Iranian principlists

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Not to be confused with Principlism.
Principlists
Spiritual leader
Right-wing
ReligionShia Islam
Executive branch
PresidentNo
Ministers
1 / 19 (5%)
Vice Presidents
0 / 14 (0%)
Speaker
Yes
Seats
198 / 290 (68%)
Judicial branch
Chief JusticeYes
StatusDominant[8]
Oversight bodies
Assembly of Experts
59 / 88 (67%)
Guardian Council
6 / 12 (50%)
Expediency Council
38 / 48 (79%)
City Councils
Tehran
21 / 21 (100%)
Mashhad
15 / 15 (100%)
Isfahan
13 / 13 (100%)
Shiraz
9 / 13 (69%)
Qom
13 / 13 (100%)
Shiraz
13 / 13 (100%)
Tabriz
6 / 13 (46%)
Yazd
11 / 11 (100%)
Rasht
9 / 11 (82%)
Part of a series on
Conservatism in Iran
Ideologies
Principles

Principlist groups

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Monarchists

Literature
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Organisations
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Related topics

The Principlists (

hardliners that some western sources use in the Iranian political context usually refers to the faction,[15] although the principlist camp also includes more centrist tendencies.[16] The faction rejects the status quo internationally,[5] but favors domestic preservation.[17]

Within Iranian politics, "principlist" refers to the conservative supporters of the

reformist rivals".[19]

A declaration issued by

Vilayat Faqih.[20]

The Principlists currently dominate the

Judiciary.[20]

They held the Presidency until the inauguration of Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian on 30 July 2024.[21]

Demographics

According to a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) in April 2017, 15% of Iranians identify as leaning Principlist. In comparison, 28% identify as leaning

Reformist.[22]

In April 2021, a joint public opinion survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and IranPoll found out that 19% of Iranians identified as Principlist while 7% were leaning Principlist, and if Reformists (21%) and leaning Reformist (10%) were still higher, they also noted that "the support base for the reformists has shrunk by about 8 percentage points since 2017, while the support base for the conservatives has grown by 4 percentage points."[23]

Factions

  • Ultra conservatives—also known as neoconservatives. This grouping is more aggressive and openly confrontational toward the West.[24] Many ultra or neo Principalists are laymen representing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) collectively.[24]
  • Traditional conservatives are a political faction that helped form
    the Revolutionary government and can point to personal ties with Ruhollah Khomeini.[24] These conservatives support the Islamist government and advocate for clerical rule.[25]
  • Deviant current

Election results

Presidential elections

Year Candidate(s) Votes % Rank
1997
Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri
 7,248,317 24.87 2nd
2001
 Ahmad Tavakkoli 4,387,112 15.58 2nd
2005/1
 		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 5,711,696 19.43 2nd
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 4,095,827 13.93 4th
Ali Larijani 1,713,810 5.83 6th
Total 11,521,333 39.19 Runoff
2005/2
 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 17,284,782 61.69 1st
2009
 		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 24,527,516 62.63 1st
Mohsen Rezaee 678,240 1.73 3rd
Total 25,205,756 64.36 Won
2013
 		Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 6,077,292 16.56 2nd
Saeed Jalili 4,168,946 11.36 3rd
Mohsen Rezaee 3,884,412 10.58 4th
Ali Akbar Velayati 2,268,753 6.18 6th
Total 16,399,403 44.68 Lost
2017
 		Ebrahim Raisi 15,835,794 38.28 2nd
Mostafa Mir-Salim 478,267 1.16 3rd
Total 16,314,061 39.44 Lost
2021
 		Ebrahim Raisi 18,021,945 72.35 1st
Mohsen Rezaee 3,440,835 13.81 2nd
Total 21,462,780 86.16 Won
2024/1 Saeed Jalili 9,473,298 40.38 2nd
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 3,363,340 14.34 3rd
Mostafa Pourmohammadi 206,397 0.88 4th
Total 13,043,035 55.60 Runoff
2024/2 Saeed Jalili 13,538,179 45.24 2nd

