Siege of Caudebec
Siege of Caudebec | |||||||
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Part of the Anglo–Spanish War | |||||||
Retreat of the army of the Duke of Parma into Flanders in May of 1592 Rijksmuseum | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
French Crown Supported by: England United Provinces |
Spanish Empire Catholic League | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Henry IV of France |
Duke of Mayenne | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
25,000[1] | 15,000[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Unknown | Heavy[3] |
The siege of Caudebec (
Background
The Catholic forces of the Duke of Parma had
Parma's force took Caudebec with ease and thus set about improving the towns defences.[10]
Siege
Parma desired to keep the Seine open for supplies and for the ferrying of his troops. Henry saw the opportunity in Parma's strategic blunder.[6] This allowed the Spanish forces to be drawn into a narrow triangle between sea and river of which the Dutch ships were present. Henry had obtained control of the Seine both above and below Caudebec holding Pont de l’Arche, the last bridge across the river between Rouen and Caudebec.[3]
On Henry's approach to the town the Catholics forces prepared for a siege, but within a few days with overwhelming numbers the League outerworks were easily overwhelmed leaving the town exposed.
Crucially on the third day Henry's force succeeded in cutting off and forcing the surrender of a leaguer division of light cavalry quartered nearby. A large quantity of baggage, food, plate, and money fell into the hands of the Kings men thus placing a difficult situation for Parma's men already in want of provisions.[6]
Parma was in a hopeless situation - to cross the river was the only means of retreat; and although Mayenne, and the most experienced officers in the army, pronounced it impracticable, Parma resolved to attempt a retreat.[11]
Parma's escape
Parma ordered a redoubt thrown up on the closest margin of the river. On the opposite bank he constructed another and planted artillery with a force of eight hundred Flemish soldiers under the Count of Bossu in the one and an equal number of
The news of this operation was not brought to Henry's attention until after it had been accomplished. When the king reached the shore of the Seine he saw that the rearguard of the army including the garrison of the fort on the right bank were just ferrying themselves across under command of Banuccio.[3] Shocked by this Henry quickly ordered artillery to bear upon the withdrawing soldiers but the bombardment was largely ineffective and the Catholic Spanish force took up their line of march to the south.[9] Henry then constructed a bridge over the Pont de l'Arche and his first objective was to pursue with his cavalry but it was too late; the infantry would not have been able to support them in time.[3]
Aftermath
Parma's withdrawal was complete, but he had to abandon his transport with the sick and wounded.[5] Having escaped from Henry's army, Parma's force then marched eastward at speed reaching Saint Cloud within five days.[1] The Duke afterwards reinforced the garrison in Paris before returning to Flanders.[6]
Even though Henry had been fooled by Parma, the victory did lay with him strategically since Parma had retreated before him and Caudebec was back in the hands of the King.[12][4] At the same time Henry's opportunity to destroy the Spanish and Catholic army had been missed.[2] Parma had escaped to Flanders but the Spanish court on the view of his retreat meant that he had fallen foul with them and was removed from the position as governor. On 2 December Parma died at Arras, the wound from the battle having proved fatal.[1]
A League and Spanish force defeated an Anglo-Royal army at Craon on 21 May but elsewhere they were less successful.[1] By Winter of that year Henry gave up campaigning but for him at least and the Protestant army Parma was no longer a serious threat.[6] In December Henry disbanded his army but was no closer to recapturing his kingdom.[10]
References
- Citations
- ^ a b c d Knecht p74-75
- ^ a b Baumgartner pp 229-30
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Motley, John Lothrop (1898). The Rise of the Dutch Republic, Entire 1566–74. Harvard University: Harper & brothers. pp. 148–48.
- ^ a b Martin, Henri (1865). Histoire de France depuis les temps les plus réculés jusqu'en 1789 Volume 1. Furne. p. 285. (French)
- ^ a b c Sutherland p 428
- ^ a b c d e f Browning, William Shergold (1845). A History of the Huguenots. Lea & Blanchard. pp. 278–83.
- ^ a b Jacques p 213
- ^ Alan James p.40
- ^ a b c the Cambridge modern history. CUP Archive. 1902. pp. 50–51.
- ^ a b c d Watson, Robert (1777). The History of the Reign of Philip II King of Spain, Volume 2 The History of the Reign of Philip II King of Spain. Library of the Netherlands. pp. 321–25.
- ^ ISBN 9780114402532.
- ^ Dyer, Thomas Henry (1861). The History of Modern Europe from the Fall of Constantinople: In 1453, to the War in the Crimea, in 1857, Volume 2. J. Murray. pp. 355–56.
- Bibliography
- Alan, James (2004). The Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661. Suffolk, UK: Woodbridge. ISBN 0-86193-270-6.
- Baumgartner, Frederic J (1991). From Spear to Flintlock: A History of War in Europe and the Middle East to the French Revolution. Praeger. ISBN 9780275939557.
- Lovett, A. W (1986). Early Habsburg Spain, 1517-1598. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198221395.
- Jaques, Tony (2006). Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A Guide to 8500 Battles from Antiquity Through the Twenty-first Century. Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0313335365.
- James, George Payne Rainsford (1999). The Life of Henry the Fourth, King of France and Navarre. Adegi Graphics LLC. ISBN 9781402189463.
- Knecht, Robert J (2014). The French Religious Wars 1562–1598. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781472810137.
- Sutherland, Nicola Mary (2002). Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion: The path to Rome. Intellect Books. ISBN 9781841507026.
- Keegan, John (2014). Wheatcroft, Andrew (ed.). Who's Who in Military History: From 1453 to the Present Day. Routledge. ISBN 9781136414169.