Battle of Shumshu
Battle of Shumshu | |||||||||
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Part of the Invasion of the Kuril Islands during World War II | |||||||||
Damaged Japanese tanks on Shumshu | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Soviet Union | Japan | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Dmitry Ponomarev | |||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
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Strength | |||||||||
8,821 troops 64 ships and craft |
8,480-8,500 troops 77 tanks | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Soviet claim: 1,516-3,472 total, as 516-2,421 killed or died of wounds (excluding naval personnel) killed and wounded |
Japanese claim: 600 total,[5] as 191 killed[6] and c.409 wounded 20 tanks destroyed[7] Soviet claim: 1,018 total, either as: 369 killed and 649 wounded or 473 killed/died of wounds and 545 wounded[4] |
The Battle of Shumshu, the Soviet invasion of Shumshu in the Kuril Islands, was the first stage of the Soviet Union's Invasion of the Kuril Islands in August–September 1945 during World War II. It took place from 18 to 23 August 1945, and was the only major battle of the Soviet campaign in the Kuril Islands and arguably the very last battle of World War II.
Background
The Soviet Union and Japan maintained neutrality toward each other after signing the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941, although the two countries were allied with each other′s World War II enemies from 1941 until the conclusion of the war in 1945.[8] The Soviet Union turned down Allied requests for any actions which might provoke Japan, but discussed plans to base American aircraft on Soviet territory for operations against Japan after the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan.
As Stalin had promised, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on 8 August 1945, exactly three months after the capitulation of Germany, and began
Preparations
On 15 August 1945, the commander-in-chief of Soviet armed forces in the
Purkayev and Yumashev placed the commander of the Soviet Army's
Forces
The
Planning
Gnechko and Ponomarev assessed the challenging schedule, concluding that the movement of a force over the 170 nautical miles (310 km; 200 mi) from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Shumshu in the world's foggiest waters would itself take 24 hours, leaving them only 24 hours to assemble an assault force if they were to meet the requirement to land on Shumshu by the evening of 17 August 1945 as ordered. Gnechko requested and received a 24-hour postponement, which moved the landing requirement to no later than the evening of 18 August 1945.[18]
Although Soviet intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese troops on Shumshu were demoralized by Japanese Emperor Hirohito's announcement on 15 August 1945 that Japan intended to surrender, Gnechko believed that the Japanese advantage in numbers could put the operation in jeopardy. Chronically poor weather in the area limited the ability of Soviet aircraft to conduct reconnaissance or provide support to a landing, but they were tasked to attack Paramushiro's naval base to interdict Japanese reinforcements attempting to reach Shumshu.[7]
Gnechko also feared that his force lacked sufficient artillery and naval gunfire support for its initial
Gnechko planned to rely on four 130-mm (5.1-inch) guns on
On the Japanese side, the 91st Infantry Division did not expect a Soviet attack. However, the Kurils had been a Japanese possession since 1875, and Japanese forces had garrisoned them throughout World War II, giving them great familiarity with the terrain. Nearby Paramushiro had been the major Japanese base in the
Landings
The Soviet landing force left Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky at 05:00 on 17 August 1945 and, after a 21-hour voyage, arrived in the First Kuril Strait at 02:00 on 18 August 1945 and took up positions for the landings on Shumshu. The first wave of about 1,000 naval infantrymen went ashore at 04:30 on 18 August 1945. Completely surprised, the Japanese mounted a disorganized defense, but the Soviets were unable to exploit this properly; inexperienced in amphibious landings, the naval infantrymen indulged in uncoordinated advances inland instead of focusing on the primary objective of establishing a secure beachhead of sufficient depth to bring artillery and mortars ashore. By 05:30, the Japanese had manned machine guns in pillboxes and foxholes and begun to inflict heavy casualties on the Soviets. The Soviets also took too long to begin their assaults against Japanese coastal artillery positions, which the Japanese defended fiercely. At 06:00, some Soviet units of the first wave finally attempted an attack on the Japanese batteries on Cape Kokutan, but were too outnumbered to breach the defenses. The Soviets held off a Japanese counterattack by infantry and 20 tanks, destroying 15 of the tanks, and then charged up the heights toward the artillery sites, but were repulsed near the top.[7]
