Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

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anti-radiation missiles

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD, pronounced

electronic warfare. In modern warfare, SEAD missions can constitute as much as 30% of all sorties launched in the first week of combat and continue at a reduced rate through the rest of a campaign.[1] One quarter of American combat sorties in recent conflicts have been SEAD missions.[2]
Despite generally being associated with aircraft, SEAD missions may be performed using any means, including through actions by ground forces.

In some contexts, Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) is used to reference physical destruction of air defense targets, while SEAD applies to sorties which discourage enemy use of their air-defense radar assets out of fear of placing the assets in jeopardy.

Primitive operations akin to SEAD emerged during the

Port Stanley, and the 1982 Lebanon War, in the Beqaa Valley. The tactical awareness, or lack thereof, of air defense operators proved to be a decisive factor in the success rate of these missions. During the 1986 United States bombing of Libya
, while Libya's integrated air defense network was not destroyed, it was damaged without major losses incurred by US forces.

During the 1990s, extensive use of SEAD was made, particularly during the Gulf War of the early 1990s. Intense aerial attacks of Iraq's integrated air defenses were conducted during Operation Instant Thunder, the Coalition's aerial attacks at the start of the conflict; Iraqi SAM operators regularly resorted to firing missiles with minimal or no guidance due to fears that radar use brought quick retaliation. All Iraqi air defenses in the south were destroyed, although the skies remained unsafe for low altitude flight. In the 1999

shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles
.

History

Pre-Vietnam War

Prior to the Vietnam War, SEAD was an undefined mission: although attempts to destroy enemy air defense sites were undertaken, they were done so on an individual aircraft basis and in relation to specific targets or operations rather than as part of an overall strategy or doctrine of defense suppression.[3] Near the end of the Second World War, US Navy pilots developed a doctrine that could be considered the first example of SEAD. When attaching enemy warships, US Navy fighters would attack enemy warships with machine guns and rockets to distract and or kill the enemy anti aircraft gunners While the torpedo and dive bombers could move in and more accurately target the ship. While crude, these tactics were frequently effective for their time.[4]

World War II

During the

flak increased tenfold.[6]

Understanding the importance of

artillery shells were fired over the course of twenty-two minutes at some one hundred targets, the mission was unsuccessful due to inaccurate targeting data and insufficient firepower.[8]

In the

B-25 Mitchells were also outfitted with radar-homing equipment and used to lead "hunter-killer" teams of other B-25s in locating and destroying Japanese early-warning radar sites.[10]

Korean War

While there were some technological changes between World War II and the

propeller aircraft, jets were much faster, could climb more steeply, were more resistant to damage and were quieter in operation. They were thus able to more effectively attack ground targets and escape, and while both jet- and propeller-driven aircraft participated in the Korean War the latter suffered heavier losses and were largely phased out by the end of the conflict.[12]

As the war progressed, the Communists developed a highly centralized integrated air defense network, incorporating early-warning radars,

air superiority rather than attacking UNC ground forces.[13]

Vietnam War

An F-105G Thunderchief 'Wild Weasel' carrying AGM-45 and AGM-78 missiles taking off from Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base.

The Vietnam War saw the evolution of what would become known as SEAD over the course of the conflict. At the start of

F-100 Super Sabres using crude homing equipment to locate and bomb radar-guided SAM and AAA sites, but these missions incurred heavy losses and the threat to American aircraft continued to grow.[14] In 1966 a task force was put together to analyze the challenges presented by the NVA's air defense network and recommend ways to counter it. One of these was for aircraft to operate at low altitudes (below 500 meters) where the missiles were less effective. This also put the aircraft well within range of AAA, which would account for nearly 85% of all American aircraft losses during Rolling Thunder.[15]

Eventually new SEAD-dedicated aircraft were introduced, the

EA-6B Prowler.[15] By the end of Rolling Thunder these changes had caused a significant degradation in the effectiveness of SAMs: only one SA-2 missile out of every forty-eight fired resulted in a hit.[16] In spite of these changes, SEAD remained a primarily tactical function throughout Rolling Thunder, with American leadership either unaware or unappreciative of North Vietnam's IADS.[15]

