Western Somali Liberation Front
Western Somali Liberation Front | |
---|---|
Jabhadda Xoreynta Somali Galbeed | |
Dates of operation | 1973–1985 |
Active regions | Ogaden |
Size | 30,000 (1977) 18,000 (1980) |
Allies | Somalia |
Opponents | Ethiopia SNM |
Battles and wars | Ethiopian Civil War Ogaden War |
The Western Somali Liberation Front (
Background
After
1963 uprising
During the late 1940s and 1950's, covert Somali organizations in the Ogaden formed with the aim of freeing the region from Ethiopian rule.[3][4] In 1963, the first major rebellion in the region broke out. Known as 'Nasrallah' or the Ogaden Liberation Front, the organization began with 300 men and soon swelled to 3,000.[5][6] The Ethiopian Imperial Army launched a large scale counterinsurgency campaign during the summer and fall of 1963. The imperial governments reprisals during the counterinsurgency campaign, which consisted large scale artillery bombardments of Somali cities in the Ogaden, resulted in rapidly deteriorating relations between the Ethiopian Empire and the Somali Republic, eventually resulting the 1964 Border War.[6][3] In the years following, insurgent activity continued but declined over the late 1960's due to pressures from both the Ethiopian and Somali governments. The Nasrallah insurgents formed the foundation of the future Western Somali Liberation Front.[7][8]
Between 1965 and 1975, Nasrallah began emphasizing on building the political and diplomatic groundwork for another liberation struggle. The organization opened an office in Mogadishu and in sympathetic Arab states such as Iraq and Syria.[8]
History
Formation
The early 1970's saw the Ogaden liberation movement continue to gain momentum off the foundations of Nasrallah,[8] though the original organization had gradually started to disintegrate. In light of this, veteran insurgents and young intelligentsia from the Ogaden region within Siad Barre's government lobbied for Somalia to support the resumption of the armed struggle.[9] Following the toppling of Halie Selassie's imperial regime by the Derg military junta, the situation in the Ogaden deteriorated. In the same period, a severe drought gripped the Ogaden resulting in mass suffering. The Derg opted to suppress news of the situation in the region rather than provide relief, and under the junta military oppression in the region increased. As 1974 and 1975 drew on, pressure from Ogaden Somalis rapidly built on the government of Siad Barre.[10] By 1975, the Somali government had been convinced to aid the movement.[9] Significant reorganizations were made in this period, including the decision to choose a new name. There was a sharp debate over whether to name the organization the 'Ogaden' or 'Western Somali' liberation front, with the latter eventually prevailing as the choice.[8]
In January 1976, a general conference of Western Somali society was held 100 km north-west of Mogadishu. A twenty-five member committee was elected to lead the WSLF, and Abdullahi Hassan Mahmoud became its first leader when the organization was formerly founded at the conference. That same year, training camps were soon formed across the Ogaden and Somalia.[8] Despite the organizations clear emphasis on Somalis, the WSLF found support among Muslim Harari and Oromo populations.[11][12][13] Many Hararis joined the organization, with several such as Colonel Ezedin Yusuf in leading positions during the armed struggle.[14] According to WSLF accounts, a large number of the fronts younger guerrillas were Harari "boys and girls".[15][16][17][13] Ioan Lewis noted that Muslim Oromo support was significant to the WSLF, and extended into the command structure of the organization.[11]
Insurgency
The WSLF found its opportunity when the
In 1976, the Somali government set up a counterpart of WSLF to fight in the
By early 1977, with the exception of towns strategically positioned on vital routes and intersections, the WSLF effectively controlled most of the Ogaden lowlands. The rebels employed hit-and-run tactics, targeting the Ethiopian army at its vulnerable points and then blending into a predominantly supportive or sympathetic local population. These tactics eroded the morale of the Ethiopian troops, compelling them to retreat to bunkers and camps. The Ethiopian army found itself confined to garrison towns, many of which were besieged. While any attempt to storm these garrison towns invited devastating firepower from the Ethiopian defenders, travel between towns became perilous. Military and civilian vehicles required armed escorts, often falling into ambushes or encountering land mines. On February 11, 1977, a notable ambush occurred near Horakelifo (between Degehabur and Jijiga), resulting in the death of 25 soldiers and officers, with another 24 wounded, and the destruction of armored cars and trucks. Around the same time, a police contingent was annihilated not far from Filtu. These disruptions to supply lines led to frequent transportation delays to the camps. In addition to affecting the morale of the troops, guerrilla actions aimed at sabotaging the economy also occurred. In the summer of 1977, WSLF fighters destroyed several important installations, and on June 1, they detonated the railway connecting the Ethiopian capital to the port of Djibouti. This crucial economic lifeline, normally handling 70 percent of Ethiopia's exports and 50 percent of her imports, remained out of commission until August.[20]
On June 1977,
Ogaden War
On July 13, 1977, the Somali army invaded Ethiopia. The Somali government refused to declare war, instead insisting that in the media that all the military actions were taken by the WSLF. The WSLF engaged in sabotage actions, impairing the mobility of the Ethiopian army. By September 1977, the Somali forces had overrun 90% of the Ogaden. The 2nd Brigade, Ahmed Gurey was the main strength of the WSLF during the war, they captured Jigjiga after 4 weeks of heavy fighting with the Ethiopia army.[22] Former Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed said "the WSLF brigades were very strong and united against all odds." during his interview with former BBC World Service report Abdisalan Harari.[23] This was claim backed by an interview with former Cuban leader Fidel Castro.[23] However, in early 1978 the Ethiopian government acquired a new arsenal of Soviet equipment and, spearheaded by Cuban combat troops, managed to push back the Somali incursion.
