Burma campaign (1942–1943)
Burma campaign 1942–1943 | |
---|---|
Part of the Burma | |
Result | Axis victory |
Republic of China
- Shojiro Iida
- Masakazu Kawabe
- Ba Maw
The Burma campaign in the
When the rains ceased, the Allies launched two offensives. One, an attack in the coastal
India and Burma, May – December 1942
A total of about 450,000 Allied troops faced 300,000 Japanese.[4] However, both Allied and Japanese operations were constrained by terrain and logistics. The frontier region between Burma and India was for the most part almost impassable country, with very few practicable routes through the jungle-clad hills. The Japanese could make use of rail and river transport only as far as the port of Kalewa on the Chindwin River, while the Allies depended on inadequate rail and river links to Dimapur in the Brahmaputra River valley, from where a single road led to the base at Imphal.
Allies
The Far Eastern theatre was accorded the lowest priority by the
Allied efforts in India were also hampered by the disordered state of Eastern India at the time. In the aftermath of the Allied military disasters in the early months of 1942, there were violent
Axis
The Japanese were consolidating their position in Burma. Lieutenant General
Within Burma, the Japanese disbanded the
Lieutenant General Iida made efforts to promote Burma's interests, but he was repeatedly overruled by directives from Tokyo, and was relieved in 1943, partly because he objected to Tokyo's economic policies in Burma.[8]
Operations
First Arakan campaign
In spite of their difficulties, the Allies mounted two operations during the 1942–1943 dry season. The first was a small scale offensive into the coastal
Japanese reinforcements, amounting to an understrength division, arrived from Central Burma. Crossing rivers and mountain ranges which the Allies had assumed to be impassable, they hit 14th Division's exposed left flank on 3 April 1943 and overran several units.[11] The division's headquarters was replaced by that of 26th Indian Division, which attempted to hold a defensive line south of the town of Buthidaung, and even to surround the Japanese as they pressed their advantage. The exhausted units which the division had inherited were unable to hold this line and were forced to abandon much equipment and fall back almost to the Indian frontier.[12]
Irwin was dismissed, partly as a result of this disaster. He made several disparaging remarks regarding the state of equipment, training and morale of Eastern Army. Although not wholly inaccurate, they were widely resented.[13] Irwin's successor, General George Giffard, concentrated on restoring the army's administration and morale.
First Chindit expedition
The second action was much more controversial. Under the command of Brigadier Orde Wingate, the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, better known as the Chindits, infiltrated through the Japanese front lines and marched deep into Burma with the initial aim of cutting the main north–south railway in Burma. The operation (codenamed Operation "Longcloth") had originally been conceived as part of a much larger coordinated offensive, which had to be aborted due to lack of supplies and shipping. Rather than let the Chindits' training be wasted, Wingate nevertheless carried out the operation, even though its original purpose was invalid.[citation needed]
Some 3,000 men entered Burma in seven columns. They caused some damage to the communications of the Japanese in northern Burma, cutting the railway for possibly two weeks. However, they suffered heavy casualties: 818 killed, wounded or missing, 27% of the original force.[citation needed] Those who did return were wracked with disease and quite often in dreadful physical condition. Though the operational results were questioned, both at the time and subsequently, the raid was used to great propaganda effect to prove to British and Indian soldiers that they could live, move and fight as effectively as the Japanese in the jungle, countering the impression created after the battles of early 1942 that the Japanese could not be beaten in such terrain.[citation needed]
It was also said by the Japanese commanders after the war that the Japanese in Burma decided later to take the offensive in 1944, rather than adopt a purely defensive stance, as a direct result of the Chindit operation.[citation needed]
Central Front
There was continual patrol activity and low-key fighting on the frontier south of Imphal, but neither army possessed the resources to mount decisive operations.
V Force, an irregular force raised by GHQ India in the frontier areas of Burma and India, also patrolled and scouted in the large areas controlled by neither army, but could have no decisive effect on Japanese operations.
Burma Road and the "Hump"
At American insistence, one of the overriding Allied strategic aims was the maintenance of supplies to the
At the insistence of the American Joseph Stilwell, who was chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek among other appointments, the Allies also began construct the Ledo Road to link India with China, which was to prove an enormous engineering task. As part of the preparations to drive this road through Japanese-occupied northern and eastern Burma, two divisions of Chinese troops who had retreated into India in 1942 were re-equipped and trained by the Americans at camps in Ramgarh in Bihar. Following Wingate's raid and the expansion of his force for the campaigning season of 1943–1944, the Americans also formed the long-range penetration unit which later became known as Merrill's Marauders and deployed them to Ledo.