Japanese coastal artillery soon found the range against Soviet ships. Almost completely lacking
At same time, a Soviet minesweeper KT-152 was sunk near Shumshu. It is believed to have been attacked by a kamikaze plane.[20][21][22]
At 09:10, Soviet forces on Shumshu – badly in need of reinforcements and supplies – finally established radio contact with the ships offshore and with the four guns on Cape Lopatka. The gunfire from Cape Lopatka was particularly effective, and the Soviet troops held out against repeated Japanese counterattacks. By the afternoon, with the weather improving, Soviet aircraft began to attack the naval base on Paramushiro to prevent Japanese reinforcements from reaching Shumshu, and the Soviets had established good communications between their troops ashore, gunfire support ships, and Soviet aircraft, which combined to inflict heavy casualties on counterattacking Japanese. By the evening of 18 August 1945, the Soviets had established a beachhead 4 km (2.5 miles) wide and 5 to 6 km (3.1 to 3.75 miles) deep and had managed to bring artillery and mortars ashore.[23]
Killed while silencing a Japanese machine-gun position on Shumshu on 18 August 1945, Soviet Naval Infantry
Conclusion of operation
In a series of attacks during the night of 18–19 August 1945, the Soviets wiped out most of the defenses of the Japanese shore batteries, and Gnechko made plans to bring all Japanese resistance on Shumshu to an end on 19 August. Soviet heavy artillery came ashore on the morning of 19 August, and small groups of Japanese began to surrender. At 09:00, a Japanese envoy informed the Soviets that the 91st Infantry Division had received orders from higher command to cease hostilities at 16:00.[23]
Japanese forces on Shumshu, Paramushiro, and Onekotan signed an unconditional surrender agreement at 18:00 on 19 August 1945. However, fighting on Shumshu continued to flare up until 23 August 1945, when the last Japanese on the island finally surrendered.[23]
Results
The Battle of Shumshu was the only battle between the Soviets and Japanese in August–September 1945 in which Soviet casualties exceeded those of the Japanese. The Soviets suffered 1,567 casualties – 516 killed or missing and another 1,051 wounded – and the loss of five landing ships, while Japanese casualties totaled 1,018 – 256 killed and another 762 wounded.
With Shumshu and Paramushiro under Soviet control, the rest of the Kuril Island chain, much more lightly held by Japanese forces, fell to Soviet forces easily. The Soviets completed their occupation of the Kurils on 5 September 1945.[26]
See also
- Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation
- Soviet–Japanese War
- Invasion of South Sakhalin
- Project Hula
Footnotes
- ^ John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese frontier in the Pacific, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1974, ISBN 0-19-821563-0, p. 165.
- ^ "Тихоокеанский флот и Амурская флотилия в разгроме Японии".
- ^ "Боевые действия на Южном Сахалине и Курилах в августе 1945 г. в свете новых архивных материалов".
- ^ a b https://elizovolib.ru/media/2018/08/05/1228365142/KAMCHATKA_V_GODY_VOV.pdf Archived 11 March 2021 at the Wayback Machine p. 82, retrieved 6 April 2018
- ^ a b "Tossランド". www.tos-land.net. Retrieved 6 April 2018.
- ^ "Kurile Operation" Retrieved 6 April 2018.
- ^ ISBN 0-945274-35-1, pp. 30–31.
- ISBN 0-945274-35-1, pp. 3–4.
- ISBN 0-945274-35-1, pp. 4–8.
- ^ ISBN 0-945274-35-1, p. 8.
- ^ Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan-And Why Truman Dropped the Bomb. Simon & Schuster. pp. 155–162.
- ^ http://www.rgo.ru/en/article/last-battle-world-war-ii-0
- ^ ISBN 0-945274-35-1, pp. 29–33.
- ^ "第12航空艦隊" (in Japanese). Retrieved 21 April 2024.
- ^ "第51警備隊" (in Japanese). Retrieved 21 April 2024.
- ^ "第52警備隊" (in Japanese). Retrieved 21 April 2024.
- ^ "占守通信隊" (in Japanese). Retrieved 21 April 2024.
- ^ ISBN 0-945274-35-1, p. 30.
- ^ Russell, p. 19.
- ^ "Смертники и полусмертники против Красной Армии" (in Russian). Archived from the original on 13 January 2020. Retrieved 7 October 2022.
- ^ "Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy". Retrieved 7 October 2022.
- ^ オネール 1988, p. 292
- ^ a b c d e Russell, p. 31.
- ISBN 0-945274-35-1, p. 32.
- ^ Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan-And Why Truman Dropped the Bomb. Simon & Schuster. pp. 115–122.
- ISBN 0-945274-35-1, pp. 33, 34.
References
- O'Neill, Richard (1988). Suicide Squads (in Japanese). Translated by Yoshio Masuda. Kasumi Publishing. ISBN 978-4876022045.
- Russell, Richard A. (1997). Project Hula: Secret Soviet-American Cooperation in the War Against Japan. The U.S. Navy in the Modern World Series, No. 4. Washington, D.C.: .