Parliament

Exclusive seats Election +/-
54 / 290 (19%)
 2000 Steady
196 / 290 (68%)
 2004 Increase 142
195 / 290 (67%)
 2008 Decrease 1
184 / 290 (63%)
 2012 Decrease 11
86 / 290 (30%)
 2016 Decrease 98
221 / 290 (76%)
 2020 Increase 135
199 / 290 (69%)
 2024 Decrease 22

Parties and organizations

Alliances

Electoral

Media

See also

Notes

References

  1. ISBN 978-0253020680
    .
  2. S2CID 145213603, 'Principlism' or osul-gera'i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami
    as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari'a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari'a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.
  3. ^
    S2CID 9926518
    , In fact, Iranian 'Islamists' of our day call themselves 'Usul gara', which literally means 'fundamentalist', but in a positive sense. It designates a 'person of principles' who is the 'true Muslim'.
  4. ^
    ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6
  5. ^
    ISBN 978-0833076373
  6. ^ Tait, Robert (18 August 2010). "Iranian President's New 'Religious-Nationalism' Alienates Hard-Line Constituency". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
  7. ISBN 9780815629788
  8. ^ "Freedom in the World: Iran", Freedom House, 2017, archived from the original on 17 May 2017, retrieved 25 May 2017
  9. ISBN 9780190468965
  10. ISBN 9780520280816
    . This discourse was eventually tagged with the Persian neologism osulgarāi, a word that can be translated into English as 'fundamentalist', since 'osul' means 'doctrine', 'root', or 'tenet'. According to several Iranian journalists, state-funded media were aware of the negative connotation of this particular word in Western countries. Preferring not to be lumped in with Sunni Salafism, the English-language media in Iran opted to use the term 'principlist', which caught on more generally.
  11. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7
    . 'Conservative' is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. 'Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as 'principlist', is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eshlahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congruous groups and individuals.
  12. ^ a b Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush (2012). "Glossary of the most commonly-used Persian terms and abbreviations". Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989–2009 (Ph.D. thesis). Martin, Vanessa (Supervisor). Royal Holloway, University of London. p. 11. Open access material licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
  13. ISBN 9781908433022
    .
  14. ISBN 978-1601270849
  15. S2CID 144111986
    , In Western sources, the term 'hard-liners' is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves Osul-gara. The word osul (plural of asl) means 'fundamentals', or 'principles' or 'tenets', and the verbal suffix -gara means 'those who uphold or promote'. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves Ommat Hezbollah. Ommat is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. Hezbollah literally means 'Party of Allah'. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as mohafezeh-kar ('conservative'). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms eqtedar-gara ('authoritarian') and tamamiyat-khah ('totalitarian') for what many Western observers have termed 'hard-liners'. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners eqtedar-gara.
  16. S2CID 153661674
    , What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hard-liners, but also more centre-right factions.
  17. ISBN 9781107010444
  18. ^ Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi (June 16, 2013). "Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope". Bloomberg. Retrieved March 10, 2015.
  19. ISBN 9780870033025
  20. ^ a b SHAUL, BAKHASH (12 September 2011). "Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. Retrieved March 10, 2015.
  21. ^ "Masoud Pezeshkian sworn in as Iranian president". www.nhk.or.jp. Retrieved 2 August 2024.
  22. ^ "Poll Results of Popular Leaning Towards Principlists and Reformists", Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) (in Persian), 28 April 2017, retrieved 1 June 2017 – via Khabaronline
  23. ^ "Disappointed in Rouhani, Iranians Seek a Different Sort of Leader in June Elections". Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 9 April 2021. Archived from the original on 7 November 2024. According to other IranPoll results, the support base for the reformists has shrunk by about 8 percentage points since 2017, while the support base for the conservatives has grown by 4 percentage points. Still, more Iranians self-identify as a reformist (21%) or leaning reformist (10%) than identify as a "principlist" (19%) or leaning principlist (7%). Four in 10 (43%) have no preference.
  24. ^
    doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.07.002
    .
  25. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1
    .
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