Battle of Kapetron
Battle of Kapetron | |
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Part of the Hasankale/Pasinler, Turkey) 39°58′47″N 41°40′32″E / 39.97972°N 41.67556°E | |
Result | Seljuk victory |
Duchy of Kldekari
Katakalon Kekaumenos
Liparit IV of Kldekari (POW)
Aspan Salarios
Chorosantes †
The Battle of Kapetron or Kapetrou was fought between a
After the Georgians arrived, the combined Byzantine–Georgian force gave battle at Kapetron (modern
Background
After the conquest of territories in present-day
The Seljuq expansion westward was a confused affair, as it was accompanied by a mass migration of Turkish tribes. These tribes were only nominally subjects of the Seljuq rulers, and their relations were dominated by a complex dynamic: while the Seljuqs aimed at establishing a state with an orderly administration, the tribes were more interested in plunder and new pasture lands, and launched raids independently of the Seljuq court. The latter tolerated this phenomenon, as it helped to defuse tensions in the Seljuq heartlands.[3]
A first large-scale raid against the eastern Byzantine province of
An even larger invasion followed, under Ibrahim Inal, the half-brother of Tughril Beg.[6] The Byzantine sources regard this as a retaliation for Hasan's defeat, but as Anthony Kaldellis points out, there were other factors at play as well: Ibn al-Athir reports that Ibrahim had at this time received a large number of recent Oghuz arrivals from Transoxiana, and that, unable to provide for them, sent them to raid the Byzantine provinces of Armenia, promising that he would soon follow with his own troops.[8][9]
The events of this campaign are well attested through the histories of the Armenian historians Aristakes Lastivertsi and Matthew of Edessa, and the Byzantine official John Skylitzes.[6] Ibrahim's invasion is usually dated by modern sources to 1048[7][10][11] although some date it to 1049.[2][12][a]
Seljuq invasion and Byzantine reaction
Skylitzes reports, with obvious exaggeration, that the invaders numbered 100,000 men, or five times as many as Hasan's force.
Like the previous raid, the Seljuq force most likely set out from Tabriz and, following the course of the
On the Byzantine side, Skylitzes records a difference of opinion as to how to counter the Seljuq invasion: Kekaumenos—who was probably one of the historian's main sources and is generally lionised by Skylitzes[17]—reportedly argued that they should confront them as soon as possible, while they were still weary from their march and the Byzantines were in high spirits after their recent victory. Aaron, on the other hand, argued in favour of a defensive strategy against such a large army, recommending withdrawing behind their fortifications and conserving their forces until Emperor Constantine IX sent clear instructions.[15][18]
It is clear that the Byzantines were considerably outnumbered, likely as an effect not only of the reduction of the eastern provincial troops under Constantine IX, but also due to the diversion of much of the
Sack of Artze
The Byzantine army's inactivity had tragic consequences, as the Seljuqs were able to move about freely, and attack the fortress of Artze, a wealthy market town which attracted merchants from Syria and Armenia. The inhabitants resisted successfully for a while, as the Seljuqs could not overcome the barricades they had hastily erected; but Kekaumenos' urgings to go to the town's aid were rebuffed, according to Skylitzes, by his fellow generals on account of the Emperor's order. Finally, the Seljuqs dropped flammable material and torches into the town, so that the defenders, caught between a raging fire and the Turkish archers, broke and fled. The town was captured and plundered, and its inhabitants massacred; Skylitzes writes that "around 150,000 souls reportedly perished" by sword or by fire, although this number is considered exaggerated by modern scholars.[15][21][22]
Battle
Once Liparit IV arrived with his army, the combined Byzantine–Georgian army moved from Ourtrou to the plain before the fortress of Kapetron (modern
Again, according to Skylitzes, Kekaumenos' advice to attack the isolated Turkish detachments as they arrived was not heeded, because it was a Saturday (18 September) and Liparit considered it an unlucky day and refused to fight.[27][25] This gave time for the Turks to bring up their entire army and form battle lines, before advancing on the Byzantine–Georgian army, which now was forced "to prepare to give battle, willy-nilly".[28] Kekaumenos commanded the right wing, faced on the Turkish side by Ibrahim himself. Liparit held the centre, faced by Aspan Salarios, while the Byzantine left was commanded by Aaron, who was faced by Chorosantes.[25][28]