The Americans also supplied logistical units (especially construction units and railway operating personnel) which improved and maintained the Allied railway lines and river transport in North Eastern India, in preparation for Allied offensives in 1944.[16]
Fort Hertz
In mid-1942, a small reconnaissance party was parachuted into the Myitkyina area, to investigate Myitkyina and the outpost at Fort Hertz in the far north of Burma, which had been cut off from India. Fort Hertz was found to be still in Allied hands. Liaison and engineering parties were flown or parachuted into Fort Hertz, and a locally raised irregular force, the Kachin Levies, was established. The airstrip was improved to become an emergency landing strip for aircraft flying the "Hump" route.[17]
Although the Kachin Levies were directly controlled at first by Eastern Army (and later by Fourteenth Army), they were later transferred to the American Northern Combat Area Command, to cooperate more closely with the impending American and Chinese advance from Ledo.
Burma Railway
Like the Allies, the Japanese sought to improve their lines of communication within South East Asia. To this end, they constructed the
Aftermath
Allied command changes
The
In August 1943, the new Allied
Wavell meanwhile became
The Eastern Army was also split, into the Fourteenth Army, part of South East Asia Command and responsible for the conduct of operations in Manipur and the Arakan, and Eastern Command, which reported to GHQ India and was responsible for rear-area security and the lines of communication.
Japanese command changes and plans
In March 1943, the Japanese created a new army-level headquarters, the
In August, Lieutenant General Iida was replaced as commander of the Fifteenth Army by Lieutenant General Mutaguchi, former commander of the 18th Division. From the moment he took charge, Mutaguchi forcefully advocated a bold offensive into India for the following year, in contrast to his earlier dismissal of the chances of such an attack succeeding. The offensive plan, codenamed U-Go, was endorsed by Imperial General Headquarters and was launched the following year.
Notes
References
Citations
- ^ Allen 1984.
- ^ Brayley 2002.
- ^ Allen 1984, p. 113.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, p. 273.
- ^ Masters 2002, p. 126.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, pp. 247–251.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, pp. 285–291.
- ^ Allen 1984, pp. 559–563.
- ^ Allen 1984, p. 96.
- ^ Allen 1984, p. 98.
- ^ Slim 1956, pp. 156–158.
- ^ Allen 1984, p. 112.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, pp. 274–275.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 284.
- ^ Allen 1984, p. 390.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 173.
- ^ Slim 1956, p. 349.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, p. 275.
- ^ Bayly & Harper 2004, pp. 303–306.
Sources
- Allen, Louis (1984). Burma: The Longest War 1941–1945. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. ISBN 978-0460024747.
- Bayly, Christopher; Harper, Tim (2004). Forgotten Armies: Britain's Asian Empire & the War with Japan. Penguin History. ISBN 978-0140293319.
- Brayley, Martin (2002). "The British Army 1939-45". Men at Arms. Vol. (3): The Far East. Osprey Publishing. p. 19. ISBN 978-1841762388.
- ISBN 978-0304361571.
- ASIN B0017YSRWG.
Further reading
- ASIN B0000CM2VR.
- Drea, Edward J. (1998). "An Allied Interpretation of the Pacific War". In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0803217089.
- Fergusson, Bernard (1945). Beyond the Chindwin: An Account Of The Adventures Of Number Five Column Of The Wingate Expedition Into Burma, Rangoon 1943. Collins.
- Latimer, Jon (2004). Burma: The Forgotten War. John Murray. ISBN 978-0719565755.
- Newell, Clayton R. Burma, 1942. World War II Campaign Brochures. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-21. Archived from the original on 2011-08-28. Retrieved 2010-06-14.
- Ochi, Harumi. Struggle in Burma.
- The Burma Campaign Memorial library is a comprehensive collection of writings about the war in Burma [Myanmar], 1942–1945 and is held by SOAS Special Collections. Digital copies of volumes are available online here.
- "No. 38274". Claude E. Auchinleck, War Office. (or see this HTML version)