Expedition to Ostend
Expedition to Ostend | |||||||
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Part of the French Revolutionary Wars | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Great Britain |
France Batavian Republic | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Home Riggs Popham Eyre Coote (POW) | Augustin Kellar | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
27 ships 1,400 soldiers | Local garrisons | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
163 killed and wounded 1,134 captured |
The British expedition to Ostend took place on 18 May 1798 during the
Background
Planning
In 1798 the French Revolutionary Wars were ongoing and France had for several years been threatening what would be the first of several planned invasions of Britain.[1] By the start of the year the majority of the invasion forces brought together for this had been diverted to join the French campaign in Egypt and Syria, but enough remained to cause worry.[2] Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger and his government, aware of the invasion flotilla that had been built up in France and the Batavian Republic, put out requests for solutions to halt or defend against Napoleon's plans. These included the scouring of the archives to create a dossier of documents profiling how the English had planned to defend against the Spanish Armada of 1588, which Pitt then used to create the Provisional Cavalry and Army of Reserve.[1] In April a proposal was put forward by General Sir Charles Grey, the commander of the British Army's Southern District, for offensive anti-invasion operations.[1][3]
In order to avoid attacks by Royal Navy warships in the
Organisation
The government supported the plan, but the
For the operation Popham was given a
Popham was fully aware that the expedition was dangerous and might fail, and that his part in it was very unpopular with many members of the military. He sent a letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Spencer requesting that if he was unsuccessful that Spencer would ensure Popham's subsequent trial would be fair and unbalanced. The force was ready to set sail on 14 May.[8]
Expedition
Landings
Popham only revealed his plans, which had been kept highly secret, to his men once the ships were at sea. Intending to make a quick crossing of the English Channel, the ships were initially halted in this action by a violent
While Popham's crews had been trained to arrive at their positions in the dead of night without the use of signals, a turn in the weather forced Popham to abandon the first attack. The expedition stayed at sea for another two days before on 18 May a captured ship revealed to Popham and Coote that the invasion craft at Flushing were making haste down the canal for Ostend and Dunkirk. With the weather having improved, it was decided that the attack should immediately go forward. The ships reached their various starting points at 1 a.m. on 19 May, by which time the wind had gotten up again and the sea was becoming rougher. Popham deliberated putting off the attack again, but was stopped in this from intelligence taken from a newly captured pilot boat that the nearby garrisons were all very small.[10]
Hearing the news, Coote begged Popham for the landings to go ahead, expecting that by the time their mission had been completed the weather would have quietened enough that the troops could reembark safely. Popham put the landings into effect immediately without waiting for the troopships to organise themselves, so that the de-embarkation was done out of the pre-arranged order. Coote's troops began to be landed, unobserved, on
Canal gates destroyed
The weather at sea continued to worsen after this and Coote looked to hurry the attack. At around 6 a.m. the warships assigned to the east side of Ostend harbour were sent towards the shore so that they could give
Men were sent to ensure that the garrison could not send fresh defenders across from the town via the harbour ferry route, and defensive positions were taken up around the sluices. Portions of the 11th and 23rd light infantry took control of
Coote cut off
Coote's force then began to make its way back to the landing beach, finding minimal resistance as it did so and having only five casualties.
