Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation
Part of the Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union
Result	Soviet victory

Belligerents  Germany  Soviet UnionCommanders and leaders Erich von Manstein Ivan KonevStrength 200,000 men
237 tanks and assault guns at the outset 1,144,000 men^[1]
2,418 tanks^[2]
13,633 guns and rocket launchers^[2]Casualties and losses 25,068–26,289

---

8,933–10,154 killed or missing
16,135 wounded^[3]
240 tanks lost^[4]
unknown guns 177,586–255,566

---

43,282–71,611 killed or missing
183,955 wounded^[5]
1,864 tanks lost^[6]
423 artillery guns^[6]
153 aircraft^[6]

The Belgorod–Kharkov strategic offensive operation, or simply Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation, was a Soviet strategic summer offensive that aimed to recapture

The operation began in the early hours of 3 August 1943, with the objective of following up the successful Soviet defensive effort in the

in autumn 1943.

Background

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev had been planned by

The Soviet forces included the Voronezh Front and the Steppe Front, which deployed about 1,144,000 men[1] with 2,418 tanks^[2] and 13,633 guns and rocket launchers^[2] for the attack. Against this the German army could field 200,000 men and 237 tanks and assault guns.

When the Soviet

The Soviet plan called for the

Offensive operation

On 3 August the offensive was begun with a heavy artillery barrage directed against the German defensive positions. Though the German defenders fought tenaciously, the two tank armies committed to the battle could not be held back. By 5 August the Soviets had broken through the German defensive lines, moving into the rear areas and capturing Belgorod while advancing some 60 km. Delivering powerful blows from the north and east, the attackers overwhelmed the German defenders.^[12]

German reserves were shifted from the

With the Soviet advance around Bogodukhov stopped, the Germans now began to attempt to close the gap between Akhtyrka and Krasnokutsk. The counterattack started on 18 August, and on 20 August "Totenkopf" and "Großdeutschland" met behind the Soviet units.^[13] Parts of two Soviet armies and two tank corps were trapped, but the trapped units heavily outnumbered the German units. Many Soviet units were able to break out, while suffering heavy casualties.^[13][15] After this setback the Soviet troops focused on Kharkov and captured it after heavy fighting on 23 August.

The battle is usually referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and the Belgorod–Kharkov strategic offensive operation by the Soviets.^[7][8] The Soviet operation was executed in two primary axes, one in the Belgorod–Kharkov axis and another in the Belgorod–Bogodukhov axis.^[8]

On the first day, the units of the

Recapture of Kharkov

This section may be unbalanced toward certain viewpoints. Please improve the article by adding information on neglected viewpoints, or discuss the issue on the talk page. (March 2014)

Following its withdrawal from Belgorod on the night of 5/6 August 1943, the

Kharkov

to prevent encirclement.

Only reaching the final defenses north of the city on 12 August 1943, following breakthroughs by the

The loss of this line of communication was a serious blow to the ability of the Army Detachment Kempf to defend its positions around the city. This meant critical delays of supplies and reinforcements, and the unit's position was becoming increasingly untenable. The way to Poltava now remained open, but Soviet General

These threats had led to a request by General Werner Kempf to abandon the city on 12 August 1943. Manstein did not object, but Adolf Hitler countered with an order that the city had to be held "under all circumstances". After a prediction that the order to hold Kharkov would produce "another Stalingrad", on 14 August 1943 Kempf was relieved by Manstein who appointed General Otto Wöhler in Kempf's place. A few days later, Army Group Kempf was renamed the 8th Army.^[20] Kharkov now constituted a deep German salient to the east, which prevented the Red Army from making use of this vital traffic and supply centre. Following boastful reports made by Soviet radio that Soviet troops had entered the city, when in fact it was still held by XI Army Corps, Joseph Stalin personally ordered its immediate capture.^[21]

The German supply situation in Kharkov was now untenable; artillerymen, after firing their last rounds, were abandoning their guns to fight as infantry. The army's supply depot had five trainloads of spare tank tracks left over from Operation Citadel but very little else. The high consumption of ammunition in the last month and a half had cut into supplies put aside for the last two weeks of August and the first two weeks of September; until the turn of the month the army would have to get along with fifty percent of its daily average requirements in artillery and tank ammunition. XI Army Corps now had a combat strength of only 4,000 infantrymen, one man for every ten yards of front.^[22] Two days after taking command of 8th Army, Wöhler also asked Manstein for permission to abandon the city. Regardless of Hitler's demands, Wöhler and Manstein agreed that the city could not be held for long.

On 21 August 1943, Manstein gave his consent to abandon Kharkov. On 22 August 1943 the German troops began their retreat from the city, under pressure from the Red Army. The

were blown up. Large German columns were then observed leaving the city and the Soviet troops pushed into the largely destroyed city.

Moving out of Kharkov to the south, the German forces fought to hold open a corridor through which the 8th Army could withdraw. Soviet artillery and mortars shelled the corridor, and planes strafed and bombed the German columns. After dark, the 89th Guards and 107th Rifle Divisions broke into the interior of the city, driving the last German rearguard detachments before them. Enormous fires were set by the Germans as part of the scorched earth policy.

By 0200 on 23 August 1943, elements of the

Aftermath

By re-establishing a continuous front on Army Group South's left flank, the 4th Panzer Army and the 8th Army had, for the moment, blunted the Soviet thrust, but to the north and southeast fresh blows had already been dealt or were in the making. The Red Army, on the other hand, employed the rippling effect that marked their offensives: if thwarted in one place, they would quickly shift to others. Most importantly, the failure of the German offensive in the Battle of Kursk meant the Germans permanently lost the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, although Hitler refused to acknowledge it. The defeat meant that, for the first time in the war, the Red Army had the full strategic initiative, and they used it well.^[24] Worse still, the large manpower losses of the Wehrmacht in July and August 1943 severely restricted Army Groups South and Centre's reactions to future Soviet thrusts during the winter of 1943 and in 1944, which was most evident in Operation Bagration during which the Red Army almost completely destroyed the German Army on the Eastern Front. Operations Polkovodets Rumyantsev, along with the concurrent Operation Kutuzov marked the first time in the war that the Germans were not able to defeat a major Soviet offensive during the summer and regain their lost ground and the strategic initiative.^[25]

Losses for the operation are difficult to establish due to large numbers of transfers and missing in action. Soviet casualties in the Belgorod–Kharkov sector during this operation are estimated to be 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded; 1,864 tanks, 423 artillery guns, and 153 aircraft were lost.^[5][6] German personnel losses were at least 10,000 killed and missing and 20,000 wounded. German tank losses are estimated to be several times lower than Soviet tank losses.^[26]

References

Citations

Sources