Operation Dracula
Operation Dracula | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Burma Campaign | |||||||
Landing craft carry troops up the Rangoon River | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Naval Support: France Netherlands | Japan | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Sir Philip Christison | Unknown | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
1 infantry division 1 airborne battalion | small parties | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
24 (from friendly fire) | 30 |
Operation Dracula was a
The plan was first proposed in mid-1944 when the Allied
During April 1945, units of the British
Background
Rangoon was the capital and major port of
The Japanese
There was stalemate for a year. By 1944, the Allied forces in India had been reinforced and had expanded their logistic infrastructure, which made it possible for them to contemplate an attack into Burma. The Japanese attempted to forestall them by an invasion of India, which led to a heavy Japanese defeat at the Battle of Imphal, and other setbacks in Northern Burma. Their losses were to handicap their defence of Burma in the following year.
Allied plans
In July, 1944, the Allied South East Asia Command began making definite plans for the reconquest of Burma. The Battle of Imphal was still being fought but it was clear that the Japanese would be forced to retreat with heavy casualties.[1]
One of the strategic options examined by South East Asia Command was an amphibious assault on Rangoon. This originally had the working name, Plan Z. (Plan X referred to the recapture of northern Burma only by the American-led Northern Combat Area Command with the limited objective of completing the Ledo Road linking China and India; Plan Y referred to an Allied offensive into Central Burma by the British Fourteenth Army.)[2]
Plan Z, which was to be developed into Operation Dracula, had several advantages. The loss of Rangoon would be even more disastrous for the Japanese in 1945 than it had been for the British in 1942. Not only was it the principal seaport by which the Japanese in Burma received supplies and reinforcements, but it lay very close to their other lines of communication with Thailand and
However, the Allied planners considered that to mount an amphibious assault on the scale required would need resources (landing craft, escorting warships, engineering equipment) which would not be available until the campaign in Europe was concluded. (At the time, the Battle of Normandy was being fought, with its outcome still in doubt in some quarters). Operation Dracula was therefore postponed, and Plan Y (now codenamed Operation Capital) was adopted instead.[3]
When sufficient numbers of landing craft and other amphibious resources became available late in 1944, they were first used in operations in the Burmese coastal
Dracula reinstated
During February and March, 1945, the Fourteenth Army (Lieutenant General
Despite these spectacular successes, Slim was uneasy. Although Messervy and several of his commanders considered there was a sporting chance that they might capture Rangoon at the beginning of May, Fourteenth Army's supply lines were strained to the limit by the rapid advances. The
Since Slim's forces would be in a disastrous supply situation if Rangoon was not captured before the monsoon broke, in late March he asked that Operation Dracula be reinstated, to take place before the monsoon began, which was expected in early May. On 2 April, Admiral
Battle for Rangoon
The principal Japanese headquarters in Burma, the
Kimura had already decided not to defend Rangoon, but to evacuate the city and withdraw to
However, Tanaka flew north with several senior staff officers on 19 April to review the situation around Toungoo. While he was absent, the remaining staff drew up orders for the evacuation, which Kimura signed unhesitatingly.[8] When Tanaka returned on 23 April, he protested, to no avail. Because the Army HQ's radios had already been moved to Moulmein, the Army could no longer control the overall battle for Burma from Rangoon.[10]
Japanese evacuation of Rangoon
As the leading British and Indian troops approached Pegu, many of the Japanese rear-area troops in the Rangoon area and even some hastily mobilised Japanese civilians were formed into the Japanese 105th Independent Mixed Brigade under Major General Hideji Matsui, who had recently been appointed commander of the "Rangoon Defence Force". The units of this brigade (also called Kani Force) included anti-aircraft batteries, airfield construction battalions, naval Anchorage Units, the personnel of NCO schools and other odds and ends. They were dispatched north to defend Pegu, although they were delayed by lack of transport (which had been commandeered for Burma Area Army HQ and other units leaving Rangoon) and arrived only piecemeal.[11]
Major General Matsui was also angered by the evacuation of Rangoon, as he had not been informed of it before finding that Kimura's headquarters had been hastily abandoned on 26 April.[12] After making unsuccessful attempts to evacuate Allied prisoners of war unable to walk and to demolish the port installations, Matsui then went north to conduct the defence of Pegu.
Many Japanese troops left Rangoon by sea, and nine out of eleven ships of a convoy carrying a thousand soldiers fell victim to British destroyers in the Gulf of Martaban on April 30.[13] Kimura himself left by airplane. Most of Kimura's HQ and the establishments of Ba Maw and Subhas Chandra Bose (commander of the Indian National Army), left overland, covered by the action of Matsui's troops at Pegu, but were attacked several times by Allied aircraft. The Japanese failed to provide transport for Ba Maw's staff, most of whom had to walk to Moulmein. Ba Maw himself began his journey by car accompanied by his wife and his pregnant daughter, who gave birth at Kyaikto, 16 miles (26 km) east of the Sittang. He feared that he would be assassinated if he went to Moulmein[14] and instead fled to Tokyo.[15] Bose regarded Ba Maw's flight as dishonourable, and marched on foot with his rearmost troops, having first arranged for lorries to evacuate a women's unit, the Rani of Jhansi Regiment.
