Siege of Corfinium
Siege of Corfinium | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of Caesar's Civil War | |||||||||
Map of the siege | |||||||||
| |||||||||
Belligerents | |||||||||
Populares |
Optimates | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Gaius Scribonius Curio |
L. Domitius Ahenobarbus P. C. Lentulus Spinther Lucius Vibullius Rufus | ||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
Sulmo 300 auxiliary cavalrymen from Noricum |
33 cohorts | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
Initial: 2 legions At end of siege: 6 legions | 3 legions | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Unknown | Unknown |
The siege of Corfinium was the first significant military confrontation of
Background
Over the previous decade
The Senate was planning to prosecute Caesar for
On 1 January 49 BC Caesar sent former
At the same time Caesar was officially declared an enemy of the Republic and leading Populares such as an tribunes Curio, and Marcus Caelius Rufus fled to regroup with Caesar in Ravenna.[6]
Caesar considered his actions carefully and then crossed the Rubicon on 11 January 49 BC with Legio XIII, declaring that "the die is cast".[7] By advancing under arms into the Roman home province of Italia, and beyond the boundaries of his own provinces where he held imperium, civil war was ignited between the forces in support of Caesar and those in support of the Senate led by Pompey.[8]
At his disposal Caesar had 12 legions; 10 of these were veterans of his campaigns wintering beyond the Alps in Gaul, while the remainder consisted of 22 cohorts recently raised in his province of Transalpine Gaul. These forces were complemented by auxiliaries and allies that Caesar had accrued in Gaul and Germania. In total it is estimated that this would account for 30,000 - 45,000 men. Pompey and the Senate had a much larger pool of resources and men to draw upon but only 2 legions were present in the home province at the beginning of 49 BC, both stationed in southern Italy. Both these legions had been recently transferred from Caesar's command, to take part in a planned war against Parthia, and had spent years fighting for him so their loyalty was far from certain.[9] Pompey did have 7 fully trained legions stationed in Hispania, however these had had little to no real combat experience and were far removed from the current theatre of operations. In the long term the Optimates were confident that they would be able to crush Caesar. The Spanish legions could be recalled, new recruits were being levied in Italy, and in the eastern provinces Pompey possessed a vast network of clients and allies from which he could call upon for wealth and men. Armies take time to train and mobilise but if given that time it was perfectly reasonable to assume that Caesar could be overwhelmed.[10]
Prelude
Caesar immediately began a swift advance down the Italian Peninsula and made his first base at
The quickness of this advance led to panic in Rome and Pompey, possibly under the impression that Caesar would only dare to attempt such direct action with a far larger force, made the unprecedented decision to abandon the defence of Rome and evacuate the Roman Senate from the Eternal City. He sent orders for all of his nearby forces to march south to Apulia in order to regroup and await the arrival of the overwhelming strength of the legions out in the provinces. According to Caesar, the panic was so great that the consul for the year Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus, who was sent to empty the Roman treasury by order of the Senate, only got so far as opening it before fleeing on account of a rumour that Caesar was approaching the capital.[15]
Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, Caesar's long time rival and the newly appointed replacement
Moving south along the Adriatic seaboard, each passing settlement greeted Caesar warmly and provided for the needs of his army. Even Cingulum which had been built and paid for by Titus Labienus, Caesar's former lieutenant who chose to side with Pompey, gladly cooperated. During this time Caesar had sent for the remainder of his men to join him from their winter quarters and was soon strengthened by Legio XII meaning he had two legions at his disposal. Advancing through Picenum he soon accepted the surrender of the city of Asculum and sent Curio to capture two more cities and raise recruits for the upcoming siege of Corfinium.[17] Caesar remained at Asculum for one day before breaking camp again. Approaching Corfinium Caesar's forces engaged in a brief skirmish with a detachment of five cohorts from the garrison sent to demolish a bridge three miles west of the city, after they were defeated he advanced and encamped his men outside of the city walls on February 15.[18] At the outset of the siege Caesar had 2 legions against Ahenobarbus' 3 legions defending Corfinium.[16]
Siege
Upon Caesar's arrival outside the city Ahenobarbus strengthened the city defences, had his men man the walls, and sent messengers to Pompey requesting troops to relieve the siege. He argued that by trapping the attackers against the walls between two armies then supplies could be easily cut off and the force routed. Additionally, he warned that without the reinforcements it was possible that his 33 cohorts and a large number of senators within the city could fall into Caesar's possession. He also made a pronouncement that every private soldier who participated in the defence of Corfinium would receive four acres from his own estate.[19]
