Liberal institutionalism
International relations theory |
---|
Politics portal |
Liberal institutionalism (or institutional liberalism or neoliberalism) is a theory of international relations that holds that international cooperation between states is feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can reduce conflict and competition. Neoliberalism is a revised version of liberalism. Alongside neorealism, liberal institutionalism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations.[1]
In contrast to neorealist scholarship (which is skeptical of prospects for sustainable cooperation), liberal institutionalism argues that cooperation is feasible and sustainable. Liberal institutionalists highlight the role of international institutions and regimes in facilitating cooperation between states.[2] Robert Keohane's 1984 book After Hegemony used insights from the new institutional economics to argue that the international system could remain stable in the absence of a hegemon, thus rebutting hegemonic stability theory.[3]
Keohane showed that international cooperation could be sustained through repeated interactions, transparency, and monitoring.[4][5] According to Keohane and other liberal institutionalists, institutions facilitate cooperation by:
- Reducing transaction costs[6][7]
- Providing information[6][7]
- Making commitments more credible[6]
- Establishing focal points for coordination[6][7]
- Facilitating the principle of reciprocity[6]
- Extending the shadow of the future[6][8][9]
- Enabling interlinkages of issues, which raises the cost of noncompliance[10]
Terminology
Some call the school of thought rational functionalism instead of liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalism is also close to—but not synonymous with—
Liberal institutionalism differs from other common international relations theories like realism in the fact that it does not ignore internal politics. Furthermore, institutional liberalism follows the idea that democracy and capitalism create systems which not only maintain peace but also create beneficial economic opportunities for those involved. Liberal institutionalists believe that democracies naturally lead to peace because the many govern and not the few, and therefore those who decide to go to war will be the many that serve. This is in stark contrast to monarchies and dictatorships that are more warlike due to the fact that the few that do not serve will go to war. Beyond that liberal institutionalists defend capitalism on an international scale because they believe that if two nations are friendly, democratic, and capitalist the two nations will inevitably negotiate mutually beneficial trade deals.
Role of institutions
According to liberal institutionalists, institutions facilitate cooperation by:
- Reducing transaction costs[6][7]
- Providing information[6][7]
- Making commitments more credible[6]
- Establishing focal points for coordination[6][7]
- Facilitating the principle of reciprocity[6]
- Extending the shadow of the future[6][8][9]
- Enabling interlinkages of issues, which raises the cost of noncompliance[10]
Critics of liberal institutionalism argue that institutions do not overcome power politics; rather, institutions reflect power politics.[16][17] Realist Joseph Grieco argues that liberal institutionalist analyses omit that states pursue relative gains (rather than absolute gains), and that institutionalist analyses that focus on the issue of "cheating" ignore that the relative gains problem is key to why realists believe international cooperation fails.[17] Critics also argue that it is unclear whether institutions have an independent effect on cooperation or whether they reflect that the members are already willing to cooperate and comply.[18] Other critics argue that liberal institutionalist underestimate the enforcement powers of institutions: institutions are often designed to be weak to attract more members,[19] and they tend to be particularly weak on issues related to security rather than economy.[20]
Using logics from historical institutionalism, John Ikenberry argues that institutions may be highly durable because
- They strengthen expectations about future behavior
- They build coalitions, routines and connections between actors, which creates incentives for continuity
- They lead to spillovers, as other forms of cooperation builds around the existing institutions
- High start-up costs prevent actors from setting up challenger institutions
- Learning effects create incentives for actors to stick with existing institutions.[21]
Contentions
Keohane and Nye
The heart of Keohane and Nye's argument is that in international politics there are, in fact, multiple channels that connect societies exceeding the conventional
Secondly, Keohane and Nye argue that there is not, in fact, a hierarchy among issues, meaning that not only is the martial arm of foreign policy not the supreme tool by which to carry out a state's agenda, but that there is a multitude of different agendas that come to the forefront. The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred in this case, as realistically there is no clear agenda in interstate relations.
Finally, the use of military force is not exercised when complex interdependence prevails. The idea is developed that between countries in which a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving disputes is negated. However, Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of the military is in fact important in that "alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc."
Lebow
Mearsheimer
Norman Angell, a classical London School of Economics liberal, had held: "We cannot ensure the stability of the present system by the political or military preponderance of our nation or alliance by imposing its will on a rival."[25]
Keohane and
Mearsheimer is concerned with 'inner-directed' institutions, which he states, "seek to cause peace by influencing the behavior of the member states." In doing so he dismisses Keohane and Martin's NATO argument in favor of the example of the
Mearsheimer criticizes Martin's argument that the
See also
- European integration
- Foreign interventionism
- Liberal internationalism
- Liberal international order
- Multilateralism
- Liberal international relations theory
- Marxist international relations theory
- Neoconservatism
- Neorealism
- New Left
References
- from the original on 2022-12-24. Retrieved 2023-06-26.
- from the original on 2021-08-11. Retrieved 2021-08-11.
- ISSN 1094-2939.
- from the original on 2021-08-31. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ISBN 978-0-521-76543-5. Archivedfrom the original on 2021-08-18. Retrieved 2021-08-11.
- ^ from the original on 2021-08-31. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ^ from the original on 2023-06-05. Retrieved 2023-06-26.
- ^ from the original on 2021-08-07. Retrieved 2021-08-07.
- ^ ISSN 1531-5088.
- ^ from the original on 2021-08-15. Retrieved 2021-08-15.
- ^ David Baldwin (1993) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 10.
- ^ Beth A. Simmons and Lisa L. Martin (2002) International Organizations and Institutions. In "Handbook of International Relations", edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 192–211. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 195.
- ^ Robert Keohane (1993). Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War. In "Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate", edited by David A. Baldwin, 269–300. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 273.
- ^ Robert Keohane (1984). After Hegemony: Power and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 14.
- ^ Robert Keohane (1993). Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War. In "Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate", edited by David A. Baldwin, 269–300. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 272.
- from the original on 2021-08-12. Retrieved 2021-08-08.
- ^ from the original on 2021-08-08. Retrieved 2021-08-08.
- from the original on 2021-08-08. Retrieved 2021-08-08.
- from the original on 2021-08-08. Retrieved 2021-08-08.
- from the original on 2021-08-08. Retrieved 2021-08-08.
- ISBN 978-0-691-05091-1.
- ISBN 9780316489362.
- ISBN 9780316489362.
- ^ Waltz, 90; quoted in Richard Ned Lebow, "The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism", International Organization, 48, 2 (Spring 1994), 273
- ^ Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, (1909) cited from 1933 ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons),p. 137.
- ^ S2CID 29960902.
- ^ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), 47.
- (PDF) from the original on 23 December 2018. Retrieved 25 April 2013.
- ^ Mearsheimer, 83–87.
- ^ (PDF) from the original on 23 December 2018. Retrieved 25 April 2013.
- (PDF) from the original on 23 December 2018. Retrieved 25 April 2013.