Losses suffered by F-105 Wild Weasels spurred on the development of a new variant based on the

F-4C Phantom II, the EF-4C Phantom Wild Weasel IV. The first thirty-six of these were delivered to Southeast Asia in 1969 and so missed taking part in Rolling Thunder. While carrying the same electronics as in the F-105G, the dense internal structure of the F-4 Phantom prevented the EF-4C from efficiently mounting this equipment, which meant it could not carry the superior AGM-78 Standard missile.[17][18] By the start of Operation Linebacker, Wild Weasel missions were both more and less effective. Tactics and technology had evolved which improved the suppression of individual SAM sites, however the American military still failed to consider the integrated nature of North Vietnam's air defense network. Not only did the network possess thousands of radar- and optical-guided AAA and SAM sites, it also consisted of early-warning radars, intelligence-gathering agencies, and hundreds of ground-controlled interceptors. Thus, while fewer American aircraft were lost to SAMs during Linebacker, many more were lost in air-to-air combat.[19]

electronic warfare and C3 countermeasures, laid the groundwork for future development.[20]

Post-Vietnam Wars

An A-7E from the USS America is armed with AGM-45 Shrike ARMs, in preparation of Operation El Dorado Canyon

With the phase-out of the F-105G, the US Air Force was in need of a new SEAD-dedicated aircraft This effort was given more urgency in 1973 when, during the

EC-130E Commando Solo and RC/EC-135.[22]

On the other hand, the Soviets did not treat SEAD as an independent air operation but as a tactical role to be performed as part of a larger mission, namely an overwhelming air assault against NATO. This role was not carried out by SEAD-specific aircraft but normal bombers and fighter aircraft, such as the Tupolev Tu-16 and Tupolev Tu-22M, which could carry Soviet anti-radiation missiles. These aircraft would be organized into several strike groups whose mission was to lay down "chaff corridors" 40–50 kilometers across at intervals of 10 kilometers, including directly on top of suspected SAM sites. A small number of aircraft in these groups would be equipped with ARMs to physically destroy the sites. These missions were conducted against pre-planned targets which had been previously identified by signals intelligence and other reconnaissance efforts, rather than having aircraft seek out targets of opportunity. The closest the Soviets came to dedicated SEAD platforms were modified stand-off interceptors like the Mikoyan MiG-25BM and attack aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-24M.[23]

The first example of a post-Vietnam SEAD campaign was by the United Kingdom during the 1982 Falklands War. The RAF Avro Vulcan B.Mk-2 was initially planned to be retired in early 1982 but the outbreak of the Falklands War, in April that year postponed it.[24] The Falklands conflict was the only time that the Vulcan performed SEAD missions, flying very long-range missions against Port Stanley, armed with AGM-45 Shrike missiles mounted on makeshift underwing pylons and carrying a AN/ALQ-101 pod for jamming.[25]

Shortly afterwards was Israel's

remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and electronic surveillance aircraft, to paint an expansive picture of where Syrian air defense sites were located and which radar frequencies they were using.[27][28]

Israel's attack on the SAMs was inadvertently assisted by the Syrians, who often placed their sites in sub-optimal positions and failed to relocate their equipment, use dummy radars or maintain active

Soviet Air Defense Forces was sent to investigate what had gone wrong. Part of Israel's success was due to extensive reconnaissance and preparations prior to the battle, incompetence on the part of the Syrians, and desert conditions conducive to SEAD operations.[29][28]

F/A-18 Hornets to attack Libyan SAM sites. Their lack of the Wild Weasel's specialized equipment required these fighters to fire their HARMs preemptively at Libyan SAM sites, a costly and wasteful method which nevertheless was effective due to the limited nature of the raid. For their part, the Libyans and their Soviet advisers had also learned lessons from the Bekaa Valley campaign: their IADS was constructed with multiple redundancies (including overlapping radar coverage and hardened landlines between defense sites) and a wider array of both Soviet and Western radar systems able to operate on multiple frequencies to avoid jamming. In the end, US forces succeeded in suppressing the Libyan IADS and conducted their punitive strike with minimal casualties suffered.[32][33]

Gulf War

The F-4G Wild Weasel played a major role during the war.