The battle began late in the evening, and lasted through the night. Aaron and Kekaumenos, in command of their respective flanks, each defeated the Turks and pursued them "till cock's crow", killing the Turkish commander Chorosantes in the process. In the centre, however, Ibrahim managed to capture Liparit, who was thrown off his horse when it was wounded. This was not known to the two Byzantine commanders, who thought the Georgian prince was pursuing the enemy as they were; they were not informed of the true events until after they had stopped their pursuit to give thanks to God for their victory.[11][28][29] Matthew of Edessa, whose narrative is heavily anti-Byzantine, claims that Liparit was betrayed by the Byzantine commanders, while Aristakes claims that the rivalry between the Byzantine commanders led Aaron to abandon his position mid-battle, leading to Liparit's capture. Skylitzes' account, however, being far more detailed, is considered more reliable by modern scholars.[29]
While Ibrahim managed to escape with his men and captives to the fortress of Kastrokome (Okomi), some 40 km east of Theodosiopolis, the Byzantine commanders held a council of war and decided to divide their forces and return to their respective bases: Aaron with his men returned to Vaspurakan, and Kekaumenos with his forces to Ani.[11][28][30]
The overall result of the battle was thus mixed: while the Byzantines prevailed against their Turkish counterparts, the capture of Liparit and the successful escape of Ibrahim led some of the medieval sources to consider it a Byzantine defeat.[29]
Aftermath
According to Skylitzes, Ibrahim returned to Rayy in only five days, presenting himself before his brother.[31] Ibn al-Athir reports—with obvious exaggeration for propaganda purposes—that Ibrahim brought back 100,000 captives and a vast booty, including large numbers of horses, flocks, and goods, as well as 8,000 coats of mail, loaded on the backs of ten thousand camels.[32][33]
The devastation left behind by the Seljuq raid was so fearful that in 1051/52 the Byzantine magnate
Emperor Constantine IX lamented Liparit's capture, and tried to secure his release, offering a rich ransom. The Seljuq ruler set Liparit free and gave him the ransom, after extracting a pledge from him not to fight against the Turks again.[d][37][36] Tughril—perhaps swayed by his brother's claims that the campaign had been an unalloyed success[38]—also sent a sharif to Constantinople to demand tribute of Constantine IX, but the envoy was sent back empty-handed.[31][37] Constantine IX did, however, agree to allow Tughril to sponsor the restoration of the mosque of the Byzantine capital, and to have the names of the Abbasid caliph al-Qa'im and of Tughril himself commemorated in the Friday prayer instead of the Fatimid caliph's.[39][40]
Expecting an imminent resumption of Seljuq raids, the Emperor sent agents to fortify his eastern border,
Nevertheless, the Byzantine defences in the east were weakened again as troops were transferred to the
Footnotes
- AH 440, which began in June 1048. However, 18 September in 1048 was a Sunday, and both Skylitzes and Matthew of Edessa report that the battle took place on a Saturday. As a result, the 19th-century German historian August Friedrich Gfrörer, followed by other scholars since, proposed shifting the date to 18 September 1049, although this is not generally accepted. According to the German historian Wolfgang Felix, the "most convincing solution" for this discrepancy was proposed by the French scholar Paul Orgels in 1938, in which the battle began on Saturday evening (17 September 1048) and was carried on until the next morning.[13] Vladimir Minorsky also argues for dating the battle 1048, in the context of Byzantine operations against the Shaddadids after the battle, which he demonstrates, from a number of other references and associations of events, to have taken place before 1049.[14]
- magistros, and perhaps of kouropalates as well.[19]
- ^ Matthew of Edessa and the 13th-century historian Sempad the Constable report that the Armenian nobleman Grigor Magistros also took part in the battle as a Byzantine commander, but this is not supported by other sources.[26]
- Marwanid emir of Diyar Bakr, Nasr al-Dawla, to mediate on his behalf, while Matthew of Edessa claims that Liparit was set free after he slew a black African champion in single combat, impressing Tughril with his valour. The Georgian Chronicles on the other hand suggest that Liparit's release was a calculated move to create dissension in Georgia, where after his capture the authority of King Bagrat IV had grown considerably. Indeed, after his release Liparit reclaimed his former authority against Bagrat.[36]
- ^ Some authors have suggested a later date, c. 1050 (A.F. Gfrörer and M.H. Yinanç) or even c. 1055/56 (E. Honigmann)[42]
References
- ^ Beihammer 2017, pp. 74–77.
