Metaphilosophy
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Metaphilosophy, sometimes called the philosophy of philosophy, is "the investigation of the nature of philosophy".[1] Its subject matter includes the aims of philosophy, the boundaries of philosophy, and its methods.[2][3] Thus, while philosophy characteristically inquires into the nature of being, the reality of objects, the possibility of knowledge, the nature of truth, and so on, metaphilosophy is the self-reflective inquiry into the nature, aims, and methods of the activity that makes these kinds of inquiries, by asking what is philosophy itself, what sorts of questions it should ask, how it might pose and answer them, and what it can achieve in doing so. It is considered by some to be a subject prior and preparatory to philosophy,[4] while others see it as inherently a part of philosophy,[5] or automatically a part of philosophy[6] while others adopt some combination of these views.[2]
The interest in metaphilosophy led to the establishment of the journal Metaphilosophy in January 1970.[7]
Many sub-disciplines of philosophy have their own branch of 'metaphilosophy', examples being
Although the term metaphilosophy and explicit attention to metaphilosophy as a specific domain within philosophy arose in the 20th century, the topic is likely as old as philosophy itself, and can be traced back at least as far as the works of
Relationship to philosophy
Some philosophers consider metaphilosophy to be a subject apart from philosophy, above or beyond it,[4] while others object to that idea.[5] Timothy Williamson argues that the philosophy of philosophy is "automatically part of philosophy", as is the philosophy of anything else.[6] Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu write that the separation of first- from second-order study has lost popularity as philosophers find it hard to observe the distinction.[10] As evidenced by these contrasting opinions, debate persists as to whether the evaluation of the nature of philosophy is 'second-order philosophy' or simply 'plain philosophy'.
Many philosophers have expressed doubts over the value of metaphilosophy.[11] Among them is Gilbert Ryle: "preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves. We run as a rule, worse, not better, if we think a lot about our feet. So let us ... not speak of it all but just do it."[12]
Terminology
The designations metaphilosophy and philosophy of philosophy have a variety of meanings, sometimes taken to be synonyms, and sometimes seen as distinct.
The term 'metaphilosophy' is used by
"The distinction between philosophy and metaphilosophy has an analogue in the familiar distinction between mathematics and metamathematics."[14]
— Paul K. Moser, Metaphilosophy, p. 562
Some other philosophers treat the prefix meta as simply meaning 'about...', rather than as referring to a metatheoretical 'second-order' form of philosophy, among them Rescher[15] and Double.[16] Others, such as Williamson, prefer the term 'philosophy of philosophy' instead of 'metaphilosophy' as it avoids the connotation of a 'second-order' discipline that looks down on philosophy, and instead denotes something that is a part of it.[17] Joll suggests that to take metaphilosophy as 'the application of the methods of philosophy to philosophy itself' is too vague, while the view that sees metaphilosophy as a 'second-order' or more abstract discipline, outside philosophy, "is narrow and tendentious".[18]
In the
Writings
Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote about the nature of philosophical puzzles and philosophical understanding. He suggested philosophical errors arose from confusions about the nature of philosophical inquiry.
Henri Lefebvre in Métaphilosophie (1965) argued, from a Marxian standpoint, in favor of an "ontological break", as a necessary methodological approach for critical social theory (whilst criticizing Louis Althusser's "epistemological break" with subjective Marxism, which represented a fundamental theoretical tool for the school of Marxist structuralism).
Topics
Many sub-disciplines of philosophy have their own branch of 'metaphilosophy'.[8] However, some topics within 'metaphilosophy' cut across the various subdivisions of philosophy to consider fundamentals important to all its sub-disciplines.
Aims
Some philosophers (e.g.