SA-3 SAM systems in their sector, which meant the SAMs did not have to turn on their own radar and reveal their position, or an IOC could direct local interceptors to engage the targets. Baghdad itself was one of the most heavily defended cities in the world – more heavily defended several times over than Hanoi during the Vietnam War – protected by 65% of Iraq's SAMs and over half of its AAA pieces.[34][35]

However, the Iraqi IADS had several fatal flaws of which Coalition air forces were able to take advantage. The system was primarily oriented towards defending against much smaller attacks from Iraq's most likely enemies –

MiG-29 and F1 Mirage. Furthermore, the IADS was centralized to a fault. Although each IOC was datalinked to their respective SOC and in turn back to the ADOC, the defense sectors couldn't share information between each other. If a SOC was knocked out of action the attached air defense weapons lost all ability to coordinate their response; its respective SAM batteries would be forced to rely on their own radar systems while most AAA guns lacked any radar guidance. Training was also poor, with Iraqi pilots overly reliant on ground-control instructions such that if the IOCs were disabled they lost situation awareness and became easy targets.[34][35]

An F-117A Nighthawk flying over the Persian Gulf.

Suppression of the Iraqi IADS played a prominent role in

F-117A Nighthawks, which would be used to attack sensitive targets.[40]

The opening shots of Operation Desert Storm were fired on January 17 in pursuit of defense-suppression: at 2:20AM local time Task Force Normandy, a group of twelve American helicopters, infiltrated into Iraq with the goal of destroying two early-warning radar sites. Three

BQM-74 drones and ADM-141 TALD decoys which would both "take the hit" for the manned airplanes and cause the Iraqis to reveal their position when they tracked or fired upon the lure. The first night's largest sortie was a joint US Air Force-Navy SEAD mission consisting of fifty aircraft designed to look like a bombing raid on Baghdad but which instead were fitted out with decoys, drones and HARMs to destroy air defenses protecting the city. With Kari degraded due to the disabling of the civilian electrical grid the Iraqi SAMs were forced to use their organic radar, producing what one pilot called "HARM Heaven". A total of 67 HARMs were fired over the course of twenty minutes, causing a significant reduction in Iraqi air defenses around the capital based on follow-up missions.[41]

Throughout the rest of the first night additional air-defense targets were hit by Coalition aircraft with varying levels of success while strikes against other targets consisted of a high ratio of SEAD and escort to strike aircraft. This pace of attack against air-defense and other targets continued into the first day, involving a variety of different aircraft, and spread to targets in Kuwait.

Iraqi Army – even the elite Republican Guard – possessed inadequate SAM defenses by NATO or Soviet standards. This allowed Coalition aircraft to attack them from the relative safety of higher altitudes.[43]

An Iraqi radar site destroyed by the French 6th Light Armoured Division during Operation Desert Storm.

By the end of the first forty-eight hours of Desert Storm, the Coalition had achieved its goal of significantly degrading Kari, including the destruction of all air defenses in the south. Although the Iraqis would replace most destroyed radars and bring back many IOCs and SOCs to at least partial operation, this was done so in an unorganized manner, with the Coalition continuing to bomb any reactivated sites.[44] In effect, combined with the failure of Iraq's air force to defend its airspace, the Coalition had gained air supremacy in the skies over Iraq from nearly the outset of the conflict.[44]

Coalition aircraft conducting strategic bombing and interdiction inside Iraq were now free to operate at medium altitudes of 10,000 ft (3,000 m) and higher with no danger of SAM activity. This also put them beyond the effective range of most of Iraq's AAA pieces, which remained a threat.[45] Baghdad's heavy AAA defenses also continued to make it a difficult target to attack, as Coalition forces found out during an attempted strike on January 19 against the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. A variety factors, including the threat of AAA and ballistic SAMs, resulted in the strike's failure and loss of two aircraft.[46]