- ^ a b c d e f Vryonis 1971, p. 86.
- ^ Kaldellis 2017, pp. 196–197.
- ^ a b Kaldellis 2017, p. 197.
- ^ a b Leveniotis 2007, p. 147.
- ^ a b c d e f Beihammer 2017, p. 77.
- ^ a b c Cahen 1968, p. 68.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, pp. 147–148.
- ^ Kaldellis 2017, pp. 197–198.
- ^ a b Ter-Ghewondyan 1976, p. 123.
- ^ a b c Beihammer 2017, p. 79.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, p. 150 (esp. note 447).
- ^ Felix 1981, pp. 165 (note 99), 168.
- ^ Minorsky 1977, p. 61.
- ^ a b c d Beihammer 2017, p. 78.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, p. 148.
- ^ ODB, "Katakalon Kekaumenos" (C. M. Brand, A. Kazhdan), p. 1113.
- ^ Wortley 2010, pp. 422–423.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, p. 148 (esp. note 437).
- ^ Wortley 2010, p. 423.
- ^ Wortley 2010, pp. 423–424.
- ^ ODB, "Artze" (A. Kazhdan), p. 202.
- ^ Beihammer 2017, pp. 78–79.
- ^ Felix 1981, p. 166 (note 101).
- ^ a b c Leveniotis 2007, p. 150.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, pp. 150–151.
- ^ Wortley 2010, pp. 424–425.
- ^ a b c d Wortley 2010, p. 425.
- ^ a b c Leveniotis 2007, p. 151.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, pp. 151–152.
- ^ a b c d Wortley 2010, p. 426.
- ^ Beihammer 2017, p. 80.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, p. 149.
- ^ Blaum 2004, p. 1.
- ^ Beihammer 2017, pp. 79–80.
- ^ a b Blaum 2004, pp. 8–9.
- ^ a b Minorsky 1977, p. 63.
- ^ a b Blaum 2004, p. 10.
- ^ Kaldellis 2017, p. 198.
- ^ Blaum 2004, pp. 15–16.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, p. 152.
- ^ Minorsky 1977, pp. 55, 60–61.
- ^ Minorsky 1977, pp. 48–49, 54–56, 59–64.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, pp. 153–154.
- ^ Vryonis 1971, p. 87.
- ^ Vryonis 1971, pp. 86–96.
- ^ Leveniotis 2007, pp. 114–116, 155–168.
- ^ Vryonis 1971, pp. 96–103.
Sources
- Beihammer, Alexander Daniel (2017). Byzantium and the Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia, ca. 1040–1130. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-98386-0.
- Blaum, Paul A. (2004). "Diplomacy Gone to Seed: A History of Byzantine Foreign Relations, A.D. 1047–57". ISSN 1370-7205.
- OCLC 909838664.
- Felix, Wolfgang (1981). Byzanz und die islamische Welt im früheren 11. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen von 1001 bis 1055 [Byzantium and the Islamic World in the early 11th Century: History of the Political Relationships from 1001 to 1055] (in German). Vienna: ISBN 978-3-7001-0379-0.
- Kaldellis, Anthony (2017). Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood: The Rise and Fall of Byzantium, 955 A.D. to the First Crusade. New York: ISBN 978-0-1902-5322-6.
- ISBN 0-19-504652-8.
- Leveniotis, Georgios Athanasios (2007). Η πολιτική κατάρρευση του Βυζαντίου στην Ανατολή: το ανατολικό σύνορο και η κεντρική Μικρά Ασία κατά το β' ήμισυ του 11ου αι [The Political Collapse of Byzantium in the East: The Eastern Frontier and Central Asia Minor During the Second Half of the 11th Century] (PhD thesis) (in Greek). Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. hdl:10442/hedi/19246.
- ISBN 0-521-05735-3.
- OCLC 490638192.
- ISBN 0-520-01597-5.
- Wortley, John, ed. (2010). John Skylitzes: A Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811–1057. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-76705-7.