The only personnel remaining in Rangoon were 5,000 troops of the Indian National Army under Major General A. D. Loganathan,[16] left by Bose to protect the remaining Indian community against attacks by lawless Burmese. Loganathan had no intention of resisting Allied attacks, and intended to hand over his men and responsibility for the city to the British when they arrived.
Battle for Pegu
While this evacuation was proceeding, the leading British and Indian troops of IV Corps (the Indian 17th Division, commanded by Major General David Tennant Cowan, with the bulk of 255th Indian Tank Brigade under command), were approaching Pegu. Messervy's leading armoured troops first met resistance from Matsui's forces on 27 April.[17] Matsui had sent a detachment (mainly of mixed line of communication troops, but also including 138 Battalion of 24 Independent Mixed Brigade) forward to defend Payagyi, a few miles north of Pegu.[18] Matsui's engineers laid mines (including some improvised from aerial bombs) and booby-trapped obstacles to delay the British tanks. Even more delay was imposed by torrential rain which fell on 28 April, which turned dusty tracks into mud and caused streams and rivers to rise in spate.
On 28 April, the advancing troops of IV Corps cut the road between Pegu and the Sittang River, thus finally cutting the Japanese communications between Rangoon and Moulmein. A small Japanese truck convoy which ran into the road block was wiped out.[19]
The Indian 17th Division cleared Payagyi and several surrounding villages on 29 April. They launched their main attack on Pegu on 30 April. The Japanese held the western part of Pegu, and demolished all the bridges across the Pegu River which separated their positions from the eastern part of the town. Reservoirs and flooded fields prevented the Indian Division making any outflanking moves. Indian infantry (4/
However, on the morning of 1 May, Indian patrols found that the Japanese had withdrawn. The 17th Division rapidly bridged the Pegu River and resumed its advance, but the monsoon had already broken. Within hours, the countryside was flooded, and the advance was slowed to a crawl. Slim immediately put all of IV Corps on half rations to help the supply lines.
On 30 April, Matsui had received another order from Kimura, now in Moulmein, to abandon Pegu and return to defend Rangoon to the death. Although he could have continued to resist in Pegu for some days if necessary, he accordingly withdrew. As his force did so, they came under attack as they moved along the exposed road to Hlegu. Matsui ordered a retreat into the hills west of Pegu.[21]
Dracula launched
Although the British knew by 24 April from
The Indian 26th Division and other forces sailed in six convoys from Akyab and Ramree Island between 27 April and 30 April. The transporting and landing of British and Indian assault forces was entrusted to Rear-Admiral
Early on 1 May, eight squadrons of
Once Elephant Point was secured,
Aftermath
The troops of the Indian 26th Division began occupying the city without opposition on 2 May. The British were joyfully welcomed, perhaps not universally as liberators, but certainly as they could restore order and bring in food and other assistance. When the Japanese and Ba Maw's officials left Rangoon, widespread looting and lawlessness had broken out and continued for several days. The retreating Japanese had burned down the jail housing Burmese prisoners. They had also destroyed St. Philomena's Convent, which had been used as a hospital, killing 400 of their own men.
Units of the 26th Division moved out along the main roads to link up with Fourteenth Army. On 6 May, they met the leading troops of 17th Division, pushing their way through floods southwards from Pegu, at Hlegu 28 miles (45 km) north east of Rangoon. Fourteenth Army and the other Allied forces in Burma thus had a secure line of communication.
Matsui's Kani Force joined the remnants of the Japanese Twenty-Eighth Army in the Pegu Yomas. During July, these forces tried to break out eastwards to join the other Japanese armies east of the Sittang. Matsui's men suffered slightly lighter casualties in this costly operation than most of the other Japanese units involved. However, the naval personnel in Matsui's force broke out separately from the main body and several days later, which allowed Allied units to concentrate against them. They were effectively wiped out, only a handful surviving.
References
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 367.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 368.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 369.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 474.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 469.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 473.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 486.
- ^ a b Allen 1986, p. 482.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, p. 435.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 483.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 477.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 484.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 467.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 487].
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, p. 436.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 485.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 474.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 475.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 476.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 478.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 479.
- ^ Allen 1986, p. 481.
- ^ a b Chant, Christopher. "Modified Dracula, Operations & Codenames of WWII". codenames.info. C. Chant, 24 May 2018. Retrieved 23 July 2018.
- ^ Kindell, Don. "East Indies Fleet War Diary 1945". www.naval-history.net. Gordon Smith, 15 July 2011. Retrieved 23 July 2018.
- ^ Y'Blood 2008, p. 185.
- ^ Allen 1986, pp. 479–480.
- ^ a b Hudson 1987, p. 180.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, p. 437.
- ^ BaylyHarper 2004, pp. 437–439.
Sources
- Allen, Louis (1986). Burma: the Longest War 1941–45. ISBN 0-460-02474-4.
- Bayly, Christopher; Harper, Tim (2004). Forgotten Armies: Britain's Asian Empire & the War with Japan. London: Penguin History. ISBN 0-14-029331-0.
- Hudson, Lionel (1987). The Rats of Rangoon. Leo Cooper.[ISBN missing]
- ISBN 978-0-7195-6576-2.
- OCLC 464081360.
- Y'Blood, William (2008). Air Commandos Against Japan. ISBN 978-1-59114-993-4.
External links
- "London Gazette Supplement April 1951". p. 1296. Retrieved 30 September 2022.
- "EXTRACT DIGIT" photo of Rangoon Prison.