By January 27, no C3 activity was detected at the SOC level by Coalition forces, and only limited activity at the IOC level. At the end of the conflict, the DIA estimated Kari was operating at 25% its original capacity, and that it would take at least ten years to rebuild the system and another five to retrain the personnel needed to operate it. In total, the SEAD campaign by the Coalition was an unequivocal success, allowing Coalition aircraft to fly at medium and high altitudes over Kuwait and Iraq with impunity. The only losses Coalition aircraft suffered to Iraqi air defenses after the first two days occurred when they operated at low altitudes, primarily conducting close air support or other missions to assist ground forces.[47]

Operation Allied Force

Post-strike bomb damage assessment of a SAM site in Kragujevac, Serbia

The bombing campaign of the

Tornado ECRs, a purpose-developed SEAD model.[48] Many NATO aircraft were furnished with new towed decoys designed to lure away any missiles fired at them, and reportedly for the first time cyberwarfare was used to target Yugoslav air defense computer systems.[49]

However, a number of deficiencies in NATO's SEAD operations were revealed during the course of the bombing campaign. The US Air Force had allowed its electronic warfare branch to atrophy in the years after the Gulf War, resulting in greater response times to engaging a SAM threat.[50] Airspace restrictions and rules of engagement limited where NATO aircraft could fly and what targets they could hit, leaving some air defense systems untouched.[48][51] Kosovo's mountainous terrain also made it difficult for NATO to locate and target Yugoslav air defenses, while at the same time the region's poor infrastructure limited where Yugoslav SAM and AAA sites could be placed.[52] Furthermore, according to a post-conflict US intelligence report, Yugoslavia had a spy in NATO's headquarters in Brussels who in the early part of the conflict leaked flight plans and target details to the Yugoslav military, allowing Yugoslav military assets to be relocated to avoid detection; NATO responded by limiting the number of people with access to its plans, which appeared to be successful.[53]

Yugoslavia had a much smaller IADS than Iraq during the Gulf War, but took greater steps at preserving it from NATO's bombing campaign. The Yugoslav integrated air defence system (IADS) was extensive, including underground command sites and buried landlines, which allowed for information to be shared between systems; thus, active radar in one area could target NATO aircraft for SAMs and AAA in another area with no active radar, further limiting NATO's ability to target air defences.[54] By focusing on its operational survival, Yugoslav air defenses ceded a certain amount of air superiority to NATO forces. Yet the persistence of their credible SAM threat forced NATO to allocate greater resources to continued SEAD operations rather than conducting other missions, while Yugoslav AAA and MANPADS forced NATO aircraft to fly at 15,000 ft (4,600 m) or higher. NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only three of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. At the same time, over 800 SAMs were fired by Yugoslav forces at NATO aircraft, including 477 SA-6s and 124 confirmed MANPADS, for the downing of only two aircraft and several more damaged. That one of the two aircraft shot down was an F-117A Nighthawk marked the first combat loss ever of a stealth aircraft and typified some of the issues NATO faced during the campaign.[49][55]

2003 US invasion of Iraq

Operation Telic
, August 2004

At the onset of the

GPS guidance jammers were acquired. In addition to the ADOC and four original SOCs, a fifth SOC was created in Baghdad and specifically assigned to defend Saddam's palaces, the Republican Guards, and key security facilities.[56]

Still, the defense network was relatively outdated and thus unable to seriously challenge the

Iraqi no-fly zones.[57][58] Starting on March 1, aggressive "enforcement" of the no-fly zones accounted for the destruction of as many as a third of Iraq's missile launchers and radars by the time the invasion commenced on March 20.[56][59] Numerous aircraft, such as the Panavia Tornado fighter-bomber, penetrated Iraqi airspace to conduct bombing raids during the opening phase of the conflict, striking at Iraqi installations.[60]

