Siege of Maastricht (1673)
| Siege of Maastricht | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Franco-Dutch War | |||||||
_-_The_Siege_of_Maastricht,_1673_-_872156_-_National_Trust.jpg) Louis XIV in front of the besieged city | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 France |
 Dutch Republic | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Jacques de Fariaux | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
24,000 infantry 16,000 cavalry 58 guns |
5,000 infantry 1,200 cavalry | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 2,300+ | 1,700 | ||||||
The siege of Maastricht took place from 15 to 30 June 1673 during the
The siege was conducted by the French military engineer
Background
In the 1667–1668
When the French invaded the Dutch Republic in May 1672, they initially seemed to have achieved an overwhelming victory, capturing the major fortresses of
Its location on both banks of the Meuse made the town extremely important and it was one of the few garrisoned in peacetime; Dutch engineer
The French reached Maastricht on 17 May 1672, but Turenne bypassed the main defences and only occupied the satellites of Tongeren, Maaseik, and Valkenburg.[7] This allowed him to overrun the Rhine fortresses and the entire Republic seemed on the verge of collapse before the Dutch managed to stabilise their position in August. The retention of Maastricht now allowed them to threaten the extended French supply lines; in November 1672, William III of Orange used it as a base for an attack on Charleroi, the French-held city at the start of their supply route, taking most of the garrison with him.[8]
As a result, capturing Maastricht was made the primary objective for the French 1673 campaign. The army was accompanied by Louis XIV who viewed sieges as a propaganda tool to enhance his personal glory and enjoyed the pageantry.[9] As a boy, he had a life-size fortress constructed in the royal gardens to enact siege warfare. While Louis assembled his forces around Kortrijk, another French army was concentrated in the west for a feint attack against Bruges, to prevent Spanish troops from further reinforcing Maastricht. While the Spanish Netherlands were officially neutral, they provided diplomatic and military support to the Dutch since Louis' ultimate aim was their occupation. Louis first moved east against Brussels, the seat of their governor Juan Domingo de Zuñiga y Fonseca, but continued his advance, reaching Maastricht over Sint-Truiden. The siege officially began on 15 June when the first trenches were opened.[10]
Advances in siege tactics
Maastricht was the first siege where the famous French engineer
Although commonly remembered for the fortifications he built, Vauban's greatest innovations were in the field of offensive operations. Some years before the capture of Maastricht he had expressed his thoughts on siege warfare in a manuscript, that after his death, in 1740, was published under the title Mémoire pour servir d’instruction dans la conduite des sièges et dans la défense des places. This has provided modern researchers with some insights about the general principles Vauban probably applied.[14] The 'siege parallel' had been in development since the mid-16th century but Maastricht saw him bring the idea to practical fulfilment.[15] Three parallel trenches were dug in front of the walls, connecting the perpendicular assault trenches, the earth thus excavated being used to create embankments screening the attackers from defensive fire, while bringing them as close to the assault point as possible (see Diagram). The transverse parallels allowed a much larger number of troops to participate simultaneously in an assault to overwhelm the defenders, while avoiding choking points that often had led to costly failures. Artillery was moved into the trenches, allowing them to target the base of the walls at close range, with the defenders unable to depress their own guns enough to counter this; once a breach had been made, it was then stormed. This remained the standard for offensive operations until the early 20th century.[16]
Vauban was unusually sympathetic to the impact of war on the poor, on one occasion requesting compensation be paid a man with eight children whose land was taken to build one of his forts.[17] However, his siege works required large numbers of unpaid workers, with severe punishments for those who tried to evade service; 20,000 local farmers were conscripted to dig his trenches at Maastricht.[18]
Troop strengths
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The
The garrison was commanded by Jacques de Fariaux, an experienced French Huguenot exile in Dutch service. Due to the serious situation of the Dutch, many regiments had been withdrawn from Maastricht after May 1672. In June 1673, eight regiments of States infantry, three regiments of States cavalry, an engineer company and a grenadier company remained. The Dutch troops had been reinforced by a Spanish Division containing a regiment of Italian infantry and two regiments of Spanish cavalry. The defenders totalled about five thousand men.[14] This was about three thousand men below the strength that the city commanders had already in 1671 indicated as the minimum for a successful defence.