After the Ogaden War, the Ethiopian army only remained in full control of the Ogaden for a very brief period of time. Six months later, the WSLF was back in control of most of the countryside, and the army was confined to the towns and the roads. Sweeps and patrols in 1979 managed to reduce rebel activity, but failed to clear out the insurgents. By the end of the 70s, the WSLF was estimated to have an army of 18,000 men, thus becoming the second largest rebel group in Ethiopia, the first being the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF).[21]
Decline
In 1979, the
On August 1980, the Derg regime launched a massive anti-insurgency campaign known as "Operation Lash" to clear the Ogaden of insurgents. The Ethiopian army deployed six divisions consisting of 60,000 men under the command of Merid Negussie. After stationing troops around the border of Somalia to block suspected entry and exit points, the Ethiopian forces moved in, dispersing, encircling and liquidating the rebels. The SALF disintegrated, whereas the WSLF managed to escape to northern Somalia. By December 1980, the Ogaden was completely cleared from insurgents.[21]
In 1981, the Mengistu regime began to support the Somali National Movement (SNM). The resulting war between the SNM and the WSLF was an important element in Ethiopian strategy, to exploit the clan divisions within Somali society and give the WSLF the final blow. From 1982 to 1984, the Somali National Movement (SNM) with support from the Ethiopian army, engaged in intense clashes with the WSLF in north western Somalia. In December 1984 the SNM launched an offensive that forced the WSLF out of its rear bases in northern Somalia. By January 1985, the WSLF had effectively ceased to exist.[22]
References
- ^ Davids, Jules (1965). The United States in world affairs, 1964. New York : Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row. pp. 284–286 – via Internet Archive.
- OCLC 467147.
- ^ ISBN 3-87118-692-9.
- ^ Abdi 2021, p. 75.
- ISSN 1753-1055.
- ^ ISBN 9781317539520.
- ISBN 978-0-8330-0696-7.
- ^ a b c d e Abdi 2021, p. 84.
- ^ a b Abdi 2021, p. 93-94.
- ISBN 9780860361947.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-56902-103-3.
- S2CID 157882043. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2020-01-31.
- ^ ISBN 9780915984534.
- ^ Ylönen, Aleksi. The Horn Engaging the Gulf Economic Diplomacy and Statecraft in Regional Relations. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 118.
- ^ "Letter From Jeddah: An Interview With WSLF" (PDF). Horn of Africa. 1 (2): 8. April–June 1978.
- ^ History of Harar and Hararis (PDF). p. 172.
- ^ Teshale, Semir. Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974–2014 (PDF). University of Toronto. p. 155.
- ^ Woldemariam, Michael (2018). Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge University Press.
- ISBN 978-1-56432-038-4.
- OCLC 973809792.
- ^ ISBN 9780300156157.
- ^ a b c De Waal, Alexander (1991). Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. Human Rights Watch.
- ^ a b Lewis, I. M (1994). Blood and Bone. Red Sea Press.
Bibliography
- Abdi, Mohamed Mohamud (2021). A History of the Ogaden (Western Somali) Struggle for Self-Determination: Part I (1300–2007) (2nd ed.). UK: Safis Publishing. OCLC 165059930.