Advance on Moscow (1919)
Advance on Moscow | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Southern Front of the Russian Civil War | |||||||
Southern Front of the Russian Civil War (summer 1919) | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
South Russia | Russian SFSR | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Anton Denikin Pyotr Wrangel Andrei Shkuro Vladimir Sidorin K. Mamontov V. May-Mayevsky Alexander Kutepov Abram Dragomirov |
Leon Trotsky Sergey Kamenev Vladimir Yegoryev Alexander Yegorov Vasily Shorin V. Selivachyov Semyon Budyonny Vitaly Primakov | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
70,000 (15 October) | 115,500 (15 October) | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
unknown | unknown |
The Advance on Moscow was a military campaign of the White
The Moscow campaign of the AFSR can be divided into two phases: the offensive of the AFSR (3 July–10 October) and the counteroffensive of the Red Southern Front (11 October–November 18).
Background
In mid-1919, the situation on the Southern Front, which in the first months of the year was much better for the Reds, changed in favor of the
Plan of action
Denikin's Moscow directive (order No. 08878[5]) determined the following directions of action:
- Pyotr Wrangel (Caucasian Army[5]) was to move north towards Saratov, then Rtishchevo and Balashov and then Penza, Ruzayevka, Arzamas and Nizhny Novgorod. His troops were to attack Moscow from Vladimir. In front of the main forces of Wrangel, units whose task was to break up the red units on the lower Volga and establish communication with Alexander Kolchak's Russian Army;[6]
- Vladimir Sidorin (Don Army[5]) was to head north to Kamyshin and Balashov, and then, coordinating his actions with Wrangel, lead some of the forces to Voronezh, Kozlov and Ryazan, with the prospect of attacking Moscow, and the other part of them should be directed to Novy Oskol, Yelets and Kashira, then also attack Moscow;[6]
- Briansk where it was possible to cross rivers,[6]
- Sergei Dobrovolsky was tasked with gaining control over the mouth of the Dnieper, Kherson and Mykolaiv;[6]
- the Black Sea Fleet was to block the port in Odesa and cooperate in the implementation of other combat tasks.[6]
Denikin intended to use railroads to carry out all tasks ashore. He also ordered to start recruiting volunteers and to carry out large-scale propaganda campaign.[5] Denikin's plan was optimistic, overestimating the capabilities of his forces after being impressed by the recent successes.[7] For this reason Denikin ignored Wrangel's suggestions to postpone a major offensive on Moscow, allow troops to rest, and focus temporarily on defense along the Katerynoslav-Tsaritsyn line and only launch an attack against Astrakhan.[7] This solution, however, also carried a certain risk - time worked in favor of the reds, they could mobilize larger reserves (even despite the fact that by taking control of the new territories, the whites could incorporate local peasants into their army), and victories over Alexander Kolchak on the Eastern Front would allow them to strengthen the Southern Front in the future.[8]
On 9 July, Lenin issued a circular "Everyone to Fight Denikin!", calling for a reorganization of forces and effective resistance to further white actions on the southern front.
Battle
Early stage (July–August 1919)
Although the actions planned by Denikin in Ukraine were to be only of a protective nature, it was in this area that the whites achieved their first important successes in the course of the launched offensive. On 29 July 1919 they seized Poltava, on 18 August they captured Mykolaiv, and on 23 August they landed at Odesa.[5] On the same day, they entered Kyiv, forcing the forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic to leave the city, which also reached it in the course of a separate offensive on 23 August.[11] According to Evan Mawdsley, Denikin's Ukrainian offensive was a strategic mistake, as the forces that led it, consequently, could not engage in combat on the key central section of the front, and its line was stretched too thin.[12]
Corrected directive (August–September 1919)