During the course of the invasion, there were 1,660 reports of SAM launches and similar numbers of AAA firings, for the loss of very few aircraft. While Iraq largely failed to shoot down many Coalition aircraft, the sheer numbers of their air defenses still made them dangerous until the final stages of the invasion. This was true in particular for its large number of short-range missile and AAA weapons, which made low-altitude missions deadly and were harder to suppress. Where possible, Coalition forces conducted stand-off strikes from outside the range of these defenses.[56] The unsuccessful 2003 attack on Karbala exemplifies the dangers faced by aircraft operating at low altitudes around air defenses.[61][62]

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Su-34 shot down over Chernihiv

Many Ukrainian air defence facilities were reportedly destroyed or damaged in the first days of the invasion by Russian air strikes.[63] On 5 March 2022, the Russian Air Force (VVS) declared that it had achieved air superiority, 11 days after the beginning of the invasion,[64]: minute 17:35  but not air supremacy.[65][a] However, that same day, Russia lost at least ten aircraft.[68] On 11 March 2022, retired United States Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula stated in The New York Times that the Russian Air Force had not achieved air superiority, noting that supposedly vulnerable Ukrainian drones had continued to operate against Russian forces.[69]

While several early air strikes on Yavoriv in Western Ukraine were performed by Russian bombers, their munitions were firing from a distance while flying within Russian air space, rather than entering Ukrainian air space; on 13 March 2022, dozens of air-launched cruise missiles were launched from within Russia to reach Western Ukraine, because it was allegedly too dangerous for the Russian Air Force to fly over Ukrainian space due to Ukrainian air defenses.

Izyum, a Russian Zhitel electronic warfare apparatus was detected, located, and disabled by Ukraine's ground and air forces.[73]

On 30 August 2022, Command of Ukrainian Air Force (KpsZSU) released a video of its MiG-29 jets firing AGM-88 HARM missiles against Russian air defenses,[74][75] one day after an alleged attack on Russian radar site for S-400 SAM batteries near Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea.[76] Earlier in the Summer, multiple Russian SAM batteries had been hit and the remains of AGM-88 missiles had been found on site.[77][78] The U.S. government acknowledged the previously undisclosed transfer of AGM-88 missiles to Ukraine on August 8, 2022.[79]

There are also suspicions of M31A1 GMLRS guided rockets firing from M142 HIMARS rocket artillery been used by Ukrainian military against Russian air defense systems.[80]

On 15 February 2023 the

air superiority.[81][82]

Weapons

A mock-up of the AGM-88E AARGM

The weapons most often associated with this mission are anti-radiation missiles (ARMs), which work by homing in on radio emission sources like radar antennae. These missiles are equipped with relatively small warheads, limiting collateral damage, but can easily destroy radar antennae and thus cripple an enemy's air defense system. Early examples of ARMs could be fooled by turning off the radar system, which would cease emitting radiation for the missile to track; more recent missiles are fitted with fire-control systems which "remember" where the source was and continue towards that location.[83] Anti-radiation missiles proved particularly effective during the Vietnam War where, despite the small number carried relative to other munitions, they accounted for 46% of all SA-2 batteries destroyed.[84][85]

However, a weapon need not be designed specifically for SEAD missions to be used to damage or destroy a component of an air defense system. A Paveway LGB for example is not a SEAD-specific munition, but when used to destroy a radar antenna it still achieves the desired effect. The American AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon is a valuable SEAD weapon due to its fairly long standoff range which allows the launching aircraft to avoid being threatened by all but the longest-range missiles, and its relatively large area of destruction against lightly armored targets.[1][86]

Possibly the most effective type of unguided ("dumb") weapon used during SEAD strikes are

CBU-87 general-purpose cluster munition are typical examples of these types of weapons.[87][88]

