 19th Panzer Division were also swept aside by the strength of the attack.[3]c These divisions were good quality units and not badly understrength for this period of the war on the Eastern Front
, but the enormous weight of Soviet firepower, mass of infantry and hundreds of tanks simply overran them.

In

III Panzercorps were deploying north and west of Kharkiv to counterattack the eastern flank of the Russian armoured spearheads driving towards Bohodukhiv
.

At the same time

SS
armoured units had isolated Soviet units which had penetrated too quickly, and this had halted the momentum of the assault.

To relieve these units and prevent further German advances the

Parchomovka.[4][5]

On 26 August the Soviet

Dnepr River was now inevitable the only question, would this happen at a time of their choosing or be a headlong flight.h

Aftermath

The constant fighting never allowed

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev marked the first time in the war that the Germans were not able to defeat a major Soviet offensive during the summer months and regain their lost ground and the strategic initiative.[7]

Footnotes

  • a Consisting of the 1st Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Tank Army, 6th Guards Army, 5th Guards Army, 40th Army, 27th Army.
  • b Both belonging to LII Army Corps.
  • c The 19th Panzer Division had only 28 tanks, the 6th Panzer Division which was in reserve and about 7-8 kilometres behind the front had 50 tanks. Both were reinforced by the Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 which had 10 operational "Tigers". Thus the entire German tank strength was 90 operational tanks in this sector.
  • d The III Panzercorps comprising the 3rd Panzer Division, the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Das Reich", the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" and the 5th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Wiking". The SS divisions were severally weakened after the failure of the 'Kursk Offensive' and more recently "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf" had suffered heavy losses at failed Soviet breakthrough on the Mius river in 6th Armies sector. "Wiking" had also suffered heavy losses at Izium in 8th Armies area.
  • e In the sector of the 57th and 68th Infantry Divisions which were reduced to the strength of "kampfgruppe"'s.
  • f The XXIV Panzercorps comprising the 7th Panzer (40 tanks), 10th Panzergrenadier (40 tanks)& Großdeutschland divisions (70 tanks and assault guns) plus a heavy tank and several assault gun battalions.
  • g The 166th and 71st Rifle divisions and the 4th Guard Tank Corps.
  • h The new 6th Army was also reeling from renewed blows on the Mius River.

Citations and notes

  1. ^ a b Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 Page 260
  2. ^ a b Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941–1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 Page 212
  3. ^ Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 pp 260–261
  4. ^ Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 pp 316–324
  5. ^ Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 pp 150–158
  6. ^ Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 158
  7. ^ Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 Page 330

References

  • Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996
    ISBN 0-921991-35-5
  • Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941–1945 by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003
    ISBN 0-306-81247-9
  • Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968

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