Between 1645 and 1672, the fortifications had been completely neglected, falling into disrepair. They largely consisted of earthworks that were susceptible to erosion. Makeshift repairs in 1672 and 1673 had only partly improved the situation. Wooden palisades were constructed to reinforce weak spots. A lunette had been added in front of the vulnerable Tongeren Gate.[14]
Siege
Fortification by besiegers
On 5 June, the first French troops reached Maastricht, advancing towards the west bank of the Maas. The next day, troops from Turenne appeared on the east bank, outside the Wijck suburb. On 7 June, the construction of two ship bridges was started, to the north of the city, to connect both forces. Simultaneously, a host of at least seven thousand peasants began to dig the
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On 13 June, the French began to prepare large amounts of wood and digging materials on the west-side of the city. The north of the fortress was protected by a deep and wide moat, directly connected to the river Maas, while the south was covered by the
Around 14 June, the circumvallation was in principle finished. Due to difficult terrain large gaps remained, which was not seen as a problem as the structure served no real function. In 1632, Frederick Henry's circumvallation had been much more extensive. The same day a third bridge was completed to the south of the city. On 16 June, gun batteries were positioned, two in front of the Tongeren Gate and one on the north slope of the
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At 21:00, 17 June, the two assault trenches towards the Tongeren Gate were opened. Work progressed at a steady pace under the cover of darkness and already in the late night a start could be made with the first parallel, their connecting trench, which was finished the next day. During 19 and 20 June, the second parallel was constructed. De Fariaux considered a sally to destroy the trenches but decided against it because they were too extensive and had been reinforced by artillery. The French gun batteries smashed the palisades, silenced the Dutch cannon on the Tongerse Kat, and created small breaches in the main wall. This caused much nervousness among the city population, as traditionally soldiers had the right to plunder a city once its wall had been breached. On 23 June, the left and right assault trenches reached their farthest point, about 160 metres from the forward defences, beyond effective musket range. During the night of 23/24 June, the third parallel was finished and about 2500 troops were assembled in it to storm the gate.[14]
Assault
In the city a rumour circulated that Louis was in haste to end the siege in order to celebrate mass in its St Janskerk on the
Part of the defences of the city were permanent tunnels that had been dug under the marl plateau to the west. During the period of neglect after 1645, these had partly collapsed but prior to the siege some hasty repairs had been carried out. As the French troops were being relieved at daybreak on the early morning of 25 June, the Dutch let a mine explode under the lunette, killing about fifty attackers. Immediately the defenders made a sally and recaptured the lunette for a second time. In response the British and French attacked again, Monmouth circling the lunette from the left, D'Artagnan from the right, while the 2nd Musketeer Company assaulted the front. After a period of confused fighting, the defenders were driven back but several English officers were killed and others wounded, including Churchill. D'Artagnan was fatally hit in the head by a bullet,[24] while passing through a breach in the first contre-escarpe palisade. Of the three hundred musketeers deployed, over eighty had been killed and over fifty severely wounded. In their honour, a later ravelin erected on this location was to be called the demilune des mousquetaires. In this critical phase of the battle, Vauban lost his confidence. It had been assumed that the morale of the garrison was low but it now proved to be much more aggressive than expected. Also he worried about the possible extent of the tunnelling. He wrote to François-Michel le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois, the French minister of war, that if the Dutch managed to recapture the lunette for a third time, it was a distinct possibility that the siege would have to be lifted. At first the attackers had only a tenuous hold on the lunette and it would take them over five hours to bring up reinforcements. Another sortie would not materialise however, the population beginning to fill the gate with manure.[14]