Meanwhile, Caesar learned the nearby Optimate-controlled city of
Caesar himself spent three days entrenching his men and scouring the nearby countryside for food and supplies. It was during this time that Caesar received reinforcements of his own in the form of Legio VIII, 22 newly recruited cohorts from Gaul and 300 auxiliary cavalry units from the king of Noricum all of which were stationed in a separate camp under the command of Curio, positioned on the opposite side of the city. Caesar then resolved to surround Corfinium with a vallum and a series of forts.[21]
As the construction of these works was nearing completion the messengers returned and Ahenobarbus learned that Pompey had refused his request for reinforcements stating that such an ordeal was too risky and that Ahenobarbus had acted against his advice and orders. Despite this Ahenobarbus announced to his men that Pompey would be coming to their assistance in due course. He then attempted to flee the city only for his escape to be foiled by the multitude of blockades and devices surrounding his position.[22]
Having uncovered the true nature of Pompey's response, this escape attempt was subsequently discovered by disgruntled senior officers within the city and they came together in agreement that despatches should be sent to Caesar that they would open the gates and deliver Ahenobarbus to him alive. It is also possible that Ahenobarbus was planning an evacuation at this point and it was the prospect of long campaigns abroad with Pompey which motivated them to abandon their leader.[23] On the fourth night of the siege Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who had previously fled the city of Asculum upon seeing Caesar's advance and taken refuge in Corfinium, appeared on the walls and asked for an audience with Caesar which he was duly granted. Once in Caesar's presence he begged for his own life to be spared, citing the prior friendship between the two men, and Caesar encouraged him by claiming "that he had not left his province to do mischief, but to protect himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to their dignity the tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the city on his account, and to assert his own liberty, and that of the Roman people, who were oppressed by a few factious men". Spinther then returned into the city and spread word of Caesar's clemency which allayed many fears.[24] It was claimed that Ahenobarbus had asked his physician to provide him with poison but upon hearing of Caesar's mercy was delighted to hear that he had only been administered a sleeping draught.[25][26]
The Greek historian Appian, writing almost 200 years after the events, gives a far briefer description of the siege than Caesar. He simply writes that Ahenobarbus was apprehended by his own men while trying to flee before being handed over to Caesar.[27]
Aftermath
The following day Caesar ordered that all senators and their children,
Caesar's stay at Corfinium lasted seven days in total and after accepting its surrender he immediately broke camp and set out into
The leniency shown by Caesar to the defenders of Corfinium was typical of the strategy he would employ throughout the remainder of the civil war. It was a significant propaganda victory, Caesar had shown clemency towards those he defeated from the outset of the war but never to a group so distinguished as this or made up of men so bitter in their hatred towards him. By appearing to forgive his enemies and restraining his troops from taking any plunder he had ensured that the peoples of Italia, who were largely apathetic to the politics of the civil war, would remain welcoming to him. In this regard his approach made practical sense.[29]
Ahenobarbus was deeply surprised by the treatment he had received as he and Caesar shared a great enmity; after being dismissed from Corfinium he briefly retired to
References
- ISBN 1-84603-002-1.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ^ Suetonius, Life of Julius Caesar, 32
- ISBN 1-84603-002-1.
- ISBN 1-84603-002-1.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 11
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 12
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 13
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 14
- ^ ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 15
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 16
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 17
- ISBN 1-84603-002-1.
- ^ a b Caesar, De Bello Civili, I, 18
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civici, I, 19
- ^ Dio, Roman History, XLI, 11
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civici, I, 22
- ^ Plutarch, The Life of Caesar, 34
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ^ Appian, The Civil Wars, II, 38
- ^ Velleius Paterculus, Roman History, II, 50
- ^ ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ^ Caesar, De Bello Civici, I, 23
- ISBN 978-0415747332.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.
- ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6.