Union of Kėdainiai
Type | Establishing a Swedish–Lithuanian Union and legally dissolving the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth |
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Signed | 20 October 1655 |
Location | Kėdainiai, Lithuania |
Signatories |
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Parties |
The Union of Kėdainiai or Agreement of Kėdainiai (
The agreement was short-lived since the Swedish defeat at the Battles of Warka and Prostki and an uprising organised by the pro-Commonwealth nobility in Poland and Lithuania put an end to Swedish power and to the Radziwiłłs' influence.
History
Radziwiłłs' influence
The
Janusz Radziwiłł was the head of the Biržai line of Radziwiłłs and a leader of Lithuanian Protestants. He was a favorite of King
Russian and Swedish invasion
On October 3, 1654, Smolensk, the only major fortress capable of stopping the march of the Russian army deep into Lithuania, fell. At this point Radziwiłł entered into secret talks with Sweden seeking an agreement with them. But as he was still hoping to establish an alliance between the Commonwealth and Sweden, upon hearing of the ongoing negotiations he set out in the spring of 1655 on an expedition deep into Belarus against the Russian army.[8]
In 1654, during the Swedish-Russian invasion of Poland, known as
Secret talks with Sweden
Swedish troops also entered Polish Livonia capturing Dyneburg on July 17. At the same time, Russian and Cossack armies took offensives approaching Vilnius. The Lithuanian army was few in number. It consisted of three parts: the wojsko zaciężne, the crown reinforcements and the pospolite ruszenie. The crown reinforcements constituted a considerable force of up to 5,000 men. The wojsko zaciężne was of similar size, the size of the pospolite ruszenie is unknown, but it did not represent much military value. In early July, the king ordered the Crown army to leave Lithuania and head for Prussia. This act removed any hope of an effective defense of the Grand Duchy.[10]
In view of this, on July 29, Vilnius voivode Janusz Radziwiłł, Vilnius bishop Jerzy Tyszkiewicz and Lithuanian equerry Bogusław Radziwiłł called on the Swedish army for help.[11] Swedish troops entered Lithuania essentially as allies.[12] The Lithuanian lords probably knew about the events in Ujście. They placed themselves under the protection of the Swedish king, with no obligation to swear an oath of allegiance or sever ties with the Polish Crown. The proposals envisioned a union of the three states, or only Sweden and Lithuania, if Poland found itself under alien ruler.[11] At the same time, both Radzwills demanded the creation of fiefdoms for themselves, separate from the Grand Duchy, and covering much of its territory, as well as parts of the Crown.[13] Meanwhile, the Swedes also held talks with the Russians, to whom they proposed various lines for dividing the Grand Duchy's territory between them.[14]
Earlier, on August 3, royal secretary Krzysztof Scipio del Campo of Jan Kazimierz arrived in Lithuania, with permission for the Lithuanian lords to enter into truce talks with Moscow and Sweden.[15] The proposals for talks were rejected by the tsarist army, which captured Vilnius on August 9.[16] Part of the army, having received no pay, left the ranks of the army after the fall of Vilnius.[17] On August 10 in Riga, Magnus de la Gardie accepted the Lithuanian terms brought by Gabriel Lubieniecki but not without changes, taking the Grand Duchy under his protection on behalf of the Swedish king. The Lithuanian army was to be attached to the Swedish one, the Grand Duchy was to take on the maintenance of the entire army, the Swedes were to take control of all fortresses. The question of the Grand Duchy's relationship to the Crown and Sweden and the fief principalities for the Radziwiłłs was omitted.[18][19] On August 11, he called on the tsar's commanders to stop further march deep into Lithuania, which is under the protection of the Swedish king.[20]
Act of Josvainiai
Lubieniecki returned to Janusz Radziwiłł on August 15, who was not fully satisfied with the negotiated terms, but accepted them. And with him 436 people at the Josvainiai convention, among them field hetman Wincenty Gosiewski,
Eventually, most of the Polish-controlled Lithuanian army surrendered to the Swedes, and the state collapsed. Most of the
Treaty of Kėdainiai
Despite the officially proclaimed protection of the Swedish king, the Moscow army continued its march deep into Lithuania, occupying
On October 10, Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie arrived in Kėdainiai in an attempt to force the nobility to sign the final agreement. Janusz Radziwiłł's position was becoming weaker and weaker, he himself was constrained by private deals with the Swedes, and he was losing supporters. The Samogitian nobility, gathered in Kėdainiai, formed a confederation manifesting their separateness.[27] Bishop Jerzy Tyszkiewicz was away in Königsberg, and Bogusław Radziwiłł in his estates in Podlachia. On September 29, 1655, the army loyal to Janusz Radziwiłł, Cyprian Paweł Brzostowski in his letter to Bogusław Radziwiłł estimates at "under a thousand"; at the time, these were exclusively foreign contingents.[28] Particularly painful for the hetman was the departure from the ranks of his army by the hussar and armoured banners, but these returned to his command later and served him until his death.[29]