The force stayed at the ready in their positions through the following day and night, with the weather conditions getting steadily worse. News of the attack had since reached the surrounding settlements, and soldiers had been formed together from the garrisons at Ghent, Bruges, and Dunkirk to repulse the British. At around 4 a.m. on 20 May these troops came up with Coote's force on the beach, organised into two columns directly opposing the British with other units on the flanks. Popham observed the French attack from his ships but the sea state meant that he was still unable to do anything to assist Coote. The French force pushed the British flanks in over a period of two hours of fighting, during which time Coote himself was badly injured while trying to rally the 11th. The decision was then made to capitulate, before which the Royal Artillery pushed its guns into the sea to stop them from being captured. Coote's force lost 163 men killed and wounded, with 1,134 men subsequently captured.[16]
Aftermath
When it was clear the Coote had surrendered, Popham weighed anchor and moved out to sea. Plans had been made to follow up the Ostend operation with similar attacks on the Scheldt and at Flushing, but these did not take place. Despite the ignominious end to Coote's force, the goal of the operation had been achieved. Lord Buckingham wrote to the Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville that he was "extremely happy in the success of your very important and very well digested attempt upon Ostend", calling it a "complete success". Despite the failure to rescue Coote's force, naval historian Sir Julian Corbett argues that as the destruction of the canal gates had the impact they had intended, the expedition was "a thoroughly well-designed, and brilliantly-executed enterprise". The Admiralty was blamed for the loss of Coote, with it being suggested that had Popham come up against less opposition to his plan in April then it would have been put into action before the coming of the bad weather and the losses would have been avoided.[17]
Ship | Guns | Commander | Notes | Ref. |
---|---|---|---|---|
HMS Expedition | 26 | Captain Home Riggs Popham | Nominally of 44 guns. Armed en flute as a troopship
|
[18] |
HMS Circe | 28 | Captain Robert Winthrop | ||
HMS Vestal | 28 | Captain Charles White | ||
HMS Ariadne | 20 | Captain James Bradby | ||
HMS Champion | 20 | Captain Henry Raper | ||
HMS Hebe
|
14 | Commander William Birchall | Nominally of 38 guns. Armed en flute as a troopship | |
HMS Minerva | 14 | Commander John McKellar | Nominally of 38 guns. Armed en flute as a troopship | |
HMS Druid | 12 | Commander Charles Apthorpe | Nominally of 32 guns. Armed en flute as a troopship | |
HMS Harpy | 16 | Commander Henry Bazely | ||
HMS Savage | 16 | Commander Norborne Thompson | ||
HMS Dart | 16 | Commander Richard Raggett | Nominally of 28 guns. Armed en flute as a troopship | |
HMS Kite | 16 | Commander William Brown | ||
HMS Tartarus | 8 | Commander Thomas Hand | ||
HMS Hecla | 8 | Commander James Oughton | ||
HMS Wolverine | 16 | Commander Lewis Mortlock | ||
HMS Blazer | 12 | Lieutenant Daniel Burgess | ||
HMS Vesuve | 4 | Lieutenant William Elliott | ||
HMS Crash | 12 | Lieutenant Bulkeley Macworth Praed | ||
HMS Boxer | 12 | Lieutenant Thomas Gilbert | ||
HMS Acute | 12 | Lieutenant Jeremiah Seaver | ||
HMS Asp | 12 | Lieutenant Joseph Edmonds | ||
HMS Furnace | 12 | Lieutenant Maurice William Suckling | ||
HMS Biter | 12 | Lieutenant John de Vitre | ||
HMS Cracker | 12 | Lieutenant Thomas Aitkinson | ||
Vigilant | 6 | |||
Terrier | 12 | T. Lewen | ||
Lion | 10 | S. Bevel |
Notes and citations
Notes
- ^ HMS Champion, HMS Dart, HMS Wolverine, HMS Crash, and HMS Acute[7]
- ^ HMS Kite, HMS Cracker, HMS Asp, Vigilant, and HMS Biter[7]
- ^ HMS Tartarus and HMS Hecla[7]
Citations
- ^ a b c Manwaring (1936), pp. 192–193.
- ^ a b Intelligence Branch (1884), p. 27.
- ^ a b Intelligence Branch (1884), pp. 27–28.
- ^ a b c Manwaring (1936), p. 193.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), pp. 194–195.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), p. 195.
- ^ a b c d Manwaring (1936), p. 197.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), pp. 196–197.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), pp. 197–198.
- ^ a b Manwaring (1936), pp. 198–199.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), p. 199.
- ^ a b Manwaring (1936), p. 200.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), p. 201.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), pp. 201–202.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), p. 202.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), pp. 202–203.
- ^ Manwaring (1936), p. 204.
- ^ Manwaring 1936, pp. 195–196.
References
- Field of Mars: Being an Alphabetical Digestion of the Principal Naval and Military Engagements, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, Particularly of Great Britain and Her Allies, from the Ninth Century to the Present Period... Vol. 2. G and J Robinson. 1801. p. 353–357.
- Intelligence Branch, Quartermaster-General's Department (1884). British Minor Expeditions, 1746–1814. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Manwaring, G. E. (1936). The Flower of England's Garland. London: Philip Allan & Co.
- Stephen, Leslie, ed. (1887). . Dictionary of National Biography. Vol. 12. London: Smith, Elder & Co. p. 161–162.
Further reading
- "No. 15017". The London Gazette. 19 May 1798. pp. 421–425.