During 26 and 27 June, the French reorganised, rebuilding their assault teams. It was decided that, before the ravelin in front of the gate could be stormed, first the hornwork and the Groene Halve Maan would have to be reduced to prevent enfilading fire. Gun batteries were placed between the lunette and the hornwork, to bombard it from a short distance. These gun emplacements also could interdict a possible sally from the gate. On 27 June, Louis was in a contemplative mood, silently observing for hours the bombardment of the city, standing on the north slope of the Sint Pietersberg. French engineers dug a tunnel under the hornwork and in the night of 27/28 June they a let a mine explode. The Italian defenders panicked and allowed the ramparts to be scaled. They then rallied, counterattacking with hand grenades, but ultimately were forced to leave possession of the earthwork to the French. The French captured several engineers who revealed the position of mined tunnels. Before the attackers could penetrate the tunnel network, the defenders blew five mines under the hornwork. Although the French readied themselves for a sally, none took place. The understrength garrison was now too weakened. On 28 June, a delegation of burghers requested de Fariaux to surrender. An additional gun battery was placed opposite the gate. In the night of 28/29 June French troops infiltrated to the ravelin which proved to have been abandoned.[14]
Surrender
On 29 June, a trumpeter again demanded the surrender of the city and de Fariaux again refused. Subsequently, the French batteries intensified their bombardment of both the inner city and the defence works. The batteries on the north slope of the Sint Pietersberg concentrated their fire on the southwest corner of the city wall which collapsed into the moat behind the Groene Halve Maan. This demi-lune was abandoned by the Dutch during the night of 29/30 June. As the situation of the garrison was hopeless, strong moral pressure was applied by the population to de Fariaux not to continue the fight. They reminded him that during the Siege of Maastricht of 1579, on the 29th of June the Spanish troops of Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma began to sack the city, in three days murdering a thousand of its inhabitants. They begged him to prevent a repeat of these tragic events.[14]
In the early morning of 30 June, de Fariaux sent a message that he was ready to negotiate. After two hours of talks, he surrendered the city on relatively favourable terms. The garrison was given free passage, with drums beating and colours flying, to the nearest Dutch-held territory in 's-Hertogenbosch, 150 kilometres to the north-west; they included Van Coehoorn, who had been wounded during the siege.[25] There would be no plundering. Maastricht was a condominium of the Duchy of Brabant, the rights of which had been subsumed by the Dutch Republic, and Liège and the bishop of Liège, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, was Louis's formal ally in the war. Also, the French king claimed to be the rightful Duke of Brabant already, as the title would be part of the dowry of his wife. In any case, he intended the city to be a permanent French possession. Immediately after the surrender two French regiments occupied the Duitse Poort in the east Wijck suburb and, in the west, the Brussels Gate through which Louis would make his triumphal entry.[14]
Losses on both sides had been heavy. The number of troops arriving in 's-Hertogenbosch is exactly known: 3118. If the number of defenders was indeed five thousand, their casualties must have numbered at about 1700. Estimates of the French losses vary considerably. They have been estimated at nine hundred dead and fourteen hundred wounded; at roughly about twice the number of Dutch casualties; or by contemporary Dutch accounts at six thousand killed and four thousand wounded.[14] The Dutch at the time, for propaganda reasons, published long lists of French officers killed.
Aftermath
The quick fall of Maastricht meant that Louis had some time to spare.[26] To keep the king occupied he attacked the Electorate of Trier, without a declaration of war, on the pretext the bishop had allowed the entry of some companies of imperial troops.[26] The city of Trier was besieged and largely destroyed.[27] William III had feared that 's-Hertogenbosch or Breda would be the next French target and had assembled an allied States-Spanish army of thirty thousand at Geertruidenberg to relieve any of these cities. The French had indeed considered an attack on 's-Hertogenbosch but decided against it because success could not be guaranteed in view of the marshy terrain. Although losing Maastricht was a blow to Dutch morale, the Trier siege it gave cause to would be very favourable to them. Public opinion in the German states was outraged by the French conduct. The emperor moved his army into the Rhineland and Louis in response withdrew most of his troops from the Holland Water Line, dangerously weakening his hold on Utrecht and Gelderland.[28]
Shortly after the fall of Maastricht, the Dutch agreed the August 1673 Treaty of The Hague with Emperor Leopold and Spain,[29] joined in October by Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine,[30] creating the Quadruple Alliance. At the Water Line William III of Orange recaptured the fortress town of Naarden on 13 September.[31] With the war expanding into the Rhineland and Spain, French troops withdrew from the Dutch Republic, retaining only Grave and Maastricht.[32] Grave was recaptured by the Dutch in 1674.[33]
The alliance between England and Catholic France had been unpopular from the start and although the real terms of the Treaty of Dover remained secret, many suspected them.
The siege was the subject of a set of paintings by
References
- ^ Lynn 1996, pp. 109–110.
- ^ Lynn 1996, p. 117.