Artillery is also used to conduct SEAD missions. After World War II, the combined arms nature of warfare meant an increased role in ground forces performing SEAD missions in support of air operations. During the Cold War the American military developed a joint definition of SEAD responsibilities, with the Army responsible for all SEAD missions within the range of observable fire and the Air Force for all missions further away. The Soviet Union placed less emphasis on using artillery to conduct SEAD missions, although where possible artillery would be used to clear a path for attack helicopters. Because of their superior range, rocket artillery such as MLRS are the ideal weapon for conducting SEAD operations.[89][90]

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) play an increasingly vital role in conducting SEAD missions. Due to the dangerous nature of attacking air defenses, the use of UAVs can provide a more cost-effective and less risky method of conducting SEAD. This is especially true since the pilot is not directly at risk and so a commander may be more willing to sacrifice UAVs to accomplish the mission.[91] The first UAVs used in the SEAD role occurred during the Vietnam War, when versions of the Lightning Bug were adapted to carry chaff and other electronic countermeasures.[92] Modern examples of SEAD-specific loitering munitions include the IAI Harpy
which loiters over areas with potential SAM activity, searches for SAM activity, and then crashes (with in-built warhead) into the target.

By country

German Luftwaffe Tornado ECR

Africa

Egypt

Morocco

America

Brazil

United States

USAF

In the US Air Force, the aircraft designed for these missions is known as the "Wild Weasel". It describes aircraft tasked with SEAD missions with anti-radiation missiles. Several platforms have fulfilled this role by the past.

US Navy
US Marine Corps

Asia

Australia

  • AGM-88G AARGM-ER missiles[104]

Bahrain

China

India

A Rudram missile on an Indian Air Force fighter.

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

  • Panavia Tornado equipped with the ALARM missile [110]

Vietnam

Europe

Turkey

  • There is one fleet that equipped with an anti radiation missile.
  • The Turkısh 151.Tunc Fleet’s F-16 aircraft was equipped with AGM-88 missiles.[1]

France

  • No aircraft in the French military is currently equipped with an anti-radiation missile, there is no proper SEAD capable aircraft.
  • The Mirage III was equipped with the Martel missile.[113]
  • The Mirage F1 was equipped with the Martel missile, but the missile was retired in 1997.[113]

Germany

Greece

  • Older F-16 equipped with AGM-88B Block IIIA and ADM-88E
  • Modernised F-16V to be equipped with AARGM that have been ordered[116]

Italy

  • AARGM missiles and electronic warfare capabilities, operational since 1990. taly modified 16 of its Tornado IDS.[114]

Netherlands

Spain

United Kingdom

Systems in development

Aircraft

Missiles

  • Spear EW
    F-35B
    , 4 missiles will be able to fit in the missile bay.
  • Stand-in Attack Weapon (SiAW) program [124]: A new program of the US Air Force for a new SEAD / DEAD weapon. Contracts have been issued to fund the initial development with Lockheed Martin, L3 Harris Technologies and Northrop Grumman that are in competition. During the Phase 1, the USAF is aligning the capabilities of the missile systems to the needs of the air force and to the technical requirements of the F-35. The end goal is 3,000 SiAW missiles for USD $8.6 billion.[125]
    • Northrop Grumman is offering the
      F-35C
      .
    • Lockheed is starting the program from scratch with a new digital design. Lockheed leverages the advanced digital solutions developed by Skunk Works for other programs in this project. The concept is an open, agile, digital weapon.[126]
    • L3 Communications, part of L3 Harris acquired a radar / sensor supplier back in 2017, Mustang Technology Group LP, and with the new consolidated competence center, it is developing its new offer for this program.
  • AGM-88G AARGM-ER:[117] It is the latest variant of the AGM-88, and is being integrated to the US Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler. The Australian government approved the purchase of 60 missiles for $431 million in August 2023.[104] The Netherlands Air force announced the purchase of the missile in June 2023 for its F-35A.[127]

Notes

  1. ^ "During Russia’s participation in the Syrian Civil War, only one of its aircraft, the Su-34 fighter-bomber, regularly used precision-guided munitions, Bronk explained, and even that aircraft often used unguided bombs and rockets."[66][67]

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