Boundaries
Defining philosophy and its boundaries is itself problematic; Nigel Warburton has called it "notoriously difficult".[26] There is no straightforward definition,[23] and most interesting definitions are controversial.[27] As Bertrand Russell wrote:
"We may note one peculiar feature of philosophy. If someone asks the question what is mathematics, we can give him a dictionary definition, let us say the science of number, for the sake of argument. As far as it goes this is an uncontroversial statement... Definitions may be given in this way of any field where a body of definite knowledge exists. But philosophy cannot be so defined. Any definition is controversial and already embodies a philosophic attitude. The only way to find out what philosophy is, is to do philosophy."[28]
— Bertrand Russell, The Wisdom of the West, p. 7
While there is some agreement that philosophy involves general or fundamental topics,[21][29] there is no clear agreement about a series of demarcation issues, including:
- that between first-order and second-order investigations. Some authors say that philosophical inquiry is second-order, having concepts, theories and presupposition as its subject matter; that it is "thinking about thinking", of a "generally second-order character";Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy warns that "the borderline between such 'second-order' reflection, and ways of practicing the first-order discipline itself, is not always clear: philosophical problems may be tamed by the advance of a discipline, and the conduct of a discipline may be swayed by philosophical reflection".[29]
- that between philosophy and analytical philosophers argue that all meaningful empirical questions are to be answered by science, not philosophy. However, some schools of contemporary philosophy such as the pragmatists and naturalistic epistemologists argue that philosophy should be linked to science and should be scientific in the broad sense of that term, "preferring to see philosophical reflection as continuous with the best practice of any field of intellectual enquiry".[29]
- that between philosophy and religion. Some argue that philosophy is distinct from religion in that it allows no place for faith or revelation:[21] that philosophy does not try to answer questions by appeal to revelation, myth or religious knowledge of any kind, but uses reason, without reference to sensible observation and experiments". However, philosophers and theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Peter Damian have argued that philosophy is the "handmaiden of theology" (ancilla theologiae).[33]
Methods
Philosophical method (or philosophical methodology) is the study of how to do philosophy. A common view among philosophers is that philosophy is distinguished by the ways that philosophers follow in addressing philosophical questions. There is not just one method that philosophers use to answer philosophical questions.
Recently, some philosophers have cast doubt about intuition as a basic tool in philosophical inquiry, from Socrates up to contemporary philosophy of language. In Rethinking Intuition
Progress
A prominent question in metaphilosophy is that of whether or not philosophical progress occurs and more so, whether such progress in philosophy is even possible.[39]
David Chalmers divides inquiry into philosophical progress in metaphilosophy into three questions.
- The Existence Question: is there progress in philosophy?
- The Comparison Question: is there as much progress in philosophy as in science?
- The Explanation Question: why isn't there more progress in philosophy?[40]
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Culture and Value remarked, "Philosophy hasn't made any progress? - If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress?...And can't this reaction to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before the cure for an itching is discovered?".[41]
According to Hilary Putnam philosophy is more adept at showing people that specific ideas or arguments are wrong than that specific ideas or arguments are right.[42]
See also
- Antiphilosophy
- Metacognition
- Metatheory
- Meta-knowledge
- Metaphysics
- Metapolitics
- Metasemantics
- Non-philosophy
- Unsolved problems in philosophy
- Theory of everything (philosophy)
References
- ^ doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.1970.tb00792.x. see also the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article by Nicholas Joll: Contemporary Metaphilosophy
- ^ a b Nicholas Joll (November 18, 2010). "Contemporary Metaphilosophy". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP).
- ISBN 978-0203492796.
Its primary question is "What is philosophy?"
- ^ ISBN 978-0271044811.
- ^ ISBN 978-0808403197.
- ^ ISBN 978-0470695913.
The philosophy of philosophy is automatically part of philosophy, just as the philosophy of anything else is...
- ^ The journal describes its scope as: "Particular areas of interest include: the foundation, scope, function and direction of philosophy; justification of philosophical methods and arguments; the interrelations among schools or fields of philosophy (for example, the relation of logic to problems in ethics or epistemology); aspects of philosophical systems; presuppositions of philosophical schools; the relation of philosophy to other disciplines (for example, artificial intelligence, linguistics or literature); sociology of philosophy; the relevance of philosophy to social and political action; issues in the teaching of philosophy."
- ^ ISBN 978-9051839104.
- ^ Nicholas Joll, Metaphilosophy, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- ISBN 978-1405191128.