- ^ Childs 1991, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Morreau 1979, p. 146.
- ^ Duffy 1995, p. 63.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, p. 100.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, p. 113.
- ^ Panhuysen 2016, pp. 85–87.
- ^ Panhuysen 2016, pp. 88.
- ^ Lynn 1996, p. 113.
- ISBN 978-0786444014.
- ^ Panhuysen 2016, pp. 89.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, pp. 284.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Sjaak Collijn, 2011, "Quod Traiectum ad Mosam XIII diebus cepit". Sebastien LePrestre de Vauban en het beleg van Maastricht in 1673, Master's Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 84 pp
- ^ Duffy, Christopher p. 10
- ISBN 978-1447158226.
- ISBN 9780198606963.
- ^ LePage, Jean-Denis p. 56
- ^ Lynn, John pp. 109-110
- ISBN 978-0297782544.
- ISBN 978-1474255141.
- ^ a b Panhuysen 2009, p. 354.
- ^ Childs, John p. 16
- ^ Childs, John p. 17
- ^ Eysten (1911). P.J. Blok; P.C. Molhuysen (eds.). "Coehoorn, Menno baron van". Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek. Deel 1 (in Dutch). Digitale Bibliotheek der Nederlandse Letteren. pp. 620–622. Retrieved 10 January 2019.
- ^ a b Panhuysen 2016, pp. 90.
- ^ Panhuysen 2016, pp. 91.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, p. 391.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, p. 372.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, p. 383.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, p. 389.
- ISBN 978-0595329922.
- ^ Panhuysen 2009, p. 428.
- S2CID 159934682.
- ^ Davenport, Frances (1917). European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies. Washington, D.C. Carnegie Institution of Washington. p. 238. Retrieved 7 October 2018.
- ^ Jenniskens (2006), p 16
- ^ Jenniskens (2006), p 16-21
- ^ Jenniskens (2006), p 9
Sources
- Boxer, CR (1969). "Some Second Thoughts on the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672-1674". Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 19: 67–94. S2CID 159934682.
- Childs, John (2014). General Percy Kirke and the Later Stuart Army. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-1474255141.
- Childs, John (1991). The Nine Years' War and the British Army, 1688-1697: The Operations in the Low Countries. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0719089961.
- Duffy, Christopher (1995). Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660. Routledge. ISBN 978-0415146494.
- Eysten (1911). "Coehoorn, Menno baron van". In P.J. Blok; P.C. Molhuysen (eds.). Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek. Deel 1 (in Dutch). pp. 620–622.
- Holmes, Richard (2001). Singleton, Charles; Jones, Dr Spencer (eds.). Vauban, Marshal Sebastien le Prestre de (1633–1707). ISBN 9780198606963.
- Kenyon, JP (1993). The History Men; the Historical Profession in England since the Renaissance. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 978-0297782544.
- Jenniskens, A.H. (2006). De Maquettes van Maastricht (in Dutch). Stichting Historische Reeks Maastricht. ISBN 978-9058420275.
- LePage, Jean-Denis (2009). Vauban and the French Military Under Louis XIV: An Illustrated History of Fortifications and Sieges. McFarland & Company. ISBN 978-0786444014.
- Lynn, John (1996). The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714 (Modern Wars In Perspective). Longman. ISBN 978-0582056299.
- Morreau, LJ (1979). Bolwerk der Nederlanden. De vestingwerken van Maastricht sedert het begin van de 13e eeuw (in Dutch). Assen.
- Panhuysen, Luc (2009). Rampjaar 1672: Hoe de Republiek aan de ondergang ontsnapte (in Dutch). Uitgeverij Atlas. ISBN 9789045013282.
- Panhuysen, Luc (2016). Oranje tegen de Zonnekoning: De strijd van Willem III en Lodewijk XIV om Europa (in Dutch). De Arbeiderspers. ISBN 978-9029538718.
- Vesilind, P Aame (2010). Engineering Peace and Justice: The Responsibility of Engineers to Society. Springer. ISBN 978-1447158226.
- Young, William (2004). International Politics and Warfare in the Age of Louis XIV and Peter the Great. iUniverse. ISBN 978-0595329922.
External links
- Davenport, Frances (1917). European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies. Washington, D.C. Carnegie Institution of Washington. p. 238.;