At the same time, the Red Army started to implement Kamenev's planned counteroffensive. On 14 August, a strike group under the command of Vasily Shorin (8th and 9th Army) began the march on Tsaritsyn, while the group under the command of Vladimir Selivachyov (parts of the 8th and 14th Armies and the 13th Army) was directed to Kharkiv.[13] Shorin's group attacked Wrangel's Caucasian Army, which left Tsaritsyn north and was approaching Saratov, but its march was halted due to lack of food and supplies.[14] Wrangel had to withdraw from Kamyshin and take up a defensive position in Tsaritsyn, where he successfully defended himself; after six weeks of fighting, Shorin's group lost the ability to engage in any offensive actions,[13] especially after it was attacked by cavalry under the command of Konstantin Mamontov.[14]
The Mamontov raid , exploiting the gap between the 8th and 9th Armies, was not included in the original plan of the march to Moscow and may have been undertaken without the consent of Denikin.[15] Numbering 7-8 thousand cavalry, the group destroyed the communication infrastructure of the Reds, blew up railway tracks and bridges, destroyed a number of ammunition warehouses and dispersed some of the newly created Red Army units.[16] On 18 August 1919, Mamontov's forces captured Tambov, and for two days (11 and 12 September) they captured Voronezh. In these cities, they committed looting on a large scale.[14]
Kamenev's plan, assuming a smooth transition to strike the areas in South Russia that constituted the center of the White movement, failed,[16] because Selivachyov's group had not managed to reach further than Kupiansk, leaving the Ukrainian Soviet capital of Kharkiv in the hands of the Whites.[17] According to Mawdsley, it was Selivachyov's defeat that resulted in the failure of Kamenev's entire strategy.[18]
General offensive (September–October 1919)
In September, the Whites achieved further successes: on 20 September 1919, units under the command of Alexander Kutepov captured Kursk,[19] destroying two red rifle divisions,[20] and on 30 September, the cavalry under Shkuro's command surprised the enemy by crossing the Don and capturing Voronezh.[19] On 14 October, the Armed Forces of South Russia entered Oryol.[19] Never before has such a large area been under their control[21] nor had they ever managed to get closer to Moscow.[19] But the seizure of subsequent provinces, contrary to the expectations of the Whites, weakened them. The administration created by Denikin did not function efficiently, recruits drafted into the army did not want to fight, and the front line was dangerously lengthening.[21] Meanwhile, the Bolshevik government more successfully mobilized new volunteers to fight Denikin.[22] Between September and 15 November 1919, 100,000 new red soldiers were sent to the Southern Front.[23]
Another significant reorganization was carried out in the Red Army.
Collapse of the general offensive (October–December 1919)
At the end of October 1919, the Red Army's counteroffensive began simultaneously in two sections. On 20 October, a strike group composed of the Latvian infantry division, the Ukrainian Cavalry Brigade under the command of
Major Battles
- Mamontov raid (10 August — 19 September 1919)
- Southern Front counteroffensive (14 August — 12 September 1919)
- Oryol–Kursk operation (11 October — 18 November 1919)
- Voronezh-Kastornoye operation (13 October — 16 November 1919)
- Chernihiv operation (17 October — 18 November 1919)
- Liski-Bobrovskaya operation (November 1919)
References
- ^ a b c Kenez 2004, pp. 36–37.
- ^ a b c Serczyk 2001, p. 274.
- ^ Smele 2015, p. 123.
- ^ Kenez 2004, p. 38; Serczyk 2001, p. 274.
- ^ a b c d e f g Smele 2015, p. 124.
- ^ a b c d e Kenez 2004, p. 39.
- ^ a b Kenez 2004, p. 41.
- ^ a b Kenez 2004, p. 42.
- ^ Mawdsley 2010, pp. 223–224.
- ^ Kenez 2004, pp. 42–43.
- ^ Smele 2015, p. 308.
- ^ Mawdsley 2010, p. 222.
- ^ a b Kenez 2004, p. 43.
- ^ a b c Smele 2015, p. 125.
- ^ Smele 2015, pp. 124–125.
- ^ a b Kenez 2004, pp. 43–44.
- ^ Smele 2015, p. 126.
- ^ Mawdsley 2010, p. 226.
- ^ a b c d Kenez 2004, p. 44.
- ^ Mawdsley 2010, p. 247.
- ^ a b Kenez 2004, p. 214.
- ^ Kenez 2004, p. 215.
- ^ Kenez 2004, pp. 215–216.
- ^ a b Kenez 2004, p. 216.
- ^ a b Kenez 2004, p. 217.
- ^ Mawdsley 2010, pp. 276–277; Smele 2015, p. 134.
- ^ Kenez 2004, pp. 217–218.
- ^ Mawdsley 2010, p. 275.
- ^ a b c d e Kenez 2004, p. 218.
- ^ Mawdsley 2010, p. 255.
Bibliography
- ISBN 0974493457.
- OCLC 750846354.
- Serczyk, W. (2001). Historia Ukrainy (in Polish). ISBN 83-04-04530-3.
- Smele, J. D. (2015). The "Russian" Civil Wars 1916-1926. Ten Years That Shook the World. ISBN 9781849047210.