- ^
Søren Overgaard; Paul Gilbert; Stephen Burwood (2013). "Introduction: What good is metaphilosophy?". An introduction to metaphilosophy. Cambridge University Press. p. 6. ISBN 978-0521193412.
- ^
ISBN 978-0521193412.
- Gilson E., Christianity and philosophy, Pub. for the Institute of Mediaeval Studies by Sheed & Ward, 1939, p. 88
- ^ ISBN 978-1439503508.
- ISBN 978-0791467466.
- ISBN 978-0195355413.
- ISBN 978-1405133968.
- ^ Nicholas Joll (November 18, 2010). "Contemporary Metaphysics: Defining metaphilosophy". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ e.g. PhilPapers
- ^ Dommeyer F., (1961), A Critical Examination of C. J. Ducasse's Metaphilosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 21, (Jun., 1961), No. 4 pp. 439-455
- ^ a b c Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (2005)
- ^ Collins English Dictionary
- ^ a b Mastering Philosophy by Anthony Harrison-Barbet (1990)[page needed]
- ^ Adler, Mortimer (1993), The Four Dimensions of Philosophy: Metaphysical-Moral-Objective-Categorical
- .
- ISBN 978-0203202029.
- ISBN 978-0199264797.
- ^ Bertrand Russell (1959). The Wisdom of the West: A Historical Survey of Western Philosophy in Its Social and Political Setting. Doubleday. p. 7.
- ^ a b c
Simon Blackburn (2005). "Philosophy". ISBN 978-0198610137.
- ISBN 978-0199264797.
"Insofar as conceptual analysis is the method of philosophy (as it was widely held to be for much of the twentieth century), philosophy is a second-order subject because it is about language not the world or what language is about.
- ^
Sara Heināmaa (2006). "Phenomenology: A foundational science". In Margaret A. Simons (ed.). The Philosophy of Simone De Beauvoir: Critical Essays. Indiana University Press. p. 22. Husserlcharacterizes this difference by saying that the task of philosophy is to ask the ultimate questions...The philosophical questions can not be answered in the same way that empirical questions can be answered.
- Husserlpictures the work of the philosopher and the scientist as mutually complementary.
- ^ Gracia, J.G. and Noone, T.B., A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, London: Blackwell, 2003, p. 35
- ^ Broad, C. D. (1953). "Critical and Speculative Philosophy". Contemporary British Philosophy Personal Statements · Volume 20. London, Allen & Unwin. pp. 87–100.
- ISBN 978-0-8476-8796-1
- OCLC 233792562
- ISBN 9781118661666
- ^ Pust, Joel (2019), "Intuition", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-01-18
- ^ Dietrich, Eric (2011). There Is No Progress in Philosophy Archived 2021-03-02 at the Wayback Machine. Essays in Philosophy 12 (2):9.
- S2CID 170974260. Retrieved 18 December 2017.
- ^ Hutto, D. (2003). Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy Neither Theory Nor Therapy. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 218.
- ^ Putnam, Hilary (1995). Renewing Philosophy. Harvard University Press. p. 134.
Further reading
- Double R., (1996) Metaphilosophy and Free Will, Oxford University Press, USA, ISBN 978-0-19-510762-3
- Ducasse, C.J., (1941) Philosophy as a Science: Its Matter and Its Method
- Lazerowitz M., (1964) Studies in Metaphilosphy, London: Routledge
- Overgaard, S, Gilbert, P., Burwood, S. (2013) An Introduction to Metaphilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Rescher N., (2006), Philosophical Dialectics, an Essay on Metaphilosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press
- Rescher, Nicholas (2001). Philosophical Reasoning. A Study in the Methodology of Philosophizing. Blackwell.
- Williamson T., (2007) The Philosophy of Philosophy, London: Blackwell
- Wittgenstein Ludwig, ISBN 0-415-25408-6;
- Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953) or Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (1953)
- ISBN 978-0-631-23127-1.
External links
- Metaphilosophy at PhilPapers
- Joll, Micholas. "Metaphilosophy". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Metaphilosophy, journal published by Blackwell
- Metaphilosophy at Curlie
- Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Lvov-Warsaw School". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Peter Suber: Metaphilosophy Themes and Questions – A Personal List