On 20 October 1655, Janusz Radziwiłł signed an agreement with the Swedes at his castle at
Aftermatch
The signing of the Kėdainiai Treaty strengthened Swedish rule in Lithuania in the short term and weakened the forces loyal to the Commonwealth and John II Casimir. King John II Casimir, who was staying in Silesia, took Paweł Sapieha's confederates into the pay of the Crown treasury.[31] On September 10, he granted them the traitors' estates in Lithuania. Instead of attempting to join the royal forces, they began plundering Radziwiłł's estates. They then entered into negotiations with Moscow, proposing a truce. This had little effect, and after October 20 Moscow took a further offensive, defeating Sapieha's troops.[32] At the same time, Paweł Sapieha maintained contacts with the Swedes, through the Swedish envoy Jan Fryderyk Sapieha. He eventually accepted the Swedish king's protection on December 5.[32]
Its main proponent, Janusz Radziwiłł, died only two months after it was signed, on 31 December at
The tide of the war soon turned and a popular uprising in Poland broke the power of the Swedish army. The Swedish occupation of Lithuania sparked a similar uprising in Lithuania. The Swedish defeat and the eventual retreat from the territories of the Commonwealth abruptly ended the plans of Janusz's cousin Bogusław, who lost his army in the Battle of Prostki and died in exile in Königsberg on 31 December 1669.
With the passing of both cousins, the Radziwiłł family fortunes waned. Bogusław became commonly known as Gnida ("Louse") by his fellow nobles, and Janusz was called Zdrajca ("Traitor"). Their treason against the Commonwealth largely overshadowed the deeds of the next generation's numerous other family members, including Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł (1625–1680), who served faithfully against the Swedes.
Assessment
Although seen as an act of treason by contemporaries, modern views on the Swedish–Lithuanian accord differ. Some argue that the arrangement with the Swedes was made by Janusz Radziwiłł not out of greed and the political ambition, but rather out of
See also
Sources
References
- ^ a b c Frost (2000), p. 168
- ^ a b Wasilewski 1973, p. 128.
- ^ a b c d Wasilewski, Tadeusz. "Janusz Radziwiłł h. Trąby". www.ipsb.nina.gov.pl (in Polish). Retrieved 2023-11-17.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, pp. 128–129.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, p. 130.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, pp. 129–130.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, p. 131.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, p. 134.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 85.
- ^ Wisner 1976, p. 105-106.
- ^ a b Wisner 1981, p. 87.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 86.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 88-89.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, p. 135.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 89-90.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 90.
- ^ Wisner 1976, p. 104-105.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 90-91.
- ^ a b Wasilewski 1973, p. 137.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 91-92.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 93.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 92-93.
- ^ a b c Wisner 1981, p. 94.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 99-100.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 96-97.
- ^ a b c d Wisner 1981, p. 95.
- ^ a b Wisner 1981, p. 98.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, p. 139.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, p. 139-141.
- ^ Wasilewski 1973, p. 138.
- ^ Wisner 1981, p. 100.
- ^ a b Wisner 1981, p. 100-101.
- ^ Bumblauskas, A. (2005). Senosios Lietuvos istorija (1009–1795) [The History of Medieval Lithuania] (in Lithuanian). R. Paknio leidykla. 307 p. ISBN 9986-830-89-3
- ^ Gerner, Kristian (2002). The Swedish and the Polish-Lithuanian Empires and the formation of the Baltic Region. Baltic University. p. 65.
Bibliography
- Frost, Robert I (2000). The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe 1558-1721. Harlow: Longman. ISBN 978-0-582-06429-4.
- Kotljarchuk, Andrej (2006). In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th century. Södertörns högskola. ISBN 91-89315-63-4.
- Wasilewski, Tadeusz (1973). "Zdrada Janusza Radziwiłła w 1655 r. i jej wyznaniowe motywy". Odrodzenie I Reformacja W Polsce. XVIII.
- Wisner, Henryk (1976). "Działalność wojskowa Janusza Radziwiłła, 1648-1655" [Military activities of Janusz Radziwiłł, 1648-1655]. Rocznik Białostocki. 13: 53–109.
- Wisner, Henryk (1981). "Rok 1655 w Litwie: pertraktacje ze Szwecją i kwestia wyznaniowa". Odrodzenie I Reformacja W Polsce. XXXVI.